





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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Social Psychology

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McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.

1960 New York Toronto London

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

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TO MY WIFE

PREFACE

It could be argued that a new textbook in social psychology is not one of the world's most pressing needs. In view of the numerous choices of a text on this subject, it seems, surely, that any addition to the swelling ranks of books in the field must be accompanied by a thorough self-justification. The justification for this book begins on the rather negative note that no one book on social psychology pleases everyone, which accounts no doubt for the fact that authors keep on trying. For the psychologist or sociologist teaching in the Catholic liberal arts college there has been another problem. In addition to his scholarly quarrels with the various textbooks available, he has had the problem of infiltration into the classroom via the textbook of values incompatible with Christian philosophy. Many social psychologists who are penetrating in their insights into the subject matter remain somewhat naïve in assessing their own value judgments and the naturalistic philosophies underlying their writings in social psychology. Aside from Father Herr's interesting little book, there have been no works in social psychology which paid attention to this problem.

Catholic sociologists and psychologists have made it abundantly clear that their fields are not to be confused with philosophy or theology. Many are rejecting "Catholic" textbooks when they are parochial in this respect. Consequently, a conceptual framework had to be contrived which would maintain the scientific standards of both sciences while retaining Catholic values on the nature of man.

The approach to this textbook is interactionist. It is hoped that this framework permeates the entire substantive area of the book. While the

major part of this book is thus dedicated to presenting the subject matter of social psychology with this interactionist viewpoint, a minor part (quantitatively speaking) is devoted to an account of the scope and method of social psychology, its long history as a social philosophy, and its short history as a social science. There is included a critique of postulates and values in social science which, it is hoped, is sufficiently developed so that it is not necessary to offer negative and reproachful comments on modern viewpoints dealing with empirical evidence. In fact, the effort has been to reduce to a minimum the polemic approach to the subject and simply present that large and fascinating field which envelops parts of sociology, psychology, psychiatry, and anthropology as a scientific body of knowledge in its own right. With the anchoring points of the historical backgrounds and the philosophical discussion confined to one chapter, the Catholic college student should suffer no adverse reaction from his exposure to the remainder of the text, which is purely social-psychological as distinct from, say, a sectarian bias. Can it be hoped that this volume will contribute to the development of this subject in the Catholic college? It is the author's expectation that a large measure of the reward for this undertaking will lie in the satisfaction that would result from such a development.

I am extremely grateful to C. S. Mihanovich of St. Louis University for suggesting that I write this book and to George Laverre and Thomas P. Imse of Canisius College for reading selected sections of it. Acknowledgement is also due the Rev. Joseph G. Keegan, S.J. and Dr. John M. Martin, both of Fordham University, and Dr. Thomas F. O'Dea of the University of Utah, for comments and suggestions. I am deeply indebted to Canisius College for the faculty grant which made it possible for me to complete the book.

Jack H. Curtis

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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION

Chapter I

THE FIELD OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Social psychology, *the discipline which investigates the relationship between society and the individual*, has become a field distinct from its parent fields of sociology and psychology. Contributions to this relatively new hybrid field have been made by representatives of all the behavioral sciences and by other scientists as well. As we shall see in the first few chapters of this book, the advance of social psychology has been in part accelerated and in part hindered by its historical midway position between general psychology and sociology. Undoubtedly with the best of intentions, both psychologists and sociologists have laid claim to the field as a subdivision of their respective disciplines. The traditional emphasis on the individual in psychological approaches to social psychology has often contrasted sharply with the sociologist's traditional group approach. A prominent social psychologist has been led by these conflicting emphases to remark that "there are two social psychologies thriving in the land."¹ The situation is actually even more complicated than this. While they have made no attempt to pre-empt the title of social psychology, both psychiatry and anthropology have come to view its subject matter, the relationship between society and the individual, as part of their own disciplines. Thus, we can add to the two contenders for the title of social psychology two additional contenders (the "interpersonal school" of psychiatry and the "culture-and-personality" school of anthropology) for its subject matter. It might, therefore, be more appropriate to say that

¹Theodore M. Newcomb, "Social Psychological Theory: Integrating Individual and Social Approaches," in John Rohrer and Muzafer Sherif (eds.), *Social Psychology at the Crossroads*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1951, p. 31.

there are not merely two but four social psychologies "thriving in the land."

We might be led to the mistaken conviction that a state of hopeless confusion exists in social psychology were it not for the fact that there is a broad viewpoint which enables us to achieve a focus *proper to social psychology* regardless of the divergent backgrounds of the sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and psychiatrists who share this viewpoint. Since such a common focus exists and a large and important body of knowledge can be seen through it, we can surely speak of one rather than of several social psychologies.

After some controversy as to whether the individual or society should be the proper focus of social psychology, the conflict has been resolved in favor of neither of these but rather in favor of a focus upon the *interacting individual*. There should be no confusion about what social psychology is if we recognize first what is meant by "interacting individual" and second that this focus, or conceptual framework, simply cuts across artificial academic walls. Let us turn first to the social-psychological perspective on the interacting individual and then show the fields within the various behavioral sciences which this viewpoint has penetrated.

THE INTERACTING INDIVIDUAL

By far the simplest way to view man's behavior is to see it as a mere reaction to innate bundles of instincts within or as a mere reaction to social forces from without. And, as we shall see in the next few chapters, the early history of social psychology was made up in a period when the instinctivistic approach to the study of the individual in society held sway and then was replaced by a pendulum swing to theories which placed man at the mercy of external social forces. These simplistic extremes in explaining man's social behavior in turn gave way to the more fruitful concept of *social interaction* or simply *interaction*, and this concept, the fullness of which is still being explored, enables us to see man as an influencing as well as an influenced agent in society.

In its essence, the problem in social psychology then, as now, was the relationship between society and the individual. The instinctivist "solution" to the problem was that society, in all its patternings, is merely the expression or the unfolding of innate and imperious biological drives of the individual. On the other hand, the social environmentalist's "solu-

tion" of the problem was that the individual, in all of his personality patternings, is molded by society. The interactionist point of view stresses neither the primacy of the individual nor of society but rather stresses the complementary nature of the relationship between them. In the eyes of the interactionist, "society and the individual are twin-born,"² each a necessary condition for the existence of the other.

The historical development of the concept of interaction as a counter to the concepts of biological or social environmental reaction is considered more fully in later chapters, but in order to understand the interpenetration of social psychology and the other behavioral sciences—one of the tasks of the present chapter—it seems advisable to pay some preliminary attention to the difference between the concepts of reaction and interaction in order to help us sort out the fields of behavioral science which have been most influenced by them. The term *reaction* refers to a response made by an organism, the effect upon it when a stimulus has been applied. Strongly implied here is the concept of one-way cause and effect, that is, of one thing exerting an influence upon another but not being, in great measure, influenced itself. Reactions, thus conceived, may be thought of as *nonsocial* or *social*,³ and it is very important that this distinction should be carefully made so that the former will not be confused with social interaction, as is too often done. *Nonsocial reactions* are those which have not been learned from other human beings, while *social reactions* are those behaviors which are affected by prior learning in situations involving other human beings.

Let us imagine that a young child throws a rock over a fence and that inadvertently the rock makes contact with and produces a response in the form of a knot on the head of an adult who happens to be on the other side. The bump on the head and the pain will be purely physical, nonsocial reactions. But the rage and the thirst for revenge which might follow these are social reactions to the extent that the form which they take has been learned in the company of other human beings. People of different social classes and of different cultures react differently, as do persons of different family, educational, and other social backgrounds.

Social psychology is vitally concerned with the ways in which behavior is affected by prior learning situations involving other human beings,

²The discussion of the Cooley "twin-born" conception of the relationship between society and the individual contains the essentials of the modern position, cf. Chap. 10.

³Richard T. LaPiere, *Collective Behavior*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1938, p. 7.

in a word, with social reactions. Needless to say, a full explanation of the social reactions of an individual would involve a "social biography" of all of his experiences with other humans, as an infant and child in his family and play groups, in school, at work, and in all of his social participation. Indeed, one psychologist has suggested a definition of social psychology as the "scientific study of the activities of the individual as influenced by other individuals."⁴ By rephrasing our own definition of social psychology as the scientific study of the relationship between society (and we add, *as represented by other individuals*) and the individual, we find no quarrel with the idea that social psychology studies social reactions. It does this and more, however, because there is an important distinction still to be made, viz., the distinction between social reaction and social interaction. Social psychology is also very much concerned with the latter.

If, as we have said, social reactions are responses of the individual which have been learned in *previous* interpersonal relations, his social activity *here and now* is by no means fully explainable merely as a response to such past experience. Because man has the reasoning power to anticipate the reactions which his actions are likely to produce in others, he selects (not always deliberately) from his repertory of possible social reactions and only performs those which seem the most suitable for the occasion. This sensitivity to and anticipation of the responses of others on the part of the individual means that in order for us to understand and study what he does here and now we must understand the other individuals involved in the behavior situation with him and what they expect of him. Hence, the telic nature of human social participation and the reciprocal influence of individuals upon one another demand that social psychology focus mainly upon the *interacting individual* who is thinking about and predicting the probable responses of others to his behavior. *The awareness of the individual that he is being perceived by others*, while not the sole reason for a person's social behavior, is nevertheless one of the most potent factors governing the form that the behavior will take. The individual not per se but as he participates in the "social act"⁵ is our focus. The learning which has

⁴ Otto Klineberg, *Social Psychology*, rev. ed., New York, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1954, p. 3.

⁵ See G. H. Mead's conception of "the social act," Chap. 10, for a more complete discussion of this concept.

occurred in previous social acts, therefore, derives its significance for social psychology from the fact that it will be operative in his present and future social participation, and for this reason, social psychologists in all of the behavioral sciences are interested both in social reactions, predispositions to behave based on past experience, and in social interactions where these potential reactions are unfolded into actual behavior.

Since it is imperative that we understand the various concepts of reaction and the differences between reactions and interactions in order that we may clearly distinguish what is social-psychological in the various behavioral sciences, perhaps the illustration of the child hurling a rock over the fence may again serve as a basis for making some of these distinctions. We recall that the adult suffered a bump on the head and pain inside it as a nonsocial, in this case a physiological, reaction to the rock. Doubtlessly there were also internal, nonsocial, neurological and chemical reactions. However, as the adult's reactions began to take the form of rage, indignation, or perhaps even fear, his reactions became social, since the forms which these feeling states take are known to be largely a matter of social learning. While we concede that the animality of the unfortunate victim of the rock-throwing incident will be involved in his reactions, it will be caught up and expressed, as it were, in his social nature. From birth and throughout his maturation he has been exposed to the modifying stimuli imposed by his mother, father, and siblings. At play, at school, at work, and in all of his social participation, he has been exposed to people who have been, in turn, exposed to cultural ideas and beliefs of the nation, region, the social class, and other subcultures of which he is a part. If our injured adult were of the American middle class, for example, he might very likely define his injury as an offense against his dignity and position, in short against his "rights." It is quite likely that he would investigate the source of the rock and make an effort to see that "justice" is done and the culprit punished. This type of social reaction, as can readily be seen, may be called *cultural* since its origins can clearly be seen in the cultures surrounding our American middle-class adult.

Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that cultural-social reactions alone will govern the actions of the individual, since the way in which he will define his present situation also depends upon *personal-social reactions* which are learned, as is most human behavior, in the company of others; yet, in this case, the reaction is not influenced directly by cul-

ture. "The word *personal* reveals its highly individualistic aspect and the word *social*, the fact that it nevertheless arises in interaction."⁶ Thus, our middle-class American with the bump on his head may be extremely aggressive in his resolve to see that justice is done. Or perhaps, if he were exceptionally meek he might forego his "rights" for fear of the retaliation which their pursuit might incur. Whether he is dominant or submissive may depend less upon the cultural influences to which he has been exposed than upon the interpersonal relations between himself, his mother and father, and others to whose unique personalities his own individual personality responded and developed. A dominant father may have "produced" a submissive son; a submissive mother, a domineering one. There are many such personal-social learning situations which are not directly culturally structured.

Then too, until this point we have assumed that the child did not know there was anyone on the other side of the fence when he hurled his rock into the air—"It fell to earth he knew not where." And of course, the adult was assumed to be unaware of the origin of the rock which struck him. In other words, to this point we have been speaking only of the reactions involved in the situation. There has been no social interaction. Now let us have the adult, as at least a mildly aggressive individual when his dignity and "rights" have been threatened, pick up the rock for "evidence" and set off to confront his "attacker" (the quotes, of course, indicate the cultural and personal-social reactions involved). Finding a gate in the fence he opens it and perceives the child in the yard. *When the child perceives that he is being perceived*, a social-interactional situation exists for the first time, since the child's perception of the adult sets into "motion" *reciprocal* reactions and influence. If we knew the history of the past relations of the child with adults, both in personal-social and cultural-learning situations, we might be able to make an enlightened guess as to his first reaction to the adult's presence—whether he would define adult strangers as menacing or friendly, in other words, what his expectations are of such adults. The same holds true for the adult, perceiving for the first time that the rock thrower was a child. We do not know his expectations of children until we know something of his past personal-social and cultural-learning situations. What we are saying is that we should know nothing of the *dynamics of the situation* unless we know something of the background of the individuals involved in it and,

⁶ Kimball Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952, p. 124.

equally important, how these unique backgrounds come together in this behavioral situation here and now. Consequently, social psychology, concerning itself with social behavior, must accumulate no less than a body of knowledge about the social backgrounds of individuals and a body of knowledge about what individuals *do* when they come together in social situations. For this reason, the science has not been content to erect academic walls which would shut it off from the other behavioral sciences, which contribute so much to the understanding of social personality and social situations. In the next section of this chapter we illustrate this interpenetration of social psychology with the rest of the behavioral sciences.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

In the following chapters it will be seen that social psychology originated in the historical context of a sociological protest against exaggerated individualism in psychology. As might be expected, psychologists responded both positively and negatively to the challenge, and some polemics ensued. Nevertheless, social psychology is firmly entrenched in both modern sociology and modern psychology and has profoundly influenced both of its parent fields. Its rise has been a healthy tonic for both sociology and psychology. It is widely accepted that psychology, where it deals with interpersonal relations, *is* social psychology, and psychologists contribute a major share of new knowledge in the field.

The individual is no longer studied in psychology as if he were in a vacuum, that is, as if he were really separable from the social world in which he lives. On the other hand, social psychology has brought to sociology the realization that the *individual* and his dynamic role in group processes is the basic social fact. While a great deal of healthy interdisciplinary rivalry may exist between the two parents of social psychology, an increasing number of psychologists and sociologists draw upon each other's disciplines and welcome the chance to draw upon each other's discoveries.

Social psychology is not a substitute for either psychology or sociology as such but presents a new and exciting approach to an aspect of psychology as social and an aspect of sociology as psychological. In this light social psychology, a discipline in its own right, is nevertheless also a bridge between its two parent disciplines and bears a heavy traffic of ideas back and forth between them. By turning first to the main areas of

social-psychological interest within the divisions of psychology and sociology, we shall be in a position to comprehend more fully the nature of social psychology as a bridge between them. In doing so, however, we must not lose sight of the fact that social psychology is a discipline in its own right, drawing from anthropology, psychiatry, and other behavioral sciences as well as from psychology and sociology. Later, we shall develop this conception of our science.

Social Psychology in Psychology and Sociology


We can best accomplish our task of "locating" social psychology by breaking psychology and sociology down into "fields" and indicating the kind of scientific study which social psychology utilizes within each such division. Then, using the concepts already developed, we can show what *kind* of contribution is made by each subdivision of psychology and sociology to our understanding of social reactions and social interaction. First, let us consider the subdivisions of psychology.

General Psychology. General psychology goes beyond social psychology and absorbs it into theories about the whole range of human nature, which have been arrived at by scientific observation and inference. It is a theoretical synthesis of such observations and inferences which draws from all branches of psychology, including social psychology, and is dependent upon them for broad understandings. General psychology also draws from sciences such as physiology, neurology, genetics, and other natural sciences and is considered itself as a natural science. Through social psychology, general psychology has become also a social science, since social psychology draws upon anthropology, sociology, and other social sciences.

Social Psychology. We are speaking here of a division of psychology which goes by the title of "social psychology." It is not synonymous with social psychology in general, which includes parts of sociology, anthropology, and psychiatry, as we shall demonstrate below. This latter and broader designation of social psychology is used in preference to such terms as "microsociology," "anthropological psychology," or "interpersonal psychiatry," which, for the sake of simplifying our terminology and of providing one common designation for the entire field, are considered, together with the social psychology subfield of psychology, as one substantive field. Social psychology is simply a more euphonious title for this broader field than psychological sociology or some other more lengthy and clumsy designation.

Social psychology in this narrower sense, serves to link general psychology with the social sciences. In addition, it draws from various other fields in psychology and contributes to the broader field of social psychology a rich flow of information about social reactions which has been gleaned from *developmental* psychology, *differential* psychology, *experimental* psychology, *comparative* psychology, and *abnormal* psychology. The social psychology subdivision of psychology is also very useful for *applied* psychology, which it supplies with data helpful in the practical application of knowledge about human behavior. While only partially dependent upon social psychology, such applied psychologies as *educational* psychology, *vocational guidance*, *industrial* psychology, *mental hygiene*, and *clinical* psychology derive many useful insights from their sister division within psychology. Let us summarize these relationships diagrammatically.

Table 1. The Relationship of General Psychology and Social Psychology



Note: The arrows indicate the direction of the flow of information from one subfield, field, or discipline to another.

* Adapted from Francis L. Harmon, *Principles of Psychology*, rev. ed., Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Company, 1951, p. 12.

The advantages of diagrams are, of course, that material can be presented concisely and clearly. They tend to “bury” important information, however, and ours is no exception. We have “buried” the very significant contributions of various subdivisions of general psychology to the broader

and independent field of social psychology. Before locating social psychology within sociology and the other behavioral sciences, let us turn to these subdivisions of general psychology and their contributions to the study of the relationship between society and the individual.

Developmental Psychology. The scientific study of the growth and development of all of the intellectual and emotional powers of the individual throughout his life span is called developmental psychology. *Child psychology*, *adolescent psychology*, and other subdivisions of developmental psychology contribute knowledge about the social and nonsocial reactions of the individuals. In other words, both the social and nonsocial aspects of growth and maturation are studied, and the more significant discoveries about the acquisition of social reactions are grist for the mill of social psychology. One such discovery was the effect of the play group and its games upon the development of the moral sense of the child.⁷

Differential Psychology. The field of differential psychology has concerned itself primarily with the development of refined measuring techniques and with the goal of measuring differences between individuals. Many of its techniques have been taken over by social psychologists and adapted to the measurement of differences in the social reactions of individuals. This contribution to method is discussed in more detail in a later chapter and is merely noted here. Examples of such differences between individual social reactions, viz., in attitudes toward Negroes or toward religion, show their importance to social psychology. Then, too, although differential psychology and its intelligence-testing techniques seemed to have originally assumed that intelligence is innate, therefore a nonsocial reaction and out of the purview of social psychology, later evidence has shown that differences in intelligence can be accounted for to some extent by social backgrounds. In other words, IQ, to some extent, as it is presently measured, is, in part, a social reaction. Thus, the findings of differential psychology may come to be an important new horizon in social psychology.

Comparative Psychology. Often belittled by the uninitiated, comparative psychology is the comparison, employing the experimental method, of animal behavior with that of man. There can be little doubt that direct comparisons of animal learning with that of man meet with little success. Nevertheless, animals and men have many sensorimotor processes sufficiently in common so that findings from the study of animals

⁷ Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1948.

can be indirectly and analogously carried over to man. While social psychology has little concern with these, since by definition such reactions are nonsocial, nevertheless experimentation which goes beyond the first stage of animal-man comparison and attempts to find the source of the differences between them has been very helpful to social psychology.⁸ Thus, the psychology of *learning*, originating in animal experimentation, becomes the psychology of social learning⁹ when related to human beings. So also with the psychology of perception, when perception is conceived of as a process having its roots in sensorimotor processes, in common with animals, but having also a human and social dimension.

In summary, social psychology has exerted a truly remarkable influence upon psychology, to the extent that psychology is now a social science as well as a natural science. We do not mean to imply that psychology has relinquished its status as a natural science, however, since much that is accomplished in modern psychology involves laboratory experimentation in physiological and neurological phenomena which belong to the domain of natural science.

Sociology has also been profoundly influenced by social psychology but, here again, it would be just as easy to get the erroneous impression that sociology has become a psychological science as it would be to get the impression that psychology has become a sociological one. As with psychology and its status as a natural science, so sociology retains its status as a social science. General sociology remains the *scientific study of human society* despite the tremendous influence within sociology of the social-psychological emphasis upon the interacting individual.

General Sociology. Despite much confusion among laymen, professional sociologists seem generally agreed that theirs is the study of human society *in its structure* (the various elements or parts which comprise it) and *in its functioning* (the way each part contributes to the whole, the working of its subgroupings to make society what it is). Sociology, then, is still concerned with the human group primarily and only secondarily with the interacting individual.

Social Psychology in Sociology. Nevertheless, sociology is much more meaningful when the various parts of society are seen as congeries of individual social roles wherein individuals are "acting out" their parts

⁸ Gardner Murphy, Lois Barclay Murphy, and Theodore Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology*, rev. ed., New York, Harper & Brothers, 1937.

⁹ J. B. Rotter, *Social Learning and Clinical Psychology*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954.

in society much as actors play their parts in a play. Social psychology (sometimes called "microsociology" or "psychological sociology" in order to distinguish it from social psychology in psychology) serves sociology by studying the interacting individual as an actor in society. Social patterns, also, are responses to the needs of individuals. People must eat, work, mate, recreate, and find a meaning to their existence within the social forms provided to facilitate solutions to these basic human needs. So, on the one hand, the behavior of individuals is a response to social structure and its functioning. On the other hand, social forms are responses to human needs, and sociological analysis which loses its sensitivity to the physical, psychological, and social needs of individuals overlooks a major variable in the analysis of society and social change; social psychology in sociology provides this valuable corrective. While general sociology, in its concern for building a body of scientific knowledge about human society in general, is thus indirectly but importantly affected by social psychology, several of its subalternate sciences are as much social-psychological as they are sociological. Chief among these is the scientific study of social problems, or social pathology.

Social Pathology. Several fine attempts have been made to provide a purely sociological interpretation of social problems. The "social disorganization" and the "values in conflict" theories are two such attempts.¹⁰ Nevertheless, social-problems textbooks, research projects, and proposed reform projects are social-psychological in flavor. By this we mean that as much attention is paid to the individual as to the social aspects of the problem in question. In the left-hand column below, we enumerate several of the major subdivisions of social pathology. In the right-hand column, we list the "interacting individuals" who are caught up in the social problem and are, therefore, the object of concern both to the general public and to the social pathologist. In this way we can see the importance of the social-psychological focus on the interacting individual for the study of social pathology.

Crime and delinquency

The deviant, the criminal, the juvenile delinquent, the prostitute, the white-collar criminal, etc.

Minority problems

The Negro, the Jew, the physical deviant, the marginal man, the prejudiced, etc.

¹⁰ See the discussion of these in C. S. Mihanovich and Joseph B. Schuyler, *Current Social Problems*, Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Company, 1956, Chap. 1. See also Mary E. Walsh and Paul Hanly Furfey, *Social Problems and Social Action*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958, p. 8.


Alcoholism and addiction	The alcoholic, the drug addict, the addicted "pusher," etc.
Marriage and family problems	The maladjusted, the divorced, the child of the broken home, the bereaved, etc.

The list could be extended, of course, to all of the multitudinous subdivisions of social pathology, but a sufficient number of examples are given to show that the study of social problems involves the problem of the socially reacting individual caught up in the problem. This, in turn, means that social pathology and social psychology have many areas in common and a dependence upon one another. To a lesser extent social psychology has interpenetrated with *demography*, or population study, where the psychological problems involved in fertility, migration, and population density become significant.

In *urban sociology*, the personality of the urbanite is contrasted with the ruralite; the behavior of the individual is related to the area within the city where he resides. The psychological factors underlying segregation, succession, and the movement of groups to avoid contact with other groups are important aspects of ecology, the subfield of sociology which studies the spatial and social distribution of groups. The psychology of *social institutions* and of *collective behavior* throws light upon the psychic forces in individuals which induce conformity or nonconformity to institutional norms. The psychology of social classes is studied in *social stratification*. We can summarize these observations and "locate" social psychology within sociology (see Table 2, p. 16) in much the same manner as we located it within psychology.

We have seen that the parent disciplines of social psychology, psychology, and sociology have a great deal of commerce with each other through their offspring. Offspring, however, have a way of coming of age in their own right and social psychology is no exception. Strong claims have been made to the effect that the science now stands alone and needs no support from her sister sciences. We hope that this never becomes completely the case because once the walls of academic restrictions cut off the discipline from its neighbors the effect might be the same as cutting off the blood from the limbs of an organism. Lifeless and ineffective, it would lose its most important function, that of conveying ideas from one discipline to another and stimulating inquiry by so doing. In no way can such disciplines as anthropology and psychiatry be considered parent disciplines of social psychology; but as tributary schools

Table 2. The Relationship of General Sociology and Social Psychology



Note: The arrows again indicate the direction of the flow of information.

* Prescinding from the natural science status which it also has.

within social psychology, they illustrate the way in which that discipline has served as a "pipeline" of stimulating ideas between the behavioral sciences.

Anthropology. Like psychology and psychiatry, anthropology is a natural as well as a social science, and in this latter capacity has brought the study of primitive man into the purview of the sciences dedicated to the study of modern man. In this way, behavioral scientists are enabled to see what aspects of man's behavior simply reflect from the fact that he is *man*, no matter under what social circumstances he might be found. The relationship between social psychology and the subfield of anthropology is illustrated in Table 3.

As can be seen in Table 3, there is a traffic of ideas between the culture-and-personality school and social psychology. Similar arrows are drawn between this school and psychology and psychiatry, since cross influencing has also occurred between these fields. In addition, *psychiatry*, another natural science, has developed a social science aspect which is called the "interpersonal" school of psychiatry. This group has developed its concepts of personality development and even of most pathology as problems in the living of humans with each other.

With these orientation concepts in mind, it is easy to see the extensive

Table 3. The Relationship of Anthropology and Social Psychology

Anthropology	Social psychology	Behavioral sciences
As natural science	The scientific study of the relationship between society and the individual.	Sociology
Physical anthropology		Psychology
Anthropometry		Psychiatry
Human biology		History
Race		Economics
As natural/social science		Government
Archeology		
As social science		
Cultural anthropology		
Ethnography-ethnology		
Social anthropology		
Culture and personality		

interpenetration of social psychology with the other behavioral sciences. Sociology and psychology majors will, perhaps, see fit to memorize, or at least to note well, the location of social psychology within the various behavioral sciences. Others may simply wish to summarize this entire discussion of the nature of social psychology in this fashion: *social psychology is the scientific study of the relationship between society and the individual no matter what the academic lines which contain such investigation.*

While, as might be expected, we have concentrated upon the impact of social psychology on her two parent disciplines, sociology and psychology, and to a lesser extent upon her relationship to anthropology and psychiatry, this does not tell the full story of the impact of social psychology on the behavioral sciences. Competent workers in political science, economics, psychiatry, and education, to mention but a few, have turned their attention to social-psychological problems; there has been a feedback from these fields of ideas and research which has also greatly benefited social psychology. Political scientists have become interested in collective behavior, the study of groups in their psychological aspects, as well as in public opinion and the psychology of social movements. Economists are increasingly interested in the social-psychological bases of economic motivation. Educators have become more aware of the social realities affecting the problem of educating the child in the complex social world of today. While social psychology has in no sense replaced any of these other behavioral sciences it has enriched them

substantially. The very nature of social psychology itself, made up as it is of sociological, psychological, psychiatric, anthropological, and other types of generalizations, makes for interdisciplinary interest.

SOME PROBLEMS IN STUDYING SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

As the student progresses in his study of social psychology, certain problems will arise regarding some of the broader perspectives of the field. Some, by no means all, of the subject matter of social psychology may be personally troubling for him. (Beginning students of social psychology have often found that their personal prejudices, attitudes, beliefs, and values conflict with material presented in class or in the textbook.) In itself, such conflict is widely held to be all to the good, since without the conflict of ideas learning becomes sterile. All too often, however, the beginning student of social psychology does not grasp real issues, but merely clashes, quixotically, with windmills. A real issue, for example, might arise where social psychology traces the behavior of an individual back to his previous social participation rather than to his innate, inborn predispositions to behave. The student may know of families which produce a deviant or two in every generation. The elders of the student's family or neighborhood may have informed him that "something in the blood" causes the recurrent deviation. The "blood" theory is a common theme in American folklore. When such a contradiction occurs between the student's folk knowledge and the material presented him in class or in the textbook, the resolving factor should be the student's critical discrimination—the evaluation and weighing of the evidence on both sides of such an issue.

(Perhaps the most common "windmill" issue for the student beginning the study of social psychology is the problem of the nature of man, that is, whether man is composed of body and soul or merely of body and personality,) the latter being reducible to a biological foundation. Unfortunately, it is not always the student who erects this windmill and then charges it fearlessly. Theist and atheist alike have sometimes adorned their beliefs in social-psychological garb and have presented them in classroom or textbook as social psychology. As modern social psychology approaches scientific status, there is less and less occasion for such confusion of the aims of the field. Man is a social animal, and upon this postulate rests the structure of social psychology. There are specific elements in human behavior which are attained in and only by

means of the social complex. These constitute the matter of social psychology.

But man is not simply a social animal—in fact he is not simply an animal. Above all man is human, which involves intelligence, the power of choice, liberty, and individuality. It is not the purpose of social psychology to prove these propositions. Such statements are postulates of social psychology and indeed are often implied by those social psychologists who would profess to deny them when stated explicitly. For example, in studying the social psychology of prejudice, the implication is that something is wrong with reacting purely emotionally to another individual because he is of a different color than oneself.

However, as we have said, the question of postulates and their corollaries is not a question for social psychology at all. As a scientific discipline, social psychology is concerned with accumulating a verifiable body of knowledge about man in his relations with his fellow men. The student should be alert to the necessity of distinguishing between incorrect postulates about the nature of men; however, genuine insights into human behavior may be gleaned even from those scientists whose postulates are unacceptable. We shall pursue this matter further in Chapter 7.

WHY STUDY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

After grasping some of the depth and breadth of social psychology and upon realizing that social psychology, however fascinating, is a lot of intellectual “work,” many students need a little encouragement before continuing in it. A would-be swimmer, standing on the side of a cold swimming pool thinking it over, needs just a bit of a push to help him to take the plunge. For this reason we shall consider at this point the advantages of studying social psychology.

From a practical standpoint, social psychology is perhaps the single most important “subject” that can be taken in college by the prospective social worker or others who plan a career of community service. Psychologists and sociologists preparing for specialized fields such as human relations in industry, in the school, and in government find social psychology an invaluable aid in understanding the complexities of the group-individual relationship in their specialties. Political science and economics majors find that having such a course enables them to qualify more readily for jobs in industry and government. Education

majors and minors quite often find social psychology listed specifically by their state boards of education as a recommended course for the teacher candidate. Thus, although it is but one aspect of the social psychology course, "practicality" is not lacking.

The student will be surprised at the tremendous gains in his vocabulary as he learns the methods and concepts in psychology, sociology, psychiatry, and anthropology. Probably no other interdisciplinary field covers the richness and fullness of these behavioral sciences as fully as social psychology. Yet the material learned is not a jumble of unrelated jargon but is well integrated by the social-psychological frame of reference, or focus, on the interacting individual. The student will be informed about the history of the two parent and the two tributary schools which make up modern social psychology. Given special consideration will be the scientific impulse of the nineteenth century as it affected the rise of modern social psychology. Social psychology will then be viewed in the light of background understandings from rational psychology—social man will be viewed in the perspective of the *whole* man as philosophy sees him. Then attention will be turned away from social psychology itself to the *subject matter* of social psychology—man in the social world, what parts of his biological endowment are the most relevant to his social participation, what and how he learns on his way from infancy to adulthood, how he and others come to "see" him and the intimate involvement of his selfhood and his social relations, how culture enters into and affects the development of his personality, how his life experiences in age groupings affect him, and the social differences between normal and "abnormal" man. Attention will be given to social interaction—in small groups and in the great structures of society as they are integrated and disintegrated. Finally, what social psychology can tell us about men in the modern world will be discussed.

The most interesting person in the world is one's self. This is probably at least subjectively true, and social psychology should be a fascinating source of new information about one's self. What are the social (interpersonal) and cultural backgrounds of one's personality? What attitudes does one hold to be natural, right, and true simply because one has been exposed to them and has thought no more about them than he has thought about the air he breathes? Is one aggressive or submissive, and under what circumstances? How is this related to his past history, to the mother-child relationship, for example? For many years introductory social psychology students have been noted to select them-

selves as subjects of term papers, and what has been lacking in the skills of social-psychological analysis has been more than compensated for by the great amount of enthusiasm generated in the writing of their own social autobiography. Hence, greater self-knowledge is one of the outcomes of the course in social psychology.

A growth in what might be called a true humanism can also be expected. This kind of humanism expresses itself in a love of others for the love of God. The brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God is advanced whenever man learns more about himself and others. Tolerance should inevitably follow from the study of the way in which others are influenced by their culture so as to appear "odd" or "strange" to us. Educated people should be more democratic and better citizens of their country and of the world. Growth in knowledge and understanding of man should make the student more God-like since the image and likeness of God in man is the intellect.

THE TRIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

In this beginning chapter of the textbook we have tried to take social psychology "apart." We have located major pieces of it in sociology and psychology and other pieces in psychiatry and anthropology. Social psychology was related to the behavioral sciences and in a cursory way to philosophy. There was a good reason for this. The fact is that the beginning student in social psychology usually remains wedded to the approach which first wins his attention. If his first course in social psychology is conducted under the auspices of a sociologist, he tends to maintain the bias that social psychology belongs to sociology. The same often holds true of the psychology student who takes the introductory social psychology course in his major department and forever after holds that it is "after all social *psychology*." If this present chapter has been read carefully, there should be little grounds for indulging in this kind of nonsense. The next chapter of this book contains a statement of the major dimensions in modern social-psychological theory. It is the extension of what we have called the focus on the interacting individual into an integrated set of propositions. It is, in effect, a social psychology in its own right. This body of theory—and we must note here that "theory" refers in science to explanations derived from research and research-oriented speculation rather than armchair speculation—incorporates three different approaches which have been taken to the

study of the interacting individual. These are the *biological*, the *social*, and the *cultural* approaches, which in the past have been taken *simplistically*, meaning that theorists have developed only one of the three dimensions and either explicitly or implicitly discarded the other two. These approaches have also been taken in a *summative* way, meaning that the interacting individual has been viewed as the product of the biological, plus the social, plus the cultural. We must avoid these pitfalls. The variables can be separated only logically; in the real world they are never found separately. We can illustrate the interrelated nature of these variables as shown in Figure 1.




FIG. 1. The interrelated nature of the three approaches.

Every social interaction involves people, and these people have bodies. They have eyes to see each other and other senses which help them perceive others. They have communicating equipment, not just voice boxes and vocal folds but also brains and other equipment which enable them to communicate with each other. People also have "feeling states" which have a physiological basis, and these are profoundly important for the way in which people will treat each other. An angry person is one thing; a timid, frightened person is another. All of these facts point to the importance of the body in the behavior of man, since all that we have described in this paragraph is possible only because man has a body.

Consequently, it is understandable that early in the history of social psychology there was developed the *physiologically oriented* approach, which early concentrated upon the innate, inborn, or *instinctive* tendencies to behave in man. Thoroughly refuted and relegated to the background by the social and cultural approaches, new vigor has been given to this approach by "constitutional psychiatry," the study of body types, and by the new drug discoveries which seem to ameliorate the personality problems of the psychotic. It remains one-sided and inadequate, however, if the social and cultural aspects of human behavior are ignored.

The *socially oriented* approach acknowledges the biological as a “substrate” or underlying current in human behavior but emphasizes the importance of interpersonal relations and their influence on the personality of the individual, stressing the continuity of consistent exposure of the individual to patterned social events. In this light personality is seen as a response to the social participation of the individual. The approach stresses the child’s experience with the mother, then with other family members, with peer groups at school and at play, and within all of the intimate face-to-face associations throughout his lifetime. The central concept in this approach is that of the process of *socialization*, the lifelong process of the modification of behavior (learning) that results from our association with others. There is a simplistic variation of this approach, also, against which we must be on guard as we were against the simplistic physiological approach. It may rule out the biological as being of no consequence or, even more gravely erroneous, it may rule out the cultural “since it is social.” *Culture patterns*, that is, clusters of ways of thinking and acting about things that are handed down from generation to generation, are “social” in the sense that they are shared by people. But in the truest sense only groups of people are social. Their group ways of doing things, their *behavior patterns*, are more properly called cultural because culture refers to ideas and things rather than to people. This may seem not a very important distinction and some have overlooked it. Nevertheless, social-psychological analysis can go far astray if the distinction is not properly made and the cultural component accounted for in human behavior. For example, the famous Oedipus complex concept developed by Freud was based on the parent-child relationship as it is known in Western Europe and America, wherein the child is subjected to the love of the mother and the authority of the father. Cultural conditions such as the avunculate, where the mother’s brother is the authority figure for the child, modify the Oedipus complex importantly, since the mother’s brother may become the object of the hostility and a purely affectionate relation is possible between biological father and son. So it is no good to say that a person’s behavior reflects his interpersonal relations unless the culturally given conditions of these relationships are also provided.

Nevertheless, the *culturally oriented* approach overlaps with the socially oriented approach to a considerable degree, since culture often dictates the form that interpersonal relations will take. But this approach is most clearly distinguished from the socially oriented approach by its

preoccupation with man's environment of inherited artifacts, technical processes, ideas, habits, values—his cultural “way of life.” The central concept of this approach is that of enculturation, the process by which the individual absorbs and becomes a part of his culture. By cross-cultural comparisons of similarities and diversities in human behavior, this approach has succeeded in demonstrating the fallacy of ascribing behavior to innate biological drives. Yet there is a simplistic variation of the cultural approach which views men as mere receptacles into which culture is poured, ignoring both their physiological and experiential (social) aspects, with fatal consequences for a holistic picture of social man.

And so we are logically led to the conviction that not one but three dimensions of man's behavior must be advanced, holistically rather than simplistically and in an integrated and interrelated fashion rather than merely summatively ($1 + 2 + 3$). Nor should it be thought that these three are the only dimensions of human behavior and thus are logically exhaustive categories. Theological and philosophical approaches could also have evolved. Social psychology, however, has its origins in the scientific impulse of the nineteenth century, and as a science, the field rules itself out as an authoritative source of insight on philosophical and theological matters.

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Chapter 2

THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

In the preceding chapter we laid out the metes and bounds of social psychology. Much as a farmer might buy pieces of land belonging to other farmers and form a place of his own, social psychologists (with the blessing of the other behavioral sciences) have staked out an area which they consider their own. New sciences must, however, back their claim for an area with much more than a mere urge for proprietorship. As a minimum they must have an object of study which is uniquely their own, a body of information about their object of study, and a methodology for gathering such information. Where we emphasized in the previous chapter the interrelatedness of our science and the other behavioral sciences, in the present chapter our task is to show that social psychology meets the criteria for a self-inclusive science in its own right, and in the next chapter we shall demonstrate that it has its own methodology.

THE OBJECT OF STUDY

First, as to an object of study of its own, social psychology is not primarily concerned, as are sociology and social anthropology, with systems of group relationships—society in its structure and functioning. Nor is social psychology, as is psychology, primarily concerned with intrapersonal processes. We will see in later chapters on the historical development of the field that the object of study in social psychology was variously seen as societal processes at times and as intrapersonal

processes at others. Finally, however, modern social psychology has come to acquire an object of study in its own right, and in the preceding chapter we named it as the interacting individual. Now we must distinguish our object of study from those of sociology and psychology in order to isolate the unique object of social psychology. If individual personality is the object of study in psychology and society is the object of study in sociology (and in social anthropology if it is primitive societies that are being studied), then the object of study in social psychology can be represented as falling "between" these as in the following diagram.

<i>Psychology</i>	<i>Social psychology</i>	<i>Sociology</i>
Personality	Personality in a status and performing a role	Statuses and roles in society

It might be objected that the personality studied in psychology is no less a personality when it is participating in society, hence no new science is needed for such study, since psychology is "already there." Conversely, reciprocal actions which are organized into roles have been studied as traditional sociology; hence no new science is needed to study these. But these are simply areas in which the boundaries of psychology and sociology overlap with social psychology,¹ and as we indicated in the previous chapter, this overlapping has enriched all three disciplines. Uniquely social-psychological, however, are *the person-to-person dynamics occurring in the social situation*. And we refer not merely to the overt, observable exchange of gestures, both verbal and nonverbal, but also to the covert processes of self-other cognition and reaction which occur. Social psychology is concerned with *A* and *B* as they influence one another in a behavior situation here and now. This might be written symbolically as $A \rightleftharpoons B^2$ and reads as "*A* influencing *B* while being influenced by *B*." Psychology is concerned with the personality of *A* and with the personality of *B*. Sociology is not concerned with their individual personalities at all. Put another way, psychology views them as individuals whose personalities are different because of the differences in biological capacities and environmental learning experiences which obtain between them. Society is "held con-

¹ Paul Hanly Furfey, *The Scope and Method of Sociology: A Metasociological Treatise*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953, pp. 145-146.

² Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1956, p. 1.

stant," as it were. For the sociologist, *A* and *B* are parts of a social system, whose personality differences, for the sake of convenience in analysis, are "held constant." Social psychology holds constant neither society nor personality but includes both aspects, personal and social, in its analysis of the interacting individual. Diagrammatically,

Society	Bestows a status on <i>A</i> and another on <i>B</i>
Culture	Prescribes roles for <i>A</i> and <i>B</i> appropriate to these statuses
Personality	Possessed by <i>A</i> and <i>B</i> , through prior social participation has acquired self-other expectancies which are cognitive and regulative of behavior between them

As a more concrete example, let *A* be a mother and *B* a child. The child "learns (*a*) to expect or anticipate certain actions from other persons and (*b*) that others have expectations of him." The child learns to expect to be fed, bathed, fondled, etc., by an adult who, of course, is operating within an existing role organization. These expectations become organized into a concept later verbalized as "mother." The adult expects certain responses from the child. These latter expectations become organized into a concept such as "mother's darling."³ The objects of study of social psychology are those behavior situations in which these expectations unfold. The interacting individuals, the mother and child, are the objects of study. As an area of overlap with psychology, we may also be interested in the social learning of the child in these mother-child situations as it affects his later social reactions. As an area of overlap with sociology, we might also be interested in the status and role of motherhood in a given social class or other social subsystem and how this would affect the mother-child relationship. While we should not wish to be restrained from studying these facets, our unique focus is upon *the self-other aspects of personality as these operate in the social situation*, the primary object of study in social psychology. But we have stated that there are other requirements for a science than merely a proper object of study, viz., an adequate theory and a workable method. We turn now to theory in social psychology in order to evaluate the science as a significant contribution to knowledge within the limits imposed by its object of study.

³ Theodore R. Sarbin, "Role Theory," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1954, p. 225.

THEORY IN MODERN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

From extreme views which exaggerate the individual or the group, there has evolved, as we have said, the modern concept laid down in the works of Charles Horton Cooley and George Herbert Mead that society and the individual are "twin-born." This can be taken in a vague sort of way to imply that neither the individual nor society comes first, or rates a special priority, and correctly so. However, interactionism, our focal concept, involves much more than merely granting "equal weight" to society and the individual. Interactionism welds them, as it were, so that society and the individual are no longer separate and distinct but are both present in the one concept. It takes a while for this point of view to "sink in" and it should be much more clear as this chapter on the theory of social psychology develops, since the theory of social psychology has been built upon interactionism. The ideal of modern social psychology is to advance its theory on a holistic basis, stressing the individual in some research studies and the group in others, but such research findings are always woven into the weave of interactionist theory. *The Authoritarian Personality*,⁴ for example, was a research project undertaken to discover the personality attributes associated with the prejudiced attitudes of individuals. On the other hand, *The American Soldier*,⁵ despite the inference in its title, is more a study of groups of American soldiers than it is of the individual soldier. Yet both of these studies make important contributions to social psychology. These studies with different foci and the way in which their theoretical contributions flowed to general theory in social psychology illustrate further the unifying role played by the interactionist frame of reference in modern social psychology.

Concentrating upon the individual, the *Authoritarian Personality* set of researches on prejudice and personality developed testing instruments to be completed by *individuals* and scaled in such a way as to indicate the extent of the individual's prejudice. These scales correlated with other scales and measures so consistently that it was possible to enumer-

⁴T. W. Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1950.

⁵S. A. Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1949.

ate the attributes of the prejudiced, ethnocentric person as: (a) "projective"—he blames others for his own faults and difficulties; (b) "narrow"—he thinks the social sciences are a waste of time; (c) "unanalytical"—not only is he opposed to analyzing social relations, he is also opposed to self-analysis, he does not like to "look inside himself"; (d) "authoritarian"—he is opposed to extending democratic rights to others.

The American Soldier, on the other hand, concentrated upon the group. The choice was dictated not so much by the a priori conceptions of the investigators as it was by the findings in the field being researched. This particular set of studies addressed itself to the problem of the morale of the soldier, and it was soon found that morale was not so much an individual matter, of the individual's having been exposed to patriotic speeches, war bond campaigns, and similar activities in the United States (the soldiers were actually revulsed by this type of "morale-building"), but rather morale was a matter of loyalty to the small squad actually doing the fighting. The greatest morale seemed to flow from such sentiments as "not letting the other fellows down." Hence the social interactional unit of the small group immediately surrounding the soldier in combat was the significant object of study of his morale.

In the above two studies, we have examples of studies in the relationship between society and the individual. The scope of one was the difference in the extent of prejudice between individuals, and the scope of the other was a group, the small fighting unit, which was the source of morale for soldiers. In each case, however, the interactionist frame of reference $A \rightleftharpoons B$ is implied. By focusing upon the attitudes of prejudice which A has, the attempt is made to *predict* what A will do if and when he enters into a behavioral situation with B . Hence, the *Authoritarian Personality* studies fall within the purview of the social-psychological frame of reference, in addition to their significance in the other behavioral sciences. The same is true of *The American Soldier*, which takes the situational approach: "When A and B enter into the interactional situation of a small group in combat with the enemy, they tend to develop sentiments of loyalty toward each other." This is an important finding of the study.

One question should stand out clearly by now: By virtue of what logic does $A \rightleftharpoons B$ constitute "the relationship between society and the individual" which we have advanced as a broad definition of social psychology? We might counter with the question, Where else is society if it is not in me and in the other person? If I am A , I see society in B ;

if I am *B*, then it will be in *A*. If I am a social psychologist, I see society in both *A* and *B*. The expectations of *A* that are socially and culturally derived become a script for *B* and vice versa. This recognition of society *in the individual* has made it possible to replace the broader concepts of "society" and "the individual" with "social situation" and "personality." Since the historical development of these concepts is treated in later chapters, the emphasis here is upon what these terms *have come* to mean rather than upon *how* they came to have their present meaning.

Tentatively, a *social situation* may be defined as that which comes into existence when two or more personalities enter into communication with each other and which terminates when communication terminates. *Personality*, on the other hand, refers to the total organization of the individual's tendencies to behave in social situations.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that "personality," as the term is used in social psychology, should be carefully distinguished from the philosophical concept of *the person* as an individual substance of a rational nature. A complete definition of "personality" in this sense would have to include everything pertaining to the soul, to the body, and the coexistence of these as an individual entity. The term "personality" as it is used in social psychology designates a scientific construct which is a limited view, a view of man in his relations with other men, achieved by scientific research and synthesis of the findings of such research. Such constructs (scientific definitions) are subject to change in the light of new scientific findings or of a reformulation of what has already been found, while, of course, essential definitions do not have this transitory character.

Behavior is the term that refers to both social situation and personality. Of all of the potential social reactions that exist in an individual, only those actually evoked or called up in a situation are behavior. The emphasis of modern social psychology upon *interactional behavior* has the twin foci of the social situation, in which personality is manifested, and of personality, which is the dynamo of the social situation. *Social psychology* may now be more precisely defined as the scientific discipline which studies personalities in interaction.

Some Theoretical Propositions in Social Psychology

The theory of social psychology, not the creation of one or a small number of men but truly a cumulative effort, is an attempt to provide principles which will aid in explaining the behavior of personalities in

social situations. *The scientific explanation of a phenomenon may be stated either (1) in terms of factors which are operating at the moment of the occurrence of the phenomenon or (2) in terms of the processes operating in the earlier history of that phenomenon.* This distinction should be noted well since both the theory and the method of social psychology are adapted to this dichotomy. The natural sciences have enjoyed a high degree of success with the former approach. Social psychologists who have a predilection for the methods of the natural sciences typically employ the former approach. This group includes "experimental," "situational," and "field" social psychologists. (See Chapter 14.) The second type of explanation, which proceeds in terms of the processes operating in the earlier history of the phenomenon, has been valuable for clinicians, caseworkers, and others who are interested in the life history, the genesis, and the development of personality. No less scientific than the situational approach, the personality approach has proved equally valuable for the understanding of behavior.

In this chapter we are equating the historical approach with personality and the here-and-now approach with situations, as is commonly done in social psychology. In the next chapter it will be seen that there is also a here-and-now (factoral) approach to personality and a historical (processual) approach to the study of the social situation, and the student should be on guard against confusion on this score.

(The first of our sets of propositions in social-psychological theory relates more directly to *the genetic or personality approach*, while the second set of propositions refers more directly to *the situational approach*. The third set of propositions relates the personality and the situational approaches within a single, broader frame of reference, that of *communication*.)

Personality is emergent, that is, it is not present at birth, does not come "all at once," but rather is a developmental process in which the potentially social animal becomes actually a social being.⁶

It is helpful to think of the stage of development that a human adult has reached as the result of a series of great transformations. The first is the evolutionary development of man's bodily structure and capacities. Individuals do not enter society as mere zeros, with no authentic properties other than the readiness to be shaped by external conditions. Rather,

⁶ Solomon E. Asch, *Social Psychology*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952, pp. 118-119.

they start with capacities and tendencies which social conditions cannot impart to them and of which society cannot deprive them without crippling them. Specifically, individuals start with a structure that can respond to social conditions, with capacities for entering into social relations. The potentialities for speech, friendship, work must precede their actualization. It is therefore necessary to ask about the distinctive ways in which human individuals perceive, feel, and think. Second, there is the quite different but no less fundamental transformation from a non-social neonate to a social adult. We need to inquire about the fundamental changes that occur in men when they enter into interaction with each other. The individual without social experience is not fully a human being. Before he reaches human stature he must go through great changes in the medium of society. The paramount fact is that men come into relation not alone with the objects of nature but also with other men, and that in this encounter they are transformed into human beings. The environment of others and the products of their labor become a powerful, comprehensive region of forces within which each individual moves and has his being. Here each person discovers the existence and character of human beings and becomes bound to them; here he discovers also the reality of his own self, and of work, art, and thought. In the process the radius of his life undergoes a profound extension; the content and form of his understanding, needs, and emotions are revolutionized.

The essential feature of the proposition that personality is emergent is that, no matter what is "the nature of human nature" (a question we shall probe more fully in Chapter 7), the physiological constitution, relations with human beings, and the ingestion of culture are a minimum set of conditions for perfecting it. Returning to Figure 1, we can see that no one-sided approach to the understanding of personality in the social situation can be advanced profitably without taking into consideration its interrelationship with the others.




FIG. 2. A reproduction of Fig. 1.

Before developing these interrelationships, however, we might ask ourselves this question: In view of the complexity of human nature and

of human experience, is not the tridimensional approach simply another "simplistic" view of human behavior, different in degree rather than in kind from the simplistic unidimensional approaches? The answer to this question is a difficult and involved one and warrants a separate and more complete treatment than we can give it in the present context. However, we have already presented sufficient material for a few limited observations on the question. For example, we can reply affirmatively to the question of the incompleteness of our approach for the full understanding of the human being. Physiology, physiological psychology, and psychiatry, in their natural science aspect, contribute vastly more than we do to the understanding of the biological constitution; similarly, social experiences are not the exclusive domain of social psychology, not to mention the question of nonsocial experiences and their impact upon personality. We could not hope to vie with sociology and cultural anthropology in terms of insights into culture. Yet we staunchly contend that the tridimensional approach is not "simplistic." The reasons are that the interactionist focus narrows our inquiry *to those aspects of the three dimensions* which are most relevant for the understanding of the interacting individual in the social situation and what is "left over," of course, is simply not social psychology. Our limitations as an empirical science also preclude what would surely be naïve excursions into the philosophical realm of questions pertaining to man's nature and his ends. While all of these precautions have been disregarded by various social psychologists, that fact is no justification for duplicating their errors. In summary, we leave philosophical considerations to a later chapter; we limit ourselves here to the proper focus of social psychology and to the constraints imposed by our status as an empirical science. We level the charge of "simplistic" or "reductionistic" only at those who, within these limitations, fail to bring within the focus of social psychology elements which are available and proper to it. We turn first to the biological variable and then to the social and cultural variables to show the relevance and, indeed, the necessity of each of the dimensions for an adequate theory.

The biological organism is the foundation upon which personality emerges and is the substrate of personality throughout life. The human body as a biological organism is studied by the methods and procedures of biological science. Social psychologists, not being well trained in these sciences, have two choices with regard to incorporating such data into their explanations of behavior. They may disregard it completely or

take it in some way into account. Simplistic environmentalists have chosen the first alternative, with unsatisfactory results, since the biological organism imposes important restrictions upon social participation. Yet taking it "in some way into account" has often led to biologicistic interpretations of behavior as misleading as environmental determinism. The alternative most modern social psychologists have resorted to is to delineate the grosser aspects of the biological variable in the development of personality as these bear upon the role of the physical constitution in social interaction. Within the whole range of biological study, we need to concern ourselves only with what seems of direct relevance to our social-psychological focus. In this way we can reduce our dependence upon biology by reducing biological theory to a comparative handful of general statements relevant to our problem.

Biological organisms are studied developmentally in two respects, phylogenetically and ontogenetically. Students of *phylogenetic* development investigate changes within phyla, species, and subspecies from generation to generation, from eon to eon. Students of *ontogenetic* development study sequential modifications of individual organisms, beginning with their earliest embryonic condition and continuing to the close of senility.⁷

This distinction between phylogenetic and ontogenetic development is an important one because it enables us to rule out a vast amount of biological data as not being immediately relevant to the focus of social psychology. Since all human beings originate from the same phylum (a primary division of the animal kingdom) and the same species and subspecies, it is not necessary to look for such biological difference to explain the differences in behavior that men exhibit when placed in similar social situations. Anthropologists, investigating differences in the various human races, with characteristic scientific reticence, do not sweep aside the notion that some biopsychological racial differences might exist, as, of course, do purely physical characteristics among the races. *The range of such differences between individuals of the same race is, however, far greater than any such possible differences between the races.* Consequently, phylogenetic biological differences cannot be elaborated into a racial psychology, much less a social psychology. Since "race" is often advanced to explain social difference, it is an important social concept but not a biologically explanatory factor in personality.

⁷Howard V. Meredith, "A Descriptive Concept of Physical Development," in Dale B. Harris (ed.), *The Concept of Development*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1957, p. 109. (Italics added.)

In what respect, then, can the phylogenetic approach to the study of man as a biological organism help us to understand man in social life? First, since there can be no race psychology we must see man as one species biologically, and within this species extreme variability can and does occur. Further, unlike the other animals, man is immature at birth and unable to care for himself. The immaturity of the human infant and the long period of postnatal care which he requires for the independent competence to live is of profound significance for society. While his nervous and other bodily systems gradually come under his voluntary control (myelination), the needs of his biological constitution dominate his reactions for the first year or two of life. Gradually these become social reactions, increasingly responsive to the reactions of those around him and through these "others" to a language and culture. During this period the sense organs, the effector organs, and all of the organs which are or will be involved in thought and communication undergo preparation for lifelong participation among the members of society and with their culture patterns. Thus, in a handful of generalizations we are able to summarize at least the major aspects of man's biological nature in its significance for his social participation.

Ontogenetic variation, however, is another matter. This concept refers to individual differences (the subject matter of differential psychology, it will be recalled). No two human beings have the same heredity, excepting monozygote or "single-egg" twins, and no two human beings have the exact same environment. The range of individual differences is tremendous. Consequently, it is more difficult to sort out the behavior differences between human beings into nonsocial reactions (where unlearned ontogenetic variation and development are alone involved) and social reactions. Even if this distinction could be made with ease, the interplay of the biological and the social in social reactions would still remain to be explained. For example, it is relatively easy to see that the contraction of the stomach muscles is a nonsocial reaction, while such a contraction of the muscles at lunch time is probably a social reaction where one has learned that twelve o'clock noon is lunch time. But even where the reaction is learned as a part of sociocultural conditioning, the fact that a physiological reaction *is occurring* helps to explain the social relationships the individual will enter into to gratify his need for food. Yet it would be naïve to say that an individual eats lunch with a friend at one restaurant instead of another and chooses one course instead of another all *because* he was hungry. The problem obviously involves the

way in which his physiological needs are caught up in and become a part of his social needs.

All the physical characteristics possessed by the individual at birth which develop in purely biological maturation may have a direct or indirect relation to his personality, as the following statements illustrate:

1. "No one will hire me because of my black skin." (skin color)
2. "She's too fat for me." (body build)
3. "He is the nation's top basketball player." (skeleton)
4. "Many successful business men have ulcers." (body chemistry)
5. "He is a brilliant student." (nervous system)

And the list could be extended greatly. It is easy to see that none of the statements actually pertain to the physiological factor in question but rather to the social significance attaching to it. If black skin were not culturally a limitation upon employment, it would have no such significance for its possessor. In Polynesian cultures where slenderness in women is undesirable, "The Too Fat Polka" would have no meaning. In America, with our cultural emphasis upon competition and success, it is easy to understand the importance of height for the basketball player and "drive" in the businessman; where these cultural elements do not obtain, as in certain Pueblo villages, the role of these physical characteristics in social life would be quite different. Hence, the ontogenetic variation in the individual's heredity and his ontogenetic development, purely biological terms, must be seen in a social and cultural context in order to lend understanding about his personality development. Three important principles are involved in this interplay of the biological, social, and cultural in the personality development of the individual:

1. His physiological constitution may prevent him from entering into social relationships and from utilizing culture.

Example. Control of entry into certain occupations may mean that only persons of higher intelligence or other physical advantages will be admitted to these.

2. His social (unique interpersonal) relations may limit or prevent him from developing his physiological potential.

Example. In a mathematics aptitude test it was discovered that the student had a high *potential* for work in higher mathematics. During the previous four years in high school his grades in mathematics had been so poor, however, that he had been dropped from the college-preparatory curricu-

lum. It developed that a teacher of ninth-grade mathematics and this student had had such a poor relationship that the latter had "tried to get even with the teacher" by failing to do the assignments.

3. Culture may limit or prevent him from developing his physiological potential.

Example. In some parts of the United States Negroes are given poorer educational opportunities than whites receive in the same communities. Suppose that there are two children, one white and one Negro, who have identical intelligence and thus the identical potential capacity for learning. It is obvious that the white child, having greater opportunity to participate in an environment in which his intelligence could be trained, will be able to attain greater educational achievement, not because he is by heredity any brighter, but only because he has greater opportunities to utilize the hereditary qualities he natively possesses.

This interplay between the biological, the social, and the cultural variables in personality is also reflected in theoretical statements about emergent personality as an outcome of social relations.

Personality Emerges in Interaction with Other Personalities. The socially oriented approach to the study of personality emphasizes the interpersonal situation in its significance for early personality development. Here $A \rightleftharpoons B$ are likely to be mother and child, father and child, or sibling and child, since this type of interaction is crucial to the development of personality in the child. Out of the early social learning in the situation where the child's biological needs are being satisfied by the mother, or "mothering one," emerges a new set of needs in the child. These are needs for security and affection—for being wanted by others, intimately and warmly.

The baby would cry at night and, during the first weeks, could not be pacified until the nipple of the bottle was actually placed in his mouth. Very shortly, however, the baby could be quieted by holding or cuddling while the bottle was being prepared. On being awakened at night by the baby's cry, the young parents often divided the job of feeding it. One would rush to the baby and embrace it, cuddling and cooing. Quite often the baby would be pacified until the other parent had time to warm up the bottle. Too long a delay, however, would set the baby wailing again, because his stomach pangs would grow strong enough to offset his pleasure and warmth from the cuddling and affection.

In this example, the replacement of the nonsocial reaction of hunger with the social reaction of love and affection illustrates the emergent

nature of personality. Even more striking is the dominance of the physical need over the social when it is sufficiently strong. Thus, personality emerges when physical needs are sufficiently satisfied so that new social needs can be superimposed upon them. The first social need superimposed upon the biological appetites is, as we have suggested, the need for security and affection, for being loved, intimately and warmly, by others. From the very first set of interpersonal relations of the infant, the self-adjusting-to-other mechanisms begin. These mechanisms probably begin as personifications of pleasurable associations with the mother in a way which is later verbalized as "good mama" and with unpleasurable or anxious associations which are later verbalized as "bad mama."⁸ With the learning of language, the infant, at about two years of age, begins to verbalize the reactions of others toward him. When these reactions induce the favorable "good mama" associations, he tends to verbalize them as "good me," and when the reactions of others produce the unpleasant or anxious "bad mama" associations, he tends to verbalize them as "bad me."

The young couple are seated at the table. Johnny, aged two, is seated in his high chair beside the table. Secure in the warmth and attention of his parents he is gurgling and talking "baby talk." He is spilling oatmeal and has smeared it in his hair, over his high chair, and on the floor. The father's face is screwed up in disgust at the mess. He commands Johnny to be more neat in his eating habits. Turning to his wife, he demands to know why she has neglected his training in this regard. His general tone and his manner of addressing Johnny are disturbing, and Johnny begins to cry.

Returning to the concept of $A \rightleftharpoons B$, let A be Johnny and B be his father. Johnny is messy and this provokes a reaction in his father. Johnny thus learns something of the meaning of messiness, although it is doubtful if he will do so completely in this one instance. Nevertheless, Johnny has seen himself (in this case as "bad Johnny") through the eyes of another. This reflex way in which we acquire attitudes about ourselves and what things are appropriate or not appropriate has been called the "looking-glass self."⁹

⁸ Harry Stack Sullivan, *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry*, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1953, p. 161.

⁹ Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902, p. 152.

In a very large and interesting class of cases the social reference takes the form of a somewhat definite imagination of how one's self—that is an idea he appropriates—appears in a particular mind, and the kind of self-feeling one has is determined by the attitude toward this attributed to that other mind. A social self of this sort might be called the reflected or looking-glass self.

“Each to each a looking-glass

Reflects to the other that doth pass.”

As we see our face, figure, and dress in the glass, and are interested in them because they are ours, and pleased or otherwise with them according as they do or do not answer to what we should like them to be; so in imagination we perceive in another's mind some thought of our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on, and are variously affected by it.

A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance; and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification.

This social self is the core of personality as we have defined that term. Personality is the total organization of tendencies to behave in social situations. In other words, *A* and *B* are “each to each a looking-glass” in terms of their statuses or positions in society and in terms of the appropriate behaviors within these statuses. If *A* is a service-station attendant he may wipe the windshield of *B*'s car, not because *B* has ordered him to do so, but because in past interactional situations he has learned that others, like *B*, expect this of him. He is able, therefore, to anticipate what *B* expects, he has “seen himself through the looking-glass,” that is, in the eyes of previous customers. All of the status and role systems of society ultimately depend upon this psychological controlling force over the individuals occupying its statuses and acting out its roles. While, as we have indicated, the process of self-reaction begins early in life, too many have taken this fact as a basis for an extreme infantile determinism. The looking-glass mechanism, the process of adjusting self to others, goes on throughout life. Equally important with infantile experiences in the family are those in the school, play group, and all other interpersonal situations where we perceive that individuals whose opinions mean a great deal to us are perceiving us. Sometimes, too, they need not even be present to produce this social reaction in us. “What would mother think of me?” is a common reaction.

In our interpersonal relations we also come into contact with culture

through the people who constitute our looking glass. The ways of thinking and acting that have come to be accepted by these people will profoundly affect their judgments of us, and in turn, these ways of thinking and acting find their way into our personalities as we learn to accept them as standards regulating our own conduct and our expectations of others.

Personality Emerges in Culture. Since the needs of the individual, both psychological and biological, lie at the foundation of all social and cultural phenomena, society and culture exist for the individual. But, since social and cultural patterns are not inherited biologically but rather socially, they are perpetuated by teaching the individuals in each generation the set of behaviors which are appropriate to the positions in society which they will be expected to occupy. In this sense, that culture exists prior to any one individual, lies the element of truth which has sometimes been distorted into cultural determinism. On the contrary, culture itself is dependent upon psychological processes within the individual. This close interplay between culture and the individual personality is summarized below:¹⁰

1. Culture provides the *conditions* for learning. Upon birth a human baby enters a man-made environment which to some extent intervenes between him and the raw, "natural" environment. He is surrounded by artifacts whose number, uses, and form are characteristic of the culture of his society. He is surrounded by older human beings who have been trained in certain ways of thinking and of doing. The artifacts and the behavior of the humans who surround the infant provide a series of stimulus situations which are repeatedly presented to him as he grows to adulthood. These stimulus situations are, furthermore, in some respects unique to the society in which the infant is born. The infant . . . is confronted by ready-made stimulus situations to which he must learn to make specific responses.

2. Culture systematically *elicits appropriate responses*. While a certain amount of an individual's behavior is learned by trial and error, nevertheless every society makes special efforts to elicit the responses which are considered appropriate to certain situations. The small child's finger is taken out of his mouth; the baby is placed on the appropriate place for elimination; eating tools are put in its hand, and its arm is guided. When language has been established, the child, and later the adult, is

¹⁰ John Gillin, *The Ways of Men: An Introduction to Anthropology*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948, pp. 248-249. By permission of Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.


constantly directed to make certain appropriate responses. The particular responses desired vary from culture to culture, as does the amount and intensity of direction and elicitation, but in no society is the individual allowed to grow up discovering all of his culture by trial and error.

3. Culture, through its products or agents, provides reinforcements. Not only are the appropriate stimuli presented, and the proper responses elicited by the culture of one's society, but also a constant press of rewards and punishments operates to hasten the learning process and to extinguish undesired habits.

Thus we may say, not only that culture is learned behavior; it is also a setup for *learning* behavior of very complex and specific types.

4. The culture of a society therefore *has certain self-perpetuating tendencies*, so long as the human population which manifests the culture does not die out. However, since culture is learned, and all learned behavior is subject to change correlated with changes in the stimulus and response situations, it follows that culture also is subject to changes, which can be attributed at least in part on the basis of . . . psychological principles.

Recalling the tridimensional nature of our approach, let us bring together briefly the salient elements of our statements about the physiological, the social, and the cultural variables in personality as they function in the social situation. In the interactional situation:



The *cognitive* element of the situation, *A*'s knowledge of himself and of *B*, and *B*'s knowledge of himself and of *A*, constitutes the social psychological "stuff" which fuses *A* and *B* in a social situation. Within the social situation *A* incorporates in his reactions the anticipated reactions of *B*, and *B* likewise in his reactions incorporates the anticipated reactions of *A*. In simpler language, *A* and *B* "define" the situation and act upon this definition. In so doing, they set up a behavior interplay which defies analysis by means of the one-way reaction used in psy-

chology to study the individual. This latter method of inquiry has its important uses, but is simply not social psychology. Physiological elements in the situation also are important objects of study in other sciences but lose their relevance for social psychology until they enter into the interactional situation, whereupon they become prime objects of interest. For example, if *A* were afraid of *B* and had defined the situation as a fearful one, then the physical symptoms of fear would affect *A*'s response as well as *B*'s, if he perceived them. Skin color would not be directly relevant to interaction between two or more Southern whites but would be highly relevant for the study of interaction between a Southern white and a Negro.

The same is true of the social and cultural variables of the situation. Not all of society nor all of culture are present in *A* and *B* when they interact. Their unique histories of social relationships and their unique exposures to culture involved only small segments of their society and its culture. Even in the most primitive society, their participation would have been limited by sex, age, kinship, and other criteria. Hence, only those social positions (statuses) and only those expectancies of behavior (roles) which enter into the interactional situation are directly relevant to social psychology. The task of the social psychologist, then, is to study the self-other expectations of *A* and *B* as these unfold in reciprocal reactions. This is why principles about social situations are so important to the science. Yet what we have presented above clearly reveals that we must study situations not abstractly but in terms of their *meaning* to participants. As one great social psychologist has put it, "What men define as real is real in its consequences."¹¹ By this we do not mean that there is no reality when men do not define it, or that something becomes true when men define it to be true. We do mean that the focus of social psychology is upon one aspect of reality—that which men define as real in their self-other relationships. Negroes are not really inferior, but it would be terribly difficult to analyze race relations if we did not know how some white men defined the Negro's statuses and roles. Hence our concern for the subjective aspect of social situations, their meaning for the individuals involved. *Social situations vary in their significance for the individual (priority, intensity, frequency, and duration).*

¹¹ Edmund H. Volkart (ed.), *Social Behavior and Personality: The Contributions of W. I. Thomas to Theory and Social Research*, New York, Social Science Research Council, 1951, p. 81.

Participation in varying types of social situations carries differential weight for, or impact upon, the personality. *Priority* refers to those situations which, occurring in the earliest and most pliable stages of personality development, have the greater potential for molding the personality. *Intensity* refers to the emotional involvement of the individual with others in the situation, which strongly affects the meaning which such experience will hold for him. *Frequency* and *duration*, once thought to be the most important factors in habit learning, refer to repeated performance and prolonged performance respectively. Intensity and its effect are now considered the most important factors for influencing future behavior, but frequency and duration are important qualifying factors.

It would seem from all that has been said thus far, that social psychology has a very narrow range of theoretical inquiry since it is concerned with only the self-other reciprocal reactions taking place in interactions involving small numbers of people. This is quite true of our focus, but when the range of such interactions in modern mass society is taken into consideration, our field is broad indeed. All that is studied in the other behavioral sciences can be "reshuffled" from the theory of the behavioral science in question and viewed through the social-psychological focus upon people in interaction.

In economics, for example, it would seem that nothing could be farther from the focus of social psychology than such rigid formulations as the law of supply and demand. Veblen's outstanding contribution at the turn of the century illustrates quite vividly how the interactional framework could be applied to economic data and reveal *lacunae* in abstract economic theory which must be filled in with social-psychological considerations.¹² His famous "canon of conspicuous consumption" illustrates beautifully the necessity for the $A \rightleftharpoons B$ situational scheme, where A is contemplating a purchase, such as a new car, and is strongly motivated to buy the car when he envisions the envious response of his neighbor B and the concomitant increase in social status which he imagines will accrue to his purchase. Previous economic theory had depended upon a concept of the perfectly rational consumer who buys because of the utility of the thing purchased. The law of supply and demand and the concept of utility were not "repealed" by Veblen and other economists who discovered the social-psychological

¹²Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1899.

element in economic phenomena, but economics was forced to broaden its theory in the light of these insights. Interactional theory has also been brought to bear upon political problems, where the influence of *A* and *B* upon each other's voting behavior has been found a fruitful area of research.¹³ The assembly line, the foreman, social interaction in factory work groups have all been studied as applications of the social-psychological point of view to the problems of industry. Parishes and pastors have been studied under this purview. In fact, it is the very breadth of possible application of the social-psychological point of view that makes it mandatory for the student of the field to have a fixed model which helps him to sort out the extraneous from the essential in social-psychological investigation. The concept of communication has been used effectively by researchers and theorists in social psychology as such a model.

Communication serves as the scientific model which integrates the physiologically oriented, the socially oriented, and the culturally oriented approaches to the study of personalities in social situations. This statement means that communication may be considered in its physiological, social, and cultural contexts, thus lending unity to the three major approaches to social psychology. The statement does not mean that communication, as such, is the focus of social psychology. While such approaches have been attempted, the end result is usually too arid and abstract for the beginning student. The concept of communication serves only as an integrating blueprint which provides a basis for relating (1) *Physiological*-psychological processes (proprio-ception, extero-ception, and the integrating "psyche" or communication center); (2) *social* processes of interaction (mother-child, employer-employee, editorial writer-reader situations, for example, in terms of the significance for the individual personality of what is being communicated); and (3) *cultural* systems of norms and beliefs (role systems, value systems, etc., as channels of communication).

Thus, when *A* and *B* are considered as elements of a communication system, their physiological constitutions can be viewed as essential conditions for transmitting and receiving messages from one to the other, and physiological factors relevant to this function must be clearly understood by the social psychologist since they constitute the substratum upon which the stratum, or level, in which he is interested

¹³ Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948.

must necessarily rest. In this light, *A* and *B* may be viewed physiologically as communication apparatuses made up of:¹⁴

- a. sense organs, the receivers
- b. effector organs, the senders
- c. a communication center, the place of origin and destination of all messages
- d. the remaining parts of the body, the shelter of the communication machinery

While this is helpful in stating the physical and purely mechanical conditions under which *A* and *B* are interacting, it tells us nothing of the *content* of the messages which they are exchanging. As a minimum, they must have language in common, hence language and all of the cultural nuances of verbal and gestural connotation and denotation for "perfect communication" (in quotes because it is so seldom achieved) must be identical for *A* and *B*. It is helpful to think of each as a transmitter and a receiver and in this analogy each must be "set to the same channel." In this sense, we speak of *culture as the channel of communication*.

Finally, the cognitive ("knowing") element is inserted in the equation, and we speak of the social aspect of the communication situation. The needs of each individual for security and response, together with his awareness of the other or others in the situation and their expectations of him, constitute the *regulating* controls of the communication system. To use the communicating organism analogy, these regulatory controls constitute the *sensitivity* of the organism to messages of various kinds. In a word, the *meaning* of the situation to the actors *A* and *B* will be the governing factor in the course that the interflow of messages will take.

THE INTEGRATING FUNCTION OF THEORY

The most meaningful way to avoid acquiring a merely superficial hodgepodge in social psychology is to employ such an integrating frame of reference as has been presented here. Taking into consideration the fact that several fields of such scope and breadth as sociology, psychology, psychiatry, and anthropology are closely related to social

¹⁴ Jurgen Reusch and Gregory Bateson, *Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry*, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1951, p. 17.

psychology, it can be seen that a danger to be avoided is that of learning a smattering of each of these fields without really learning social psychology at all. Of the fields which lend material to social psychology (and within each of which are mountains of accumulated nonrelevant knowledge), it is imperative that the question of what material is relevant to social psychology be answered. Thus, to the question of what is relevant from physiology, for example, to the study of the individual in interaction, a standard of relevance is provided by the theoretical frame of reference outlined above. What role does the skeletal system of the body play in social psychology? The answer is relatively little. Yet from physiology some broad understandings of other bodily systems such as the autonomic and central nervous systems are essential to the understanding of the communicative process and hence to social psychology.

Relevant to social psychology in the field of psychology is, as a very minimum, the work that has been done in human learning and social adjustment since these occur largely within social situations in a process of communication. Even a cursory glance at an introductory sociology or anthropology textbook reveals that such concepts as *status* (one's position in a group), *role* (the behavior expected of one in a group), and *culture* (the constantly changing patterns of learning behavior and the products of learned behavior which are shared and transmitted among the members of a society) are relevant to the study of individuals in interaction.

But the intention here is not to present an exhaustive study of these other disciplines in their relevance to social psychology. Rather the intention is to suggest, to point the way for the reader to integrate, the frame of reference and the materials which follow in the text. Although perhaps an oversimplification, it has been said that learning is problem solving. Certainly the student learning social psychology must sift a large number of propositions about human behavior and integrate them into such a frame of reference as has been presented in this discussion of theory.

Since the methodology of social psychology, as is true of all sciences, has been tailored to suit its focus, the discussion of method in the next chapter should serve also to help the student "apperceive" the scope of the modern field.

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Chapter 3

THE TOOLS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Modern social psychology is scientific in scope and method. Its scope of inquiry, recalling the previous chapter of this book, is the range of possible knowledge which might be gathered about the interacting individual. This scope of inquiry is limited further by the method which social psychology has adopted. We are limited not only to the study of the interacting individual but also to the particular *kinds* of study which are proper to scientific inquiry. The choice of a method for our discipline is not an arbitrary one which we decide upon but is rather the historical consequence of the scientific impulse in sociology and psychology in the nineteenth century. The striking success of the scientific method in the natural sciences encouraged a great deal of speculation about its applicability to the study of the human being and society. Unfortunately, the underlying assumptions appropriate to the natural sciences, which we may characterize briefly as determinism and materialism, led to serious errors about the human individual and society on the part of some and a repugnance to social science on the part of others who rejected these errors.

If the essence of science is that all of its phenomena can be reduced to something physical and explained by the mechanistic principles governing matter, then social psychology is not a science. If, however, a large and important body of knowledge about the reciprocal influencing of individuals in social situations can be built up via the same thought processes used in the natural sciences, and our discussion of the theory of social psychology in the previous chapter illustrates that this is the case, then social psychology is a science to this extent. However, we have

had to adapt our methods of studying the human being to the irrefutable fact that the mental life of man cannot be reduced to material principles nor studied by the methods appropriate for the study of matter. This entire issue is explained more fully in the chapters which follow. At this point we summarize the question in this way: social psychology limits itself in scope much the same as any science; its methods are adaptations of models used in the natural sciences and in certain other social sciences as well as inventions of methods uniquely its own. This enables us to qualify carefully our decision to consider social psychology as a science.

We consider, therefore, that social psychology is scientific in scope and method, and as such is subject to the restrictions imposed upon all sciences. Science is not concerned with individual cases excepting where they are used as examples and, of course, as individual instances which are recorded in the process of inducing a general theory. Science is, rather, concerned with classes of beings. Since its primary aim is the discovery of order in nature, the scope of each science is thus limited to the natural order—to the formulation of principles and relationships pertaining to the classes of things which fall within its proper scope of inquiry. In the case of social psychology, the exploration of the natural order is at the social level, i.e., at the level where man's mental life is involved in forming thoughts about expectations of himself and others in social life and his emotional reactions to these thoughts. For biology and in some areas of psychology, the scope of inquiry is limited to the organic level of life within the natural order; for the physicist, the level of nonliving matter within the natural order. The tools of these investigators must, therefore, be adapted to the thing they are studying. Admittedly, the microscope is of little or no help in investigating questions in social psychology. On the other hand, the case history, the questionnaire, and the interview, all tools of social psychology, would be of little use to the microbiologist. Therefore we need apologize for the methods of social psychology only to the extent that they are inadequate to the tasks proper to the field. If these restrictions are carefully observed, the question, Is social psychology *really* a science? is reduced to the lowly status of a "quibble." The real question relates to the adequacy of the tools of social psychology for the scientific study of the interacting individual, and without further preliminary, we turn our attention to this question.

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CHOICE OF METHODS

By now it should be evident that the methods of social psychology must be appropriate to the needs of theory development. In the preceding chapter some important dimensions of theory were discussed, and we review them here in order to illustrate their relationship to methodological considerations. (1) Two (or more) individuals interacting comprise a social situation. The influence of one upon the other, or the reciprocal influence upon both, is a feature of the *personality* approach which is a part of social psychology. (2) The *situation* can be studied in itself, without reference to personality directly, or it can be studied concurrently with personality. Fixing these theoretical constructs firmly in mind let us turn to their meaning in terms of method.

The scientific explanation of a phenomena may be stated either (1) in terms of factors which are operating at the moment of the occurrence of the phenomenon or (2) in terms of the processes operating in the earlier history of the phenomenon. The first we may term *factoral* (some synonyms are "actuarial," "situational," "field") since it is concerned with the factors operating here and now in the personality or the situation. The second we may call *processual* (some synonyms are "genetic," "biographical," "historical") since it emphasizes the historical development, by stages, of the personality or the situation. We hasten to point out that not two realities are represented by the two viewpoints but two different dimensions of the same reality. The factoral approach stresses the present; the processual approach resorts also to information about the past. Let us assign fictional titles to two imaginary research projects in order to clarify this relationship between the two approaches. The first is "The Broken Home in Juvenile Delinquency: A Study of 2,000 Delinquent Girls." Later in this chapter we shall deal more fully with the methodology of such a study. At this point we merely note that this study was probably a tabulation of the characteristics of 2,000 delinquent girls and that the factor of "broken home" occurred with what the investigators thought to be unusual frequency in the group studied. Consequently, it is easily classified as a *factoral* approach. (The distinction between the two approaches is not always so easy.) Let us now imagine a study entitled "The Broken Home in Juvenile Delinquency: An Intensive Study of Twenty Delinquent Girls." The tip-off here is

the small number of cases studied. It is extremely unlikely that any kind of statistical reliability with regard to "factors" could be achieved. Hence, the study was probably a small and intensive exploration of the backgrounds of delinquent girls coming from broken homes. In this case, the study is genetic or *processual*. Now we have examples of the study of personality both as *factoral* and as *processual*. But we have not exhausted the possibilities of these two approaches. *Situations* may also be studied as factoral or processual. We shall include "sociometry" in a later section of this chapter devoted to the methods of studying interactional situations. So we are not here considering sociometrics as such but rather as a means of providing us with an example of the difference between the factoral-situational and the processual-situational approaches.¹

The Moreno test has found extensive and intensive use in the fields of sociology, psychology, and education. Its fundamental purpose is to measure the social structure of a specified group. The sociometric test accomplishes this by requiring each individual of a specified group to select one or more individuals in that group on the basis of a stipulated criterion of choice. The standard method of obtaining choices in a sociometric test is the question-and-answer method, i.e., the individuals are asked to name their choices. These choices are usually written by the individual or, in cases of young children, may be written in by the experimenter. Thus, by simply counting the total number of choices each individual receives from the other members a rank order can be obtained and each individual's relative position in that group may readily be ascertained. This is the basis of the group structure in sociometric studies.

The basic structure may be divided into groups of individuals on the basis of the number of choices received. Those individuals who receive the largest number of choices have been designated as *leaders*, *stars*, *most-chosen*, and *most-accepted*. Individuals receiving few or no choices have been called *isolates*, *unchosen*, *rejected*, *least-chosen*, and *least-accepted*.

Let us construct a hypothetical sociogram to illustrate these concepts.

We can imagine that this sociogram represents the attraction of the various children of a neighborhood play group toward one another.

¹ Eugene Bird, "Validity and Constancy of Choices in a Sociometric Test," *Sociometry*, 1951, 14, p. 175.

The arrow \longrightarrow indicates that the child in question listed the child toward whom the arrow is pointed as a favorite playmate. The arrows pointed at both ends indicate a mutual choice. From the sociogram we can see that Trudy is the *most chosen*, since five of the others have designated her as a favorite playmate. Teresa, Cynthia, and Hope are *isolates*, since no one has chosen them. If we imagine that the children





FIG. 3. A hypothetical play situation represented as a sociogram.

were all questioned at roughly the same time, we can see that we have here a *factoral-situational* study. Likewise, if we were to go back into the history of the play group to explore the reasons why these choices developed, it is equally easy to see that the character of the study would be *processual-situational*. Frequently a series of factoral-situational studies taken at various points in time will constitute a valuable aid to processual study. For example, if the group of children were questioned at intervals to state their choice of a favorite playmate and a series of sociograms were constructed from these, the changing patterns of playmate preference would be a valuable aid in gaining insight into the processes at work in the group.

In summary, we find that personality and situation, factoral and processual are capable of being combined as a fourfold table of categories:



So, for the sake of convenience we may classify the methods of social psychology under four main headings: (1) the *factoral-personality*, (2) the *factoral-situational*, (3) the *processual-personality*, and (4) the *processual-situational* approaches, which classification serves as a vehicle for the orderly presentation of the major methods and techniques of social psychology.

The Processual-personality Approach

The main method of this approach is, of course, the case history, which has been the chief tool of analysis for psychiatrists, social workers, and for many social psychologists. The genetic approach involves the assumption that present personality organization can be adequately understood only developmentally, i.e., only in terms of the past life experiences of the individual in his society and culture (in modern societies, social class and *subculture*). This has often been called the longitudinal approach because, in contrast to collecting data across time at a given point (e.g., a nation-wide survey of opinions about presidential candidates), this approach (by analogy with the spatial concept of longitude, of course) goes "up and down" the life span of the individual to discover the sources of his attitudes and opinions. As an example, the life histories of a Maine Republican and a Georgia Democrat might be analyzed in the hope of finding personal-social and cultural reasons why these individuals possess different political opinions, the reasons why these individuals "became" Republican or Democrat.

There has been a great deal of criticism of the use of life-history material as a method for gathering data in social psychology. Perhaps the chief criticism of the use of life-history material has been the lack of scientifically rigorous *procedures* for gathering and analyzing the life-history information. Other objections include improper sampling and the tendency to generalize from one or a handful of cases. No matter how skillfully accomplished and scientifically rigorous, the case history of one individual is a dubious basis for generalization. The essential problem is that, in order to do the intensive analysis and the painstaking data gathering required for the properly conducted life history, the time and effort expended on one subject could have been diverted to the gathering of relevant data from a greater *number* of subjects selected carefully enough so as to constitute a sample from which more reliable generalizations can be made. The trend in modern social psychology has been away from the case-history method because of the emphasis on scientific experimentation and statistical analysis. This is in no small measure due to the influence of laboratory-trained psychologists who, as we shall see in the chapters devoted to the historical backgrounds of social psychology, have traditionally hewed closer to experimental methods of the natural sciences than have their fellow workers in sociology, anthropology, and psychiatry. Without

denying the scientific value of experimental social psychology, there are, nevertheless, important functions for social psychology of the life-history method which, for the present at least, cannot be performed as satisfactorily by other methods. By delving into the life organization of the subject, a highly qualitative and insightful analysis may be made of the *meaning* which life situations may now have for the individual and how he came to acquire these meanings.

It is often helpful, sometimes even essential, for the investigator to "know what it is like" to be one of the subjects he is studying. It is extremely difficult for a middle-class, professionally trained social psychologist to conduct research into such areas as the function and meaning of work for persons of the lower occupational groupings, since in his own life history there would be few comparable experiences to help him with this understanding. Thus the life histories of one or several persons in the lower occupational classes would be an excellent source of meaningful questions and insights which could be incorporated into a study involving a larger number of subjects carefully selected so as to constitute the sample of a more extensive study. Life histories, then, are highly useful for illustrative purposes, especially where the remainder of the presentation is purely statistical. In this way the life history enlivens the presentation of the findings.

There have been concerted efforts to devise a more scientific methodology for the life-history approach in view of its value in providing a deeper understanding of personality than is obtainable by any other means. In this connection, the "criteria for a life history" of John Dollard have found widespread acceptance as broad principles of scientific case-history construction.²

1. The subject must be viewed as a specimen in a cultural series.
2. The organic motors of action ascribed must be socially relevant.
3. The peculiar role of the family group in transmitting the culture must be recognized.
4. The specific method of elaboration of organic materials into social behavior must be shown.
5. The continuous related character of experience from childhood to adulthood must be stressed.
6. The "social situation" must be carefully and continuously specified as a factor.
7. The life-history material itself must be organized and conceptualized.

² John Dollard, *Criteria for the Life History*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1935, pp. 8-36.

To the above criteria, Young would add that attention must be paid also to the (1) interaction in which the self arises and (2) to the individual differences which obtain between the subject and others due to personal-social (unique social experiences) learning. In his *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*,³ Appendix A is an excellent and exhaustive outline for a life history, not all of which is germane to every life history, but which constitutes a good check list to ensure that no essential material is omitted. Its broad headings include:

- I. Data on family
- II. Developmental history of the individual
- III. Adult life
- IV. The nature and meaning of the inner (subjective) life

The chief tool for accumulating data for the life history is, of course, the interview in which either the subject or an informant who knows a great deal about the subject is asked to provide direct information relevant to the life history. Additional sources of data for the life history may be as varied as memoirs, letters, diaries, and autobiographies. Public sources such as court records and published documents may supplement the more personal types of sources. But this other material is usually of secondary importance to the case method which uses the interview as a key technique and this supplementary material to substantiate and implement the information obtained in the interview.

The interview may be *structured* or *unstructured*, meaning that it may consist of a long string of preconceived questions to which the respondent has merely to reply yes or no, or to provide bits of information called for by the questions; or it may be very loosely structured with no formal questions prepared but merely a list of points to be covered. In addition to the verbal interviewing, some "projective" and other types of *testing* may occur as supplementary methods of obtaining information. But the concepts of structure in the interview and the use of other means of supplementing interview information are more appropriate to the *factoral-personality* approach. To date no great advance over the loosely structured case-method type of interview (with supplementary recourse to diaries and other personal documents as well as public records) in the study of the life history has been made. On the other hand, the development of new techniques for the study of factors in personality has been nothing short of phenomenal. Often referred to

³ Kimball Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, 2d ed., New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952, p. 687ff.

as "statistical" studies, they have all but replaced the life-history method as a means of studying personality in the social situation.

The Factoral-personality Approach

As we have suggested, this approach is usually accomplished not with a handful of subjects whose life histories are to be studied *intensively* but rather with a large, carefully drawn sample of persons whose characteristics are to be studied *extensively*. Sometimes, too, the distinction is difficult or impossible to draw if the investigator uses large numbers of subjects but studies them over a large segment of their life span. For example, in their studies of gifted children, Terman and his associates⁴ interviewed and tested substantially the same study group at intervals in their life development. Hence, their study was a combination of the processual, since they studied their subjects from the genetic point of view, and the factoral, since they had schedules of items of information about their subjects which emphasized statistical norms for the subjects as a whole rather than comprehensive life histories of each individual subject. But the distinction between the two approaches is usually much more easily drawn. On the whole, the characteristics of the factoral-personality approach derive from attempts to introduce the scientific features of *objectivity* and *generality* into the study of personality.

Objectivity demands techniques which are relatively free of the observer's subjective judgments of the individuals being studied. Generality demands techniques for making statements from research findings which will hold true for all personalities or at least for a much larger *population* than the *sample* studies. The basic difficulties encountered in the genetic or processual approach were that the interviewer's judgment often provided the only basis for deciding what information should be recorded, the accuracy of the information given, and other such questions. Further, as we have said, the sampling problem in studies employing merely the life-history technique is a difficult and often an impossible one. Clinical psychologists, biographers, and others who are concerned with the *idios*, the uniquely individual subject, must use this method. Generality is, however, the aim of social psychology, a science which is not directly concerned with application of its findings to any particular individual.

⁴L. M. Terman and M. Oden, *The Gifted Child Grows Up*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1947.

The factorial-personality approach in social psychology often overlaps with similar approaches in the psychology of personality, the psychology of perception, and other specialized fields in psychology, education, and other disciplines concerned with personality. The prime focus of social psychology is upon the interacting individual in the social situation. Hence it seeks to know about the interaction of *A* and *B* and their preparation to assume statuses and perform roles in this interactional situation. These preparations or predispositions to behave in this situation are called *attitudes*. We will develop this concept throughout the text; at this point we simply wish to reiterate that "personality" as we employ it in social psychology refers to the total organization of the individual's tendencies to behave in social situations. We must be extremely careful to distinguish between this limited concept and broader ones in psychology and philosophy which are concerned with the whole range of mental life. Attitudes, of course, do not comprise all of the interior life of the individual. This narrows the scope of social psychology considerably and accounts for the overwhelming preponderance of attitude studies in the field. But before turning to the discussion of the concept of attitudes and their measurement, perhaps it will be helpful to consider briefly some means of studying personality (in a broader sense than the term is used in our field) in other areas of psychology and education which border on social psychology.

Without abandoning the idea completely that *personality tests* have been, or at least will be, helpful in solving the problems of social psychology, we must nevertheless acknowledge that they are not contributions to methodology which have come out of social-psychological research but are "borrowings" from neighboring fields. They have been of most use in those fields whose task it is to appraise the personality of an individual.⁵

As commonly understood, a personality test is a device that singles out and measures aspects or dimensions of personality through answers or performances in response to predefined questions. These answers are recorded on a scale of response units. The test represents an artificially constructed situation of stimulus and response. The individual is presented with questions (stimuli) and responds with verbal answers or performances (responses). These sequences constitute the data for personality appraisal.

⁵ Louis P. Thorpe and Allen M. Schmuller, *Personality: An Interdisciplinary Approach*, Princeton, N.J., D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1958, p. 308.

We may group the tests developed in psychology, education, and other fields concerned with personality under two headings, those which are often used in social-psychological research and those which are not. We repeat that social psychologists may find any of these tests useful on occasion but only a handful are a part of the permanent tool chest of the researcher in social psychology.

Personality Tests in Social Psychology

Frequently used

Questionnaire

Rating scales (especially attitude scales)

Less frequently used

Intelligence tests

Personality inventories

Projective methods

Concept-formation tests

Word-association tests

Art analysis

Free-play

Social psychologists also employ other techniques in common with students of personality in the other behavioral sciences. These include observation, interviewing, and the life-history method, but, as we have emphasized, the study of *attitudes* has been the major preoccupation of research in social psychology where the emphasis has been placed upon personality. And it is in the area of attitude study that social psychology has made its chief contribution to methods of studying personality.

Perhaps the simplest way to distinguish the social psychologist's approach to the study of personality from those of others is to point out that he is interested in no more of the total personality than that which helps him to understand the responses of *A* and *B* toward themselves and each other in the interactional situation $A \rightleftharpoons B$. With the life-history method, he would have to have access to the biographies of *A* and *B* and from these he would try to predict and understand their responses. With the factorial-personality approach, he is freed from the laborious task of piecing all this together and the uncertainty that attends it. He seeks, instead, two broad kinds of information: (1) the socially significant characteristics of people like *A* and *B*, and (2) the attitudes associated with these characteristics which will facilitate understanding of the ways in which they respond to one another. Attitudes are known to vary by *sex*, *age*, *socioeconomic class*, *rural* or *urban* residence, and a myriad number of other characteristics. The

problem of predicting what *A* or *B* will do in a given situation centers around the knowledge, accumulated in painstaking research, of associations between these background factors and responses in social situations. Although several conceptions and techniques have been developed which counter the difficulties attending such an approach, many difficulties remain to be ironed out.

The first of these difficulties is finding out what the attitudes are of people like, let us say, *A*. The procedure is to delimit a *universe* of all persons having similar characteristics and then to select a small manageable number of these for study. This sample must be *representative* of the universe as a whole. The sample may be drawn in such a way that every person in the universe has an equal chance of being represented, a *simple random sample*. Alternative means of sampling include *systematic sampling*, that is, selection at regular intervals, which could be accomplished by assigning all cases in the universe a number and then by selecting every *N*th number; *cluster sampling*, by groups rather than by individuals, for example, *N* number of cases from each of several census tracts; and *stratified sampling*, random sampling from parts or "strata." Somewhere along the line in the sampling process the element of randomness or "chance" must be observed, since the essential feature of reasoning from a sample to a universe is the invoking of the laws of probability mathematics. But, assuming that a satisfactory sampling design has enabled us to locate a representative sample of people like *A*, we now know only *who* to call upon for the information we seek; *how* to ask them must be equally well thought out.

The schedule of items to be asked, normally the *questionnaire*, may be filled out by the respondents and returned to a messenger or mailed back to the researchers. Preferable by far, for obvious reasons, is the situation where a trained interviewer establishes rapport with the respondent, sets up the proper atmosphere for the exchange of information, reads the question to the respondent, and notes his reply as well as other observations that he may wish to include. The completed *items* of the questionnaire are, of course, the basic data of the study. It is vitally necessary that careful attention be paid to *what* is being asked, and the items are that *what*. So far in our discussion of sampling, *who*, the instrument for collecting data, and *how*, the procedures, are purely mechanical and can be found detailed in full in methods manuals. By far the most fascinating aspect of the whole procedure is the selecting of items to be submitted to the respondent. Here research, in a circular

process, brings us back to theory, where interesting questions remain from previous research, and our ingenuity is taxed in two directions. First, in our quest for information about the attitudes of people like *A*, there is a wealth of previous research available in the literature of the various behavioral sciences, journal articles, books, and monographs. There must be a search through the literature for information gleaned from previous research relating to our general problem: What are the attitudes of people like *A*? Second, our items must be selected. Most of them will be found in the literature and adapted to our needs. Inevitably, however, some items must be invented because of the uniqueness of our problem: What can be contributed by *this* study to the understanding of attitudes of people like *A*?

Some observations about attitude measurement in general have been accumulating and these reduce the confusion about just what is being sought in attitude research. The first of these is that attitudes are persistent, since they are enduring unit processes of personality. Since they range in intensity, however, there are degrees of persistency which must be taken into account. A second, and equally important, fact is that the social reactions (learned behaviors) of an individual are not each one an attitude but rather form clusters, or *attitude universes*. Conversely, a whole host of social reactions make up an attitude. In selecting items for inclusion in the study, then, it is important to have clearly in mind just what dimensions of attitudes are being investigated. *Unidimensionality* is the objective sought in the various items making up an attitude scale. This means that when the items *thought* to reflect an attitude comprise a scale along which the respondents can be ordered, the *existence* of a single (uni) attitude (dimension) is actually verified. All of this means nothing, of course, unless the concept of scale is understood, and perhaps the use of an example is the best means for insuring this.⁶

In the detailed procedures used in working out a scale of general attitudes toward the Army, for example, twelve items were used. Some of the items rather closely resemble each other in format. But they are certainly not synonymous. Consider four of them:

In general, do you think you yourself have gotten a square deal in the army?

⁶ Samuel A. Stouffer, "Scaling Concepts and Scaling Theory," in Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch, and Stuart W. Cook (eds.), *Research Methods in Social Relations: Part Two, "Selected Techniques,"* New York, The Dryden Press, Inc., 1951, p. 689.

- ☐ Yes, in most ways I have.
☐ In some ways yes, in other ways no.
☐ No, on the whole I haven't gotten a square deal.
 In general, how well do you think the army is run?
☐ It is run very well.
☐ It is run pretty well.
☐ It is not run so well.
☐ It is run very poorly.
☐ Undecided.

Do you think the army has tried its best to look out for the welfare of enlisted men?

- ☐ Yes, it has tried its best.
☐ It has tried some, but not enough.
☐ It has hardly tried at all.

Do you think when you are discharged you will go back to civilian life with a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the Army?

- ☐ Very favorable.
☐ Fairly favorable.
☐ About 50-50.
☐ Fairly unfavorable.
☐ Very unfavorable.

Even the briefest of analyses of these four items will illustrate the concept of *scale*. Those responding favorably on one item will tend to do so on the others, those responding unfavorably on one item will also tend to respond unfavorably on the others, and those in the middle category will tend to remain consistently so. *Reproducibility*, meaning that a score on one item is predictive of scores on the others, is a feature of a scale. From the example given, *scalar types* can be constructed thus, resulting in a "measuring stick" for evaluating general attitudes toward the army. The simplest way to illustrate this is to group together all of the favorable and all of the unfavorable answers to each of the four items and scale them thus, with *X* equaling favorable replies and *O*, unfavorable:

XXXX	XXXO	XXOO	XOOO	OOOO

This brief discussion of scales serves to indicate that items are not loosely thrown into a questionnaire, but that *dimensions* of attitudes are thoroughly thought out (they are often *pretested* on a small sub-sample before being submitted to the respondents) and their signifi-

cance for broader theoretical questions are the guiding feature in their selection. Then, too, it should be kept in mind that by changing the wording of a given question the proportions of responses can be affected considerably. Emotionally tinged words can produce distorted percentages of responses. For example, "Are you prejudiced against Negroes?" will probably get a different response than, "Do you think the Negro should keep his place?" but the underlying dimension is the same to both questions. The researcher using this method must be constantly on guard against the intrusion of his attitudes into the questionnaire and the problems of interpreting respondents' replies. Often the combination of these difficulties makes it mandatory to use the case history, where an eye can be kept on such difficulties by keeping notes on respondent reactions during the interview and the like. The questionnaire is not, innately, more scientific as some seem to believe.

We have discussed the means by which attitudes are studied in relation to the characteristics of the individuals who hold them. There are important variations on this procedure. Sometimes the procedure is reversed and those who hold certain attitudes are studied in order to learn their characteristics! The "actuarial" school of criminologists, for example, starts with groups of youthful delinquents and adult criminals, those known to have attitudes unfavorable to the observance of the law, and attempts to uncover the factors associated with their criminal attitudes. Often such attempts overlap with other than statistical methods, such as the life history and personality testing. In this approach, these are merely means of acquiring data for statistical manipulation.

Suppose that a research-minded clinic team consisting of a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, and sociologist, and their assistants, using the best available methods of study and examination, were assigned the task of studying several hundred consecutive cases of juvenile and adult offenders, at the best vantage point in the legal-correctional process . . . a projection of the expected findings of such a team can be given, taking into account a balanced perspective of all the important points of view. The projection will be made for the American scene in the United States today, and the assumption will be that the psychiatrist will represent an eclectic psychiatry, the psychologist will be a clinical psychologist, and the sociologist will deal with the impact of the social background, especially the family and community situation, as well as the person's own story or life history.^{6a}

^{6a} Walter C. Reckless, *The Crime Problem*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955.

Table 4. Projected Causative Factors by Rank Order (from High to Low) of Assumed Frequency of Occurrence, for Juvenile Delinquents and Youthful Offenders, Adult Misdemeanants, and Adult Felons—Males*

<i>Causative factors</i>	<i>Juvenile delinquents, youthful offenders</i>	<i>Adult misdemeanants</i>	<i>Adult felons</i>
Transmission of delinquent and criminal pattern	1	4	1
Wish blockage and frustration	3	5	2
Family tension and discord	4	2	5
Inadequacy and pressure of personal problems	6	1	4
Lax family supervision (for juveniles) and homelessness (for adults)	2	6	6
Psychopathic trends	7	3	7
Aggressiveness and assertiveness	5	†	3
Neurotic symptom	8	7	8
Epilepsy, etc.	9	9	9
Physical liabilities and handicaps	†	8	10
Psychosis	†	10	†
Mental retardation	†	†	†
Glandular dysfunction	†	†	†

* Adapted from Walter C. Reckless, *The Crime Problem*, New York, Appleton-Crofts, Inc., 1955, p. 68.

† Negligible in frequency.

This approach is sometimes called "actuarial" because it employs the actuarial method of insurance companies which fix their rates of insurance according to the characteristics of the person to be insured. Single young men attending college and not residing at home have the highest rates of automobile insurance, for example, while older married persons with families have lower rates. As shown in Table 4 it can be seen that young people who are exposed to delinquent companions (transmission of delinquent and criminal pattern, rank order 1), who have lax home supervision (rank order 2), wish blockages, family

tensions, and so on down the rank order of factors, are the poorest “risks” as far as juvenile delinquency is concerned in pretty much the same way that the college youth is the poorest “risk” for auto insurance. Similar attempts have been made to predict success in marriage and in other life situations. This kind of statistical study, therefore, provides much valuable information and escapes many of the difficulties of attitude measurement, although, of course, losing also many of its useful insights.




FIG. 4. Reproduced with permission from Floyd H. Allport, “The J-Curve Hypothesis of Conforming Behavior,” in T. Newcomb and Eugene Hartley (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology*, New York, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1947; first published in *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1934, 5, pp. 141–183.

Finally, there are those who hold, rightly, that questionnaire items may be predictive of *what people will reply to a questionnaire* but entertain serious doubts that this kind of verbal reply will always carry over to *what people will actually do in a behavior situation*. These approach the problem of behavior from actual observation. An example of this type of study is provided by Father Joseph Fichter’s research on a modern city parish.⁷ The proportion of the congregation attending church at each mass was estimated as well as the number receiving the sacraments and other manifestations of religious belief. An attempt was made to develop typologies of the extent to which religious participation

⁷ Joseph H. Fichter, S.J., *Dynamics of a City Parish*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951.

was incorporated into the life organization and personality of the parishioners. A pioneer study of the actual behavior of individuals in the face of institutional norms revealed that a surprising number of graphs of such observations take the form of the reversed letter "J." Among these were motorists' behavior at a stop sign, Catholics blessing themselves upon entering a church, and other instances where individuals' conformity to social norms could be observed. Two examples of this phenomenon are reproduced in Figures 4 and 5.




FIG. 5. Reproduced with permission from Floyd H. Allport, "The J-Curve Hypothesis of Conforming Behavior," in T. Newcomb and Eugene Hartley (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology*, New York, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1947; first published in *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1934, 5, pp. 141-183.

We might just as well have considered these observational procedures under the situational approaches, since behavior, as we have stressed, involves both personality and situation. These are marginal to both the personality and situational approaches, but we have considered them in this section for two reasons. First, from them were drawn inferences about personality, and second, we wish to confine our treatment of the situational approaches to *experimental social psychology*, that is, to those approaches which actually set up the conditions under which the subjects of study are to perform. Needless to say, neither Fichter nor Allport controlled their subjects in this way.

The Factorial- and Processual-situational Approaches

The essential feature of these approaches is, as we have said, the attempt to carry over into social psychology the laboratory techniques

perfected in psychology and the other natural sciences. Yet we must keep in mind that the method of the laboratory involves a logic which permeates all of the methods of social psychology and not merely its experimental subdivision. This is the model of the controlled experiment.

Table 5. The Model of the Controlled Experiment*

	<i>Before—After</i>		<i>After—Before</i>
Experimental	X_1	X_2	$d = X_2 - X_1$
group			
Control	X'_1	X'_2	$d' = X'_2 - X'_1$
group			

Note: The test of whether a difference d is attributable to what we think it is attributable to is whether d is significantly larger than d' .

* Samuel A. Stouffer, "Some Observations on Study Design," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1950, 55, p. 356.

This is the model to which the proponents of experimental social psychology wish to adhere as closely as possible. Its advantages in terms of scientific rigor cannot be argued. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the other methods of social psychology also are influenced by this model. In the life-history method an attempt is made to view the important events in the life history of an individual as these would affect his behavior. The subject is the X_1 of the model and the things that have happened to him which affect his behavior (a domineering father, disappointment in love, and the like) since his birth, X_1 , account for the difference between himself and someone else, X'_2 , whose life span since infancy, X'_1 , did not include these experiences. X_2 now engages in behavior, d , which is radically different from that of X'_2 , whose behavior, d' , does not reflect these experiences. Needless to say, this involves more speculation than scientists are prone to permit. Improvement in the case-history method must be improvement in the rigor with which the experimental model is adhered to.

We can further demonstrate the general applicability of the experimental logic to other areas of social-psychological research by referring back to the causative factors in delinquency discussed on page 64. Since "Transmission of delinquent and criminal patterns" was of the rank order 1 (the most recurring factor in delinquency), we can say that both those who are delinquent and those who are nondelinquent were once nondelinquent infants and children, but the experimental group was exposed to companions who transmitted delinquent and criminal pat-

terns to them. The control group remained nondelinquent *because* they had not been exposed to such companions. We need not accept this conclusion but we can see the experimental logic underlying it. We can construct a model to illustrate the experimental logic which underlies such a statistical study.

Table 6. The Experimental Model Applied to Delinquency

	<i>Before</i>	<i>After</i>
Experimental group	Nondelinquents	Delinquents
Control group	Nondelinquents	Nondelinquents

The psychologist, having been nurtured in the laboratory influence (for reasons that will become clear in the historical materials to follow), has led the way in social psychology to the adaptation of laboratory procedures to the study of personality in the social situation. The difficulties attending the experimental approach are even more numerous than the problems of the case history, attitude measurement, and statistical analysis. Our democratic heritage rightly ensures that no individual will ever be the subject of experimentation in America without his consent. Hence, the subjects of social-psychological experiments must be volunteers. This, of course, means that the validity of results is often open to question. The overwhelming majority of individuals participating in such experiments have been students whose "volunteering" was prompted by an hourly wage or the good will of an instructor. Sometimes conditions in industry are suitable for simulating the experimental situation. The Hawthorne Western Electric studies revealed many valuable insights into the relationship between the work situation and personality response.⁸ These studies incidentally revealed an additional difficulty in the experimental approach. The subjects in the experimental group tend to develop an "in-group" rapport which becomes the most significant factor in evaluating the findings of the experiment!

To add to the complications of the experimental method, it is so new to social psychology that some of the terms it employs are often associated with the men who coined them or pioneered them. Hence, "sociometrics,"

⁸ Elton Mayo, *Human Problems of Industrial Civilization*, Boston, Harvard University Bureau of Business Research, 1946.

which merely means the measurement of social relations in small groups, has come to have a special reference to J. S. Moreno and his followers, who pioneered in this technique and initiated a journal entitled *Sociometry*. "Experimental social psychology," of course, merely refers to the movement toward objectivity and control in social-psychological research, but is often associated with the names of Gardner and Lois Murphy and Theodore M. Newcomb, who wrote a book by that name.⁹ This is simply a symptom of newness in any developing science. We have sidestepped the problem by lumping together the various areas of sociometry, small groups, and the human laboratory experiments of psychologists on the logical grounds that all are *situational* approaches. Their experiments involve more than one individual. They attempt to create an artificial social climate in each case, and they all strive toward the rigid scientific standards of the experiment.

Such experiments are *factoral* when all of the elements of analysis are present in the test or experiment situation and *processual* when the emphasis is upon the group dynamics, that is, upon the processes which develop *within the group being studied*. The factoral approach is helpful in the application of the situational methods of concrete problems. For example, the social psychologist may be asked to evaluate the success of a given conference. Using observation techniques and perhaps some sociometric techniques, he can evaluate the participation in decision making and the general success of the conference in meeting its objectives. This practical application of experimentally derived techniques must not be overlooked, especially in view of the great proliferation of conferences for improving intergroup relations which have resulted from group tensions in modern social life. Factoral studies are of some limited value in social research, but since they are by definition "one-time" observations or experiments, their importance is secondary to processual studies. By far the more important of the two types of situational approaches is the processual since it seeks new knowledge about the process of interaction, which, of course, is at the core of social-psychological theory.

The essential features of the processual-situational approach are (1) a trained *observer*, (2) *devices* for recording his observations, (3) a group of *subjects* in a behavior situation (this may be a real-life situation

⁹ Gardner Murphy, Lois Murphy, and Theodore M. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1937.

ideal for the study at hand or an artificially created situation), (4) *controls* of the situation so that (5) a small number of *variables* can be analyzed.

The observer or observer teams have been trained in relating themselves to the subject, explaining their own presence in the situation, actually observing and recording data, without differing in any way from the dominant climate of the situation. The following is an example of a two-man observer team:¹⁰

Observer *A* codes the problem-solving process of this group; observer *B* records the content of the meeting. To test the hypotheses developed for this study, the problem-solving observer uses a prepared category system. He is responsible for coding each relevant contribution into each of a number of categories. He also records which member made the contribution and to whom it was addressed. These categories are listed on a standardized form which facilitates rapid recording of these data. This observer watches the group interaction in terms of the categories.

A great deal of ingenuity has been used in the development of data-gathering techniques. In addition to the categories mentioned in the preceding example, the observer may employ rating scales which he completes himself. In sociometric studies, however, he must enlist the aid of the subjects in rating their preferences and avoidances of other subjects in the situation. Special equipment has been developed for recording the observations made, for collecting data during the actual social interaction, and preserving a record of the behavior for later analysis. Chief among these are "interaction recorders," ingenious machines which drive a wide paper tape; sound records and stenotype recording; IBM cards; "Interaction Chronographs," devices which provide a time record of interaction of two persons and acts as a computer which provides summary data on the principal variables; and a whole host of devices which enable the observer to perform his function more efficiently.¹¹

The subjects of situational studies are either paid or unpaid persons, sometimes fully cognizant of the purpose underlying the experiment and

¹⁰ Roger W. Heyns and Alvin F. Zander, "Observation of Group Behavior," in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (eds.), *Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences*, New York, The Dryden Press, Inc., 1953, p. 383.

¹¹ Roger W. Heyns and Ronald Lippitt, "Systematic Observational Techniques," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1954.

sometimes kept in the dark until the experiment has been completed. Very conscientious efforts are made to respect the personal integrity of the subject. When, as is sometimes necessary, he is misinformed during an experiment (in order to obtain his reaction to such a cue), he is later made aware of the true facts, and the reason for misleading him is explained to his satisfaction. The controls operating in human experimentation are not as rigid as in the natural science laboratory, of course, but they do exist. "All things being equal" is not a scientific assumption. Scientists, rather, prefer to specify the conditions under which their conclusions are derived. These conditions are the control elements of the experiment.

From the Bibliography Index of the most comprehensive bibliography on small-group, situational research currently available we find the following variables to be the most studied:¹²

- Activity level
- Age of group or phases in process
- Age or sex of members
- Authoritarianism, conservatism, and rigidity
- Education, training, and learning
- Friendship
- Heterogeneity vs. homogeneity
- Leadership
- Mental abilities
- Norms: primary vs. secondary, and reference group
- Personality and values
- Roles (other than leadership)
- Size of group
- Status, prestige and power
- Structure and communication
- Suggestibility and social conformity to pressure
- Task

The range of interest of experimentalism in social psychology is increased even further when we consider that experiments in learning and perception, which employ animal and human subjects, often fall under the purview of social psychology. When this is the case, it is more proper to relate the work to its mother field in psychology, as, for example, social learning, social perception, and the like.

¹² A. Paul Hare, Edgar F. Borgatta, and Robert F. Bales, *Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955, p. 579.

In this brief overview of methods in social psychology we have made our presentation more in the hope of providing broad perspectives rather than of delving deeply into every facet of the methods of social psychology. Necessarily, the treatment has been selective—we can mention only in passing that important methods of propaganda analysis, “content analysis,” cross-cultural methods, and other techniques are tools of social psychology, no less important than the methods we have discussed in more detail, but perhaps not so frequently used. This discussion does not terminate our concern with method in this textbook. As each topical chapter is developed, the major methodological techniques and problems are considered along with the topic. It will be noticed also that frequent reference is made to certain elementary statistical concepts which have become standard terms in social psychology. The remainder of this present chapter is devoted to a brief overview of the main statistical tools of social psychology.

STATISTICAL TOOLS

As with the methods of social psychology which we described briefly, we are concerned here merely with what we might think of as a sentence-outline treatment of the major statistical tools of the field. This is to ensure that at least some idea of the uses of statistics will precede the reading of the topical chapters. Statistics divide into two broad categories with regard to the function they are to perform. They may be *descriptive* or *inductive*. The function performed by descriptive statistics is merely to bring order into what would otherwise be a jumbled mass of data and facts resulting from the research observations. In other words, descriptive statistics are the means by which researchers put together in an orderly way the facts they have found in their studies in order to communicate what they have found to others. Inductive statistics are not statistics at all to the laymen who use the term to indicate column after column of figures as on the financial page of the newspaper. But in the proper sense, inductive statistics, namely, procedures employing the mathematics of probability to aid in reasoning from what has been found in a sample to what conditions might be like in a universe, are the true “statistics.” The concept of *relationship* is also of extreme importance in research. *Descriptive statistics of relationship* reveal the extent to which two or more variables are related in *this* sample. Hence, from a study of 2,000 cases of juvenile delinquency we might show

descriptively that "delinquent companions" and "broken homes" appear so regularly in our analysis that we conclude they are factors related to juvenile delinquency in our sample. When we try to reason to a broader universe—all juvenile delinquents in the United States, for instance—it is necessary to resort to *inductive statistics of relationship* in order to estimate the chances that what we have found in the sample is a characteristic of the universe.

Some of the more common measures of the descriptive statistics type are:

Measures of central tendency:

The <i>mean</i>	Often referred to in the vernacular as the "average" (actually all measures of central tendency are averages in some sense)—the sum of all values divided by the number of cases.
The <i>median</i>	The value which divides the cases in half. Half of the cases fall above and half of the cases fall below this measure.
The <i>mode</i>	The most popular, the most frequently recurring score.

Measures of dispersion:

The <i>range</i>	The difference between the highest and lowest scores, the "spread" of the cases.
The <i>variance</i>	$-\sigma^2$ the average of the squares of the differences between each score and the mean.
The <i>standard deviation</i>	$-\sigma$ the square root of the variance.

The variance and the standard deviation require more complicated computation than the other descriptive measures, but they have the characteristics of mathematical manipulability which makes them valuable for cross comparisons and other research operations.

Descriptive measures of relationship are somewhat complicated for such a brief treatment as we are affording them here. The student should be able, however, to recognize such terms as r , the Pearson Product-Moment Coefficient, and that such expressions as $r_{xy} = +.9$ are read "the relationship between x and y is $+.9$." The $+.9$ is, incidentally, a "high" correlation since they range only from -1 (a perfect negative relationship) through 0 (no relationship) to $+1$ (a perfect positive relationship). Our $+.9$ relationship is a rather high positive one. Other measures of association are X^2 (chi square) and C (contingency coefficient). The

essential feature to remember is that these measures of relationship are of factors which show much more tendency to "go together" than can be accounted for by mere chance. Even more important, they should never, in themselves, be taken as an indication of *causal relationship*.

Finally, *inductive statistics* perform the function most related to the objectives of social psychology as a science. They are an aid in *generalizing*, and we have repeatedly stressed the importance of this feature in any scientific reporting. Listed below are the steps involved in statistical induction:¹³

1. The definition or postulation of a universe, existent or hypothetical about which we wish to gain knowledge.

2. The selection of a sample from the universe in such a way that the assumption is justified, or approximately justified, that only chance factors make the sample different from any other sample of equal size similarly drawn from the same universe.

3. Enumeration or measurement of the units of the sample with regard to one or more characteristics.

4. Analysis of the quantitative data recorded about the units of the sample to yield estimates of various features of the distribution or distributions of the characteristics in the universe.

5. Computation of measures to be used to evaluate the accuracy or reliability of the above estimates.

6. Testing of hypotheses about the universe by the use of the estimates derived in 4 and the measures of reliability computed in 5. Such tests are often called tests of significance. They make possible the testing of a hypothesis from the measures derived from observations on the sample. Such tests are limited to disclosing the probability that the results obtained would be observed in a random sample drawn from a universe which has certain specified values of its summarizing measures. If the probability is moderate or large, we can merely say that our results are in accord with the hypothesis—not that they prove this particular hypothesis, for they might be in accord with other hypotheses as well.

Note that the competent statistician is always careful to point out the *limitations* of inductive (and indeed, of all statistical) reasoning. The methods we have discussed in this chapter are equally subject to cautious evaluations of their limitations. It is not for the euphonious sound that we have called the methods and techniques of scientific investigation the "tools" of social psychology. The analogy between the

¹³ Margaret Jarman Hagood and Daniel O. Price, *Statistics for Sociologists*, rev. ed., New York, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1952, p. 195.

tools of the artisan and the methods of the social psychologist is a good one—the tools are no better than the one who wields them. We do not wish to detract from the importance of the methods of social psychology, but we do wish to emphasize the importance of creative genius and the systems of ideas often called “the great philosophies of the Western world,” which have contributed to the rise of social psychology in broader and more penetrating ways than are possible through purely mechanical, methodological techniques. For this reason we now turn to the philosophical forerunners of social psychology for an understanding of the broader currents of ideas that have shaped it.

SUGGESTED READING

- Britt, Stuart Henderson: *Selected Readings in Social Psychology*, New York, Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1950. See chap. 1 for a statement of the directions which method in social psychology is taking.
- Festinger, Leon, and Daniel Katz: *Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences*, New York, The Dryden Press, Inc., 1953. General research manual for social psychologists.
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- Young, Kimball: *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952. See especially chap. 11, “The Study of Personality,” and appendix A, “An Outline for Writing a Life History.”

Chapter 4

PHILOSOPHICAL FORERUNNERS

Any speculation that pretended to be comprehensive about the relationship between the group and the individual would need, surely, to take into account some significant characteristics of the social thought of all people everywhere and of all human groups in time. Conceptions about human nature and its expression in the social order are, at least implicitly, a part of all cultures. The folklore of primitive peoples is richly sprinkled with insights into the relationship between man and his social groupings. "The link has no ring except in the chain" is a theme that appears in the songs and stories of primitive folk, indicating the universal conviction of man that he achieves his fullest meaning through his membership in the clan and his "living out" of its tradition. The lifetimes of many scholars have been spent in gathering information about what we might loosely call "the social psychology of primitive tribes" and volumes many times the size of the present one could be devoted to such a topic. An even more complex task would be an effort to compile a definitive work on the sociopsychological elements of Oriental and Occidental social thought during the thousands of years of development which fell between the ancient and modern eras of the East and West. Fortunately, there are several important limitations upon the field of social psychology itself which help us to narrow down our treatment to manageable proportions. Modern social psychology, as we shall see, is descended from certain developments in sociology and psychology which were strongly related to the rise of the science movement in Western Europe in the nineteenth century. Yet it would be like coming in in the middle of a play if we were to confine our treatment

of social psychology merely to its history as a science. Social psychology has a much longer history in the broadest sense; it has long been an aspect of social philosophy, yet it has only a very short history as a science in its own right.

So the history of social psychology may be divided into two main periods: the first, the pre-nineteenth century era of speculation about society and the individual, and the second, that which begins with the rise of the scientific movement in sociology and psychology. Following the hypothesis that social psychology, as an empirically oriented, humanistic science *could* not have emerged prior to the nineteenth century, this chapter covers some of the major currents of pre-nineteenth century thinking. Later chapters are devoted to a discussion of the rise of the four modern schools of social psychology, the sociological, the psychological, the psychiatric, and the ethnological. It will then be seen that the historical development of these schools had relatively independent evolutions from nineteenth century beginnings, but that nevertheless they grew within similar broad philosophical views which are presented in the present chapter.

The student will benefit more from his reading about the men and ideas which have influenced modern social psychology if he sees them through more than one perspective. Our first definition of social psychology, as the discipline which studies the relationship between society and the individual, is broad enough (1) to include historical trends of thinking which lie outside of the modern scope of the field, yet which have an important indirect relation to it, and (2) to leave room for further refinement or even reformulation of the narrower modern definition of the field as the science which deals with personalities in interaction. In this chapter we shall study the main currents of social psychology *within social philosophy* (a procedure justified by the broader definition) which have determined the scope of inquiry of the modern science, and in later chapters we shall see how these ideas crystallized into a modern science as the bounds of modern social psychology became narrowed and refined.

PRE-NINETEENTH CENTURY PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUNDS

If, as we have said, social psychology has a long history as an aspect of social philosophy and a short history as a science, there is a problem involved in selecting the backgrounds from its long history most relevant

to the short. We must also recognize the distortions which are introduced when the centuries old, rich, and plentiful social-psychological thought of the Western world is capsulized into "periods." The intention in this chapter is to discuss briefly certain ideas which might be said to be characteristic of each intellectual age with the view of pointing out why a scientific social psychology did not, could not, emerge in that particular age and of pointing out the elements of thought which ultimately did find expression in the modern field. Space is not accorded to a specific philosopher in proportion to his "greatness." For example, Plato and Aristotle, perhaps the greatest of Western philosophers, receive less attention here than does Auguste Comte in the next chapter. The difference is precisely that Comte's ideas are representative of the rise of the scientific emphasis in sociology, while Plato's and Aristotle's are only indirectly relevant to that emphasis.

Some Greek Conceptions of Society and the Individual

In view of the importance of the Greek philosophies for later intellectual developments in Western civilization, their inclusion in an historical sketch such as ours needs no apology. Yet, we must avoid the naïveté of the assumption, too often made, that the culture of Western Europe begins with and was invented solely by the Greeks.¹

Recent research has tended to undermine somewhat the unique position which historians once assigned to Greece. Enthusiastic humanists in Renaissance days used to believe that the Greeks had practically created their remarkable culture out of nothing. We know better now. We know that before the Greek people had migrated into the peninsula which bears their name, a high civilization flourished there and in the surrounding area. What the Greeks did was inherit this culture, stamp it with their own peculiar genius, and then hand it on in turn to other peoples.

All of modern science and philosophy have benefited from elements of Greek culture which have been handed on to the modern world. Perhaps, the richest and most valuable of their contributions was their *method* of deriving observations about man and his problems. The "peculiar genius" of their philosophers was the recourse to human reason and a reliance upon it rather than upon mythological explanations of human behavior. While we do not intend to glorify it, mistakenly, as the sole source of

¹ Paul Hanly Furfey, *A History of Social Thought*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1946, p. 108.

truth, the human reason, with whatever measuring devices and other tools the human intellect can invent to aid itself, is the source of new knowledge in modern science. This rationalistic bent traces back directly to the Greeks and it is for this reason that we begin our historical treatment with them. But it is difficult to know just where to break into the stream of Greek thought. We might begin with the sixth century B.C., when, in the city of Miletus, of Cretan origin, trade and commerce flourished so greatly that the conditions were right for leisure and, as Aristotle later said, "Leisure is a necessary condition for philosophizing." "The place where European philosophy was born"² produced Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes. But it could be argued that these were philosophers of matter, of "physics," and hence were merely methodological precursors of social philosophy as it later developed. Although they contributed the invaluable concept of "form" to their predecessors' concept of "matter," Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans are rightly honored for their foundation contributions to mathematics and the natural sciences. Heraclitus, by distinguishing between reason and the senses and in his concept of a soul with distinctly psychological properties, lays important foundations for later psychological speculation. There can be no doubt, however, that by the times of Plato and Aristotle in Athens, Greek philosophy had segmented off a division which was systematically concerned with man's relations to man and penetrating enough to warrant being called social philosophy. And there were enough social-psychological elements in it to warrant our interest.

Plato and Aristotle. In fact, Plato (427–347 B.C.) and Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) came nearer in many respects to the modern theory of social psychology than other philosophers prior to the present century. Plato, the most distinguished pupil of Socrates (470–399 B.C.), was greatly influenced by his observations of Athenian and Spartan life (perhaps more particularly the latter) and of the life of the people he encountered in his travels. Our insight into Plato's social psychology comes largely from his treatise on social ethics, the sketch of the ideal society in his celebrated dialogue *The Republic*. Often mistakenly considered sociological, the work is actually a study in social psychology where Plato is concerned with personality integration and its relationship to, or consequences for, social participation. The ideal state which he describes is actually a metaphor. He is saying that a well-balanced personality is

²B. A. G. Fuller, *History of Greek Philosophy: Thales to Democritus*, New York, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1923, p. 78.

like a well-balanced society. In developing this concept he displays a finesse at sociopsychological analysis unsurpassed through the centuries intervening between his era and that of the modern science of social psychology. First, let us consider his concept of the ideal state and then turn to his metaphoric use of the perfect state to describe a state of perfect personality integration.

Foreshadowing the modern efforts to construct personality typologies, Plato proposes three basic personality types: (1) those who devote themselves to the gratification of sense appetites; (2) those who engage in the active pursuit of prestige and distinction; and (3) those who are dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge. Each of these "types" of personality reflects a dominance of one of the three levels of human nature, the senses, the will, and the intellect, but we shall return to this point later, where it will be more clear.

Plato also develops a conception of social stratification which relates these types of personalities to the social classes in which they would logically participate. Those who live at the sensate level would be the producers or artisans, whose function it would be to support the other two classes. The seekers after prestige would be the athletes and soldiers. The intellectuals would be the philosopher guardians of the state. It would be quite a problem to get the citizens of the state to accept this (he notes whimsically, but with a great deal of insight into culture change), but over time their children and their children's children could be led to believe in the tale that ³

. . . you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and in the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have the greatest honor; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved in the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son. And God proclaims as a first principle to rulers, and above all else, that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard, or of which they are to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the race. They should observe what elements mingle in their offspring; for if the son of a golden or silver has an admixture of brass and iron, then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards the child because he has to descend in the scale and become

³ Plato, *The Republic*, trans. by B. Jowett, New York, Modern Library, Inc., p. 125.

a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold in them are raised to honor, and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the state, it will be destroyed. Such is the tale; is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it?

There are so many sociopsychological insights in this one passage, it is difficult to single out the most important ones for discussion. Plato certainly foreshadows the modern concept of socialization of the young into the roles which they are expected to occupy in society, that biological stock is not necessarily definitive of social rank, that biological nature imposes restrictions upon social participation, and a whole host of other "modern" conceptions. And yet, we must acknowledge that his deepest insight, obscured unfortunately, in the parable of the *Republic* derives from the fact that he was not talking about society at all but rather about personality! In his insight into the nature of society and the individual he is as modern as Cooley (see page 103), who held that when we look through a telescope from one end we see society (the individual wrought large), and when we look through the other end of the same telescope we see the individual, as the microcosm of society.

Clearly then, Plato in order to illustrate justice in the individual or as we say personality integration in the individual brought forth the metaphor that the individual is like a state. Conflicting elements in the individual personality must be harmonized and integrated like conflicting classes in a state must be harmonized and integrated. The guardians mentioned in the hypothetical state are like the conscience and reason in men. The soldiers are like the practical and efficient purposefulness in men, while the slaves are like the basic urges and drives or instincts.⁴

Qualified carefully, as we must also qualify Cooley's statement, Plato in a figurative way draws parallels between society and personality which still bear exploring in social-psychological research.

Plato's student, Aristotle, had an equally extraordinary life history. Tutor of Alexander of Macedon, biologist, literary critic, historian, he had an encyclopedic mind whose interests cut across the boundaries of what are now the natural and social sciences. It could be argued that he was an important forerunner of modern social science, for he studied the social organization of the city-states of his time and collected 158 different political constitutions for purposes of analysis. This emphasis

⁴ James E. McKeown, "Sociological Misinterpretations of Plato's *Republic*," *The American Catholic Sociological Review*, October, 1955, 16, p. 192.

upon data gathering and generalizing from data rather than from a priori speculation is, of course, an essential feature of the scientific method. His conception of man also qualifies him as a social scientist, for it was Aristotle's famous dictum that man is a social animal.

Aristotle's emphasis on the education of the young points to his agreement with Plato that social participation shapes the young to social roles. Misunderstandings of his theory of personality have arisen, however, out of Aristotle's use of the term "nature." A superficial observation of Aristotle's ideas on sociability might seem to support the notion that he assumed that "natural, biological, forces determine what human beings will do."⁵ Nothing could be farther from the truth. Let us consider the kind of language Aristotle used in his analysis of sociability which might lead to such a conclusion, and then let us see if Aristotle actually reduces all of behavior to the biological.⁶

. . . friendship . . . is . . . most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those in possession of office and of dominating power are thought to need friends most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most laudable form toward friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends? The greater it is the more exposed it is to risk. And in poverty and in other misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge. It helps the young, too, to keep them from error; it aids older people by ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that are failing from weakness; those in the prime of life it stimulates to noble actions—"two going together"—for with friends men are more able to think and to act. Again, parent seems, *by nature* to feel it for offspring and offspring for parent, not only among men, but among birds and among most animals; it is felt mutually by members of the same race, and especially by men, whence we praise lovers of their fellowmen.

The only term which in any way indicates biological instinctivism in Aristotle's conceptions of human associations is the term "nature." But he does not differentiate between the ways of men and those of infra-human species as many moderns draw such a distinction, between the

⁵ Richard T. LaPiere and Paul R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology*, 3d ed., New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949, p. 10.

⁶ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book VIII, 1155a, in Richard McKeon (ed.), *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, New York, Random House, Inc., 1941. (Italics added.)

beasts living in nature and men somehow living outside of nature. Aristotle today would say that the Empire State building is natural to man. Man, he would say, is a rational animal *by nature*, that is, it is natural for him to construct artifacts which enable him to achieve his ends. An understanding of this usage of his term is necessary to understand his essential view of sociability, which is fully acceptable in the light of modern social psychology. To Aristotle there are three motives which explain the association of people with each other (he constantly uses the term "friendship" to indicate this tendency toward association). Some associations are exclusively for *pleasure* and some are exclusively for *utility*; these are transitory because the things that give pleasure and the things that are useful are subject to change. One person may cease to find pleasure or usefulness in another; the other may change to ways which no longer satisfy. Consequently, permanent associations must be those based upon wishing well to the other person and not merely to one's self. "Now those who wish well to their friends for their own sake," writes Aristotle, "are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of their own nature and not incidentally. . . ." Aristotle emphasizes that such a bond is rare and that this "perfect" type of social relationship is possible only after a period of acquaintanceship, "for a wish for friendship may arise quickly, but friendship does not." This emphasis upon the necessity of *developmental* relations in order that associates may *know* each other, the necessary condition for mutual involvement in a "friendship," clearly indicates that Aristotle is not an instinctivist or any kind of biological materialist in analyzing social relations, because to him the act of knowing was not a material operation. To him the mind, that in the soul "whereby the soul thinks and judges," is free of the flesh and, indeed, of all matter, excepting for a dependence upon the senses for perception and the images from which the mind abstracts its immaterial concepts.

Aristotle's sociology though far from being fully developed was perfectly sound. Man must live in human associations such as the family and the state, and he cannot persist without these associations. The most basic human unit is the family, "the association established by nature for the supply of man's . . . wants." From the instinctive need of reproducing springs the family, from the interdependence of several families springs the village, and from the mutual interdependence of villages springs the state. But it is only in a limited way that these societies rest upon instinct, for they also, and even more importantly, rest

upon man's higher faculties of wisdom and morality. In this sense, the state derives from man's rational nature and only indirectly from his biological nature. The differences between the associations of men and those of the gregarious animals are differences not merely in degree but in kind. Man alone has the power to deliberate on the good and happy life; has the power to communicate the values upon which the social structure rests.⁷

Aristotle's psychology, however, was philosophical rather than social. In other words, he was concerned with the whole range of possible speculations about the human person, not merely with social reactions, interaction, and social situations. In a word, the social-psychological focus was not "opened up" by Aristotle nor by Plato, precisely because Western philosophy was so new that more basic questions, such as the nature of the cosmos and man's place in it, were still primary questions beside which man's social relations and the ways in which people influence each other were of secondary importance. The universe of knowledge was not sufficiently great to permit such narrow specialization.

While the ideas of Plato and Aristotle were held by a few intellectuals, the social attitudes of most Greeks were reflected more in the thinking of Epicurus (341–270 B.C.). Contrary to the teachings of Plato and Aristotle, Epicurus held that the individual is not essentially social, but merely accidentally so. According to him, self-interest rules personality, which enters into social relationships primarily to gain some self-advantage or personal pleasure. Epicureanism undoubtedly had a popular appeal to the masses and in its popular form was so widespread not only in Greece but throughout the Roman empire that "perhaps [it] must be regarded as the chief competitor of early Christianity."⁸ But there is little grist for the social psychology mill in Epicurean thought. In fact, it could be argued that its exaggerated individualism and hedonistic materialism were influences on later European thought which hindered the development of a true social psychology.

Stoicism, founded by Zeno (340–260 B.C.), was much less popular than Epicureanism in Greece and later in Rome. It is no wonder, since this was a more stern doctrine which bore a strong resemblance to some

⁷ B. A. G. Fuller, *History of Greek Philosophy: Aristotle*, New York, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1931, p. 291.

⁸ Charles A. Ellwood, *A History of Social Philosophy*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1938, p. 62.

of the teachings of Aristotle and Plato. Contrary to Epicureanism, the Stoics held that man's highest pleasure came not from sense pleasures but through virtue. Man's intellect and will must seek first to know the laws pulsating in the universe and then must place themselves in accordance with them. As with Aristotle's conception of "nature," man's participation in the natural order is on the plane of intelligence as well as the lower planes shared by the animals. The highest good is truth as rationally understood and conformity to the truth inherent in the order of things. Surprisingly, it was not a social philosophy and there is not much social psychology to be gleaned from it. This is probably due to the fact that it was extremely individualistic, and as a form of pantheism, it dealt more with the relationship of the individual to the cosmos than to his fellow participants in the social order. Again, as with the other Greek philosophies, the concern was more with absolutes than with the narrower focus upon everyday social participation.

In fact, the foregoing highly abridged summary probably suffices to indicate that the Greeks as a whole made many insights into the relations between the individual and his society, but no body of knowledge developed by them could truly be called a social psychology. In Hellenic thought there appear reflections on custom and convention, sex roles and family life, the individual and his political participation, which however accurate or profound were never systematized enough to provide ground for scientific investigation of human relationships. The chief social concern of the Greeks was an ethical one, on the other hand, and while ethics is an important subject for consideration, it is not social psychology. This distinction has led many apologists of sociology and psychology to the conclusion that the interests of the ethical thinker and those of the social scientist are irreconcilable. These, of course, would disregard the teachings of the Greeks as not being germane to the modern science of social psychology. But the humanism of the Greeks, through its influence on later thinking in Europe, has had an important formative effect upon the modern field. Then, too, humanism, as a purely healthy concern with human beings and their welfare, is a philosophy which motivates scientists to learn more about, and thus ultimately to aid, their fellow human beings and themselves. But if even this should be denied by some, the *concept* of social values and ethical norms should not be ignored by those who would understand human behavior, since a mind incapable of social values would not be fitted to study social

activities which, by definition, are impregnated with values. The normative, or ethical, interest can not be substituted for the scientific because, if not controlled by the latter, it either prevents or biases the attempt to understand society.

In summary, the Greeks contributed the philosophy out of which grew modern science and the social philosophy out of which grew the modern social sciences, including, of course, social psychology. While, on the one hand, their curious probings into the nature of the universe and of man provided no final answers, their heritage was a Pandora's box of vexing questions. When the lid was taken off this box by later European thinkers many vexsome spirits escaped, among them the materialism of the nature philosophers and the misguided humanism of the Epicureans. Nevertheless, the positive side of their contributions to modern social psychology includes the beginnings of the philosophy of science and of a true humanism which enables social psychologists to achieve more penetrating insights into their subject matter—man. While the impact of the Roman Empire upon later European history was so great as to defy description, the contribution of the Romans to modern social psychology was almost negligible compared with that of the Greeks.

SOME ROMAN AND PREMEDIEVAL CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

M. Tullius Cicero (106–43 B.C.) is a figure often taken as characteristic of Roman thought. He had studied in Athens in the Platonic atmosphere of the New Academy, but he leaned more upon Stoicism than upon Plato. Cicero was self-admittedly unoriginal in his thinking—a rather typical Roman in this respect, since the Romans were excellent administrators and poor philosophers. Also typically Roman, Cicero's emphasis was largely upon law, which may account for the fact that his social-psychological thinking does not extend beyond the view of Aristotle's that man is naturally a social animal. This Roman bent for jurisprudence was undoubtedly related to the problems of the expansive Roman Empire and the necessity for ruling the peoples who became subject to it. Thus, the Roman concern was for devising codes of how people *should* act rather than for developing philosophies of how people really *do* act. At any rate, later Roman philosophers also contributed further to the development and codification of law, but like Cicero,

without offering new insights into the relationships of concern to the social psychologist.

With the decline of the Roman Empire and the rise of Christianity, a new conception of society and the individual developed based on the synthesis of Christ's teaching and Platonism, and a not negligible admixture of Stoicism. The teachings of the early Christian Fathers were involved largely with concern for the afterlife; their direction of interest was away from the individual and from social participation at the natural, as opposed to the supernatural, level.

St. Augustine (A.D. 354–430) is an outstanding model of the social thinkers of his day. His theory of society and the individual contrasts sharply with that of modern social psychology, the modern approach being narrower in scope and more confined to the consideration of the natural consequences of human association. Where the modern social psychologist would question the importance of human association for the formation of an individual's attitudes, St. Augustine would question its importance for bringing him closer to God. Augustine's conception of society is contained in his great work, *The City of God*. Human society, through the sin of Adam, has become two societies; one, the society of God, and the other, earthly society. Drawing upon the familiar Bible contrast between the world of the earthly social order and the Kingdom of Heaven, his emphasis is upon the supernatural consequences of earthly social participation. From the Sermon on the Mount it was quite clear that Christianity is to be a social religion, but one which involves an intimacy of union between man and God. The individual has interrelationships not only with other individuals but with God. Failure to obey the commandments of God which regulate social relationships breaks the tie between the individual and his God.

Whosoever therefore shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, he shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven; but whoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven.

Capturing the spirit of these words of Our Lord, St. Augustine traces the development of the earthly city to its logical culmination in the fires of hell because men, in their social relations, have tried to serve only themselves. On the other hand, the social organization which is based upon love and the observance of the commandments infused with God's grace becomes the perfect City of God in heaven for all

eternity. "The faithless 'worldly city' aims at earthly peace, and settles the self therein" while the "celestial society" here on earth breaks the temporal laws which are against God's law but observes all the diverse laws of nations if they are in keeping with, or indeed so long as they are not opposed to, "the adoration of one only God."

The social psychology of St. Augustine is, therefore, caught up in and is a part of his philosophical-theological psychology and in this respect he is typical of the great thinkers who follow him through what has come to be called "medieval" times. As with the Greeks, the cosmic problems are more pressing and the speculations about the interpersonal aspects of personality are secondary in importance. The division of academic labor sufficiently extensive to permit such a refined and narrow interest lies far in the future. The difference between St. Augustine and the Greeks is, of course, that his conceptions cut across two worlds, the natural and the supernatural, while the Greeks gradually developed a philosophy free of dependence upon theological systems. In this light Greek social-psychological speculation foreshadowed more distinctly the scope of inquiry in modern social psychology. St. Augustine's, however, was the conception of man which foreshadowed very distinctly the conception of man in the Middle Ages.

MEDIEVAL CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

The social thought of the Middle Ages, like that of the early Christian Fathers does not contribute much directly to the concerns of modern social psychology. Medieval thinkers did, however, assimilate Greek, Roman, and Islamic ideas into the Christian system of belief. The schoolmen were not acquainted with the entire work of Aristotle until the twelfth century and it was not until the thirteenth century that St. Thomas Aquinas systematically Christianized Aristotle's philosophy. St. Thomas held, with Aristotle, the view that society is natural to man, and it is he who makes clear the concept of the relativity of the individual to his social group which, as we have seen, was implicit in the work of Aristotle. St. Thomas anticipates the emphasis of Emile Durkheim on the "division of labor in society," although, of course, he lived in times when social status and social role were more fixed and stable than in modern times, and consequently did not anticipate the crucial importance of status and role for the individual in modern society, as did Durkheim. St. Thomas develops Aristotle's notions of

the interdependence of people in social groups and stresses much more the necessity of specialization of physical and intellectual work as the basis for association rather than instinct. The social-psychological thought of St. Thomas might have contributed a great deal to the furthering of inquiry in the field had it been developed in more detail. Had he, for example, taken the problem of the relationship of society and the individual as his central problem, as did the social-contract theorists, it is highly probable that a most rewarding outline for a modern social psychology would have been the outcome. But, as with the Greeks and the early Christian Fathers, his concern was with broader problems than interpersonal relationships; and with the Fathers of the Church, his concern was the human person whose nature has both a natural and a supernatural dimension.⁹

St. Thomas assigns to man a mediate degree in the hierarchy of being, in that he shares in the characteristics of both the spiritual and the material creation. He is a *minor mundus*, in which elements of all things are found, so that he acts both as the voice of the earthy order and the incarnation of the spiritual. Not only is he in part immediately made by God, but in part he is educed from the stuff of the earthy, so that all his activity manifests both these aspects.

In a word, St. Thomas was concerned with the relation of man to God and in interpersonal relations only as these throw light on the God-man relationship. It is a curious paradox that the modern science of social psychology developed out of an atmosphere in which only man-to-man relationships were considered, without reference to, indeed without the acknowledgment of, supernatural aspects of these relationships. In the very wellsprings of the modern field, from science on the one hand and humanism on the other, there were always numerous and influential scholars of the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish faiths who, had the intellectual climate been conducive to it, might have etched in the relationship between social psychology as science, as philosophy, and as theology, each phase of which is limited by the bounds of its scope and method and each maintaining its autonomy. But the intellectual climate was not right for this sort of dispassionate reflection. In the remainder of this chapter we shall attempt to throw light on the philosophical heritage of the modern field as it veered so sharply away from the medieval heritage of the modern Western world and restored instead

⁹ Ian Hislop, O.P., *The Anthropology of St. Thomas*, Blackfriars, Oxford, 1949, p. 5.

the materialism and Epicurean individualism of some, but by no means all, of the Greek philosophers. The task begins with the rise of science in Western intellectual life.

THE RISE OF SCIENCE IN THE WESTERN WORLD

The historical events which led to the rise of science in Western Europe have been enumerated variously as the Renaissance, the Reformation, the battle between the landed class and the rising middle class, the "enlightenment," and other revolts against the "sterility" of the scholastics; but whatever the causes, the fact is that science did rise. The discoveries of such men as Copernicus and Cardan were supplemented by such men as Galileo and Newton and a scientific structure was erected which would withstand any onslaught.¹⁰

Earlier than this, however, the spirit of scientific inquiry had swept over the western world, and men of learning had begun to take increased interest in natural phenomena. The men of genius who carried science through to victory were able to succeed because the time had come for a change.

. . . during the Renaissance and Reformation thought was liberated—and the price of free thought was confusion. Men dared to think for themselves, but they distrusted reason; they craved new experiences but desired, too, the security of established beliefs and customs; they questioned authority but were unwilling to live in doubt. . . .

We leave to the historians and to the philosophers of history the analysis of the social forces underlying the rise of the science movement. It is reasonable, however, in the light of later philosophical developments in Western Europe, to assume that the scientific approach to the study of things became a faith as well as a method, a sentiment as well as a procedure; and in the early history of modern science there were as many devotees on emotional grounds as there were on a solid and rational basis. As we have said, the modern field of social psychology grew out of the scientific impulse in the fields of sociology and psychology in the nineteenth century. We must concede that this impulse in social science was, in its earliest days, more a sentiment than a reality.

¹⁰ Rollin Chambliss, *Social Thought from Hammurabi to Comte*, New York, The Dryden Press, Inc., 1954, p. 340.

THE SOCIAL-CONTRACT THEORISTS

In no sense of the word could Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), John Locke (1632–1704), and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) be called men of science. Yet in one light they were forerunners of modern social psychology, since they addressed themselves to the problem of the relationship between society and the individual and thus fell, in their theoretical formulations, within the theoretical scope of the modern field. These men, the “social-contract theorists,” all developed theories which had in common three elements:

1. A postulation of what man’s nature would be in isolation from his fellow man, or apart from the civil state;
2. a reason, or set of reasons, why man placed himself in association with others; and
3. a set of moral rules which “follow” from the first two considerations.

Thomas Hobbes is famous for his postulate of human nature in “tooth-and-fang” isolation. Man, essentially brutish and selfish, in a state of nature would be perpetually at war with other men. No distinction between right and wrong, but only the law of self-preservation prevails in this natural state. An enlightened self-interest causes man to enter defensively into a contract with his fellow men, who in turn enter into obligations, the total fabric of which we call civil society. The set of moral rules which follow from these considerations, according to Hobbes, are the moral law, which exists only in the civil state; any act which threatens the civil state is immoral. The state, standing between civilized man and man the brute, must be preserved at all costs.¹¹

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man against every man. . . . In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor use of the commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the fact of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no

¹¹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909, reprinted from the edition of 1651.

Society; and which is worst of all continuall feare, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.

Both Hobbes and Locke made contributions to psychological theories of perception, which are discussed briefly in a later chapter dealing with the psychological school of social psychology.

Locke, on the other hand, did not believe that a presocial state could exist or even be conceived of. Locke held that man has always lived in society, that the state had come into being as a means of redressing wrongs and protecting the natural rights of man to life, liberty, and property. This theory is more in keeping with modern social psychology than Hobbes's theory. The theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau with respect to man in isolation have some bearing on our later discussion of "feral man" since the limited number of research findings on this subject seem to indicate that man is, in fact, "brutish." The Lockean view, however, is best borne out by the data, since feral children, apparently as a result of having been denied human association during the early, plastic years of life, never seem to realize their human potentiality. Hence, there could be no such presocial condition or there would be no men!

Perhaps the most naïve of the social-contract theories according to modern social psychology is Rousseau's. He begins, much the same as Hobbes, with the conception of man in isolation as a brute, but while the latter declared the solitary state to be intolerable, Rousseau held that it was a happy condition. Nature is wholly good; it is society that degrades.¹²

Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater slave than they. How did this change come about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer.

If I took into account only force, and the effects derived from it, I should say: "As long as a people is compelled to obey, and obeys, it does well; as soon as it can shake off the yoke, and shakes it off, it does still better; for regaining its liberty by the same right as took it away, either it is justified in resuming it, or there was no justification for those who took it away." But the social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights. Nevertheless, this right does not come from nature, and must therefore be founded on conventions.

¹² Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right*, London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1916.

It is interesting to note that modern theories of personality reflect to some extent the influence of one or another of the social-contract theorists. There is a Hobbesian note in Freudian theory, wherein man is seen as driven by innate biological forces over and against which the social order must establish a restrictive repressing force. The libidinal drives are repressed in favor of the superego, which is the repository in personality for the mores, especially the "tabus" of society. Many of Locke's epistemological views are implied in modern behavioristic psychology which clings to materialistic conceptions of man's nature, and Rousseau has profoundly impressed the "progressive" school of education, which stresses the "permissive" attitude toward children and takes a dim view of discipline enforced by punishment.

If one makes a careful distinction between the scientific naturalistic *emphasis* and the scientific *method*, there becomes apparent the influence of the stimulation and growth of the natural sciences upon the social-contract theorists. They attempted to explain social organization at the natural, rather than the supernatural, level. However, none of these men, least of all the impressionistic Rousseau, employed the scientific method of controlled observation and data gathering. They are typical of the humanistic forerunners of social psychology and were selected because of their typicality in that respect. There was one *atypical* philosophical source, in addition to the advocates of humanism and scientism, which substantially affected the formation of the modern field, that is, the philosophical system of George W. F. Hegel (1770–1831).

THE HEGELIAN CONCEPTION OF SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

In a sense, modern social-psychological theory can best be understood as the result of a sociological protest against the exaggerated individualism of early psychologies. An important impetus to this protest was given by Hegel. Hegelianism in its political implications has earned for itself a great deal of notoriety, having served as the philosophical basis of both Nazism and Marxism. There can be little doubt that Hegel's conception of the relationship between society and the individual is repugnant to the democratic mentality. His conception of individual "freedom" as complete submission to the state is not, however, the necessary conclusion to be drawn from one element of his thinking which has vitally affected social-psychological theory.

The emphasis on the group characteristics of Hegelian thought has very definitely formed a considerable part of the basis for the protest against exaggerated individualism. In its simplest statement, Hegel's theory holds that society (as the state) possesses an objective mind in which the individual participates. While individuals are physiologically discrete entities, their minds are inseparable from the common spirit, or *Geist*.

The Hegelian influence is responsible for the mystic "group-mind" theories which have plagued social psychology as persistently as the opposite fallacy of exaggerated individualism. There is, however, a positive aspect. Modern theory holds to a middle position, recognizing the "shared" (social and cultural) aspects of mind while placing the locus of thought in the individual. It is highly unlikely that the overly individualistic psychologies could have been uprooted without the Hegelian, or a similar, counteracting influence.

EFFECTS ON THE MODERN SCIENCE

Our modern science, about fifty years old, bears many marks that result from its having been a division of social philosophy for many centuries. The ancestry of our discipline is most apparent in the general philosophical atmosphere which surrounds it. We have no quarrel with science as a method, indeed, we are eager to apply it to social psychology. As indicated earlier in this chapter, the first modern social scientists, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, and others, were "scientific" only by sentiment or value judgment; they were motivated by a desire to replace conventional morality with a "new" morality of science. This is difficult to understand in our modern age, where the obvious fact is that science creates moral problems and does not, cannot, solve them. The weapons which science has placed in the hands of modern man are capable of destroying him, and his plight is that he must develop ethical norms to control the inventions of science or he will perish. All this, however, was not so clear in the nineteenth century when those who were revolting against ecclesiastical authority sought in "science" a new source of authority for morals. Herbert Spencer hastened to finish his *Data of Ethics* even in outline form "because the establishment of rules of right conduct on a scientific basis is a pressing need. Now that moral injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred

origin, the secularization of morals is becoming imperative.”¹³ On the assumption that “it’s an ill wind that blows no good,” modern social psychologists have extricated elements of their field from the unfortunately attempted ethic. Frequently, however, some confusion still remains. *Materialism*, which holds that only matter exists and all phenomena can be explained in terms of scientific statements about matter and motion; *behaviorism*, which denies the existence of the human mind and of human motives; and *determinism*, which denies the existence of the human will—all can be traced to attempts to carry over into the social sciences the identical tools of natural science. *Relativism* can be traced to such systems as Spencer’s, which were attempts to build an ethic upon science; since science is relative, subject to modification in the light of new findings, any ethic built upon it must be relative. These vestiges of the social-philosophical past of the modern science of social psychology are discussed in more detail in a later chapter. At this point it is enough for us to recognize the main currents of ancient and modern social-philosophical thought which produced the veins of materialism (the first Greek philosophers to modern science) and its correlates, behaviorism, determinism, and ethical relativism, which in profound and various ways influenced the nineteenth century founders of the modern science of social psychology.

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¹³ Herbert Spencer, *The Data of Ethics*, New York, A. L. Burt, Publisher, 1879, p. iv.

Chapter 5

THE PARENT SCHOOLS IN SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

The modern schools of social psychology can be differentiated in at least two major respects. First, each school has a separate and distinct history which, though often interwoven with the history of a neighbor school, has its own succession of great men and ideas. Second, each school has a separate and distinct function to perform *in addition to its function in social psychology*. Ethnologists generally feel a responsibility for relating their work to the trends in general anthropology, thereby contributing to the growing literature on the relationship between culture and personality. Psychiatrists engaged in social-psychological work feel obligated to the general field of personality therapy to the extent of attempting to introduce elements of social psychology into the treatment of personality disorders. The affinity of sociologists for group determinants of personality and the affinity of psychologists for intra-personal conceptions of personality do not stem from myopia but from the recognition of a responsibility to their respective parent disciplines as well as to social psychology itself.

The conception of the dual function of each of the modern schools of social psychology should help orient the student in his attempt to understand some of the puzzling currents in modern theory. Unless qualified, however, the conception is misleading and oversimplified. Some social psychologists do not belong to schools, feeling responsible only to social psychology itself. Others have participated in the growth

and development of several schools of social psychology.¹ Finally, there is a nebulous haze which hangs over much research which is vaguely "social-psychological." Much of the fascination of the young field lies in the exploration of the hazy area. But the student entering the area will be confused unless he has some clear ideas about the history of social psychology and the men and ideas which have shaped and are shaping it.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL SCHOOL

In a sense, the sociological school is the true parent of social psychology. Originating as it did in the protest of sociologists against the overweening psychological emphasis on individualism, this school more or less forced the recognition of the importance of interpersonal relations in personality formation and development. In the discussion of the growth of the psychological school of social psychology, it will be seen that from its beginnings the psychological school also contributed to social psychology. The more systematic theoretical approaches did come, however, from the sociological protest.

The chief function of this school for social psychology is developing further its insights into the consequences of social organization for individual personality. On the other hand, it has the functions for sociology of providing insights into the motivation of institutional behavior and the motivation of deviant behavior—in a word, the study of *individual role taking*, which lies at the foundation of all social patterns and their breakdowns.

Since the sociological school of social psychology emerged historically from general sociology, its beginnings are intimately bound to the beginnings of sociology itself.

Auguste Comte (1790–1857). Comte is often called the founder of sociology, primarily because he gave the discipline its name. For the sake of convenience, this discussion is begun *as if* Comtean thought were the beginning of modern sociology, recognizing that the choice of a starting point for the discussion is somewhat arbitrary. In a further arbitrary choice, the nineteenth century has been selected as the break-

¹ For example, the social psychologist John Dollard has been variously labeled a psychologist, a sociologist, and finally, an anthropologist. See Clyde Kluckhohn, "Psychiatry and Anthropology," in J. K. Hall, G. Zilboorg, and H. A. Bunker (eds.), *One Hundred Years of American Psychiatry*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1944.

ing point between the generalized discussion of some of the philosophical precursors of social psychology and the differentiated treatment of the development of the schools. Perhaps no better choice of a nineteenth century beginning could be made, since Comte's *Positive Philosophy* . . . has come to be generally recognized at once as one of the most characteristic expressions of the developing scientific impulse of the nineteenth century in its larger aspects and as an outstanding landmark in the development of modern sociology more particularly.²

It will be recalled that Comte formulated three stages in the development of human thought (theological, metaphysical, and positive). In the final, or positivistic, stage man will work out his destiny scientifically. Toward this end, Comte blueprinted a science of society which, in pyramid fashion, placed sociology at the apex and subsumed under it the sciences of biology, chemistry, physics, astronomy, and mathematics. Comte's social psychology was a revolt against the introspective psychology of his day, and as a consequence of this, he found no place for psychology in his hierarchy of sciences. Comte did not omit psychological inquiry from the scope of science but merely divided it into its biological and social aspects—a divison which has a certain validity even in modern social psychology.

The division of psychology into biology and sociology brought about certain theoretical problems for Comte, however, since he is never able to come to grips with the *interrelationships* of the biological and the social. His conception of the individual personality is largely instinctivistic. To Comte, man's instincts are divided into two main classes, the egoistic and the altruistic. The altruistic class of instinct being the weaker, society must have for its central purpose the organization of a structure which supports altruism and represses the egoistic tendencies of the individual. The altruistic and egoistic tendencies are each made up of a complex of discrete instincts. According to Comte, man has many more instincts than any other animal.

Despite his elaborate individual psychology, Comte insisted that the true social unit is the family, out of which all social organization grows. The function of the family is to generate and encourage altruism, so that from the family matrix the individual will emerge as a worthy participant in society, a broader organization made up of many interdependent families. Curiously, Comte's emphasis on the conditioning of

² Fay B. Karpf, *American Social Psychology*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1932, p. 14.

the individual in family living as preparation for participation in society has many modern theoretical counterparts. In addition, his instinctivistic psychology of the individual dominated much of social psychology until the early 1920s, even though there were reactions against it early in the history of the field.

French Reaction to Comte. The French reaction to Comte took two major directions. These were contained in the social psychologies of Gabriel Tarde (1843–1904), who made individual psychology the basis of his sociology, and Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), who, like Comte, protested against the overly individualistic psychology of his day.

Tarde's main work, *The Laws of Imitation*, was undeniably an attempt to explain social phenomena in terms of the interactions of individuals. His general orientation was therefore a stimulus to modern social psychology, as the forerunner of the modern concept of interaction. While Tarde pointed the way toward this key concept, his specific elaboration of it fell far short of the mark. Positively, Tarde led the way toward a middle ground of social interaction in terms of an intracerebral process of "imitation" which was, however, too formal and simplistic to survive as an adequate theory for social psychology.

While a diametrically opposed approach, the social psychology of Durkheim was a system of social determinism which left little or no place for individual psychology. With his celebrated and controversial doctrine of the *collective consciousness*, Durkheim actually developed a concept which anticipated the modern term "culture." From this point of view, his concept was years ahead of its time. Durkheim, in defining the collective consciousness, states:³

The totality of the beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a social group forms a determinate system which has its own life.

The phrase "has its own life" is typical of the turns of speech which have brought down on Durkheim the widespread criticism of fostering group-mind explanations of individual behavior in groups. It seems likely that in his early work it is Durkheim's figures of speech which attract criticism. In his later work Durkheim does, however, seem to treat the group as an entity with a motor of its own, distinct from the individuals in the group.

³ Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1947, p. 79.

In summary, Comte, Tarde, and Durkheim offer valuable contributions to modern social psychology. Comte would explain group behavior in terms of the instinctive reactions (as conditioned by family living) of the individuals involved. Tarde rejects the Comtean stress upon instincts and explains the group's behavior in terms of individuals interacting ("imitating") largely in patterned ways. Durkheim's emphasis is upon group behavior patterns rather than upon those of individuals. Each falls short of a two-fold emphasis, perhaps Durkheim the most severely, since the individual's subjective definition of a group (the meaning of the group for the individual) is as fully important to social psychology as the "collective consciousness."

The contributions of Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1857-1939) and Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931) typify the facets of French social psychology which were influenced by Durkheim. Levy-Bruhl developed the Durkheimian thesis of the collective consciousness in an anthropological frame of reference. He concerned himself with the collective "representations" of primitive peoples, in the belief that the primitive mind could not be studied in terms of the psychological laws which obtain among the more "advanced" peoples. Le Bon interested himself in group psychology and tended generally to give his interpretations of group phenomena a Durkheimian flavor. When he deals with the individual, on the other hand, he turns toward Tardean social psychology. In general, his work is brilliantly written but superficial and without really thoughtful integration of the Durkheimian and Tardean points of view. Le Bon is remembered for his best known work, *The Crowd*, probably because the title is easily remembered and because the book is a forerunner of the modern "collective behavior" subfield of social psychology.

German Reaction to Comte. The reaction of German sociologists to the social psychology of Comte seems to have stemmed largely from the work and influence of Albert Schaffle (1831-1903), who was also instrumental in naming the discipline of "social psychology." Schaffle's work, like that of Comte and Durkheim, was a revolt against the overly individualistic emphasis of the psychology of his day. While there is little of Schaffle's work that is of direct value to modern social psychology, he provided ongoing support for the Comtean emphasis on the scientific method. In addition, he is widely known as a typical theorist of the "organic analogy" interpretation of the relationship between society and the individual. Finally, Schaffle's influence on such notables in the history of social psychology as Durkheim, Gumpлович, Ratzenhofer,

Small, and Cooley gives him a secure place among the founders of the modern discipline.

Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838–1909) and Gustav Ratzenhofer (1842–1904) are often described as the “conflict theorists” in sociology, but their significance for modern social psychology does not lie in Gumplowicz’s race-conflict theory of social processes but in Ratzenhofer’s modification of that theory. For the first time in German sociological thought, the emphasis in theories of the society-individual relationship was upon personality and personal motives or “interests.” Ratzenhofer’s theory of human interests traveled to America via A. W. Small, who reinterpreted the interests theory and presented it to American social psychology. The theory has found its expression in many American modifications. In this present textbook, as in others, there is implied acceptance of a modified interest theory when there is reference to the needs of personality for satisfaction and security. The “interests” are the objects which are sought in social participation. One of the most intensive attitudes of modern time, “patriotism,” has as its external correlative the best interests of one’s own country. The insistence upon the social rather than the biological nature of these needs has been the crux of the sociological protest against the purely individualistic approach to social psychology. Ratzenhofer’s contribution to social psychology, then, is that he deliberately initiated a vein of social-psychological inquiry which stressed neither the group nor the individual, but concentrated on the social individual.

An equally important German forerunner of modern social psychology was Georg Simmel (1858–1918), who proposed for sociology the subject matter of the forms, types, or patterns of association. Relying heavily on an analogy with geometry, he advanced the conception of sociology as the geometry of the social sciences, a discipline that was concerned solely with the forms of social interaction and left the study of the content of social forms to the other social sciences. For our purposes, the significant feature of Simmel’s emphasis on the forms of association is that the collective behavior subfield of social psychology is given substance and structure by the Simmel approach. The modern viewpoint that personality is not studied fruitfully outside the social situation demands that situations be studied schematically, i.e., that some classification of the different kinds of social situations serve as a background of our study.

It should not be assumed that Simmel’s contribution to modern social

psychology is confined to collective behavior. His excellent discussion of the internalization of social norms, the relationship between society and the individual, and the social psychology of the "stranger" all have a suggestive value for the personality-oriented approaches as well. Nor should it be assumed that German sociologists alone participated in the growth of social psychology. There are significant German contributions to social psychology via the avenue of psychology which are discussed in a later section of this chapter.

English Social Psychology. Historically, English sociology has been the stronghold of individualism in sociological thought. This emphasis on the individual *in vacuo* stemmed largely from the individualistic psychology of Locke as set forth in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, which is not fully consistent with Locke's more sophisticated understanding of the society-individual relationship as revealed in his social-contract theory. With this disregard of the social aspects of individuality, it is not surprising that English sociology has not contributed much to modern social psychology.

Walter Bagehot (1826-1877), although under the influence of the evolutionists Darwin and Spencer, arrived at a concept of group struggle as opposed to the individual "survival of the fittest" conceptions advanced in Darwin's *Origin of Species*. Bagehot's recognition of the group side of the society-individual relationship stands as something of an antidote for the overweening individualism of English sociology. However, the Bagehot influence has been secondary to the influence of William McDougall (1871-1938), the psychologist whose instinctive psychology dominated social psychology in England and America until the 1920s. A truly indigenous American social psychology (with European theoretical backgrounds, of course) can be said to have its beginnings in the revolt against instinctivism which began at that time.

American Sociologists. Modern social psychologists, in attempting to fill in the void created by the demise of instinct social psychology, have come to view the works of Charles Horton Cooley (1863-1929) and George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) as being broadly definitive of the modern viewpoint of the relationship between society and the individual.

Cooley's three best-known works, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, *Social Organization*, and *The Social Process*, reflect the influence of James M. Baldwin of the Tardean "imitation" school, Albert Schaffle's organic analogy, and the psychology of William James. Cooley's lucid

style of writing and his excellent treatment of the crucial issue of the relationship between society and the individual set him apart from other early modern social psychologists. Cooley pointed the way toward the modern viewpoint of the inseparability of the individual and the social in human life. In his *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Cooley states the basic premise of modern psychology when he writes that "a separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience, and so likewise is society when regarded as something apart from individuals." In the second edition of *Human Nature*, Cooley added a chapter on "Heredity and Instinct" which dealt with the heredity-environment argument then raging. Cooley dismisses the argument as meaningless, since the "inextricable union of the animal and social heritages" militates against any meaningful effort to separate the two. Cooley's views on the nature of the difference between the animal heredity of man and of the infrahuman forms of animal life are best stated in his own words:⁴

Roughly speaking, then, the heredity of the other animals is a mechanism like that of a hand organ; it is made to play a few tunes; you can play these tunes at once, with little or no training; and you can never play any others. The heredity of man, on the other hand, is a mechanism much more like that of a piano; it is not made to play particular tunes; you can do nothing at all on it without training; but a trained player can draw from it an infinite variety of music.

Cooley therefore does not deny the influence of instinctive emotion, but rather points out that "instinctive emotion probably enters into everything we do." His insistence is, rather, that instinctive behavior never operates as such, but operates solely in a social form and context. Cooley provides the bridge between the individual physiological organism and the great patterns of social organization. In early primary group associations, family and neighborhood face-to-face associations, the plastic physiological organism is molded into a being whose attitudes are those of the primary groups in which he has participated. As subjective sentiments, these attitudes are the foundations of social institutions, and the manifestations of these attitudes in "the social process" are the social institutions.

Another trend of early modern social psychology was begun by E. A. Ross (1866–1951), whose *Social Psychology* shared with McDougall's book the distinction of being the first textbook in the field.

⁴ Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922, p. 19.

Ross's emphasis, although not incompatible with Cooley's, was upon collective psychology, or what is now called collective behavior. He attempted to devise a means by which both the collective and the individual sides of the society-individual relationship could be studied, and his approach had a great deal of validity. Essentially, his plan involved the twin foci of *social ascendancy* and *individual ascendancy*; social ascendancy referring to the group influence on the individual, and individual ascendancy referring to the influence of the individual upon the group. These twin emphases find their expression in the modern emphases upon the social situation and the personality respectively.

Perhaps unfortunately, Ross was so influenced by Tarde's "imitation" concept of social life that through overemphasis upon this oversimplified concept of interaction he almost led American social psychology away from the important insights which Cooley had provided.

The work of George H. Mead served as a valuable corrective to the fifteen years of American emphasis on suggestion-imitation social psychology which was set off by Ross. Mead's influence came as something of a delayed reaction, since he published very little (*Mind, Self, and Society*, his only book, was published by his students after his death). His real influence on modern social psychology is best seen in his effects on the work of William I. Thomas, Florian Znaniecki, Ellsworth Faris, Kimball Young, and others who did much to propagate his ideas.

Essentially, Mead begins his conception of the development of personality at the point where Cooley left his—in the process of the modification of the young individual by the group. Mead focuses upon the specific acts which produce this modification. First, he distinguishes between the physiological potential of the human infant to achieve the organization which is called mind and the actual achieving of mind. The intervening variable between this potentiality and the active functioning of the mind is the "social act." Carrying on from Cooley's concept of the social self, Mead developed his notions of the "I," and the "me," and the "generalized other," which are the psychological factors involved in the rise of the self in social interaction. In Chapter 10, these concepts are developed more fully. At this point it is only essential to see Mead's contribution in terms of (1) his extension of the Cooley conception of the relationship between society and the individual, and (2) his placing the locus of study in social psychology in the individual-in-interaction, in

the "social act" or what has been termed in this present textbook, "the social situation."

William I. Thomas (1863–1947) and Florian Znaniecki (1882–) in their *Polish Peasant in Europe and America* performed a signal service for modern social psychology by using the Cooley-Mead frame of reference in practical research. The *Polish Peasant* research, while crude and rudimentary in many ways, stressed individual attitudes, values, and wishes in terms of the situations which evoked them. In this sense the research begins the present era in social psychology—an era which has as its distinguishing characteristic the determination to test empirically the elements of modern theory which are philosophically derived.

The wave of research on social-psychological problems which followed in the wake of the Thomas-Znaniecki study, up to the time of the Second World War and beyond, centered around the Cooley-Mead frame of reference and received most of its impetus from scholars at the University of Chicago. While it is difficult to single out individuals of outstanding influence from this group of outstanding social psychologists of the "Chicago School," Karpf suggests that:⁵

In particular the work of Ellsworth Faris, Robert E. Park, and Ernest W. Burgess, in developing, supplementing, and adapting Thomas's point of view to the testimony of accumulating evidence and research experience, has been so intimately a part of Thomas's own work as to be practically inseparable from it.

The stimulation and growth of social psychology under the aegis of sociologists soon produced a reaction from some psychologists who felt that social psychology is, after all, psychology. Such writers as Floyd Allport maintained that all the reality is within the individual and that "the group," "society," and other such terms are nothing more than unreal abstractions. While this was an unfortunate starting point for a rapprochement of the sociological and the psychological points of view, it nevertheless provided a basis for the experimentally oriented psychologist to enter into the study of social-psychological problems. Both sociology and psychology laid claim to the field of social psychology. Most of the larger universities offered a course in the subject in both departments—many still do. The resolution of this quandary, however, has been in the process for some time and is culminating gradually

⁵ Karpf, *op. cit.*, pp. 379–380.

with the realization that the field, like biochemistry, stands alone but between two fields. As biochemistry feeds back valuable contributions to biology and chemistry in addition to building its own body of knowledge, social psychology serves sociology and psychology, yet is a growing discipline in itself.

If it seems strange that psychology was, in a sense, a late arrival on the social-psychological scene, perhaps some understanding of the currents of psychological thought which led into this seeming paradox will help to clarify the matter.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHOOL

Modern psychology probably contributes more workers to social psychology than any other discipline including sociology. Social psychologists with psychology backgrounds feed back to psychology a flow of data and ideas concerning the interaction of the psychobiological organism with the human environment. These psychologists bring to social psychology a long tradition of laboratory experimentation, and their chief contribution to the field has been the pioneering of experimentation in social-psychological problems.

Because of its long past, the late arrival of psychology at the scene of social psychology seems all the more paradoxical. But from the time of Aristotle, psychology has been shaped by the needs of philosophers because of the importance for philosophical inquiry of the study of mind—the rational endowment through which the world becomes knowable and reflection possible. Aristotle defined psychology as the “study of the soul and its accidents,” and since his time, the emphasis in philosophical psychology has been upon the soul and its rational qualities. Since the soul is by definition personal, private, and nonsocial, it is understandable that philosophical psychology has not concerned itself with social psychology. *Rational psychology* should, however, be distinguished from the *empiricist psychology* that emerged from nineteenth century natural science discoveries and the then current sensist philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, Hartley, and others, a psychology equally unconcerned with the social aspects of personality.

British Associationism. It has been noted that British sociology was the stronghold of individualism in social thought and for that reason somewhat unproductive of social-psychological insights. The overly individualistic psychologies of Hobbes and Locke were the source of

much of this influence. Hobbes, it will be recalled, declared the natural state of man to be solitary, brutish, poor, and nasty. Civilization controls the individual through fear and the desire for honor and prestige. The physiological factor of control is memory of the consequences of past behavior, the rewards which accompanied socially approved acts and the punishments which accompanied antisocial acts. These memories Hobbes thought to be organized by the coherence of ideas, i.e., the association between ideas (hence the term "associationism").

The Hobbesian psychology together with Lockean empiricism, the emphasis upon observable processes, was the foundation of the British associationist psychology. Locke also contributed the notion of the mind at birth as a clean slate "written upon," so to speak, by the sensory experiences of the individual. Thus, to this school, what the mind came to know or believe depended upon the experience of the individual. It might be thought that the interpersonal relationships of the individual would come in for consideration by this school, but such was not the case. The individual was looked upon as the sole object of psychological inquiry.

British associationism dominated the field of psychology until the late nineteenth century. Physiological discoveries about the brain and nervous system, a development in the natural sciences, began to stimulate inquiries into the physiological basis of thought and emotion. Thus, the philosophically derived associationism and the scientifically derived physiological discoveries fused as the backgrounds of modern psychology. Early philosophers such as Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mill, Herbart, and Leibniz contributed to the growth of primitive psychology in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries. Johann Herbart's concept of the "apperceptive mass," the accumulation of the individual's past experience which guides the learning process, represents the epitome of the understanding of personality achieved during this era.

The scientific laboratory emphasis on the physiology of the senses, moving forward at about the same time, led to the declaration by a characteristic figure, the pioneer psychobiologist Johannes Müller, that "no one can be a psychologist who is not a physiologist." This scientific sentiment found its concrete beginning in the founding of the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig, in 1879, by Wilhelm Wundt.

The Structuralism of Wilhelm Wundt. It is significant that Wundt (1832–1931), often considered the founder of modern psychology,

the case with methods and theory, devised to carry out the research problems formulated theoretically and these, of course, were framed for the study of the individual. Hence, not from its philosophical, methodological, nor physiological origins were there any precedents for the study of the social aspects of man's behavior.

Yet if it had not been for Wundt's "structuralist" psychology, it is highly likely that he would have proceeded to sketch in the broad outlines of a social psychology, aware as he was of the need of it. He applied the laboratory experimental method to the study of intrapersonal psychic processes, employing the assumption that complex experiences are constructed from mental elements in much the same way as chemical compounds are composed of basic chemical elements. He felt that this general psychology of the individual could somehow be correlated with interpersonal psychology and he strived to effect a social psychology.

The most significant fact about Wundt is his insistence that the study of all higher mental processes falls in the province of *Völkerpsychologie*. He did not believe that individual psychology, especially as pursued in the psychological laboratory, could account for man's thought. Thinking is heavily conditioned by language, by custom, and by myth, which to him were the three primary problem areas of *Völkerpsychologie*. The argument runs as follows: when men receive sensations from the outer world these commence to combine according to the laws of association, but association depends upon the absorption of an impression into the individual's apperceptive mass. Impressions enter into a creative relation with memories and contexts stored in this apperceptive mass. But this apperceptive mass is itself largely a product of culture. The apperceptive mass is furnished with linguistic habits, moral ideas, and ideological convictions. . . . Wundt would have felt at home in modern-day discussions of "social perception." ⁶

It is difficult to assess the influence of any one man upon later writers. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that Wundt's influence upon modern psychology, so thoroughly interpenetrated with social psychology, was considerable. He surely "would have felt at home" in such areas of modern psychology as social learning, developmental psychology, social perception, and the like because he would recognize many of his own ideas still alive in these fields. As we have said, however,

⁶ Gordon W. Allport, "The Historical Background of Modern Social Psychology," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1954, p. 36.

Wundt's structuralist theory of personality was simply inadequate for the ambitious social psychology which he envisioned. Valuable correctives to this shortcoming were provided by various schools of psychology, and elements of these schools are fused in modern social psychology. The functionalist school of psychology was a revolt against the inability of structuralism to deal with the obviously important effects of interpersonal relations upon personality.

The Functionalism of James and Dewey. William James (1842–1911) and John Dewey (1859–1952) early abandoned efforts to explain behavior in terms of the internal structure of personality and turned to the analysis of the value of mental experience in "adjusting" the individual to his social environment. The functionalists did not abandon the concept of mental states in personality but emphasized rather the stimulus-response acts of individuals in relation to their "adjustment" to the situation. Dewey, in particular, in his influence on George H. Mead and Mead's followers, had a vital role in the growing conviction of American social psychologists that their proper locus of study was the "social act" or social situation.

Despite the popularity of "existentialism" in modern philosophy, merely a rebirth of structuralism with its emphasis upon introspection, functionalism remains at the forefront of interactionism, which is to say, of theory in modern social psychology. Introspection, the method of structuralism and of existentialism, involves probing within one's self for the purpose of reaching an understanding about the facts of one's psychic life. This existentialist approach runs contrary to the interests of modern social psychology in two respects. First, it is an *intrapersonal* psychology. The investigator must study himself, which involves serious problems of objectivity. By interviewing or projective testing, he may inquire into the psychic life of another person, which, in addition to the problem of objectivity, raises problems of generality and specificity. How far can we generalize from what this subject has revealed of himself to the psychic life of other human beings? Even if the problem of representativeness did not exist, a far more serious problem for social psychology would be the interpersonal circumstances under which psychic predispositions would unfold. Without belittling the "depth psychology" and "personality" approaches in psychology, which probe into the depths of human personality, social psychology spells out the social conditions under which psychic potentials become actual behavior and hence must remain functionalistic to some degree.

The Watsonian Behaviorists. John B. Watson and his followers also became convinced that the introspective method had fatal limitations which justified the abandonment of that approach to the study of psychology. They turned their backs on the concept of consciousness and turned their attention to overt behavior. Their chief contribution was the concept of conditioned reflex and their research model was the laboratory technique of the celebrated Ivan Pavlov. In Europe (outside of the Soviet Union, of course, where it survives as the "official psychology") and America, Watsonian and Pavlovian behaviorism in its pure form was shortlived. Perhaps the greatest influence in swinging interest away from the behavioristic approach was the growing interest in psychoanalysis, stemming from the work of Freud and his followers in Europe and America. (The emphasis in the psychoanalytic approach, of course, is upon the covert processes of personality in common with some of the elements of structuralism. The contributions of Freud are discussed in the next chapter, but they may be and often are considered psychology as well as psychiatry, a consideration which strengthens the contributions of psychology to modern social psychology.)

The reason for the rather sudden demise of Watsonian behaviorism was undoubtedly its naïveté. There was good ground for breaking away from the introspective heritage in psychology and, indeed, modern social psychology in focusing upon what people do in social situations (by definition "behavior") is behavioristic. But it is a far cry from the materialistic and deterministic variety of behaviorism which holds that knowledge gained from conditioning animals in a laboratory can be carried over directly to generalizations about human "conditioning." Such attempts are made, but only by analogy and in full recognition that man is more than an anthropoid ape. Watsonian behaviorism, based on the "conditioned-response" experiments of Pavlov, Bekhterev, and others, made no such distinctions about the differences between man and the lower animals. The situational, or "field," or "gestalt," school of psychology is at once the most typically psychological in origin of the modern schools of social psychology and the school to which the modern field is most indebted for the experimental methodology of studying the social situation scientifically.

The Gestalt School in Social Psychology. Gestalt is brought into psychological terminology directly from the German because no English word seems precisely to define the term. Some English synonyms for the term are "configuration" or "pattern." The essential idea is that

mind or behavior cannot be viewed as composed of single elements, as Wundt believed, but rather that it must be viewed holistically. This school holds that the whole of experience is greater, that is, more meaningful, than its parts and that an act by a human being is more than a group of reflexes. The protest is directed largely against the Lockean epistemology which still permeates much of psychology.

Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) is the best known of the gestalt psychologists and his experiments pioneered the effort to study personalities in artificially created social climates. The variations on this theme are numerous, yet most experiments in social psychology retain a more or less Lewinian flavor. However, the field theory is but a variation on the essential theme of American psychology, the *experimental* orientation, and it is important to keep in mind the fact that social psychology owes much of its scientific character to the influence of modern scientific psychology.

Since the 1916 version of the Binet scale of intelligence by Lewis Terman, American psychology has followed its scientific tradition in terms of the precision and quality of its instruments and methods. Psychology has provided social psychology with “experimental social psychology,” many attitude scales, sociometry, personality studies, and a wealth of material from the psychology of learning. If social psychology came into existence as a result of the sociological protest against exaggerated individualism in psychology, it is no less true that it remains in existence as a scientific discipline through the psychological protest against theorizing without the benefit of painstaking scientific research.

The following seven problem areas are considered to be definitive of the interests of social psychologists by an outstanding modern psychologist:⁷

1. The interpenetration of general psychology and social psychology
2. The socialization of the child; culture and personality
3. Individual and group differences
4. Attitudes and opinions; communications research, content analysis, propaganda
5. Social interaction, group dynamics, sociometry, leadership
6. Social pathology
7. Politics, domestic and international

While it is not known how extensive this view is among psychologists,

⁷ Otto Klineberg, *Social Psychology*, rev. ed., New York, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1955, p. 15.

it seems reasonable to assume that the position taken in our present book, that social psychology is an independent discipline between sociology and psychology, fairly well represents the view of many psychologists. The first and third problem areas as well as part of the fifth can be identified with the purely psychological tradition. The second, fourth, sixth, and seventh can definitely be traced back to origins outside the psychological tradition, in sociology, anthropology, political science, and other behavioral sciences. In the following chapter we shall trace two of the most important of such tributaries to the modern stream of social psychology.

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Chapter 6

THE TRIBUTARY SCHOOLS IN PSYCHIATRY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

Nothing could be more absurd than to attempt to subsume psychiatry and anthropology as subalternate fields of social psychology. Anthropology is the scientific study of man and employs both natural and social science to achieve all the insights into the nature of man that are possible through the methods of science. One could well, if it served any practical purpose, categorize social psychology as one of many divisions of anthropology. Social psychology might well be subsumed under cultural or social anthropology, although in the light of the range of social-psychological interest in psychology, sociology, and the other behavioral sciences, such a label for our field would be narrow and myopic. So, too, in psychiatry we find a natural social science increasingly prepared to range across the whole arc of scientific inquiry into human behavior in its quest for insights into the causes of personality disorder. Hence, a logical but functionally inadequate division could be made of social psychology as a field within psychiatry. But we have located "schools" within both psychiatry and anthropology which are distinctly social-psychological in orientation and, as we shall see in this present chapter, have contributed much to the modern field of social psychology. When we speak of the tributary schools in psychiatry and anthropology, we refer then to these scholars and to their contributions to the independent modern field of social psychology, not in their primary aspect as psychiatrists and anthropologists but in their secondary aspect as social psychologists.

The psychiatric and the anthropological schools belatedly "discovered" much of what sociology and psychology had long known. Even more recently, students in these schools discovered social psychology itself. In the growing rapprochement of the four schools, a development very young in years, the anthropological and the psychiatric schools have, however, become indispensable tributaries to the modern social-psychological stream. As with the parent schools in sociology and psychology, these tributary schools have dual functions. The psychiatric school brings medical and psychoanalytic training to bear upon the study of the interacting individual and returns to medicine and psychoanalysis a better understanding of the social backgrounds of the patient's personality. The anthropology school performs the indispensable function for social psychology of bringing home the relationship between culture and personality, and in the process of performing this service for social psychology, has discovered much about the individual and his physical and psychological development which has relevance for the study of culture. Perhaps the most important of these discoveries is that personality development cannot be reduced to biological endowment and cultural conditioning alone.

THE PSYCHIATRIC SCHOOL

The psychiatric school of social psychology was led to the area of interpersonal relationships in its quest for greater understanding of personality pathology and its treatment. The chief source of data for this school has been the case history of the patient. Because of the confidentiality of this material, the subjectivity of their approach, and their dependence upon Freudian theory, the conclusions reached by the psychiatrist are not subject to the verification and replication of observations characteristic of psychological experimentation or of sociological research. For this reason, the sociologist and the psychologist have long been suspicious of psychiatric theories of interpersonal relations. In addition, psychiatry has achieved little agreement on the nature of personality or on the importance of the social situation for personality emergence and development. However, the contributions of a number of modern psychiatrists, notably Harry Stack Sullivan, Norman Cameron, Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Abram Kardiner, have called attention to the social matrix in which patient and psychiatrist operate. Their chief contribution to psychiatry has been to

bring psychiatry out of its traditional isolation and to make of it a social as well as a natural science.

It can no longer be denied that these psychiatrists have brought to social psychology insights into the role of neurophysiological processes in the motivation of behavior, which have been long overlooked. The medical training of these psychiatrists accounts for a sophistication in the discussion of anxiety, tension, and other motivational drives which contrasts sharply with the naïveté of sociologists in these matters.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Yet it was in breaking away from the domination of psychiatry by the medical conception of mental disorder that this school found itself in the domain of interpersonal relationships. As long as psychiatry looked for a physiological pathology behind every mental disorder, it was inevitable that the influence of the social situation on personality should be overlooked. The psychiatric school of social psychology emerged in a revolt against the interpretation of disorders of human living as "nervous disease," however helpful such a concept had been in the initial stages of the history of modern psychiatry.

Modern psychiatry dates from the efforts of Philippe Pinel (1745–1826) and his distinguished student and successor, Jean Esquirol (1772–1840), to secure for the mental patient the humane treatment accorded other hospital patients. From these beginnings, in keeping with the trend toward a higher degree of specialization in medicine, came the medical practitioner who specialized in "mental disease." By the time of the First World War, the specialty of neuropsychiatry had become entrenched in medical practice—a neuropsychiatry dedicated solely to the investigation of mental disorder in relation to neurology, endocrinology, and physiology. Credit for the trend toward a more "complete" psychiatry, i.e., a psychiatry with roots in the social as well as the natural sciences, has been given to "three great figures who appeared in the later years of the Nineteenth Century—Sigmund Freud, Adolf Meyer, and William Alanson White."¹

Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) developed a bold theory of personality which postulated a fundamental drive or source of energy called the *libido*. The *libido* is a sexual (in the broadest sense of the term) drive

¹ Harry Stack Sullivan, *Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry*, New York, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1940, p. 8.

derived from the unconscious part of mental life. The *id*, Freud postulated as man's primitive animal nature. "Located" in the unconscious, the *id* constantly strives to satisfy the libido. The *superego* is the internal repository of societal norms of conduct and ethics. Freud thought that the *superego* and the *id* are in constant warfare and felt that the self (the *ego*) is the regulatory mechanism which mediates between them. In the normally adjusted person, the *ego* resolves the conflict satisfactorily; personality maladjustment occurs when the *ego* fails to mediate successfully between the *superego* and the *id*.

Many of the Freudian concepts have not withstood the test of empirical research. His famous concept of the Oedipus complex, the supposed sexual love of the male child for the mother, has had to be revised in the light of anthropological findings. Yet, in exploring the family relationships of the patient, Freud pioneered the approach to personality disorder which led away from the neuropsychiatric emphasis toward the emphasis on interpersonal relations in personality therapy. Freed of many of its biologicistic and instinctivistic assumptions, Freud has much to offer modern social psychology in its study of the interaction between individuals. In the scheme $A \rightleftharpoons B$, the "egos," to use Freudian terminology, of each individual are interacting. If they are dealing with each other in realistic, problem-solving ways, a minimum of *anxiety* (the apprehension of fear, according to Freud) is present as a factor in their interpersonal relationship. If, however, anxiety is present in one or both individuals, a common type of social situation, the *ego* of the individual in question will be employing *defense mechanisms*, the means taken by the *ego* to reduce anxiety, to avoid danger to the psychic security, and in general, to protect personal integrity. This is in keeping with the role of the *ego* as the regulatory mechanism of personality. Unfortunately, the *ego* does not always regulate psychic activity in a straightforward way, such as we might say would be logical or the "right thing to do under the circumstances." As often as not, the means taken by the *ego* when there is real or imaginary stress in the situation will deny, distort, or falsify reality. In a word, Freudian concepts help us to understand irrational elements in interpersonal relations. This has often been taken to mean that there are *unrational* elements in human behavior. Nothing could be further from the truth. The defense mechanisms point up one truth very graphically—that there are many appetites that are purely emotional in origin, but, granting the intensity of the emotional appetites, the means taken to

satisfy them are rational; they are the actions taken by a rational animal. Let us take the most irrational example available, that of the person who is constantly proffering "good reasons" for his self-indulgence in some kind of behavior unacceptable to his superego. Of this type of "adjustment" one analyst says:²

Rationalizing is the technical word for this misuse of reasoning which, in some people, amounts to their major nuisance value in society. All the things they do that don't happen to receive just the right response from the other fellow are "explained," and they are always explained plausibly, although few indeed of us know why we make particular social mistakes. If I were asked, at a moment of weariness, "What is the outstanding characteristic of the human being?" I believe I would say, "His plausibility."

Because thought and language are involved in man's behavior, it is possible to engage in rational behavior, in irrational behavior, as we have just seen, but never in unrational behavior, or "plausibility" would not occur so universally. Chief among the irrational defense mechanisms are *repression*, *projection*, *reaction formation*, *fixation*, and *regression*, and these concepts do much to help us explain why people behave as they do in interpersonal situations.

Repression refers to the keeping out of awareness of appetites and desires which would meet with disapproval and cause psychic pain or anxiety if permitted into awareness. In Freudian terms, it is the ego which represses things back into the "unconscious" (a more acceptable modern term would be "out of awareness," thus avoiding many of Freud's mistaken concepts of extra-awareness), and this action of the ego is usually at the behest of the superego to which the undesired and repressed element would be unacceptable. An example might be a sexual attraction for a near relative.

Projection is likewise a method by which the ego conciliates between the pressures exerted by the id and by the superego. It consists of attributing to the outer world, usually to some other person, undesirable elements from one's own interior psychic life. To attribute physical desires, unthinkable in one's self, to others, with some feeling of relief that one is "not like that," is an example of projection, as is attributing guilt feelings in the superego to persecution by others.

Reaction formation is one of the most irrational adjustments of the

² Harry Stack Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

ego to anxiety. It involves escape from anxiety by hiding from awareness the feelings and wishes that are unacceptable to the superego and by fostering a self-deception that, on the contrary, such feelings and wishes are the farthest thing from one's mind. For example, a person who engages in promiscuity may be actually concerned about sexual adequacy; an athlete who exercises several hours daily and makes a great deal of "to do" about his athletic exploits may be masking his fears about his masculinity. The essential feature of the reaction formation is this element of self-deceit. It involves wasteful expenditure of psychic energy and a great deal of hypocrisy.

Fixation and *regression* refer to the stages of psychological development and to the fact that one may remain at a given stage, once achieved, and fail to progress beyond it, as in fixation, or drop back to an earlier stage of development which is less threatening than the more advanced stage attempted, as in regression. In a society like our own, each stage of development involves additional responsibilities and occasions for anxiety and stress. Few demands are made upon the infant, more upon the child, the adolescent, and the young adult in increasing amounts. For one psychological reason or another but always as a consequence of anxiety, one may fixate at a given level and give up attempts at adjustment at a more advanced level, or one may, after a great deal of anxiety and emotional disturbance, regress back to a level where the stresses are not so great. As used in the modern literature, the terms are more descriptive of behavior and are not advanced as explanatory concepts.

Then too, despite the usefulness of these Freudian concepts, it must be remembered that in their totality they constitute a system of *intra-personal* psychological processes and as such are not completely satisfactory for the *interpersonal* psychology which is the scope of social psychology. It remained for others to move psychiatric and psychoanalytic conceptions even closer to modern social psychology than did Freud himself. We turn to this extension of Freud's ideas into psychiatry proper in the paragraphs immediately following and reserve the extension of his ideas into anthropology for a later section of this chapter.

Adolf Meyer (1866–1950), although his conceptions were not as flamboyant nor as widely disseminated as those of Freud, nevertheless contributed equally concretely to the modern interpersonal theory of

psychiatry. Meyer held that functional, i.e., not organic in basis, psychoses are the culmination of failures to make adjustments to one's social environment.

William Alanson White (1870–1937) carried this conception even further in declaring that a personality “can never be isolated from the complex of interpersonal relations in which the person lives and has his being.” Thus, White held that the science of psychiatry is not merely concerned with “mental illness,” but also with the general theoretical problem of personality in society. This latter concern he held to be the broader scope of psychiatry; personality maladjustment, the narrower scope of psychiatry, being understood only against the background of the social setting.

Harry Stack Sullivan (1892–1949) held that the final synthesis of psychiatry as a natural and a social science will come with the conception that psychiatry is “the field of interpersonal relations, under any and all circumstance in which the relations exist.” If this prophecy is accurate, a much greater rapprochement of psychiatry and social psychology may be expected in the future. Perhaps the advance guard of this rapprochement is the alliance which has begun between certain psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrists and the field of cultural anthropology, which is discussed in a later section of this chapter. Sullivan himself contributed a great deal to social psychology in psychiatry as did a number of neo-Freudians, a small number of whom we may discuss in order to “get the feel” of the psychiatric contributions to social psychology. We make no pretense of completeness in this list and, further, have centered our discussion around the conceptions of Alfred Adler on the grounds that elements of his work have a certain typicality for the neo-Freudians.

NEO-FREUDIAN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY WITHIN PSYCHIATRY

Despite the name which he gave to his psychology, *Alfred Adler's* “individual psychology” was actually strongly oriented to the importance of interpersonal relations in the formation of personality. Unlike Freud, he tended to minimize the importance of biological instinct and stressed instead that a man's attitudes were importantly shaped by nursery and early experience and accumulated throughout his lifetime, that his attitudes were persistent and were difficult to change excepting through extensive introspection or psychotherapy, and most importantly, that

they were acquired and not innate. In this respect, Adler is far more consistent with modern social psychology than such psychiatrists as C. G. Jung, whose "analytic psychology" included the conception of the human mind as a self-regulating whole made up of the conscious and the unconscious minds. Unfortunately, Jung cluttered up his concept of the unconscious with vague (and unacceptable to modern social psychologists) conceptions of a "collective unconscious" made up of instincts and archetypes. Jung obviously was deceived by the unconscious and nondeliberate way in which the individual, in his life experiences, imbibes culture, and was led by this to assume that some of what is actually cultural is innate and instinctive. Adler, on the other hand, made no such mistake; his "New Leading Principles for the Practice of Individual Psychology" relate neurosis and social participation in a manner quite consistent with modern social psychology:³

- I. Every neurosis can be understood as an attempt to free one's self from a feeling of inferiority in order to gain a feeling of superiority.
- II. *The path of the neurosis does not lead in the direction of social functioning, nor does it aim at solving given life-problems but finds an outlet for itself in the small family circle, thus achieving the isolation of the patient.*
- III. *The larger unit of the social group is either completely or very extensively pushed aside by a mechanism consisting of hyper-sensitiveness and intolerance. Only a small group is left over for the manoeuvres aiming at the various types of superiority to expend themselves upon. At the same time protection and the withdrawal from the demands of the community and the decisions of life are made possible.*
- IV. *Thus estranged from reality, the neurotic man lives a life of imagination and phantasy and employs a number of devices for enabling him to side-step the demands of reality and for reaching out toward an ideal situation which would free him from any service for the community and absolve him from responsibility.*
- V. These exemptions and the privileges of illness and suffering give him a substitute for his original hazardous goal of superiority.
- VI. *Thus the neurosis and the psyche represent an attempt to free oneself from all of the constraints of the community by establishing a counter-compulsion. This latter is so constituted that it effectively faces the peculiar nature of the surroundings and their demands.*

³ Alfred Adler, *The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1927, p. 23. The social-psychological elements of the "principles" are italicized and some therapeutic conceptions omitted. Copyright U.S.A., Humanities Press. World rights, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London.

Both of these convincing inferences can be drawn from the manner in which this counter-compulsion manifests itself and from the neuroses selected.

- VII. The counter-compulsion takes on the nature of a revolt, gathers its material either from favorable affective experiences or from observations. It permits thoughts and affects to become pre-occupied either with the above-mentioned stirrings or with unimportant details, as long as these at least serve the purpose of directing the eye and the attention of the patient away from his life problems. In this manner, depending upon the needs of the situation, he prepares anxiety and compulsion-situations, sleeplessness, swooning, perversions, hallucinations, slightly pathological affects, neurasthenic and hypochondriacal complexes and psychotic pictures of his actual condition, all of which are to serve him as excuses.
- VIII. Even logic falls under the domination of the counter-compulsion. As in psychosis this process may go as far as the actual nullification of logic.
- IX. *Logic, the will to live, love, human sympathy, cooperation and language, all arise out of the needs of human communal life. Against the latter are directed automatically all the plans of the neurotic individual striving for isolation and lusting for power.*
- X. *To cure a neurosis and a psychosis it is necessary to change completely the whole upbringing of the patient and turn him definitely and unconditionally back upon human society.*

Adler is typical of the neo-Freudian psychiatrists in his social-psychological emphasis upon the relationship between mental health and social participation. Isolation from society and the substitution of self-centered fantasy is associated with neurosis and psychosis; effective integration and communication with other social beings are the antidotes to these. We shall be concerned further with these socially oriented principles of mental health in Chapter 13, where deviant behavior such as neurosis and psychosis is discussed at greater length. It is important at this point to recognize the important change in direction away from Freud's psychoanalytic conceptions of society as a purely repressive force exerting a pressure upon the imperious biological drives of the individual. In this light, society and the individual are set apart as if they were in conflict. In the neo-Freudian view, however, social participation is not a matter of conflict, but on the contrary a healthy antidote to neurotic withdrawal into the self. We must be careful, however, not to mistake their general agreement on the society-individual relationship

with a general agreement on the psychological processes which motivate the individual's social participation, for no such widespread agreement exists. Adler's first "principle" calls attention to the status striving and quest for power and domination so characteristic of Western industrial society. The concept of striving for superiority and the "inferiority complex" found popular acceptance, but it remained for other social-psychologically-oriented psychiatrists such as *Karen Horney* and *Erich Fromm* to develop the cultural origins of the quest for power and domination, and indeed, to point out that in the person of normal childhood and life experiences no such inordinate appetite for power (as Adler postulates) exists.

Horney's work firmly places psychoanalysis in social psychology since she seeks to understand the behavior of the patient in terms of the social environment and the problems and challenges which it presents to him. Fromm's classic *Escape from Freedom* is considered a masterpiece of sociological analysis blended with psychological insights and displays a great deal of background knowledge of history and anthropology, which provides a marked contrast with the writings of psychiatrists, who attempt to explain the behavior of modern man in purely materialistic medical conceptions. Finally, we return to Sullivan, who, it will be recalled, held that the proper scope of inquiry for psychiatry is the field of interpersonal relations. Describing Sullivan's contribution, Mullahy writes:⁴

. . . he has succeeded to a considerable degree, we believe, in showing *how* mind and personality always operate in an interpersonal reference, not as an isolated and more or less self-contained entity. In other words, he has attempted to demonstrate *how* and *why* psychiatry is ultimately the locus of social psychology. In theory, psychiatry as the specialized professional preoccupation of doctors with the mentally ill is replaced by a conception of psychiatry as the study of processes that involve or go on between people.

It is a tribute to the seminal genius of Freud that his ideals dominate the neo-Freudians in psychiatry even though it was necessary for them to modify his biologicistic and materialistic concepts to place the role of social participation in proper perspective. It is an even greater tribute that his influence upon anthropology produced in that staid discipline a "culture-and-personality" school, which proved to be an excitingly

⁴ Patrick Mullahy, *Oedipus—Myth and Complex: A Review of Psychoanalytic Theory*, New York, Hermitage House, Inc., 1953, p. 333.

new and stimulating source of insight into human behavior both to anthropology itself and, of course, also to social psychology.

THE CULTURE-AND-PERSONALITY SCHOOL

The anthropological approach to social psychology had its inception in the early twentieth century in the beginnings of an alliance between ethnology (cultural anthropology) and psychoanalytic psychiatry. The reasons the anthropologists' interest in personality was belated are clear. Prior to 1920, the task of anthropology was descriptive and historical in method because it was considered a necessity to record the workings of the few remaining nonliterate societies of the world before these societies lost their indigenous cultures to the engulfing European civilization. The emphasis of early anthropology was, understandably, upon ethnography and general patterns of culture, culture change, and diffusion rather than upon the role of individual personalities in culture.

On the other hand, the reasons for the affinity of the American ethnologist for the psychoanalytic as opposed to the sociological or psychological approaches are not so clear. The anthropologist *Clyde Kluckhohn* suggests a "genuine convergence upon a series of fundamental assumptions" of anthropology and psychoanalysis, while the psychologist *Allport* has suggested that psychoanalysis "is the most effortless type of psychology to lean upon." Whatever the reasons for the alliance, this school may well serve the purpose for psychiatry of helping to bring to an end the isolation of psychiatry from the social sciences and for anthropology of contributing to the understanding of the psychological processes underlying culture and culture change. On the positive side, this school contributes conceptions of variabilities in culture which are associated with variability in personality. Its greatest achievement, perhaps, has been the testing of instinctivistic theories of personality in cultures around the world. In this manner, new insights have been achieved into the problem of innate, inborn tendencies of personality as distinguished from those which are culturally acquired.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS

Aside from casual footnoting of Freud's work in isolated instances, ethnological research employing psychoanalytic conceptions did not begin in earnest until the 1920s. In 1920, *A. L. Kroeber* published a

critique of Freud's *Totem and Taboo* which distinguished between Freud's amateurish anthropology and the genuine insights Freud provided for the professional ethnologist. Freud turned his attention in 1912 to the subjects of "totem" and "taboo" among the primitive peoples of the world, hoping in this way to make a contribution to the psychology of religion. The work is absurdly biased⁵ by virtue of Freud's atheism and also by his attachment to his own psychoanalytic principles, which he imposed upon data about primitive peoples rather than submitting them to any real test. Using the works of Sir James Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy* and *The Golden Bough*, Freud attempts to explain the primitive totem clan in terms of the Oedipus complex. When primitive people honor the totem animal as the remote ancestor of the clan, the "father" of the clan, there is a symbolism involved in which the totem animal actually represents the human forefather of the "primal horde." The universal taboos upon killing any animal of one's own totem and upon sexual relations with any woman of the same totem clan Freud saw as reflections of the Oedipus complex. Building upon Darwin's theory that men originally lived in hordes governed by a patriarchal and despotic biological father, Freud imposed his concept of the Oedipus complex and decided that the original father of the horde was overwhelmed and killed by the sons because of their resentment of his monopoly of the women. Because of their guilt over having killed their father, they then felt constrained from having sexual relations with women of their own totem clan. This was the origin of exogamy (marrying outside one's own "bloodline," although sometimes extended beyond true biological kinship), which Freud thought constituted the beginnings of social organization. Recalling the social-contract theories discussed in a previous chapter, it can be seen that Freud's social-contract theory could be considered something of a variation upon that of Hobbes, with sexuality and guilt rather than the need for orderly social relations as the basis for the formation of the "state." Indeed, Freud's theory relates the beginnings of religion, ethics, society, and art to the Oedipus complex.

It was not long before anthropologists began to take an interest in Freud's amateurish and mythological interpretations of ethnological data. Kroeber, as we have noted, recognized a certain validity in the questions Freud was raising, but called his concept of the "primal

⁵ H. L. Philp, *Freud and Religious Belief*, London, Rockliff Publishing Corp., 1956. See especially chap. 3.

horde" a "Just So" story and Kroeber's general conclusions, shared by almost all, even psychoanalytically oriented, anthropologists were largely unfavorable.⁶

The psychoanalytic explanation of culture is intuitive, dogmatic, and wholly unhistorical. It disregards the findings of pre-history and archæology as irrelevant, or at most as dealing only with details of little significance as compared with its own interpretation of the essence of how culture came to be. . . . The theory is obviously as arbitrary as it is fantastically one-sided.

Bronislaw Malinowski, in his studies of the Trobriand Islanders, found that rivalries may exist between father and son where the social structure makes of the father a dominating figure who, through his dictates, restricts the desired activities of the son and hence becomes a source of frustration to the son. However, he argued, on the basis of the situation among the Trobrianders where culture establishes the mother's brother (the avunculate) as the authority figure, the hostility is directed toward the uncle rather than to the biological father. In other words, the hostility arises from cultural rather than sexual sources. Both Malinowski and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown made a strong case for the structural-functional basis of totems and taboos. By this is meant that the function performed by the totem in primitive societies is to cement the relations between persons of the same family line. Taboos likewise serve a social function by prohibiting activities which would impair the satisfactory functioning of the group. The orderly division of the society into subgroupings to carry out the activities necessary for societal (and hence, for individual) survival, or *social organization*, is the cause of totems and taboos. This is the generally held theory of anthropologists today, a view importantly influenced by the work of Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl, whose notions of "collective representations" foreshadowed the modern concepts of culture and social structure (see Chapter 16).

Freud's influence upon anthropology, then, was very much like his influence upon the neo-Freudians in psychiatry. By his daring, penetrating, albeit often illogical, thrusts into areas hitherto unexplored, he prompted others to investigate those areas even if it were solely for the purpose of proving him wrong. In this sense, Freud was the "father" of the culture-and-personality school of anthropology. But

⁶ A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, rev. ed., New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1948, pp. 616-617.

Freud merely attracted interest to the area, and the painstaking tasks of developing a theory and a methodology, processes still unfolding, have had to take place within anthropology itself.

The fundamental theoretical ground work of this school was laid by *Edward Sapir* (1884–1939), *Ruth Benedict* (1887–1948), and *Margaret Mead* (1901–). Edward Sapir, an intimate friend of Sullivan and other psychiatrists, developed keen insights into the unrealistic treatment (or lack of treatment) of the individual in the current anthropological conceptual scheme. Sapir held that some of the more important psychiatric insights could be brought into anthropological theory and into specific field research. It is generally believed that Sapir provided much of the inspiration for the psychiatric orientation in the work of Ruth Benedict and, of course, in the work of Benedict's pupil Margaret Mead.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Benedict published journal articles which adumbrated some of the personality-and-culture analogies and other conceptions of the modern school. In her famous *Patterns of Culture*, her basic analogy is "between the variations in human personality and the variations between cultures." There is systematic treatment of the relationship between cultural pattern and individual personality development. Benedict also shows that certain idiosyncratic components of personality may be so incongenial with culture patterns that mental illness results. This view is, of course, compatible with the views of the psychiatric school of social psychology.

Benedict's views are reflected in the earlier writing of her disciple, Margaret Mead, whose *Coming of Age in Samoa* was the first major piece of empirical research organized along psychiatric and ethnologic lines. Her subsequent researches, *Growing Up in New Guinea* and *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, very definitely converged with psychiatric theory. Margaret Mead sums up focal questions of the culture-and-personality school in terms of the time span in which they were developed:⁷

1925: How flexible is human nature? How much can we learn about its limits and its potentialities from studies of societies so very different from, so conveniently simpler than, our own?

1930: Is human nature elastic as well as flexible? Will it tend to return to the form that was impressed upon it in earliest years?

⁷ Margaret Mead, *From the South Seas*, New York, William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1939, pp. ix–xxxi.

1935: In judging human nature may human societies make assumptions which their educational systems are unable to carry out?

In the twenty-five years from 1925 to 1950, these questions received a great deal of attention. Sometimes in systematic and painstaking research and often by piecemeal observation and overgeneralization,⁸ a sufficient body of knowledge was accreted which supplied some cautious answers to these earlier questions and provided a basis for the formulation of more refined questions which are currently being explored. It had been argued that cultural variation was potentially boundless as likewise was the variability of human personality. An overemphasis upon the importance of early childhood experiences (especially ludicrous claims were made with respect to the importance of toilet training) threatened to carry the culture-and-personality school to the opposite extreme from biological determinism, the position they were, in a sense, attacking. It gradually became apparent that mankind, anywhere and everywhere on the face of the earth, has certain common problems, and while the solution to these problems varies among cultures, the solutions are not limitless but could rather be said to have boundaries which are imposed by man's nature. Also, the concept of individuality crept into the discussions of personality. It became widely recognized that no "one-to-one" relationship existed between culture and the individual personality. The concept that culture is carried in the minds of individuals, who reduce it to their particular needs and build it into a mental system which provides an organized individual approach to living and achievement of a unique life view, has led to the conviction that not only culture *x* must be studied, but also individual *y* as *he* is influenced by culture *x*. This, of course, places the modern school of culture and personality squarely within the focus of social psychology.

Florence Kluckhohn summarizes the basic questions explored by the modern culture-and-personality school in its concern with *value* orientations, the compelling desires of individuals within cultures as they face the problems which inevitably arise out of the human situation.⁹

1. What are the *innate predispositions* of man? (Basic human nature)
2. What is the relation of *man to nature*?

⁸ A. R. Lindesmith and A. Strauss, "Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1950, 15, pp. 587-600.

⁹ Florence Kluckhohn, "Dominant and Variant Value Orientations," in Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray (eds.), *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture*, 2d ed., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1954, p. 346.

3. What is the significant *time* dimension?
4. What is the valued *personality type*?
5. What is the dominant modality of the *relationship of man to other men*?

From current investigations it is hoped that typologies of cultural "solution" to problems of this kind will form into what might be called a "natural law, ethnologically derived," which will provide important insights into the conditions which human nature imposes upon cultural, and hence upon personality, variability.

MODERN THEORY

These questions have been raised and considered by a gifted group of psychiatrists and ethnologists who seem to have relied more upon their own gifts of brilliant insight and facile expression than upon the cumulative strength of plodding research. When the contributions of this school are sifted, it is found that much social-psychological "truth" has been discovered which represents no real advance over the earlier insights of, say, Cooley in sociology and Dewey in psychology. Géza Roheim, the psychoanalytically trained ethnologist, is a characteristic figure in this respect. On the other hand, it can not be denied that daring speculations like those of Roheim have provided interesting hypotheses for the more systematic empirical research approaches of M. E. Opler, A. I. Hallowell, and others.

On the academic scene, the psychiatrist Kardiner and the anthropologist Linton sponsored a seminar in culture and personality at Columbia University out of which grew an interdisciplinary social psychology with, however, a broader relationship between the various schools of social psychology other than merely the psychiatric and the anthropological approaches.

The interdisciplinary nature of the culture-and-personality school is often stressed, but sociologists, psychologists, and even many anthropologists have raised questions concerning the need for ethnologists to build upon a more solid psychology. Both the psychiatric and the culture-and-personality schools of social psychology will have to resort more to the scientific procedures of modern psychology and sociology if they are to achieve full partnership in the larger discipline of social psychology.

APPROACHES

Ethnologists are conscientiously perfecting their methodology for the study of culture and personality. Several approaches are being perfected. It will be recalled that in the present textbook the distinction was made between the genetic and the factorial approaches to the scientific study of interpersonal relations. Ethnologists have worked out methods which can be conveniently described using this distinction.

The *genetic* approach to the study of culture and personality, of course, is concerned with the development of a modal personality within the culture, the relationship between the attitudes and values of adults, and the learning processes of childhood. The postulates underlying this approach are found in the chapter on the relationship between culture and personality (Chapter 11). In brief they can be stated as assuming that child-training practices are similar within cultures but vary from culture to culture; homogeneity of child-training practices produces homogeneity in adults; hence, adults within a given culture will be like each other and unlike adults of other cultures. Since these postulates are well supported by ethnological data, the quest for a modal type of personality within a given culture seems a reasonable one. On the other hand, Geoffrey Gorer and others have aroused much indignation for attempting to stretch this concept to the study of nations and "national character," attempting to relate patterns of childhood experience to adult personality on a cosmic basis. Gorer's attempts to relate early feeding experiences and early toilet-training experiences to the Great Russian personality, to the American personality, and to Japanese character seem farfetched, indeed, but it should be kept in mind that Gorer's concepts are often advanced as absolute conclusions when in actuality they are merely tentative hypotheses and suggestive for further research. The techniques of the genetic approach involve the hazards of the interview, and the inability to apply the experimental approach hampers the advance of this approach. Yet ethnologists are loath to abandon it:¹⁰

Before abandoning a genuine scientific approach to genetic studies it is well to recall that the genetic approach has contributed immensely in psychiatry and psychology toward the understanding of individual human

¹⁰ John J. Honigmann, *Culture and Personality*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1954, p. 57. The primary source for the discussion of "approaches" here.

development in Western society. The success in those fields offers justification for following a similar approach in making comparative investigations into modal personality.

Other approaches to the study of culture and personality include the *descriptive approach*, which somewhat cuts across our twofold distinction between the genetic and the factorial since it can be adapted to each. The descriptive method refers to reporting about personality or ethos at a given time (a Hopi village of pre-Coronado days) or at different points in time (pre-Coronadon Hopi compared with modern). The descriptive method, of course, presupposes a talent for descriptive writing, even something of a flair for the journalistic style on the part of the researcher, as well as an acute sensitivity to cultural differences—a combination reserved to a gifted few. Witness the following passage.¹¹

All the while waves of ecstatic rhythm have been sweeping over the congregation, with the actions of the preacher setting the pace. There are patterns to the rhythmic actions: running around the pulpit, holding trembling hands to the sky, very fast clogging of the feet, swinging the arms in a sharp staccato motion. One girl leaps from her seat as though struck by an electric shock, races four times around the aisles of the church, screaming "O God . . . do Jesus . . . O God . . . glory, glory, glory . . . give me more . . . more . . . glory, glory, glory"; falling over backward with hands outstretched, her whole body quivering and rhythmically jerking, she collapses at last in a dull heap upon the floor, and stays there in comatose condition for several minutes. Others rise and shout at the top of their lungs for five minutes or bang on something in staccato rhythm.

It seems highly unlikely that just any observer could have captured so graphically the spirit of this "holiness meeting." The descriptive method is no better than the observer using it. But since descriptive ethnography is the main tool of anthropology, strong objection has seldom been taken to it except, of course, where the observer's report is biased by judgments which reflect his own cultural conceptions.

The *functional approach* in culture-and-personality study, of course, is the prototype of the factorial approach in that it undertakes to study here and now the relationships between, let us say, family structure and character, or individual attitudes and political structure, or whatever relates functional interrelationships between individual personality

¹¹Liston Pope, *Millhands and Preachers*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1942.

patterns and the social structure. An example would be the attitudes toward sex of individuals of different class position. Finally, since both psychiatry and anthropology are natural as well as social sciences, investigators in these fields do not hesitate (as does sociology) to relate drives or instincts to culture patterns. This *phylogenetic approach* (which we will discuss in Chapter 8) looks upon social systems as by-products of biological forces, a valid view but a very narrow one which excludes the major influence on behavior (culture) by focusing upon a minor variable in human behavior (biological stock). This approach is especially complicated by the insistence of some in using hazy and mystical concepts such as the "racial unconscious," a completely unacceptable concept (in the light of modern findings) of the Oedipus complex. When viewed as a consequence of social structure, it is quite acceptable, but when viewed as biological instinct, it is utter nonsense.

Research Techniques

Within each of the above-described approaches to the study of culture and personality, techniques have been developed for executing the approach. Major techniques are *sampling*, *observation*, *participant observation*, *interviewing*, *testing*, and *thematic analysis*. We have discussed the question of sampling elsewhere, and it is sufficient to note here that it has been extremely seldom that anthropologists have been able to use informants selected according to scientific sampling standards. They have usually been atypical in one important respect or another. Usually, they belong to the handful who speak English, or have become so acculturated to the white man's ways that they no longer see tribal customs in their true perspectives, and so on. Sampling methods, increasingly, however, are being introduced into ethnological research. Observations of behavior in its natural setting include *participant observation*, where the observer takes a role in the group which facilitates his observation of group life. That is to say he achieves rapport with and becomes, in a way, one of his subjects. The difficulty involved in this method, of course, is achieving objective detachment in reporting, after having become emotionally involved with the subjects. *Systematic observation* and note taking need not involve, however, this identification with the subjects. Ethnologists may also use the *structured* and *unstructured interview*, the *life-history recording*, and of course, the more psychoanalytically oriented are interested in dream

analysis. Tests, such as the Rorschach and the Thematic Apperception Test, have been used to study the personalities of primitive people. One of the major objections to this technique is, of course, that these tests have been devised for literate peoples of modern industrial societies, and their application to nonliterate primitive folk has been viewed with some justifiable misgivings. One of the most distinctive features of ethnological research which can be brought to bear upon the problem of culture and personality is called thematic analysis, which, in pre-literate societies, involves the study of folk tales and proverbs, myths and legends, poetry and drama, the arts, and even mundane artifacts in an attempt to lay bare certain *themes* in the culture which will mold the value orientations of the personalities sharing the culture. Such a theme among the Kwakiutl is the striving for prestige; among the Apaches a respect for old age. But this brings us to the chapter (11) on the relationship between culture and personality, and we shall pursue the subject there at greater length.

In conclusion, we find that the inclusion of both the psychiatric and the culture-and-personality schools as tributaries of the modern field of social psychology is well justified. Their methodologies are not so fully developed as those of the parent schools of psychology and sociology; however, this is not due to a resistance on their parts but to the nature of their subject matter. The analyst has his experiences and his confidential case files to draw from; the ethnologist his own field researches and those of others. All too often even these ethnological monographs may contain "ten pages on pots and ten lines on personality." The inventiveness of members of these schools in overcoming these obstacles to an adequate methodology can be evaluated on the basis of the contributions they have made to a scientific social psychology. In later chapters of the present book, especially the one pertaining to culture and personality, we shall unfold some of the major findings of the culture-and-personality school, and psychoanalytic concepts are cited throughout the entire text. It would seem apparent from this that, despite methodological problems, both schools are integral to the modern field of social psychology.

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Chapter 7

VALUES AND POSTULATES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

This is the last of the chapters in which we shall be talking about social psychology. The remainder of the book is concerned with the *subject matter* (the interacting individual in society and culture) of the science rather than with the science itself. Summarizing the things we have accomplished in the first part of this book, we find that one task remains—the “coming to grips” with the philosophical heritage of the modern field and its meaning for the values and postulates of modern social psychologists. We first staked out the boundaries of social psychology as an autonomous field distinct from its parent fields of sociology and psychology and its tributary fields of psychiatry and anthropology. Contributions to this relatively new field have been made by representatives of all the behavioral sciences. Its designation as a distinct and separate discipline does not mean that it has lost its interdisciplinary character.

From its two parent schools and its two tributaries a set of propositions has emerged based on empirical research which comprises the *theory* of the modern field. We saw that this theory, unlike that of general psychology, which is primarily concerned with intrapersonal structure and processes, and sociology, which is concerned with group structure and processes, has for its focus the *interacting individual*, illustrated by the diagram $A \rightleftharpoons B$, the social situation in which one individual is affecting another while being affected by another or others. We then explored the methods or “tools” of social psychology for the

purpose of gaining insights into the ways in which additions to theory are accumulated and theory tested against reality, the world of human beings living in society.

After getting this over-all "feel" (apperception) of our discipline, in terms of its scope, theory, and method, we turned our attention to its history, where we saw that social psychology has a long history as a social philosophy and a short history as a modern science. The key to understanding the present philosophical climate surrounding social psychology lies in this philosophical heritage from the past. Prior to the nineteenth century, psychology itself was shaped to philosophical concerns. The primary method was that of deductive reasoning according to the rules of logic *from* a preconceived set of postulates about human nature *to* corollaries about human psychology. (Associationism is typical in its postulate of man as a biological animal whose neural associations govern his behavior.) Sociology, also, prior to the nineteenth century, existed as a philosophy rather than as a science. We might expect that with the change in status from philosophy to science the offspring of sociology and psychology would contain nothing but scientifically proved and demonstrated propositions. Indeed, this is a naïve claim advanced by some.

However, no science, philosophical or empirical, can proceed without postulates and corollaries deduced from these postulates, nor can the men engaged in scientific or philosophical endeavor proceed without a system of values. These are the questions we shall discuss in the present chapter. As we saw in the two preceding chapters, both the parent and the tributary schools have attempted to establish themselves on firm scientific ground, a desirable goal if social psychology is to be a separate and autonomous science. Yet the modern discipline still bears some marks of its philosophical heritage, although increasingly relying more and more on sounder scientific principles.

Comtean positivism is still a philosophical sentiment permeating much of the writing in the field. Comte did not follow the rules of science in developing his theories, however strongly he advocated their use, and his law of three stages, theological, metaphysical, and positivistic, was not inductively derived. Yet it is common to find in the introductory textbooks of social psychology the statement that only science can help us to understand man. This is, of course, a projection of Comtean *philosophy* into the modern scientific field where it has no place. Durkheim also established a postulate of the "collective consciousness"

which sometimes finds expression in a social and cultural determinism in the modern field. Despite the brilliance of his scientific statistical studies, most of Durkheim's conclusions are deduced from his original postulate. And so it was with Tarde and his "laws of imitation" and others, who are often referred to as the "classical systematists" of sociology. Yet, variations of these postulates often are found in the literature without any other justification than that they are a heritage of the past.

The same holds true for the psychologists. The pervasive influence of nineteenth-century materialism vitiates many otherwise fruitful laboratory investigations. Likewise, it is common to advance "structuralism" or "functionalism" as the "right" way to study man's behavior based on nothing more than admiration for Wundt or James or Dewey, despite the fact that Wundt's work flowed largely from his postulates about structure in the personality rather than from his work in the laboratory. Similarly James and Dewey constructed functionalism from their brilliant minds rather than from painstaking empirical research. Freud's concept of man, like Hobbes's "brutish and selfish" and constrained only by the mores of society, has been projected by the Freudians into psychiatry and anthropology and to a lesser extent into psychology and sociology. We must keep in mind that these philosophical conceptions are not a part *of* social psychology, but rather are brought *to* it. It is the purpose of the present chapter to explore the elements extraneous to social psychology and to delineate carefully those elements which it requires and those it can do without. These extraneous elements are postulates and values derived, as we have said, from sources outside social psychology but which are intermingled, often without explicit reference to the fact, with research findings in such a way that they are given an authenticity which they do not deserve.

Let us anticipate, somewhat, the conclusions of the present chapter as an antidote against pessimism or despair on the part of the beginning student who might logically feel that he can learn little in a discipline where there is such widespread disagreement among authorities. In a word, the conclusion is that the situation is not so bad as it seems at first glance. Whatever systems of ethics social psychologists may hold individually, probably all social psychologists without exception will agree in making certain value judgments, for instance, that crime should be repressed, poverty minimized, and personality maladjustment avoided. Still more important, the proponents of conflicting postulates can work

together harmoniously in large areas of empirical research. This being the case, it is not necessary—in fact it would be extremely wasteful of time and energy—to construct a social psychology for each set of divergent postulates, viz., Catholic, Jewish, Protestant, agnostic, atheistic, and to collect and process the same data according to each postulate. Values being what they are, such a procedure would reduce the scientific aspect of the social psychology in question to a mere pretense, since there would be conscious and unconscious attempts to interpret research findings in a manner supportive of the values which one held before beginning his research. Having anticipated our conclusions somewhat, let us turn to the reasoning which underlies these conclusions.

Value Judgments and Postulates in Science

Despite verbal difficulties, social psychologists have come to agreement as to the meaning of the term “value.” Values are objects, ideas, or beliefs which are *cherished*. In America, such things as money and social position are valued highly, but we also have many values which are not economic; beauty is valued, as is art, music, and philosophical speculation (although we are somewhat remiss in this latter regard). As social psychologists, however, we are not only concerned with the values of the people we are studying but must be cognizant of the fact that we ourselves have values, and that these values strongly influence our ways of looking at things. Unless the safeguards of scientific method are observed, we shall find that our values will consciously or unconsciously bias our scientific inquiry. But this is not to say that as social psychologists we must be “value-free.” On the contrary, science itself is a value and selecting from the natural and social sciences the area or focus that social psychology is concerned with involves a number of values (which we shall discuss later in the chapter). Science itself is a value in that it seeks truth and avoids bias. By cherishing truth the scientist demonstrates a value which governs his methodology. But even aside from the values involved in the methodology of science, its goal is a humanistic value in itself.¹

The scientist seeks scientific truth because he accepts, *on faith and faith alone*, that out of the quest for more accurate knowledge will eventually come some good for humankind. He cannot be sure that that will be the result, because demonstrable harm as well as good has resulted from

¹ John F. Cuber, *Sociology: A Synopsis of Principles*, 4th ed., New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1959, p. 47.

scientific knowledge up to the present. Currently, among thinking men's greatest fears are the Atomic bomb and the Hydrogen bomb, which scientific man has created and which may destroy him. Even though less dramatically than in the case of the atomic bomb, many other scientific inventions have *so far* been of doubtful good. Yet science goes on apace, spurred by the hope and the faith that eventually, when there is "enough" knowledge man may be the better for it.

One of the more precise attacks upon this problem of values in science has been accomplished by the use of a fourfold division of "good" and the application of these four concepts to the problem. Since values are by definition based on the goodness of the object, Furfey² distinguishes four kinds of good, the *vital*, the *ethical*, the *pleasurable*, and the *useful*, so that we may think of vital values, ethical values, pleasurable values, and useful values. Vital good is cherished because it contributes to the superior functioning of man in all of his powers. For example, "high intelligence, knowledge, acute sense organs, manual skill, sound health, and longevity," are vital goods. Ethical good is cherished as an ethical value attaching high worth to virtue and moral goodness. Pleasurable good deriving from "play and recreation, comfort, luxury, sense enjoyment, and whatever we do for the joy of doing it" is cherished as a pleasure value. Finally, useful good attaches to whatever helps us to achieve our ends, "whatever helps to the attainment of some good beyond itself has a useful value." The idea of value-free scientific endeavor becomes an absurdity if we subject scientific activity to analysis using these concepts. The scientist may be and usually is imbued with a sense of duty, of obligation to perform a useful role in the division of labor in his society. He often hopes to contribute in some way to the betterment of mankind (ethical value); he becomes absorbed in and enjoys his work (pleasure value); he prepares himself by studying for years and working under older and more mature scientists in order to perfect himself (vital value) so that he may occupy a position of esteem within his community (useful value). Without laboring the point it seems quite clear that science is not value-free, but rather that values are always present and must be taken into account if scientific objectivity is to be achieved. Value judgments are not the only elements which have their source outside the boundaries of a given science.

Postulates also, by definition, are working assumptions which are

² Paul Hanly Furfey, *The Scope and Method of Sociology: A Metasociological Treatise*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953, pp. 90-91.

taken for granted because they have been proved elsewhere. Like values, postulates are often overlooked and unless the scientist is aware of the postulates upon which he is proceeding he may be duped into believing that his scientific endeavor is "postulate-free." Postulates and values are intimately related because the question as to just which postulates will be introduced into the science often reduces to a question of values. We have seen that science, as conceived by Darwin, Spencer, Comte, Durkheim, and others, was held to be an alternative to metaphysics, ethics, and religion. Those who do not hold this view may cherish science and the scientific method but reject the notion that science can be a substitute for ethics, metaphysics, or religion. The objection is not based on arbitrary grounds, since values can and often do have a logical basis. In this case, for example, it is held to be logical that ethical, metaphysical, and religious questions have no place in scientific inquiry since scientific methodology is not adapted to the study of such questions, hence, attempts to subsume them under science is to pre-empt the subject matter of other disciplines more suited to such study. However, the relationship between science and philosophy does not preclude philosophy from borrowing from science, as when a philosopher submits his epistemology to the data of the psychology of learning in order to draw upon all available sources in his quest for the broadest, most absolute conception of "what it is to know." The scientist, on the other hand, must be "stingy" in what he borrows from other fields. His primary task is to prove empirically, not to speculate broadly without an empirical basis for his speculations. He, therefore, borrows from philosophy a minimum number of postulates, without which he is unable to carry on his science. Such a list of postulates would necessarily include statements such as the following:

1. That he exists
2. That a real and knowable world exists around him
3. That his senses are the bridge between himself and this external world
4. That he can know and understand the external world by abstracting from his sense impressions of it intellectual representations, or *ideas*, about it

We rather imagine that for most scientists there would also have to be a few statements about values, based on the useful, ethical, pleasurable, and vital goods encountered in his work. But the list of postu-

lates need not be very extensive if the science in question is a "natural" one, especially if the subject matter is inorganic. Chemicals and crystals follow mechanical laws which can be dressed in invariant mathematical terms, formulas, and other symbolic representations. Little needs to be drawn in from outside of this type of science to aid in the understanding of the subject matter. The problem becomes more acute for the biologist, because in studying organic beings he must (or should) ask himself questions about the nature of life, consciousness, instinct, and other questions which defy analysis by the methods of science. The question of postulates is most crucial in the sciences which study man, of course, since invariant formulas become of decreasing value as *immanent* action increasingly characterizes the subject matter. The degree of immanent activity refers to the extent to which the object of study contains within itself its active principle, i.e., of initiating activity while remaining itself. Hence a stone is purely transitive, while a dog, a cat, and a human being are capable of immanent action. Immanent activity and the potentialities for it vary, of course, in the ladder of being, and human beings are more capable of it than animals. While philosophers might be unhappy about its incompleteness, we can represent diagrammatically five stages, shall we say,

Inorganic	Organic	Organic	Organic	Vital
1	2 vital	3 vital	4 vital	5 rational
		sentient	sentient	
			rational	

in the level of capacity for immanent activity. First the inorganic with none, the organic vital with a crude immanence of a sort, and so on through to the Most Perfectly Immanent Being. This is, of course, the concern of the philosopher and we explore the question here solely to indicate that as the capacity for immanent activity increases more complicated philosophical questions are raised, questions outside the scope of science to solve, and hence more postulates are needed for the empirical science whose focus falls within such an area. For this reason there has been a great deal of controversy about social science and whether or not it is really science. Nothing could matter less than this question so long as it is conceded that social science has its proper subject matter and the proper theoretical and methodological tools for building a body of knowledge about its subject matter. The only serious objection raised is that social science requires so many postulates that it is as much philosophy as science. The answer, we can see by now, is that social science is more narrowly (and more properly) defined in modern times

than formerly and no longer vies with philosophy for what is purely the subject matter of that latter discipline. Recall that Spencer proposed to initiate a new ethics based on sociology and psychology and compare this extravagant claim with the sharply focused, carefully worded, and statistically documented research projects of social psychologists today.

Values and Postulates in Social Psychology

We have seen in preceding chapters that the science movement in the nineteenth century fused with certain philosophical elements in sociology and psychology to produce the modern field of social psychology. To this budding discipline were soon added the tributary schools in psychiatry and ethnology. The flow of postulates to social psychology, therefore, was fourfold. Fortunately for the sake of simplifying our task, but unfortunately for the philosophical heritage of our field, a small number of themes dominated the postulates from all of the contributing schools, and these themes were *humanism*, *materialism*, and *empiricism*. Before considering the individual variations upon these themes within the various schools, let us consider them generically. *Humanism*, as the term implies, refers to a preference or a predilection for the study of human beings in place of the lower animals, plants, and inorganic matter. It also implies that man in his natural as opposed to his supernatural aspect is worth studying. As we have seen, these are value judgments and are no more subject to criticism than "botanism" (if we may invent a word), wherein, as in "humanism," one makes the choice that he would like to study and work within a given focus of inquiry, in the case of "botanism" at the natural botanical level and in the case of "humanism" at the natural human level. Hence, there can be no argument with true humanism. However, there are some gross distortions in this notion of humanism which we have traced to their historical roots. Of course it is unacceptable to reject the supernatural order on the grounds that social psychology is adequate as an ethic or as a substitute for religion. There is no basis whatsoever in social psychology for this position. Some evidence exists to support the reverse idea, that the data of social psychology support and tend to prove the existence of a supernatural order. For example, philosophers and theologians do well to note the role of religion in primitive and modern societies and the universal psychological functions which it performs. But let us heed our own advice and leave such speculation to the philosophers. Our role as social psychologists precludes this and demands that we pay careful

attention to the postulates imported from philosophy. We must not repeat the mistake of early social psychology in accepting a humanism which denied in man all but the grossest material aspects of his nature.

Materialism, then, combined with humanism painted a caricature of human nature in insisting that only matter exists; man exists, therefore man is only matter. Aside from a handful of social psychologists who were *idealists* and insisted that only mind exists and not matter, most psychologists and sociologists were materialists. This is not to say that no effort was made to take into consideration psychic phenomena, but when this distinction was made only a crude "parallelism" was the result. This position of Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) stated that

. . . psychic and bodily phenomena do not have to be dependent upon each other at all. They merely occur along parallel lines. It meant that, if one wants to walk and one actually does walk, the bodily act of walking is not the effect of the spiritual act, the wish, or the order of the mind, but that it just occurs at the same time as the spiritual act. The psychic and the bodily events are independent and follow their own laws but remain in perfect harmony, run as parallel events because of a pre-established order of the universe.³

Such a dissociation between the spiritual and the material must surely, since it was so widely accepted in psychology and sociology, have been advanced as a rationalization for concentrating upon the material side of man in those behavioral sciences. At any rate, the spiritual side of this dualism was soon dropped in favor of an altogether monistic materialism. Swept out were such concepts as the human will, consciousness, ideation, and all of the higher faculties of man. Slowly, however, these concepts are being restored to their rightful place as postulates of social psychology. It was probably in the first flush of enthusiasm about science and its potentialities that such errors were committed in the first place. When sociology and psychology became sciences they could well have retained sound systems of postulates and could have developed as sound empirical sciences, but, as we have seen, the philosophical climate was not right and the overenthusiastic hopes for the new science too rampant for such a development. So, empiricism, a good and useful approach to man's behavior became a rallying position for new philosophical beliefs which erroneously held that the inductive method of empiricism was the only valid path to truth.

³ Henryk Misiak and Virginia M. Staudt, *Catholics in Psychology: A Historical Survey*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954, p. 9.

Empiricism, properly defined, is not a philosophy but is rather a method by which information about phenomena is gathered, hypotheses tested, and generalizations drawn. It is proper to confine a scientific inquiry to observation, classification, and generalization, the three processes of this method, and it is acceptable when this method alone is cherished, i.e., valued above other methods. It is one of the value postulates of social psychology that its method will be the empirical method. An unacceptable and wholly unwarranted corollary of this postulate has been advanced to the effect that the deductive methods prevalent in philosophy are inferior to the scientific method. Another erroneous corollary is that science provides the only truth, and that since what science holds to be the truth at any one time is relative (subject to revision in the light of future findings), truth itself is relative. Truth, of course, is not dependent upon the scientific method.

Some scientists insist that it is not necessary to know first principles before proceeding to the scientific study of a phenomenon. These "operationalists" hold that we can know a thing only by the operations which it manifests. Intelligence, for example, is that which an intelligence test measures. Again, light is that which comes on when the switch is tripped. By this token there can be no metaphysics or any philosophy which tries to probe into the nature of things. This kind of empiricism has its validity in science; after all, intelligence *is* that which an intelligence test measures, but also intelligence is *something* or it couldn't be measured. Hence, operationalism, like all forms of empiricism, is valid truth, especially as methodological technique, but like all empiricism, is prohibited by its own restrictions from probing first principles.

These then were the three main themes of the philosophical heritage of social psychology. Of course, these themes were adapted to the particular problems of the disciplines of sociology, psychology, psychiatry, and anthropology. Because each of these fields had a different focus, different problems arose (with some overlapping, of course) and humanism, materialism, and empiricism were elaborated into postulates more specific to each discipline. For example, reducing the individual to matter was more an error of psychology, reducing him to an anthropoid ape more an error of psychiatry, and eliminating him altogether more an error of anthropology and sociology. Psychology has been plagued with attempts to invade the realm of philosophical psychology where science is not prepared to cope with problems of the "person" and "personality." Sociology has been plagued with the problem of whether

society or the individual is real and has finally conceded the real nature of both. Psychiatry has had to cope with the animalistic Freudian conception of man, the question of the will, the conscious and the unconscious, and related questions of no small philosophical significance. Anthropology has had similar problems such as the nominal or real nature of culture, cultural determinism, and cultural relativism. As might be expected, borrowings from the four schools of social psychology often contain implicit postulates reflecting the values of some workers in these schools. While space prevents an exhaustive treatment of these—we are again faced with reducing problems of mountainous proportions to a manageable handful of propositions—the remainder of this chapter is devoted to the values which form the background in which Catholics view science, with the special purpose, of course, of placing social psychology in this perspective.

Catholic Values in Science

So well known is the achievement of Catholics in science that no special treatment of that subject seems necessary. Some few conflicts have occurred between Catholic scientists and the Catholic hierarchy and while we do not wish to minimize their seriousness, nevertheless they have been magnified to the point of distortion by antagonists of the Church. Such incidents tend to distort the true nature of the protection and support which the Church has provided for science from the first awakenings of the scientific impulse. The position of the Church has been stated succinctly in various presidential addresses to the American Catholic Sociological Society as well as in the writings of Cardinal Mercier and others from the viewpoint of Catholics in psychology. From these we select passages which illustrate the Catholic view on science.⁴

Our devotion to our science, to our society, and to our Church should prompt us to acknowledge three general areas of difficulty:

First: There is the lack of an acute awareness of the nature of the social problem which besets the world and the Church, and the consequent lack of a sufficient sense of responsibility to be intelligently active about it, active in an effort to understand the problem, and active in an effort to use our knowledge to improve man's social life.

⁴ Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, S.J., "Catholics and the Scientific Knowledge of Society," in *The American Catholic Sociological Review*, March, 1954, 15, p. 3. Presidential address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Catholic Sociological Society, Cleveland, 1953.

Second: Even where there is genuine awareness of the social problem, and zeal to be active about it, we are hampered by a lack of a Catholic attitude more favorable toward the scientific knowledge of society, i.e., an orientation of mind and a motivation which would drive us to seek as thorough and deep and rich a knowledge of man's social life as is within reach of modern methods of research.

Third: This lack of a scientific habit of mind is related to a much deeper problem, the lack of a proper spiritual motivation, a response to the meaning of our Faith which should prompt us to perfect ourselves by perfecting the highest power God gave us, our intellect; and to perfect it in our case by seeking the greatest knowledge of God's creation that is possible in a scientific inquiry into man's social life.

In a tradition beginning with St. Augustine's *City of God*, we find an interest in the earthly city among Catholics and an attempt to make of it a more adequate facsimile of the Heavenly City, or at least an effort to make of the world a more adequate preparatory environment for the afterlife. We need only point to the work and teachings of Sts. Francis, Ignatius, Vincent de Paul, Peter Canisius, and a host of others who spearheaded powerful reform movements intended to achieve these goals. While, as we have stressed in the historical sections of this book, the philosophical and theological emphases have been dominant in such Catholic movements, the quest for truth, no matter by what means acquired, has been the central concern of such emphases. As a consequence no ultimate (as opposed to short-range) conflicts can exist between them and science.⁵

There is not a Catholic philosopher who is not ready to abandon an "idea already many centuries old" as soon as it is plainly contradicted by one observed fact. For we, too, are "accustomed to take observation as our starting point, as the beginning of our investigations, as the source of truth and the supreme mistress of science."

The moral of all these prejudices for us Catholics is, that we should love science and cultivate it in our schools of philosophy more energetically than ever.

The long and short of it is that Catholics not only value science, that is, "cherish" it as a source of truth, but also value it highly as a means of bettering mankind through applying scientifically derived

⁵ Désiré Joseph, Cardinal, Mercier, *The Origins of Contemporary Psychology*, London, R. & T. Washbourne, Ltd., 1918, p. 338.

knowledge to the problems of the world. But it is one thing to cherish science and altogether another thing to accept uncritically the postulates which have their origin not in science but in rather amateurish philosophizing in the name of science. For this reason some of the past antipathy of Catholics to social science is understandable. This negative attitude, however, is giving way to a more positive one as the unacceptable postulates are unraveled from the skein of social science knowledge and the scientifically derived truth in social science is thus laid bare. By the very definition of science and its dissociation from philosophy and theology, there is no Catholic biology, Catholic psychology, nor Catholic sociology. Therefore there seems no reasonable alternative for the Catholic engaged in scientific endeavor than to discover and remove postulates which are neither true nor scientific and to view the scientific truth that remains in his field as his rightful focus. This is the procedure that we shall attempt in the remaining paragraphs of this chapter. Needless to say, however, it is important to place the science—without, of course, distorting it—within the broader Catholic perspective on life, and we shall also attempt to achieve this objective.

Catholic Values and Social Psychology

Strictly speaking, there are no such things as “Catholic” postulates in any science, since truth is not the exclusive possession of the Church but rather can be enjoyed by all. However, in the Catholic value system, there are truths which are cherished and which represent the frame of reference in which Catholics view scientific endeavor. Let us take the $A \rightleftharpoons B$ focus and place it in this framework. The most basic qualification that we must make is that we must deliberately limit our social-psychological inquiry to but one phase of the *whole person*. The failure to distinguish between scientific social psychology and philosophical psychology has resulted in an ambiguity, found in many social psychology textbooks, concerning the proper scope of the science. Philosophical psychology, most Catholics would agree, is separate and distinct from scientific psychology and, following this line of thinking, separate also from social psychology. Most agree that no scientific method has been devised which is an adequate tool for the study of the whole person, and it is only by abandoning the methods of science and becoming something of a philosopher that one is able to make such generalizations. The task is a necessary and desirable one. The Catholic is not content

with the analysis and classification of the proximate causes of man's attitudes and behavior. His humanism is a much more penetrating sort than that which we have discussed previously as part of the philosophical background of modern social psychology.⁶

The deeper problems of psychology demand a solution, and man can not help inquiring into the *ultimate causes* which lie behind and beyond the proximate causes. Above all the objects in the universe, the object of the greatest interest to man is *man*. Scientific psychology should refrain from investigating these ultimate realities in man's being, but the philosophic psychologist must use every means at his disposal in the attempt to arrive at a solution to the fundamental problems which lie in the core of man's innermost nature. He hopes to achieve success in his undertaking by bringing these problems before the piercing scrutiny of reason.

The "piercing scrutiny of reason" is, of course, operating in scientific social psychology, but it is or should be operating within the restrictions imposed by the scientific method. The social psychologist is eminently qualified to study the operations of interacting individuals and their reciprocal influencing of one another in the social situation. This social aspect of human nature tells us a great deal about the way in which the original biological endowment is modified through social influences.⁷

But even when applied only to empirical personality that statement is false, because it is incomplete. Heredity and environment have a great share in molding personality, but there are two more factors which are equally, if not more, important: the will and God's grace. The way in which a person adapts himself to his environment depends to a great extent on his own free volition. He may consciously and voluntarily inhibit certain drives; he may, to a certain extent, hold in check his emotions, or at least their expression; he may even, within narrow limits, act upon his physique, for instance, by dieting. Finally, he is capable of influencing his environment, either by modifying it or at least by moving out of it.

Divine grace also has a great influence upon man's life. That influence primarily affects his spiritual faculties, in the form of light for his intellect and strength for his will. But it extends also to his actions and attitudes, his emotions and drives, even to the unconscious stirrings of his mind.

⁶ Celestine N. Bittle, O.F.M. Cap., *The Whole Man Psychology*, Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Company, 1945, p. 6.

⁷ J. F. Donceel, S.J., *Philosophical Psychology*, New York, Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1955, p. 279.

We should not be dismayed, however, that the focus of social psychology does not provide ultimate insights into human nature. Our case rests upon the valid and demonstrated propositions which we can obtain by maintaining the integrity of our science *as a science*. To achieve the fullest significance of our findings we have only to fit them into place in the broader perspective of the whole man. The limited frame of reference provided by the scope of social psychology is, thus, most fruitful, in an indirect and partial way, in advancing our knowledge about the whole man.

Vis-à-vis the whole man, any of the textbooks on philosophical psychology on the suggested readings list for this chapter can supply in much greater detail the conception of human nature that we must necessarily deal with in a sketchy way. As a minimum, however, such a discussion must include the individuality and dignity of each man, his spiritual nature, his bodily and his psychological capacities. This complexity of human nature is the reason why so many disciplines, both philosophical and scientific, are needed in order to increase our understanding of man. The person's individuality is not studied in social psychology, but *from the science* the philosopher achieves valuable insights into the problem.⁸

We suppose that the only difference between individual men, when they begin their existence, is the relation of their form to matter. But as these men go through life, they accumulate all kinds of experiences (perceptions, emotions, especially attitudes and free decisions) which leave something behind in the individual. In a conscious, and especially in a self-conscious being like man, the past is not just something which has happened and has gone forever. Something of it remains with him, grows with him, modifies him, makes him different from all other men, not substantially, of course, but in some of his accidents. And so these accidents are not, like those deriving from the relation to matter, perceptible by the senses, they are really intelligible, though not always for our human intelligence. Therefore, we may conclude that man is individualized, basically through the relation of his soul to quantified matter, secondarily through his own personal history, as written in him by his immanent actions, especially his free decisions.

Such a concept of men's individuality differs strikingly from that of the social psychologist who would erroneously construct a theory of

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 344-345.

individuality solely from the biological constitution as affected by social participation. Notice that the philosopher takes the theory of social psychology (he is speaking, of course, of personality as the secondary basis of individuality) and places it within the broader purview of philosophy. Without such a broader perspective the data of social psychology would reveal only the biopsychological changes in men which result from their social participation. This is the reason so many social psychologists in the past believed that men receive their individuality solely from social participation, that society confers "humanness" upon, shall we say, a kind of anthropoid who is entitled, therefore, to whatever rights society wishes to bestow upon him. After a taste of Nazism and Marxism, the entire Western intellectual world has found this concept distasteful and unacceptable. In addition, it has little to support it empirically. Ludicrous experiments have been performed which attempted with no success, of course, raising a chimp or ape with human children to infuse in it some humanness. Although there are some who might insist that if only the proper type of ape could be grown, with more convolutions of the brain, more vocal cords, and an appposable thumb, then through social participation it could be humanized, the great interest in human existentialism today seems to constitute a trend toward a view of human life as a *special type of existence*. Yet man is an animal, but one whose nature is different from the other animals, capable of not only perceiving and forming mental neural associations (the "thinking" processes of the higher animals and, by analogy, of electronic computers) but also possessing an intellect which is not intrinsically dependent upon neural associations and consequently able to "know" at a higher level than other animals. This is not to say that the intellect and the body are independent of each other (as in parallelism, it will be recalled) but rather that in human thought there are also spiritual elements.

When *A* comes into interaction with *B* in the social situation, both his body and soul are involved in the relationship. The cues provided by the "other," such isolated items as light reflecting from his body, the sound of his voice, and other wave phenomena, impinge upon *A*'s receptors, which are located on or near the surface of the body. These isolated stimuli are formed into a perceptual whole or phantasm which gives him an organized sensory image of *B*. The psychologies of Locke and Hobbes, of course, would close off the knowing operation at this point. Truly, however, this is only the beginning of *A*'s cognition of *B*, for it is at this point that the higher human powers come into operation.

The agent intellect picks over and abstracts the bits of intelligibility in the phantasm. The *meaning* of the cues, the "definition of the situation" which we have stressed so greatly, is introduced into *A*'s cognition of *B* when his passive intellect comes into operation and forms *ideas* from the intelligible elements which the agent intellect has abstracted from the sense image. *A* and *B* interact with one another in terms of these ideas which they have about themselves and each other. In *A*'s intellectual memory are ideas about the statuses and roles of himself and *B*. These constitute his understanding of the situation and his expectations of *B*. The same holds true for *B*, of course, and the two interlocking sets of ideas constitute a miniature social system in terms of which they respond to one another, "each to each a looking glass." In the minds of *A* and *B* lies the subjective side of social structure, the objective side of which, of course, is society and culture. The fullest significance of this view of social interaction is that thought is placed at the core of interpersonal processes. The idea in the mind of *A* previsioning some change in the state of affairs which he hopes to bring about is the cause of social interaction, as are, of course, similar ideas of *B*. But *A* and *B* are not interacting as disembodied intellects, an erroneous caricature erected by some idealists and even by Catholics who are scornful of the materialistic aspects of psychology and social psychology. These latter disciplines derive great worth from their analyses of the ways in which physiological and emotional factors are operative in interpersonal relations. Returning to the idea of Cooley's "looking-glass self," the three steps involved are:

1. *A*'s imagination of how *B* is perceiving him.
2. *A*'s putting himself in the place of *B* and imagining how *B* "must be" evaluating him.
3. Finally, there is a subjective reaction, an emotional one, in *A*, such as pride, pleasure, pain or anxiety, or whatever emotion is the consequence of his imagined evaluation of himself by *B*.

The first two stages are intellectual and the third is emotional. This fusion of the intellectual and the emotional in actual behavior illustrates the necessity for understanding both the cognitive and the affective aspects of the social situation, and, indeed, the rewarding insights into human behavior thus achieved make social psychology an indispensable area of the study of man.

However sketchily, we have attempted to show the interrelationship

between scientific social psychology and philosophical psychology. While we have called such an awareness of the importance of both types of psychology a Catholic "value," it seems to be supported by common sense that some type of philosophy should exist to study the aspects of human life which transcend the scope of social psychology. Hence, from one point of view drawing the relationship between social science and philosophy is one important task of every social scientist, not merely the Catholic. What is uniquely Catholic, however, is the sublimely idealistic conception of the relationship between society and the individual conceived at the philosophical and theological levels. The concept of the whole man participating in society differs strikingly from the social-contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. The spiritual element in man's nature as advanced in the Catholic conception of social participation is the keystone upon which ethical considerations are based. Since matter has no potentiality for the spirit the soul does not arise from the body but is, rather, created by Pure Spirit, from Whom flows all individual rights at the moment of creation. Thus a man's rights are in and are inseparable from his human nature.⁹

Man has inalienable rights, because he is a sovereign being, an end in himself, never merely a means; because he is a spirit, albeit in matter, because the core of his being is self-consciousness, self-possession, and self-position.

True, man is subordinated to God, but not merely as a means. God's purpose in creating man is fully achieved when man perfectly fulfills his own destiny and obtains perfect happiness.

The Catholic's conception of the outcomes of social participation is not earthbound as were those of Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau.

It is extremely important, however, that those whose values include the spiritual nature and inestimable worth of the human being take measures to ensure that these values will not distort such scientific endeavor as they might undertake. After all, the pruning away of materialistic postulates in social psychology leaves a great deal of purely objective and valid subject matter which tells us a great deal about human personality and interaction. Social psychologists with scientific respect for truth can work side by side in vast areas of sociopsychological inquiry even though their values are worlds apart, *provided* that certain precautions are taken. There must be rigorous training in scientific method and in the scientific ideals of objectivity and detachment,

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 348.

and there must be replication of studies. Catholics may wish to repeat studies conducted by non-Catholics and vice versa as a double check against the operation of bias. The increasing dependence upon statistical procedures and the use of mathematics bode well for future objectivity in the science. Finally, and most important, honesty with ourselves and recognition that we possess values which might distort our findings will help us to make them explicit and recognizable so that we may be on guard against unconscious bias.

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PART TWO
PERSONALITY

Chapter 8

THE BIOLOGICAL ORGANISM

Social psychologists seem never to tire of advancing the proposition that the child has no “human nature” nor culture at birth. They point out the fact that he has certain rudimentary patterns of stimuli and responses and an amazingly flexible neural system upon which the social world builds a wide variety of habits, attitudes, and appropriate cultural beliefs which will fit him for the positions in society that he is expected to occupy. In this sense a proposition in the theory of social psychology is that *the biological organism is the foundation upon which personality emerges, and is the substrate of personality throughout life*. As we have seen in the previous chapter in our discussion of the different roles of philosophical and scientific approaches to the study of man, this position has a great deal of descriptive validity about what man *does*, as seen from the restricted scientific point of view, rather than about what man *is*, as seen from the philosophical point of view. This proposition is assigned a lesser role in the theory of social psychology than are propositions about the social and cultural aspects of personality. Modern social psychology relegates the biological emphasis to the background in its conceptions of personality and social behavior.

MAN IN THE ANIMAL KINGDOM

Despite the modern-day emphasis upon the importance of the “social situation” and “culture” in governing behavior, the student should never lose sight of the fact that the human being belongs to a biological species.

Modern biologists hold the view that man and the other animals have a common history and that man's relationship to the other animals can be charted. Table 8 shows the place of man with respect to the other species in the animal kingdom.

Table 8. Man in the Animal Kingdom*

1. Kingdom—Animal
2. Phylum—Chordate
- a. Subphylum—Vertebrate
3. Class—Mammal
- a. Subclass—Eutheria (Group—Placental)
4. Order—Primate
- a. Suborder—Pithecoid
5. Family—Hominoid
6. Genus—Homo
7. Species—Sapiens
8. Race—Caucasoid, Mongoloid, Negroid
- a. Subrace—Alpine, Mediterranean, Nordic, etc.

* Adapted from E. Adamson Hoebel, *Man in the Primitive World*, 2d ed., New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1958, pp. 31–32.

Of the two great *kingdoms*, plant and animal, man, of course, belongs to the latter, and because of his spinal cord he is an animal of the *phylum* of chordates. Because his spinal cord is segmented, his *subphylum* is vertebrate; because when young he is fed from the mother's milk, he is in the *class* of mammals; and because as an unborn young animal he developed in the maternal womb, his *subclass* is Eutheria. Within the *group* of Placentalia (unborn young fed directly from the blood stream of the mother), man belongs to the *order* of Primates, whose general differences from the other mammals include:¹

1. The brain is relatively larger, especially in proportion to body size, than that of other animals.
2. The eyes are located forward on the skull, rather than back and to the sides; the back of the eye socket is closed and encircled with a bony ridge; in other mammals it is open at the sides and rear.
3. The forepaws are flexible, with five digits; the thumb is opposable (i.e., it can be rotated so as to face the fingers) In other words, it has a prehensile, or grasping, hand. It can manipulate.
4. The hind paws retain five flexible toes.
5. The claws have become flat nails.

¹ E. Adamson Hoebel, *Man in the Primitive World*, 2d ed., New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1958, p. 34.

6. The digits have soft, fleshy pads on the underside, which facilitate grasping by providing a nonskid tread.

7. The forearm exhibits a high degree of flexion; i.e., with the elbow steady it may be rotated clockwise or counterclockwise almost through a full circle.

8. The snout and jaws are reduced in size and forward projection.

9. The olfactory sense is reduced and vision sharpened.

10. Generally, there are but two mammary glands.

11. The female bears but one, or at most a few, offspring at a time, instead of a litter.

12. Adults are sexually active the year around, a condition known as *oestrous*, instead of being limited to well-marked rutting seasons.

13. Whereas the generalized mammalian dentition includes forty-four teeth in a dental formula of $\frac{3.1.4.3}{3.1.4.3} \times 2 = 44$ (i.e., each half of the upper and lower jaws contains three incisors, one canine, four premolars, and three molars), among the primates this has been reduced to a total of thirty-two in the case of the hominoids, and to an intermediary number in various other primates.

Within the Primates man's biological constitution is "apelike" (*suborder*—*pithecoïd*), and he has a downward nose instead of a flat one (like the Old World monkeys as opposed to those of the New World) and hence belongs to the *infra-order*, *Catarrhine*. His *family*, *Hominoid*, is man-like and his *sub-family* is true human, or *Hominid*. Since only a single species of the *genus*, *Homo*, has been clever enough to survive, man today is classified as *genus Homo*, *species*, *sapiens* (wise). The varieties of man are three, the *Caucasoid*, *Mongoloid*, and *Negroid* races. The subject of the races of man, because of common misconceptions, is important enough to warrant a separate and slightly more detailed treatment.

The Races of Man

While the subject of much popular misconception, the concept of race is a completely valid one when viewed in its proper perspective, i.e., as one of the conceptual tools of the physical anthropologist. It refers to physical, inheritable differences between peoples without reference to any assumed emotional or intellectual differences between them. Anthropologists are in agreement with the theologians that there is only one human race, descended from common ancestors whose domicile was located somewhere around what is now "Mesopotamia." Through

migration, isolation, and inbreeding three varieties or "races" developed. There is no pure race, but three discernible sets of body characteristics enable the physical anthropologist to subsume the peoples of the world under three categories, as follows:

<i>Caucasoid</i>	<i>Mongoloid</i>	<i>Negroid</i>
Nordic	Asiatic	African
Mediterranean	Oceanic	Oceanic
Alpine	Amerindian	Negrito

The most numerous of the peoples of the world are Mongoloid whose skin color, hair, and eyes (actually their eyes do not always "slant," but rather the epicanthic fold of flesh on each side of the nose often gives the illusion that the eyes are slanted) are characteristic of most of the people of north, central, and southeastern Asia, of Malaysians and Indonesians (and certain other of the Oceanic peoples with whom there are intermingled elements of all three racial heritages) and, finally, of the American Indians who are presumed to have migrated from Asia to the New World via the Bering Peninsula.

The skin color, hair, flat nose, and other distinguishing physical features of the Negro are characteristic of the peoples of Africa and the islands of the South Seas not populated by "Polynesians." An interesting variation on this race is the "Negrito," or pygmy, who is Negroid and is found in the Congo and in the jungles of such widely separated areas as New Guinea, the Philippines, and the Andaman Islands.

Finally, the Caucasoid race includes the blond Nordic and the brunette Alpine and Mediterranean peoples. The Alpine is found in East Central Europe and Asia Minor, while the Mediterranean is found in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Egypt, North Africa, India, and Indonesia, and the Nordic, of course, is found in Scandinavia and northern Germany.

Our concern in this chapter is with the biological aspects of social interaction, so we need not dwell upon the myths of racial superiority except to note them and to indicate that research evidence does not support the contentions of racists:²

If the effects of differences in early training and social environment (cultural differences) could be eliminated, and the constitution and functioning of the mind in different races be determined, there is still the question of whether the results would be found to be qualitative or quantitative.

² Raymond Firth, *Human Types: An Introduction to Social Anthropology*, rev. ed., London, Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1956. See also New York, Barnes and Noble, Inc., pp. 38-39.

On the qualitative side, it is possible that differences in such fields as musical ability may yet be found between races. This has not yet been properly investigated. On the quantitative side, it has still to be clearly shown that the moulding influence of social process on the working of the mind can be eliminated from the tests that are applied. But though the experimental basis is small as yet, it does seem from such simple tests as the comparison of similar shapes that the mental functioning of different races is identical. . . .

What does emerge very clearly from all the work done is the wide gap between the cautious, tentative opinions of the scientist about racial psychology, and the dogmatic views of many other people with a superficial acquaintance with primitive peoples.

Thus we may speak of *human* psychology on far more firm grounds than we may speak of *racial* psychology. We can, therefore, think of man as a whole both in terms of a common history and common emotional and intellectual capacities. Whatever man's origin in the animal kingdom, and it appears that he had an ancestor in common with some living primates, his ability to think and reason, to retain concepts, and to build social systems sets him off from the other animals as *man*, without reference to racial factors.

HEREDITY

The link between man and the other animals is essentially man's heredity or animal heritage. The individual constitution begins as an almost microscopic cell formed by the union of cells from the bodies of the father and the mother. In this cell (the fertilized ovum or zygote) the animal heritages of the parents are united. The expression "carried in the germ plasm" refers to the sum total of hereditary traits of an individual within the single cell in which he begins life. The continuity of these hereditary characteristics extends back through the individual's parents, grandparents, and remote ancestors.

The science of genetics is devoted to the study of regularities and variations in the transmission of physical traits from generation to generation. Genetics has uncovered a wide variety of facts about the heredity of plants and the lower animals, but facts about human heredity are still relatively scarce. Important studies are available regarding the transmission of such hereditary features as skin color, color and texture of hair, and other bodily characteristics, but all too often the "findings"

by geneticists concerning the place of heredity in personality characteristics do not sort out the effects of environment (either physical or social) on the constitution.

Heredity and Social Transmission

While it is a difficult matter to distinguish what is transmitted through the germ plasm and what is socially transmitted, social psychologists have been able to arrive at some broader statements of the relationship between constitution and behavior:

1. *The germ plasm is the main source of our bodily traits.* Examples of these bodily traits are skin pigmentation (color), color, form and texture of hair, the facial angle, nasal angle, color and shape of eyes and the distance between them, the shape and size of lips, general bodily structure, including stature, the relation of the length of arms and legs to the total height, and relative presence or absence of hair on the face and other parts of the body.³ These physical traits do not affect the personality characteristics of the possessor excepting where social definition imputes a significance to them.

2. *The original mental endowment of the individual is contained in the germ plasm.* Heredity brings tendencies toward a definite sort of physical development or "constitution." Physical, constitutional, development is known to be related to various types of aptitudes, dispositions, and "intelligence." Intelligence is apparently modified considerably in society and culture, and a battle rages between those who hold the IQ to be fixed from birth and those who consider it as largely a socio-cultural phenomenon. Studies have shown some rather consistent differences in IQ which seem most reasonably accounted for as genetic differences. Nevertheless, there is an abundance of research evidence to the effect that life experiences do exert an influence upon the mental capacities of individuals and further that even the intelligence tests themselves often measure, to some degree, cultural differences between individuals rather than intellectual differences. In summary, the best evidence seems to point to a strong hereditary component in intelligence which sets drastic limits upon the social participation of many individuals (for example, the moron, the imbecile, and the idiot), and more subtle limits upon the social participation of all.

3. *Only through organic structures can there be any manifestation of*

³ Paul A. F. Walter, Jr., *Race and Culture Relations*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952, p. 9.

personality (i.e., behavior). Sociologists and anthropologists are interested in patternings of society and culture. The foundation of even the most elaborate and complex social system is the individual human constitution. Within it is contained all of the immediate causes of thought and emotion. Consciousness, volition, and communication are basic necessities for interaction and hence for all that is social.

4. *The constitution sets limits within which society and culture may produce a myriad number of modifications.* Each generation of human beings lives in a social setting different from that of past and future generations. This is true only of human societies, and is possible only because man's native adaptive powers are vastly greater than those of the animals. Yet the biological endowment of the individual sets certain limits upon his participation in society. For example, certain positions and roles in many societies are beyond the range of all but the physically adequate. Only the most limited type of participation in society is possible for those of grave physical deficiency.

5. *There are no specified "instincts" carried in the germ plasm.* While we may legitimately speak of "instinctive emotions" as a generalized term referring to an hereditary element in bodily changes, such as the secretion of adrenalin during fright, it is fallacious to speak of the "fear instinct." Social behavior is not made up of instincts, but rather of the mobilization of the personality to meet the expected demands of social situations. While instinctive emotion may trigger a given reaction, the content of the reaction will be largely learned (social), and the resulting behavior cannot be explained in terms of the instinctive element involved. If there is some confusion as to why the term "instinct" is not as acceptable as "instinctive," the concept of the *pluripotential* newly born child may be helpful. In other words one may not speak of a *given number* of potentialities or instincts as being present in the child at birth, but one may think of a *vast number* of potentialities for behavior, only some of which will ever actualize as a result of the social participation and volition of the individual.

On the above subject, Cooley has this to say:⁴

Although instinctive emotion probably enters into everything we do, it enters in such a way that we can rarely or never explain human behavior by it alone. In human life it is not, in any considerable degree, a motive to specific behavior at all, but an impulse whose definite expression de-

⁴ Charles Horton Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922, p. 27.

pend upon education and social situation. It does not act except through a complex, socially determined organism of thought and sentiment.

CONSTITUTION AND PERSONALITY

Many and varied have been the attempts to explain personality in terms of hereditary constitutions. This trend of inquiry has been common among positivistic social scientists. The underlying assumption of this school is that personality characteristics can be predicted from measurements of bodily constitutions. Perhaps the most widely known constitutional theory of personality is that of Cesare Lombroso, the founder of the Italian positivistic school of criminology. His early experiments led him to conclude that:

1. The criminal personality is actually an atavistic one (a "throw-back" to a more primitive type in the scale of evolution).
2. The criminal is consequently a subhuman freak who is marked with certain physical abnormalities or "stigmata."
3. Consequently, from the measurement of these "stigmata" the scientist can determine which is the criminal personality and which is not.

Needless to say, this vastly oversimplified theory of the relationship between physique and personality did not stand unchallenged for long. Lombroso himself later accorded more influence to environment, and Dr. Charles Goring conducted a series of experiments on 600 English convicts which in no way supported the early findings of Lombroso. It might be thought that Goring's work would sound the death knell of the constitution-personality theory, but the theory was revived by Ernest Hooton, an American anthropologist, and enjoys a limited vogue today as "constitutional psychiatry" based largely on the somatotypy of W. H. Sheldon.

Sheldon names the three constitutional components, endomorphy, mesomorphy, and ectomorphy.⁵ All constitutions possess the three components, but one component ordinarily predominates. Thus, constitutions would vary according to gradations of dominance of the three components (Figure 6).

Endomorphy means relative predominance of soft roundness throughout the various regions of the body. When the endomorphy is dominant

⁵ W. H. Sheldon and S. S. Stevens, *The Varieties of Temperament*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1942.

the digestive viscera are massive and tend to dominate relatively the body economy.

Mesomorphy means relative predominance of muscle, bone, and connective tissue. The mesomorphic physique is normally heavy, hard, and rectangular in outline. Bone and muscle are predominant and the skin is made thick by a heavy, underlying connective tissue.




FIG. 6. Three Somatotypes. (Drawn by James Nilo.)

Ectomorphy means relative predominance of linearity and fragility. In proportion to his mass, the ectomorph has the greatest surface area and hence relatively the greatest exposure to the outside world. Relative to his mass he also has the largest brain and central nervous system.

Evaluation

As has been suggested, the essential feature of the constitution-personality scheme is the correlation of constitutional features and personality traits. The mesomorphic type is, for example, overrepresented in some samples of juvenile delinquents. For the student of social psychology, the key to the analysis of the value of somatotypes for predicting personality characteristics lies, perhaps, in the wise dictum of R. M. MacIver:⁶

⁶ R. M. MacIver, *Social Causation*, Boston, Ginn and Company, 1942, p. 92.

A correlation is a clue or question mark. Its significance is what we can infer from it or what we may learn by following the lead it provides. Sometimes the lead peters out. Correlation techniques are extremely useful in many areas of investigation, both in the physical and in the social sciences, but their heuristic value is small where the correlative variables do not fall within a single coherent order.

By viewing the discovered correlation between mesomorphy and juvenile delinquency as a clue or "question mark," we may analyze the possible causal link between them. Mesomorphy, we might say, "causes" juvenile delinquency, but if this is to be our inference, we must accept the notion that a physical entity (the bodily constitution) causes a social phenomenon (juvenile delinquency). The "correlated" variables do not fall "within a single coherent order." The church and steeple do not cause the behavior of the religious participants. We must also reject, from common sense, the notion that juvenile delinquency causes mesomorphic constitutions. We are left, therefore, with the probability that some third factor explains the link between the two, and the probability which suggests itself is that social definition of body types is the cause of certain correlations of these types with personality characteristics.

Examples of this social definition, or *stereotyping*, of body types are numerous. The fat man (endomorph) is stereotyped as good-natured or jolly. The endomorph may come to find that being good-natured or jolly is the best social adjustment to make in certain situations. The expectations of others may well induce this reaction. The pranks of an athletic, "well-built" youth (mesomorph) may arouse a fear in others which produces the charge of juvenile delinquency, while the similar pranks of a youth of slighter size (the ectomorph) could conceivably be dismissed as youthful boisterousness. In this way, persons of varying constitutional types come to have imputed to them certain personality qualities which tend to produce varying behavior but are not caused by the condition itself.

By rejecting the idea that instincts or bodily traits produce behavior, we have merely stated what modern social psychology does *not* view as biologically relevant to the study of personality in the social situation. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to more positive tasks: that of outlining the major biopsychological foundations of social-psychological theory and of presenting a description of those bodily systems which *are* most clearly relevant to problems of social psychology.

A FOUNDATION FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

It should be reiterated that social psychology looks to psychology, especially physiological psychology, and to psychiatry for an understanding of the physiological and psychological processes underlying social interaction. Such understanding would be vastly simplified if it were not for the fact that many relationships between the bodily systems are not as yet thoroughly understood. As a consequence, social psychology is on uncomfortable footing when it seeks to relate intrapersonal psychological processes with interpersonal relationships. The difficulty of the task has led to oversimplification of its "solution." Such "solutions" as instincts, prepotent reflexes, and constitutional psychiatry have at least served as vehicles for "explaining" the inner physiological processes which are the foundation of social interactions even though the explanations leave much to be desired. Hence, social psychology has been able to advance its knowledge of personality in the social situation only imperfectly, since a knowledge of foundations is essential to a knowledge of the structures which stand upon these foundations.

These considerations have prompted social psychologists to define rather sharply a minimum set of questions for which answers must be sought in the realm of physiological psychology, and this latter field provides research findings from which a tentative set of answers can be deduced. There seems to be general agreement in physiological psychology on the supposition "that the production of bodily activity must be ultimately traced to the action of the nervous system."⁷ The most convenient way to ask the questions about physiological psychology which are most relevant to the substrates of personality behavior is therefore in terms of the nervous system. However, three important considerations of social psychology must be understood before the relationship between the nervous system, the other bodily systems, and social participation can be clearly understood. The first of these considerations is the question of the *biological needs* of the human constitution. The second consideration is man's *needs* (for security, recognition, etc.) *in interpersonal relationships*, and the third is man's *need for effective communication* in interpersonal situations.

⁷ Clifford T. Morgan and Eliot Stellar, *Physiological Psychology*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950, p. 376.

Man's Biosocial Needs

Essential to an understanding of the relationship between the individual and society is the question of man's basic biological needs. With the exception of religious institutions, man's most complex and towering cultural structures have all emerged historically from one or the other of his bodily needs. For example, while it would be the height of absurdity to explain the highly complex economic structure of modern civilization in terms of "the hunger instinct," it is, nevertheless, true that its rudimentary beginnings lay in the food quest of primitive man. One aspect of all social institutions is that they emerge from and satisfy human needs. Certainly, one of the "minimum set of questions" which, as we indicated above, must be asked of physiological psychology must relate to the question of the needs of the bodily constitution.

For an orderly attack upon the problem of the needs of the bodily constitution, it is necessary to possess a rudimentary knowledge of the various systems within the body. In their interrelated functioning these systems constitute an organismic whole. Physiological needs should never be conceived of as needs of a particular system, but rather as needs of the organism as a whole. A person does not require food because he is the possessor of a digestive system, but rather because his organic nexus of bodily systems requires food. The digestive system is but a part of the over-all system which meets their need.

Chief among the bodily systems are the digestive system, the respiratory system, the circulatory system, the eliminative system, the reproductive system, the endocrine system, the muscular system, the nervous system, and the skeleton. Table 9 shows the major functions appropriate to the various systems. When the bodily systems are in equilibrium, a state of well-being, there is said to be a lack of tension in the organism. When one or the other of the bodily systems becomes lacking in the necessary elements for its normal functioning, the resulting disequilibrium is called a tension or *need* in the organism. The satisfaction of the biological needs of the infant by the mother is an excellent example of the equilibrium-tension-restoration of equilibrium concept. The baby cries, the mother finds out what is lacking for equilibrium and satisfies the need. The concept of "tension needs" is much more difficult to apply to the adult person. There are two cautions which should be invoked against any glib statements of direct relationship between a bodily system and the needs of the adult individual which society must

Table 9. The Needs and Functions of the Bodily Systems

<i>System</i>	<i>Functions</i>	<i>Needs</i>
Digestive	Converts food to energy	Food, fluids
Eliminative	Expels waste matter	Ratio of fluids/bulk
Respiratory	Intakes oxygen, expels carbon dioxide	Oxygen
Circulatory	Transmits oxygen to cells and expels waste	Corpuscles
Reproductive	Procreation	Release of tension
Nervous	Reception, transmission, storing, processing of signals	Electric impulses
Endocrine	Produces chemicals for other systems	Hormone ingredients
Muscular	Regulates physical reactions of other organs (smooth muscles), mobilizes for action upon outside world (striated muscles)	Hormones for tonus (smooth muscles) Electric impulse from nervous system (striated muscles)
Skeletal	Frame of support for other systems	Support of striated muscles, minerals

satisfy. The first caution has been discussed above: the body is an organismic whole—no system sets up a bodily need *in itself*. Second, an equally important caution is that no biological need is met in the raw but only in a context of social and cultural conditioning. This second caution will become as evident to the student as the first, as his understanding of social psychology progresses. In the chapter on social learning and adjustment, which follows this chapter, and in later chapters, it will be seen that emotional and intellectual attitudes develop in the individual which overlay his basic or primary biological needs.

We have said that social psychology asks a minimum set of questions of physiological psychology. The first of the questions dealt with the biological needs of men. Since social psychology is concerned with the relationship between society and the individual, this problem lies within its scope. Unlike the other animals, man is not compelled to deal directly with nature in meeting his needs. The natural environment of man is the society and culture in which he lives. Consequently, society deals with the physical environment, and the individual man deals with society. While we would be going far afield, at this point, to elaborate upon the ways in which various societies around the world are organized to meet

men's needs, our later discussion (Chapter 11) will take cognizance of this problem. For our present purpose it suffices to indicate that all societies must meet the minimal needs imposed by the bodily constitution in its interrelated systems. That there is a constant tendency for all social systems to become more elaborated and complex than is actually necessary for the meeting of these needs is a vastly important fact for the student of social psychology to bear in mind.

We have not discussed the relative "importance" of any of the bodily systems as yet, since, as we have mentioned, the proper functioning of all of the bodily systems is necessary for the continued functioning of the organism as a whole. There are, however, certain aspects of the bodily systems which are more relevant, more immediately "important," for social psychology than are certain other aspects of the constitution. Those bodily systems which are most intimately related to the concepts of needs and the resolving of *needs in communication* with others in society are of the greatest significance.

The individual does not, in return for the satisfaction of his biological and psychological needs, surrender himself to society. He is not a receptacle into which the culture of the society is poured. Rather, he participates in small social systems, parts of congeries which form the larger society. As we have said previously, there is no social behavior except in and through individual bodily constitutions. In this sense, the individual constitution is the foundation of the smaller social systems and hence of the larger society. All of this is by no means clear when we consider the bodily constitution of the new-born infant, who is not able to communicate with others nor to care for his bodily needs. One of the "minimum set of questions" which social psychology must ask of physiological psychology must relate to the psychophysiological processes by which the infant becomes prepared for his later participation in society.

We have discussed the instinctivistic "answer" to this problem, and our conclusion was that such theories explain away but do not explain satisfactorily the physical basis of society. Other "answers" are provided in theories of learning, conditioning, and other systems which emphasize the molding effects of the group upon the individual. There is a great deal of factual support for parts of both the theories which stress the innate drives of individuals and the theories which stress the external factors molding them. In our discussion of the modern theory of social psychology, it was indicated that the modern viewpoint follows a middle

course between these extreme views. The modern concept of the emergence of personality is not, however, a "middle of the road" eclectic version which simply waters down the extremist theories but, rather, it represents a dynamic trend of thought in its own right. Foreshadowed in the works of Dewey, the psychologist, Cooley, the sociologist, and Mead, the philosopher, the concept of the emergence of personality has gained widespread acceptance.

The essential features of the personality-emergence theory, it will be recalled, are (1) that the personality exists potentially for the infant at birth; (2) that this potentiality begins to be actuated in a system of interpersonal relations between the infant and the mother (or mother surrogate). The student is not asked for an uncritical acceptance of this theory. At this point it is only necessary to comprehend the fact that the theory calls for a process by which the infant develops a basis for relating to other persons. The psychological process proposed by this theory is the *sensitizing of the child to the demands of interpersonal relations*. Modern social psychology postulates, implicitly or explicitly, the "need for security" as the psychological mechanism by virtue of which this sensitization takes place. As with the biological needs, the need for security can be thought of in terms of an equilibrium, the imbalance of which sets into motion attempts toward restoration of the equilibrium. Unlike the tensions of body need, however, the tension for security arises from the *conditioning* of the bodily constitution (chiefly the nervous and glandular systems) rather than as a more or less direct expression of bodily need. In other words, the tension of security is psychological rather than biological in its immediate origin.

In the process of interaction, communication occurs between two or more personalities who have been socially prepared to interact. This social modification of the biological organism can be viewed most meaningfully for the student of social psychology in terms of the mechanical operation of the biological constitution as a communicating organism.

THE COMMUNICATING ORGANISM

Psychology, as such, provides us with an understanding of the physiological processes which occur within the individual as he communicates and reacts with others. Looking inside the one individual, *a construct of what happens to him as he communicates* and reacts to other individuals may be called the *intrapersonal network of communica-*

tion. There is a directional flow of communication in this network since there is *reception* ("messages going in"), *transmission* ("messages going out"), and the central functions, or processing of the messages within the organism. From philosophical psychology it is known that the agent intellect operates as a superior faculty which abstracts from the purely physical properties of the received message, or sensory perception, and forms ideas. But neither the intrapersonal network of communication as understood from physiological psychology nor the higher thought processes as understood from rational or philosophical psychology are our primary concern in social psychology. Our concern is with the individual in interaction with another or other individuals, and for this reason we need a construct of the interpersonal network of communication. The individual biological organism considered in itself (*the intrapersonal network of communication*) and the same biological organism considered as part of a larger system (*the interpersonal network of communication*) are considered below.

The Intrapersonal Network of Communication

As mentioned above, the intrapersonal network is characterized by three distinct groups of functions. There is a directional flow of the reception of messages, the transmission of messages, and the central functions (the *processing* of messages). This directional flow of messages enables us to use one-way cause and effect thinking in analyzing communication. An individual is presented with a stimulus s which sets certain of his receptors into motion, the receptors set into motion the central functions, and in turn these central functions r initiate the transmission processes. Reception includes both proprio-ception (self-perception) and extero-ception (perception of other people and things). Proprio-ception gives information about the state of the organism; these data, if consciously perceived, are referred to as "feelings" or sensations. In proprio-ception the end organs are predominantly internal and react to chemical and mechanical stimuli; in extero-ception the end organs are located on or near the surface of the body and give information about relations between the self and the environment. The extero-ceptive end organs react to wave phenomena such as light and sound, in addition to other mechanical, chemical stimuli.

Transmission includes both proprio-transmission and extero-transmission. In proprio-transmission nervous impulses travel on the different pathways to the smooth muscles, and chemical impulses travel along

humoral pathways for purposes of regulating the organism. In extero-transmission the contraction of the striped muscles is used for action upon the outside world, including communication with other individuals.

The central functions, from a purely physiological point of view, include coordination, interpretation, and storage of information. In summary then, the communication apparatus of the biological organism consists of the sense organs (receivers), effector organs (the senders), the communication center (chiefly the brain stem of the central nervous system), and the remaining parts of the body which are considered here as the shelter of the communication machinery.

While, from the standpoint of their working in unison as parts of the communicating machinery, the central nervous and the autonomic nervous systems can be thought of as one over-all nervous system, it is sometimes helpful to distinguish between them and their separate functions.

The Nervous System

We have said earlier that the beginning of life for the individual is with a single cell. This cell, living communally with the uterine environment, divides and redivides in a process of growth. The hereditary factors (genes) within the cell produce alterations in the form of the growing organism. Ultimately, the expanding cell mass evolves an oral and an aboral end and a system of neural organization which connects these ends. This physiological fact is of the profoundest importance for the later development of personality.

The Central Nervous System. The spinal cord and the cerebrum are the avenue and the coordinating system, respectively, for the entire nervous system. The spinal cord, located within the vertebral column, serves to relay sensory and motor impulses from many parts of the body to and from the cerebral cortex and in addition accomplishes many simple reflex actions independently of the brain. In a manner not too thoroughly understood at the present time, the cerebral cortex "presides" over the entire nervous system, organizing responses and facilitating or inhibiting reflexes of the lower centers.

The cortex is divided into fissures and lobes as illustrated in Figure 7. The localization of functions indicated in Figure 7 are those well established by clinical research and are of great significance for personality. However, the *entire* cortex is involved in the process of personality participation in the social situation in terms of (1) perception and

definition of the situation and (2) the internal trial-and-error processes correlative to the individual's participation in the situation.




FIG. 7. Functions associated with areas of the brain. Reproduced with permission from W. Grey Walter, *The Living Brain*, New York, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1953, p. 37.

Connecting the spinal cord and the cerebrum are the medulla oblongata, the cerebellum, and the thalamic region above the cerebellum. The medulla connects the spinal cord with the upper extremities of the central nervous system. The cerebellum is linked to the cerebrum, and the thalamic region lies above and adjacent to the cerebellum. These ganglia serve coordination functions between the nervous system and other bodily systems.

Autonomic Nervous System. As the central nervous system enables the personality to perceive, define, and react to the (external) situation, the autonomic nervous system makes possible the internal adjustments necessary to the smooth functioning of the total organism. These systems function simultaneously in a coordinated manner (Figure 8). The autonomic system controls the operation of most of the smooth muscles and the endocrine glands (the glands of internal secretion). Thus, the autonomic system plays a crucial part in the affective or emotional state

of the individual as he participates in the social situation. The actions which emanate from thought processes (chiefly based, physiologically, on the actions of the central nervous system) are more or less affected by concomitant emotional autonomic reactions. For an understanding




FIG. 8. The intrapersonal network of communication (partly after Francis L. Harmon).

of the emotional states it is necessary to consider the functioning of the endocrine glands and other bodily elements involved in autonomic reactions.

The Endocrine System. The relationship between the endocrine glands and personality characteristics has often been held to be one of simple

cause and effect. It is now known that the relationship is infinitely complicated and not susceptible to such an elementary analysis. It is also widely accepted that the role of the endocrine system in affecting behavior is inextricably interwoven with that of the nervous systems.

The endocrine glands are the ductless glands of the body. In contradistinction to the duct glands (e.g., the digestive system) which convey their products to various parts of the body by means of channels or ducts, the ductless glands release their products (hormones) directly into the blood system. The major endocrine glands are sketched in Figure 9.




FIG. 9. The glands of internal secretion. (Drawn by James Nilo.)

We can trace many influences of the endocrine glands on the emotional life of an individual. The secretion of adrenalin in certain periods of stress, the effects of the parathyroids upon nervous tensions, and other functions of the endocrine system give ample testimony to the importance of the ductless glands in the emotional changes which can occur in social interaction.

There are a variety of autonomic reactions which could be called emotional and which involve bodily systems other than the endocrine. In fear, the blood tends to leave the head, and there are even more dramatic changes in the circulatory system which may accompany emotion. The respiratory system is involved—we say that a startling event “takes our breath away.” These brief examples should suffice to warn against overlooking the role of the endocrine or any other system in the affective states of the constitution.

In addition, the musculature of the body plays a role in the stability or tension of the bodily organism. When there is muscle tonus the person is relaxed; during periods of extreme tension there is a dramatic increase of muscle activity. The autonomic reactions are worthy of a textbook in themselves. The purpose in presenting this brief discussion of them is merely to relate them, as aspects of the body which affect social interactions, to the social situation or the interpersonal network of communication. Such reactions are learned in a social context—and, of course, the major emphasis in social psychology is upon the social situation rather than upon its physiological resultants.

In the preceding section man's needs were (necessarily somewhat arbitrarily) divided into those of bodily need and those of security. The bodily needs were seen to be antecedent to the sociopsychological needs of the infant. It was pointed out that the care of the infant by the mother far exceeds the mere satisfying of its bodily needs. In the elaboration of this first interpersonal relationship of the infant the rudimentary communicational process of empathy develops. The effect of this empathic communication is chiefly that of sensitizing the infant to a new type of need, that of security. With these concepts in mind we turn to another question. What is the tension of security in the adult person? In other words, there is implied in our discussion of the infant-mother relationship the idea of emergence of psychic tensions, which will become further developed and which will be operative throughout the lifetime of the infant. Insight into the functioning of these psychic needs in the adult provides an insight into the direction which the infant's process will take.

Security in the adult may be thought of as an equilibrium along the same order as the bodily equilibrium which was described in the preceding chapter. The tension of security, employing the analogy, would be a tendency toward restoration of equilibrium, much the same as a physical “drive.” There is, however, an essential difference between

the two types of equilibria. The tensions of need may approximate zero, i.e., the bodily organism can sometimes approximate complete physical satisfaction. The tension of security represents the tendency to achieve a *subjective feeling of complete self-esteem*. Complete equilibrium would therefore preclude any doubts whatsoever about personal worth.

It has long been known that the zero-point of this type of tension can never be achieved, and further, that as the person approximates the goal of complete freedom from these tensions, he tends to redefine his goals, setting them higher, thus creating new tensions for himself. In American culture this type of self-reappraisal is glorified. Failure to strive for greater achievement is referred to as "getting in a rut."

If we look upon a person's *achievements* (as defined by himself) as the numerator of a fraction and his *expectations* as the denominator, we can say that the greater the difference between the numerator and the denominator, the greater the person's tensions of security. We should not overlook the fact, however, that the person whose expectations exactly equalled his achievements would be like an automobile without gasoline, having lost his physical source of power.

The equilibrium of self-esteem (the subjective conviction of personal worth) may therefore be conceived of as something toward which the personality tends, but which is achieved only in more or less degree, and never absolutely. The neuropsychological processes which interfere with the achieving of the security equilibrium are referred to as forms of *anxiety*. While anxiety is often termed a tension in itself (and there is a certain validity in the usage), it should be thought of more in the light of a process which inhibits the release of tension. In this way anxiety can be more clearly seen as a neurophysiological emotional process which impedes the free and easy interaction of personalities. For example, the autonomic reaction of anxiety interferes with the student's performance in an examination. He may be so anxious to perform well that he is unable to concentrate on his test papers.

The interrelationships between the emotions and the drives (tensions) are most evident in the relationships of *frustration* to the processes of adjustment. The activities that are required to get from need to satisfaction may be interfered with or blocked and the resulting psychological state is one of unreleased tension. This condition of frustration may be accompanied by a preponderantly autonomic reaction such as rage or fear, and the reaction in such a situation might take the form of aggression against the blocking or thwarting of his needs.

Aggression is not the only alternative to frustration, however, since there are substitute reactions to the blocking or thwarting of tension release. Some of the substitute reactions can be harmful if they become habitual "adjustments." Excessive daydreaming is one of these reactions. Escaping or retreating may sometimes prove wise modes of adjustment in certain situations but are scarcely adequate as habitual ways of meeting frustrating problems.

Frustration often carries with it the autonomic reactions of anxiety. When there is an objective reason for anxiety a highly important adjustive function may be served by the autonomic triggering of the bodily system to meet the demands of the situation by appropriate action. When there is no objective basis for anxiety it is neurotic, and the neurotic form of anxiety seldom, if ever, makes for adjustment to others.

So we can see the relationship of the nervous and other systems of the bodily constitution in relation to communication. The tensions of individuals are normally released in a medium of communication with other individuals. Anxiety, especially the neurotic variety, can then be seen as a barrier to effective communication and hence as a thwarting factor in the release of tensions.

Interaction between individuals is a "conversation of attitudes" wherein each individual reacts to the other in terms of previously acquired and integrated tendencies to act. These previously learned attitudes may be divided into two kinds, those learned by emotional conditioning and those learned by previous problem solving. This distinction is further elucidated in the following chapter but at this point it is essential to bear in mind that the *conditioned* type of learning occurs chiefly through the autonomic nervous system in its interrelationships with other bodily systems, and the *problem-solving* type of learning seems to occur chiefly through the central nervous system. Broadly speaking, the central nervous system is the necessary condition for the higher thought processes and the autonomic nervous system for the lower appetitive faculties.

In the interpersonal network of communication the biological constitution, viewed as a communicating organism, is seen not as being a complete communication network in itself but as a part of a broader network including as a minimum one *other* biological communicating organism. At another level this is the social situation which plays a central role in social-psychological theory. This is the reason why we have emphasized the physiological data of most direct relevance to

the social situation. In the interpersonal network of communication there is not the same directional flow of messages that is found in the intrapersonal network. Prior to dispatching a message to another individual, the communicating individual anticipates the reaction that will be evoked in the other. In the process, emotional attitudes acquired through previous autonomic conditioning (such as fear, shame, desire for prestige, etc.) may interfere with the more effective message which might have been dispatched by means of the central nervous system. Thus, in our discussion of social learning and adjustment (Chapter 9), we shall concentrate upon the learning of these two types of attitudes, emotional and intellectual, bearing in mind the physiological basis of each. In other words we shall be dealing again with the interpersonal network of communication, and for the remainder of the textbook the emphasis will fall upon the social-interactional rather than the intrapersonal and physiological aspects of communication. We could do no less, however, than to devote at least one of our chapters to such an important variable as the biological in the development of personality.

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Chapter 9

SOCIAL LEARNING AND ADJUSTMENT

The relationship between society and the individual is such that social learning and adjustment are necessary conditions for the survival of both. For the individual to fit into society it is necessary that *he know how* to perform his social roles and that he experience a degree of *emotional satisfaction* in performing these roles. A society must provide constant and predictable roles appropriate to the various positions or statuses within its social structure. Knowing what is expected in a social situation, personality is mobilized with effectiveness, and the individual who has been adequately prepared for role participation fits in or “adjusts” to the situation in which he finds himself.

An individual has many roles, especially in a modern complex society. In the course of a twenty-four-hour period he may, more or less satisfactorily, play the role of son, student, member of the bowling team, escort on a date, and a wide assortment of roles in addition to these. In our society (as in most societies) the main emphasis is placed on *familial* and *occupational* roles. No society can afford to leave to chance the preparation of its individual members for participation in family life, the satisfactory functioning of which is imperative for the survival of the society. And similarly, every society depends upon the satisfactory accomplishment of work in order that it will have the necessary goods and services to maintain its socioeconomic equilibrium. This, of course, means that society has a vital stake in the learning processes of the individual.

It is a common misconception to think of learning and its correlative, teaching, as taking place primarily, if not exclusively, in the classroom.

A multitude of primitive societies have survived without formal education, and many of them have done an excellent job of socializing their young into the roles they are expected to perform in the society. In our modern society, we have delegated only a small amount, albeit, an indispensable amount, of teaching and learning to the classroom. We are all learners under one aspect and nearly all of us are teachers under another. Teaching is not limited to schoolrooms. Far more important is learning in the broadest sense, where life is the classroom and we learn from others as others learn from us in the process of living and working together in society. In fact, as we shall see in this chapter, the process of learning, the modification of attitudes and behavior through experience, goes on from the cradle to the grave for the individual and occurs to some extent in almost every interpersonal situation in which he participates.

In keeping with their traditional emphases, psychology (the psychology of learning) has approached this phenomenon from the standpoint of the learning processes within the individual, while sociology has approached the problem from the group point of view. In addition, the contribution of anthropology has been so significant in bringing home the importance of cultural learning as a determinant of personality that it is necessary to reserve a special chapter (The Relationship of Culture and Personality) for this topic.

In turning to the psychology of learning we shall have to sift and evaluate the various experimental findings and theories in that discipline in order to discover those facts and relationships which are of most importance to the study of the interacting individual in the social situation. As social psychologists, we are not directly concerned with many of the major problems in the psychology of learning, which concerns itself with many aspects of learning not directly relevant to the problem of social psychology. Personality, as conceived in social psychology, is an organization of emotional and intellectual attitudes. Consequently, for social psychology the study of the acquisition of verbal and reading skills, aptitudes and specialized abilities, and many other topics of great interest in the psychology of learning, which are secondary in importance to our study of attitudes, is unnecessary.

The overwhelming evidence concerning the acquisition of emotional and intellectual attitudes supports the contention that these are learned in a process of interaction of the individual with others. In other words, social learning, in contrast with learning in general, occurs in a process

of communication. For the individual to communicate with another it is necessary that he have the communicating equipment (which was described in the preceding chapter) and he must have something to communicate. This "something" is his complex of attitudes. It is for this reason that George Herbert Mead has called social interaction "a conversation of attitudes." This, Mead used to say, occurs when the individual has developed symbols or gestures "which have the same meaning for the person initiating them as they have for the person receiving them." These gestures are verbal, written, or physical gestures, all of which have a symbolic meaning for the individuals involved in the interaction. (These Mead called "significant" gestures or "significant" symbols.) This accounts for the fact that we find it easier to talk with others "of our own level," those with whom we have an easy familiarity, those who "understand" us. This understanding is a result of prior association with those individuals with whom we find communication easy. We have learned attitudes in common with them. In the reverse situation, when we find ourselves uneasy in conversation or other mode of communication, we may become tense, anxious, and unable to communicate as skillfully as we know we are capable of doing. In this latter case we may lack those intellectual or "know-how" attitudes which facilitate communication with another, or the situation may be further complicated by the tensions and anxieties produced by emotional attitudes such as desires to be liked by others, pride, and shame.

In the preceding chapter it was explained at the physiological level, in the discussion of the nervous systems of the body, that intellectual attitudes, learned primarily through the central nervous system, solve problems and make for ease and integration in communication, and that emotional attitudes, learned primarily through the autonomic nervous system and not being so readily controlled, may and often do interfere with communication. But it is not a sufficient explanation to define these attitudes in terms of neural changes. Attitudes are not physiological but rather social phenomena. For this reason we must look to processes occurring within the social act both in the intrapersonal and interpersonal networks of communication for our explanation. It is information about these networks of communication that we must glean from the psychology of learning. In the remainder of this chapter, the nature of attitudes is discussed more fully, and psychological theories of learning are brought to bear on the problem of how attitudes are acquired in social participation.

ATTITUDES AS UNIT PROCESSES OF PERSONALITY

It is imperative that the concept of attitudes be understood since attitudes are the basic unit processes of personality. Personality, as the term is used in social psychology, refers to the organized body of emotional and intellectual *attitudes* which the individual has built into systems of roles and statuses which enable him to deal with others and with himself in the social interaction. The source of these attitudes is chiefly his previous participation in social groupings (with their culture patterns).

We have seen that the construct of personality as developed in social psychology, to enable us to understand more readily the relationship between society (in the form of social situations) and the individual, is not to be confused with the philosophical concept of the *person* (the very substance of man) nor is it to be confused with the concept of personality as developed in general psychology (specifically, in the psychology of personality). While it is probably true that these have all been used interchangeably by social psychologists who have confused one with the other, there are good reasons why such confusion should not be perpetuated. By reexamining these three concepts (which seem identical but are really quite separate and distinct notions) within one over-all frame of reference, it will be seen that our focus upon attitudes as the elements of personality is a necessary consequence of social psychology's status as an empirical science with the formal object of social interaction rather than merely a self-imposed narrowness of focus.

By starting with the concept of *person*, adding the appendage *-ality*, and using the term personality in this sense we have the broadest meaning of the term which cuts across the boundaries of theology, philosophy, psychology, sociology, and all the rest of the social sciences. We are referring to everything man is and does. Our frame of reference would be so broad as to prevent us from specializing in any one approach to the study of behavior. Personality as employed in general psychology is a much more limited concept. It is a construct restricted to that aspect of total personality which is accessible to scientific study by psychologists. In this perspective, personality is the way in which the organism, modified through experience, is related through activity to other aspects of the world. The historical emphasis of psychology has been upon the

individual as a stimulated and responding organism in his total environment. As we have seen in the discussion of the historical development of social psychology, the sociological protest against exaggerated individualism in psychology has resulted in a frame of reference which emphasizes the interacting individual. This construct stresses the social nature of man and is a highly useful system of thought about *the social elements of total personality*, as that term is defined in philosophy, or about *the socially acquired predispositions to respond of the organism*, in psychology's frame of reference. Attempts have been made to coin a new term for this more limited construct, but such efforts have met with little success. It seems preferable simply to understand that the term *personality* has different meanings in philosophy, general psychology, and social psychology.

In view of all this it is important to keep in mind that this volume follows largely the social-interactional construct or theory of personality. Within the limits of logic and the starting points provided by the postulates from rational psychology concerning man's nature, and with the recognition that personality rests upon constitutional bases, the term is here used to refer to a social and cultural product which is always in a dynamic state of equilibrium or disequilibrium with respect to the roles and statuses ascribed by the group or achieved within the group by the individual. Since much that is to follow is in support of this position, it is not necessary to go into great detail at this point. The essential point to be grasped here is the concept of attitudes as the basic unit processes of the social-interactional construct of personality. The *organization* of these unit processes into patterns forming a total whole is reserved for the following chapter (The Self and Motivation).

Attitudes are predispositions to perform, perceive, think, and feel in relation to objects and persons. In this sense attitudes do not refer so much to actual response as to *direction set*. Since a quality of attitudes is that they require a correlative, an objective of orientation toward which they are positive or negative, it follows that direction is of the essence of attitudes. If there is lacking either an object of orientation or a tendency toward or away from an object, there is no attitude. In the social environment these objects are called the *interests* and *values* of the subject. Another quality of attitudes is that they are more or less enduring states, i.e., they tend to persist through time. It is erroneous, however, to think that attitudes are fixed and static and cannot undergo change. Attitudes acquired through learning can be

and often are modified through learning. It is quite true that emotional attitudes which are residuals of infantile and early childhood conditioning persist into adult life. Nevertheless, these attitudes can be modified, although the process can conceivably be long and difficult, as in extended psychotherapy. Also, direction and persistence are not the only qualities of attitudes. Other qualities are *magnitude*, the strength or intensity of the attitude, and *stability*, the frequent, regularly occurring quality of the attitude; the attitude may be *common*, i.e., held by individuals, or it may be *idiosyncratic*, an attitude found in that particular form in only one individual. Because of the fact that attitudes are acquired or learned, understanding of certain aspects of the learning processes is essential to the understanding of the congeries of attitudes which are organized into the total whole called personality. Certainly the concept of attitudes will be much more clear after we have discussed the processes which go into the learning of them.

ATTITUDES AND LEARNING THEORY

Because much of the research that has gone into the formulation of modern theories of learning has been conducted in laboratory experiments on animals, many social psychologists, especially in the sociological and anthropological schools, have questioned the value of such learning theory as applied to humans. While this is a serious limitation on the contribution of learning psychology to our understanding of social learning, which as we shall see is unique to human beings, it should be kept in mind that the psychology of learning has applied its experimental findings on animals to human learning only with a great deal of caution and sometimes has followed these with experiments employing human subjects. Also, the animality which is a partial aspect of human nature permits of certain crude analogies between man's learning and that of the lower animals.

Conditioned Response

Earlier in the presentation of the historical backgrounds of the modern schools of social psychology, British associationism was discussed as a bulwark of individualism in British social and psychological thought.

It should be recalled that associationism is the theory that holds certain sequences of ideas, images, and motor patterns to be interrelated

in such a way that psychic phenomena thus related are said to be *associated* in that the recall of one element brings with it the recall of the total pattern. The *conditioned-response* (association by contiguity) theory, chiefly associated with Pavlov, seems to point to a degree of validity in associationist theory, at least at the animal level. In the Pavlov experiments, food was placed in an animal's mouth which produced a flow of saliva, the secretion of which was a reflex response of the animal. Then, shortly before the introduction of food again as a stimulus, a bell was rung and continued ringing until the food had been consumed. After a number of repetitions of this procedure, the animal secreted saliva in response to the bell alone. There had been a *conditioning* to the bell, the new stimulus, which produced a response formerly produced only by the introduction of food. This principle, the substitution of one response for another through learning, became the core of the conditioned-response theory of learning. This work was carried out by Pavlov over many years and many of his conditioned-response concepts have become parts of theories of learning developed by psychologists of later periods. Obviously, however, the concept of conditioned response, involving merely the notions of stimulus *S* and response *R* is an inadequate frame of reference for the analysis of human learning, and in an attempt to correct this deficiency in conditioned-response theory several important modifications have been proposed.

In addition to the concepts of association and conditioning, the *law of effect* has come to be recognized as an important principle of learning. This construct of E. L. Thorndike holds that learning is brought about in large measure by association, but with varying rewards or punishment to the subject, associations may have more or less significance for the learner—mere repetition being of less significance than this effect principle. That learning which has satisfied needs and served as a solution to problems is more easily achieved and longer retained than those associations which are not problem-solving or need-gratifying.

In Thorndike's studies he had concentrated upon the trial-and-error behavior involved in animal learning. Thorndike constructed "problem boxes" in which an animal was placed, with food displayed outside the box. Then, through some simple manipulation which the animal was expected to learn and perform, it could open the door and gain access to the food as a reward. The animal subject's reactions provide a clear

picture of unintelligent random efforts to reach the food, such as thrusting out the paw or the nose, biting, and scratching; finally, often without noticing the fact, the animal would chance to perform the correct act which released the cage door and gave it access to the food. In repeating the experiments over and over again Thorndike observed that the amount of random activity of the animal and the time required for the release of the cage door were gradually reduced until finally the animal was able, without any random activity, to release itself from the problem box at once. Thus, the animals had learned the solution to the problem. From these experiments Thorndike formulated his two celebrated principles of *exercise* and *effect*. The law of exercise referred to the strengthening of connections with practice and the weakening of connections, or "forgetting," when practice is discontinued. It referred to the repetition of acts and the acquisition of mechanical habits as in rote memorizing. Later, Thorndike wisely saw that he had merely accepted uncritically a mechanical, behavioristic theory of learning prevalent in his day. As a corrective he came to place much more emphasis on his second principle, the law of effect. The law of effect referred, as discussed above, to the rewards or punishments which further the learning of behavior.

Thorndike, quite correctly, contended that ideation is not present in animals, and his experiments certainly bore out this contention. Unfortunately, he tended toward the belief that ideation is not present in the effect learning of human beings. This is not a necessary conclusion from the "law of effect"; it is quite reasonable to find that the effect principle does apply in rational learning. In analyzing the experimental work of psychologists in connection with *problem solving*, we note much that is illustrative of *rational* learning, in which insight and *abstraction* figure conspicuously in contrast to their absence in animal learning.

Animal Learning. Several factors are involved in the extent to which intellectual functions are operative in any given problem. Rote memory is operative in problems of recall, but abstraction is required in instances where only premises but not conclusions are presented to the subject. Maturity, mental capacity, and experience of the subject are factors which, in addition to the nature of the problem, determine the extent to which the learning is rational. It is quite likely that except for simple conditioning, human learning is to some extent rational

even when there is conditioning or trial-and-error learning blended into the response.

It will be recalled that in our discussion of the postulates of social psychology drawn from rational psychology it is not part of the man that acts but the whole man, thinking, perceiving, feeling. Man's behavior may be rational or irrational, but never unrational as is the behavior of animals. It is for this reason that the conditioned-response theory of learning can explain, by analogy only, part of human learning.

LEARNING PROCESSES IN THE INTRAPERSONAL NETWORK

The inadequacy of the principles of learning based on the concepts of association, conditioning, and effect have stimulated many psychologists and sociologists to seek new approaches to the problem of human learning. These new approaches can be divided into two broad categories, those which maintain the traditional psychological emphasis upon the individual as an *S-R* organism in an environment and those which hold that social learning can best be understood by analyzing the processes occurring within the social act. These categories correspond to our distinction, made earlier, between the intrapersonal network of communication, i.e., the human conceived as a communicating organism, and the interpersonal network of communication, i.e., the system which comes into existence when two or more individuals begin to interact with one another.

The two theories which seem to throw most light on learning in the intrapersonal network are (1) those which relate learning to the nervous systems and (2) the Hullian *S-R* theories of learning, especially those which relate attitudes *as intervening variables between S and R*. Of the former, perhaps the O. H. Mowrer dual theory of learning is of most importance for our concerns; of the latter, Newcomb's intervening variable theory of attitude learning. Both of these theories are concerned with the nature of attitudes and their acquisition and hence fall close to the heart of the matter in this chapter.

The Dual Nature of Learning. The basic position of the Mowrer learning theory is that there are two distinctly different learning processes, one the process by which we learn through problem solving, through the integrating function of the central nervous system and the skeletal muscles which solve problems, meet needs, and reduce tensions; the

other learning process occurs at the autonomic nervous system level and involves conditioned responses in the visceral and vascular systems of the body, more closely linked with the autonomic nervous system. This position does not deny the previously discussed contributions to learning theory but rather points up the fact that the higher intellectual capacities and the lower emotional capacities are not modified by the same learning principle. The significance of this theory for social psychology lies in its explanation of the differential processes by which emotional and intellectual attitudes are acquired. Intellectual attitudes are acquired through an association which differs strikingly from the simple conditioning type of association which occurs in the learning of emotional attitudes. In social interaction, intellectual predispositions to behave have been learned through prior effective social participation. They are the attitudes which make for flexibility and creativity in social roles. These attitudes, therefore, are best thought of as acquired more through the operation of the law of effect than through mere conditioning. They are, physiologically speaking, the changes in the nervous system which are correlatives of the rational aspects of human learning.

On the other hand, there is a level of man's nature whose physiological correlative is the autonomic nervous system. Unlike the central nervous system which is more closely linked with the voluntary muscles, this level of reaction involves the involuntary (smooth) muscles. Associations at this level are not problem-solving, but may even be problem-producing, since the autonomic nervous system is more closely linked with the emotions, the physiological expression of which is through the smooth musculature and related body systems. Obviously the law of effect does not directly apply at this level, since emotional responses are not problem-solving except when blended with rational responses or attitudes. The *law of association* or conditioning has a great deal of validity in describing learning phenomena associated with the acquisition of emotional attitudes. Attitudes acquired in this fashion are not predispositions to interests and values as rationally desirable or undesirable but are more generalized feeling states. They are called attitudes because they possess characteristics in common with intellectual attitudes, but the essential difference is their different functioning within the individual. The object of these attitudes is more commonly the situation or stimulus associated with a prior situation or stimulus which produced the conditioning. These attitudes are produced more from sustained and repeated exposure (although the intensity factor, especially

in the pliable infant or child, must not be overlooked) than from the law of effect. Since they are not "stored" in the brain stem of the central nervous system, it is not so easy to call them up as is the case with intellectual attitudes. For example, a young man may not understand his shyness in the presence of ladies. His intellectual attitudes may predispose him to social participation with young ladies, but his emotional attitudes, perhaps felt by him as vague uneasiness, may be traced to a process of conditioning which occurred in his infantile or early childhood relationships with his mother, governess, or schoolteacher. That he can work through such emotional attitudes and bring them under more rational control is a fact of experience. That the relearning of attitudes can be very difficult and require specialized treatment is also known.

The "dual nature of learning" theory makes an important contribution to social attitude learning providing that we carefully qualify the meaning of certain key concepts in the theory. Neither Mowrer nor most learning theorists postulate any spiritual elements in learning at all. Consequently, problem solving and deliberative thinking are viewed as a purely manipulative operation of material cell sensitivity and electrical impulse. Nothing in this frame of reference distinguishes the human mind from the electronic computer, since both reduce to an "input" of a problem to be solved, a purely mechanical set of procedures by which the problem is "solved" and a "feedback," or answer, to the problem is given. Several objections can be raised to the naïveté of this position, all centering around the dehumanization of the learning process. Since we have discussed the question of materialism in the chapter on the values and postulates of social psychology, we simply note here that this materialism and dehumanization are unacceptable as postulates of our science.

Another danger that must be noted is that of an artificial separation between the two nervous systems. The autonomic nervous system is under the control of the central nervous system. For all practical purposes, that is, in terms of the way in which the systems actually do function in the body, they are not two systems but one. We approve of the attempt to show how each contributes to learning by the *human organism as a whole*, but we warn that the process of breaking up learning into segments is like that of dissecting a frog in a laboratory. One learns a great deal about frogs by such dissection only if he puts together the segments of knowledge gained in the laboratory with his

understanding of a frog as a whole, jumping about and croaking in a pond. With this in mind there should be no dichotomizing of the human into two separate kinds of animals, one governed by a central and one by an autonomic nervous system.

There are two valid reasons why any distinction at all can be made between the two systems. First, in the infant the autonomic seems to function at an earlier age than the central nervous system. This "pre-cortical" learning, i.e., learning which precedes the ability to think, has led to theories, among many experts in child psychology, of the existence of many autonomic "sets" existing independently of the central nervous system. Then, too, as we have mentioned, the learning of fears and anxieties is not explained by the "law of effect" but rather by some such theory as the dual theory of learning which explains the presence of unwanted, problem-creating, yet learned, autonomic reactions. The final word has not been said on this subject. To just what extent some autonomic reactions have a degree of independence from the central nervous system is still a question for conjecture and research. Nevertheless, it now seems quite clear that there is a hierarchy of authority in the body and that the central nervous system, especially the brain, presides over all the other systems.

In view of the dangers inherent in attributing learning potentials to any subordinate elements of the human organism, many learning theories have been developed which center around the "total organism" concept, that is, of learning by the organism as a whole rather than merely by certain of its parts. Chief among these has been the Clark Hull *S-R* learning theory, which in its various modifications has been fruitfully applied to social learning. This view builds upon the broadest conception of human behavior, as an adaptation of the individual to his external environment, and is conceived of as an "organism-in-environment" approach to the study of learning. Of course, the human organism does more than "learn" in his environment—much that is essential to him arises from internal modification rather than external stimulus. In addition to his rational and volitional immanent activities there is also biological growth and maturation which takes place "from the inside."

Nevertheless, the capacity of the individual to make changes can be understood only with reference to the external circumstances which impinge upon him and to which he must adapt. It is in this light that the Hullian theory takes on its significance for social-psychological theory.

To what extent and in what ways are the reactions of individuals learned as responses to their social environment? This we recognize at once to be part and parcel of the matter of social psychology. Hull's theory divides into four main elements, which we can consider in terms both of their usefulness and of their advantages. *Drive* refers to a disequilibrium in the organism which impels it to take measures to restore equilibrium. We have elsewhere in this textbook described a drive as a "tension," and there is no substantial difference between the term and the term "drive" as employed in Hullian learning theory. The strength of the drive depends, of course, on the intensity with which the human experiences it. The drive does not determine behavior but ordinarily thrusts itself upon the consciousness; if any actual behavior ensues it will occur in a social and cultural context. For this reason it is difficult to separate drives into "innate" and "acquired" or "primary" and "secondary" since it is difficult to separate biological and social "urgency" in a drive. However, we may postpone this subject until a later point (Chapter 10) and recognize here only the fact that drive does refer to a disequilibrium in the organism that leads to behavior and in so doing leads to learning on the part of the organism.

Cue is the second element in Hullian learning theory, and it refers to a stimulus that governs the way in which the response will occur. Thus, there is an intimate relationship between drive and cue. Drive is directed toward something in the environment and this "something" is the cue. When it appears in the environment (and almost anything in the environment can come, through conditioning, to have a strong stimulus value) it has the effect of stimulating the drive. *Intensity* or strength belongs, however, to the drive, while the characteristic of *distinctiveness* refers to the cue. To a modern man a crow flying over a field may be perceived and have little significance. If one, however, were a primitive to whom the crow had profound significance as a symbol of one's totem it is conceivable that the crow might constitute an important cue arousing a strong response.

So the drive impels the organism to respond to certain cues depending upon the previous learning experiences of the organism. Hence, *response*, the form which the reaction to the cue will take, is dependent upon *reinforcement*, the prior experiencing of a thing which has been problem solving (Thorndike's law of effect). Learning takes place when drive reduction occurs and when this occurs we have reinforcement, i.e., the organism has acquired a way in which it will characteristically behave

in response to a given cue. The deficiency of this learning concept we have already discussed—some such theory as the theory of the dual nature of learning must also be invoked to explain learning where drive reduction does not occur, since anxiety reduction (as opposed to drive reduction) is not otherwise explainable. Nevertheless, the Hullian concepts, drive, cue, response, and reinforcement, have proved to be valuable tools in the analysis of learning. That such insights are only partial simply reflects the fact that the psychology of learning is not yet in a position to provide more fully complete conceptions. Variations on Hullian learning theory are numerous and many important conceptions of the learning of attitudes have been developed from it. Chief in importance among these is probably the intervening variable theory of Newcomb.

The Intervening Variable Theory. Newcomb's theory on the nature of attitudes and their origins is a valuable corrective to the quite natural tendency to think of attitudes as independent "causes" of behavior. He holds that attitudes are neither stimulus, as such, nor response, as such, but represent intervening conditions of reaction, states of *readiness* to respond. These are states of readiness to be motivated along certain lines rather than upon others but the underlying "push" or movement derives from motives and drives. (This is quite consistent with the separate treatment of attitudes as the unit processes of personality as advanced in this chapter, and our treatment of motivations and drives as the motor principles of personality in the following chapter.)

In Newcomb's theoretical construct, attitudes in their early stage are not sharply differentiated. Favorable attitudes are all relatively homogeneous and unfavorable attitudes are much alike.¹

The favorable ones represent undifferentiated "good," something of which as much as possible is to be obtained; the unfavorable represent undifferentiated "evil," to be avoided at all cost.

Within these broad categories there gradually comes to be differentiation wherein favorable attitudes as well as unfavorable ones come to be more specific and distinctive. Out of these generalized tendencies to seek pleasure and avoid that which is painful the child begins to make finer distinctions. The first attitudes of the infant would normally be toward the "good" mother, i.e., all those warm, secure, and appetite-

¹Theodore M. Newcomb, *Social Psychology*, New York, The Dryden Press, Inc., 1950, p. 128.

gratifying relationships obtained between himself and the mother, or toward the "bad" mother, in terms of all those relationships which evoke anxiety in, or fail to satisfy needs in, the infant. Then, gradually, through association, "good" is segmented into favorable attitudes to father, siblings, relatives, other children, and, in childhood, to "Hopalong Cassidy" as well as football and baseball heroes. Likewise, "bad" is gradually extended to more specific attitudes unfavorable to individuals or situations in which the conditioning factors have been anxiety-producing. The infant howling in the pediatrician's office is differentiating his general unfavorable attitude to the "bad" mother into a more specific negative attitude toward white-gowned individuals who poke needles into one.

After attitudes have become specific and diffuse, there is a process of *integration* in which attitudes become organized into patterns, core attitudes absorbing related attitudes, in the organized whole that personality becomes with maturation. As mentioned previously, the term interest or value is applied to the object of each pattern or cluster of attitudes. "The American Way" is such a value, as the external correlative of a congeries of attitudes to free speech, private property, human rights, and similar ingredients of the American ideal.

These concepts of Newcomb's, *mass*, *differentiation*, and *integration*, have a great deal of descriptive validity and are compatible with and supplementary to the *S-R* theories of learning described above. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that grave disagreements exist between proponents of various learning theories, even within the *S-R* frame of reference. In developing a pattern of convergence of theories of animal conditioning, the law of effect, the dual nature of learning, and the social learning of attitudes, we have deliberately glossed over the various disagreements in order to provide the student with an articulated approach to the problem of learning. Just as behaviorists might denounce our interpretation of the dual nature of learning, so might some theorists of social learning deny any validity at all to the concept of conditioning. Such debates tend to obfuscate rather than clarify the issues for the beginning student. The more advanced student may refer to the references in the suggested readings for sources on the major controversies in learning theory. Our concluding objective in this chapter is to relate what has been gleaned from learning theory to the central focus of social psychology, the "self adjusting to other" in the social situation. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to enlarge our perspective

from the intrapersonal view employed by psychologists interested in formulating learning theory (without abandoning the insights provided by this view) to the interpersonal network of communication.

LEARNING PROCESSES IN THE INTERPERSONAL NETWORK

One proof of the value of the distinction between the genetic and the factoral (or situational) approach to the study of social psychology is the number of times we have had to have recourse to it in our presentation of the theory, method, and findings of social psychology. In the conceptualizing of the learning processes, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and others have also made this distinction. Many have developed genetic conceptions of learning, which we have described in relation to the intrapersonal network of communication. Many learning theories have thought that more could be achieved by studying the whole learning *situation* rather than merely studying the learner as an *S-R* organism in environment. Only extremists, however, have held the view that this is the only valid approach to the study of learning, disregarding completely the intrapersonal network of communication. As a specialized approach to the problem of learning and adjustment, the concentration upon the social situation (the "field," "social act," "interpersonal network"—the terms have roughly the same connotations) contributes further understanding of the individual in yet another dimension, rather than refuting the findings of individual learning psychology. This is not to say, against strong evidence to the contrary, that the two approaches to learning theory are *fully* compatible at present, but rather that, since both systems are explanatory of much learning behavior, certain elements of both approaches must be true together. There can be no difference between what is true of the individual considered in himself and the individual conceived of as an element of a social situation, except, of course, for the difference in perspective.

For our purposes we may distinguish two main types of situational approaches to the problem of learning. First, we may distinguish the *gestalt* and *field* situational approaches to learning which are attempts to extend classical psychological learning theory beyond its traditional emphasis upon the *S-R* organism. These theories are efforts, mainly, to correct the conception of the learner as a mere passive organism adapting itself to whatever environmental pressures may impinge upon it. These theories hold, rightly, that the human organism is purposive and

dynamic, that it has needs and can "see" in the situation opportunities for thrusting into and shaping the environment in such a way as to produce a state of affairs more conducive to the satisfaction of his needs. While these theories are not *in themselves* attempts at solving the problems of social psychology but are rather attempts to correct deficiencies in traditional learning theory, nevertheless, a secondary application of these "situational" learning theories to the problems of social psychology has been made. Their obvious applicability to the social interactional focus has made them of great importance to our science.

Second, there are theoretical developments in sociology, which, unlike the situational learnings described above, did not emerge from traditional learning psychology but were rather devised by sociologists, anthropologists, and others and which are, nevertheless, attempts to explain the social act as a learning situation, i.e., as the matrix of socialization. On the one hand, these theories represent an impatience with the slow, plodding development of an adequate theory in learning psychology and an attempt to proceed with the concerns of social psychology without "waiting," as it were, for a fully comprehensive and tested learning theory. On the other hand, while these speculations about social learning constructed by social, as opposed to psychological, scientists are appropriate to the focus of social psychology and are more daring and speculative than the cautious tentative formulations of experimental workers in learning psychology, *their deficiencies* as scientific theories stem from the fact that they have not been subjected to the same painstaking experimental procedures as those employed in the study of animal learning in laboratories. This is not to say that the social psychologist should or can wait for such a perfected theory of learning to emerge from the laboratory. Meanwhile he is faced with the task of explaining why individuals are conforming to the dictates of social structure in terms of the roles imposed by social participation. Also he is faced with explaining deviant groups and individuals and the way in which they acquire attitudes which predispose them to behavior which is deviant from the "normal." Both conformity and deviation are problems of social attitudes, and, as we have seen, attitudes are *learned*, primarily *from other people*; in order, therefore, to understand their transmission from one person to another it is necessary to understand the learning processes involved—the *how* of attitude transmission. In the remainder of this chapter we shall present

the salient features of the *gestalt field* learning theory and the interactionist theories which developed primarily in sociology.

Gestalt field learning theory is an extension of the focus of learning psychology from the individual to the behavior field of which the individual is a part. It is a rejection of the notion that the whole can be studied by breaking it into parts. In gestalt terms $A \Leftrightarrow B$ can not be understood merely as A plus B , but rather in terms of the situation as a whole. In interpersonal groupings the whole is greater than its parts—a new phenomenon emerges from the “togetherness” of people. This is often mistaken for the group-mind theory of human aggregates, but this is erroneous since the *gestalt* is in the mind of the observer and not in the “mind” of the group. It is easy to see why social psychologists find themselves in sympathy with this theory, in view of its obvious compatibility with the social-psychological focus upon the social situation. Yet an even more important contribution than this “wholeness” viewpoint is the concept of “insight” and the cognitive aspect of learning and perception which has been contributed by these theories. While strictly speaking not a gestaltist, E. C. Tolman developed the concept of *molar* behavior and learning, by which he means simply that behavior must be viewed as the activity of a whole organism and not merely of its component parts (as in the *molecular* viewpoint). He conceived of behavior as goal-oriented and involving the selection of appropriate means of achieving goals. This is still, in a sense, an organism in environment theory but we include it with the situational or field approaches because it is a radical departure from the *S-R* frame of reference and views the individual in a more active light compatible with our conception of the interacting individual. It was from Tolman’s theory, incidentally, that Hull and later Newcomb took over the idea of “intervening variables” so that the *S-R* theories could be strengthened (in that the individual’s consciousness and mental life could thus be made an ingredient of the learning process). Cognitive activity is brought in, albeit by the back door, to *S-R* theory when the thought processes are introduced as intervening variables—thus *S-thought-R* represents more closely the *human* side of learning than the mere *S-R*.

In their studies of animals the gestaltists K. Koffka and W. Kohler established the fact that “insight” operates in the learning of animals, and this has been the keynote of gestalt learning theory. It should be recalled that in the animal experiments of Thorndike the factor of trial and error was stressed—the animal solved the laboratory problem simply

by repeated random efforts until by chance he struck upon the solution. The gestaltists demonstrated the existence of what we might call the “sudden discovery,” that is, where a chimpanzee, after random efforts to reach a bunch of bananas suspended from the top of his cage, might *suddenly* perceive a relationship between a stick lying on the floor of the cage and the needed reach which would help him knock down the bananas. This “insightful” perception does not require intelligence of the abstract sort which operates in rational problem solving but rather involves what St. Thomas repeatedly referred to as the “prudence” of animals. This discovery by the gestaltists has many implications for social learning, of course, because it helps to bridge the gap between learning concepts based on animal experiments and the complex mental processes involved in human learning.




FIG. 10. Subgrouping and potency of the group as a whole in (a) an autocratic and (b) a democratic setting. Reproduced with permission from Kurt Lewin, *Field Theory in Social Science*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1951, p. 250.

Lewin and other gestalt psychologists expanded the molar concept even further to include the whole environmental field of which the individual subject is a part. While unfortunately these schemes are complicated by elaborate analogies with electrical and other physical fields and a great deal of jargon which has to be mastered before the simplest kind of problem can be analyzed in terms of “field” psychology, they have helped the social psychologist to understand learning as a function of the total behavioral situation, rather than as a mere summation of the experiences of individuals comprising the situa-

tion. Let us use one of Lewin's own diagrams as an illustration of the field approach. Probably no attempt should be made to understand every detail of Lewin's diagram, which is reproduced here as Figure 10. In order to get the "feel" of field psychology, however, it is well to grasp the notion of group determinants of individual learning as conceived by Lewin. We might ask ourselves a simple question in order to help us grasp the significance of Lewin's work. Would an individual learning theory such as the *S-R* explain the differences in learning as between the pupils of one of these situations as opposed to the other? It seems likely that the answer would have to be in the negative.

In explanation of Figure 10 Lewin says:²

In the autocratic situation, (*a*), two distinct social strata exist, a higher one containing the leader (*L*) and the lower containing the children (*C*). (The social distance between these strata is indicated in Figure 10*a* by the heavy black circle.) In democracy the status differences are less marked (dotted lines). In the autocratic setting distinct subgroups of two exist containing one child and the leader. Therefore, if the leader is taken away, no strong bond between the members remains. In democracy the subgrouping is varying and less rigid. The potency of the group as a whole (*GrP*) is higher there than in the autocratic setting where the potency of the individual goal (*IP*) and of the subgroup (*SuP*) is relatively higher. These differences between the autocratic and democratic situations provide some of the reasons why children in the autocratic groups are more likely to be aggressive against their fellows although submissive to the leader.

Many and varied have been such attempts as Lewin's to bring into social psychology elements of experimentally produced learning theory. The difficulties in translating results of experiments in the laboratory, usually conducted with animal subjects, into meaningful insights into the social learning of human beings is fraught with difficulties. The cognition of rational human beings, fully socialized, is, of course, a far cry from the simple sensory perception of experimental white rats and other laboratory subjects. Then, too, the laboratory is by definition a place where subjects are isolated for study. In this light, how can the study of a phenomenon in *isolation* help us to understand the *social* learning processes which, by definition, do not occur in isolation but only in social life? Can human subjects be used instead of animals? If so, to what extent does the contrived laboratory situation really reflect

² Kurt Lewin, *Field Theory in Social Science*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1951, p. 251.

what the behavior of the subject might be under real-life circumstances? These are only a few of the problems that hamper the flow of information and ideas between learning theory and social psychology. Yet, social psychology must have learning theory.³

The social sciences are badly in need of a theory of human learning. They look to social psychology for the formulation of such a theory. However difficult the task may be, no other discipline is in a better position to undertake it. There are pressing problems of education, of government, and of human interaction generally which could be clarified by even a tentative scientific formulation of how man acquires his habits. What then, should be the general characteristics of a learning theory which aims to be useful for the social sciences?

The learning with which social psychology is concerned is, of course, something broader than memorizing, or acquiring skill, or certain types of problem solving, or the learning of school subjects. These narrower forms of learning are the ones which have undergone most of the experimental analysis and are therefore the best understood. But the social psychologist conceives learning as the whole business of adjusting to human adult life. For him, it means the acquisition of culture, or the ways of interacting with one's fellows, or the innumerable conscious and unconscious habits and traits of a developed personality. In present-day social psychology learning must bear the burden of accounting for attitudes, values, interests, morals, prejudices, stereotypes, ideologies, the hopes and fears of the individual, his hates and loves, and even his ego and super-ego. Learning has to be viewed as the process of socialization of the child and a prerequisite for social participation of the adult. What is required then is a theory of *social* learning.

Conceptions of social learning on the ambitious level suggested in the quotation in the last analysis involve both the genetic and the situational approaches. There is no gainsaying the fact that an analogy exists between the conditioning of animals and the formation of habit patterns in the human young. Equally obvious is the fact that social molding can never be simply equated with the conditioned response. In the concept of *socialization*, the term referring to the social learning of an individual, no such simple notion as conditioning suffices to explain the extremely complex ways in which the individual comes to internalize his social roles, that is "take into himself" various segments

³ James J. Gibson, "The Implications of Learning Theory for Social Psychology," in James Grier Miller (ed.), *Experiments in Social Process*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950, p. 149.

of social structure so that he "becomes" a social being. This view of social learning which focuses upon socialization as learning process has, understandably, been developed largely by students of social structure, either in sociology or anthropology.

Socialization theory approaches the problem of learning in a way which involves both the genetic and the situational viewpoints. Learning is viewed as a function of the behavior situation $A \rightleftharpoons B$, but the genetic or life-history approach is also implied. Owing to the importance of the pliability of the human young, A is seen as an infant or young child, and B is seen as an adult whose habits and roles are already established. This interactionist theory of learning, therefore, incorporates the findings of learning and child psychologies within it while remaining essentially a situational learning psychology. The interactionist theory is an attempt to explain social conformity and deviation, that is, the circumstances under which people participate in social groupings, obeying the dictates of the group and enacting its roles without question. On the other hand, interactionism is also concerned with explaining deviation (surprisingly enough, also largely explainable through group attachments, as we shall see in Chapter 13). What needs explaining for the interactionist is the process by which *habits* become embedded in individuals so that their social participation takes on the quality of predictability. In this light social roles are personally and individually simply a matter of habit. The father doesn't "think twice" about going home at night to his family. The child obeys the father without question. The lawyer prepares his case, the physician treats his patient, the teacher prepares his lesson material. What must be understood here is the acquisition of attitudes so uniformly favorable to the habitual performance of social roles. Of equal importance, of course, is the understanding of the occasional father who deserts his family, or the professional person who throws off his expected role and "makes the headlines," or more commonly the child who disobeys his father. Both conformity and deviation must be explained in terms of habit learning or its breakdown.

As we have said, the interactionist emphasizes the importance of early learning and its molding effects upon the habits of the developing personality. Of these, the simplest types of human conditioning, such as food tastes, disgusts, emotional attitudes of avoidance and repugnance, can be explained at something like the conditioned-response level. Here the term "social molding" has a limited degree of validity. In

$A \rightleftharpoons B$ where A is a child and B is an adult, we have seen that the child forms his habits in the milieu of adult habits already formed. The foods provided for him are foods which B and other adults define as the proper things for him (and for all people) to eat. The manner of eating, the things discussed at table, the saying of grace or its omission, all provide the atmosphere of the social situation in which the foundations of the child's attitudes to food and its consumption are laid. In some cultures things are defined as food which in other cultures are viewed with repugnance. Eating with the fingers may be proper in one culture and improper in another. Utensils of various sorts vary from culture to culture. The essential question pertaining to such cultural continuity of practice relates, of course, to the way in which each generation teaches the next the "proper" way to do things. This question is so broad that we have reserved an entire chapter (Chapter 11) for analyzing it. Each generation not only learns the food tastes, disgusts, and emotional prejudices of its parent generation, but variations will occur due to the particular nature of the parents (a domineering father, for example), or variations may arise from purely fortuitous factors such as being the "baby of the family," or having been born during a war, depression, or some other type of crisis which might affect the intellectual and emotional climate of the family. These factors as well as cultural ones are reflected in *social* "conditioning." The learning involved in such "conditioning" is no less cognitive than the more complex role learning of later years but the perception and cognition are of course that of an infant or child and not that of a more deliberative, mature mind. The behavior of adults as *perceived* and *recognized* by the child defines and gives meaning in the child's mind to the external social world. The adults in question must have prestige, that is, they must be significant for the child, capable by their approval of inducing in him a feeling of pride and self-esteem or by their disapproval of inducing a feeling of shame and anxiety. Hence, if Johnny tries to eat a worm, the disgust reactions of adults will (in time) come to have the effect, for Johnny, of feeling that worms are not food and furthermore that deviants who think worms are food bring down upon themselves the negative reactions of all right-thinking people. It is obvious, by now, that the interactionist theory of learning is an application of Cooley's looking-glass theory to the problem of learning. "Each to each a looking-glass" and in order to understand the tastes, disgusts, prejudices, and emotional reactions of adults it is

necessary to look back through the long, almost endless succession of mirrors in which the man has "seen himself" since the days of his youth and even of his infancy. The processes involved in thus "seeing" himself in the "eyes" of others are *identification* (putting one's self in the other's place) and *introjection* (learning to act toward ourselves as we imagine the other does), both of which are processes of social learning. In fact, they are the most social of all the processes involved in learning since they are the basic processes by which we learn social roles. Yet they are more fully understood when considered in relation to the "self" and we shall postpone any extended treatment of the role learning processes until the next chapter, which is reserved for the study of the self and self-systems.

As we shall see in a later chapter of this book (Chapter 12, Life Experiences in Age Groups), certain life circumstances which individuals have in common somewhat "standardize" the problem of social learning, so that we can speak of learning in the family, in the play group, in school, and so on through the progression of age and work roles in the confident knowledge that in so doing we are speaking of social circumstances to which all in our society will normally be subjected. At that point we shall again be concerning ourselves with learning as it occurs under these circumstances. In the next chapter we shall be concerned with the way in which we learn about ourselves; in the following chapter, how culture structures our learning. There is not a chapter remaining in this text (especially in this present section, which is concerned primarily with personality) which is not concerned directly and importantly with the problem of learning. All that we have hoped to accomplish in the present chapter is to open up the subject so that when we encounter it again, as we shall, over and over, we may be aware of some of the more fundamental issues which complicate our understanding of the learning process.

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Chapter 10

THE SELF AND MOTIVATION

We have so far considered attitudes, the unit processes of personality, only in the general sense that they are predispositions to respond in socially acquired ways as if they were merely an undifferentiated aggregate of behavior tendencies which the individual just happened to have accumulated because of his past experiences. We have not considered their *organization* or structure *within* personality. This conception of the personality as a bundle of attitudes has had a vogue in social psychology (the “apperceptive mass” concept of behaviorists), but our modern understanding of the workings of the self-system and the operation of motives forbids such an oversimplification. And, although we have considered learning, we have not considered the specific situational and personal circumstances under which the learning of attitudes takes place. Nor have we considered the *unique* personality components of the individual which make his perception, his learning, and his motivation unlike that of any other person. These are all functions of *the self-system*, the subject matter of the present chapter. We begin our examination of the self by contrasting its component attitudes with other, nonself, attitudes.

Attitudes Mediate the Environment

We are, or can be, aware of the fact that, during our waking hours, we are surrounded by an environment of things and people, and that we have attitudes of varying direction and intensity toward elements of that environment. We may perceive a person, or even a crowd of people, toward whom we may feel attraction, antipathy, or revulsion.

We may perceive clouds in the sky on an overcast day, and these may depress us. A clear, beautiful day may induce in us a feeling of well-being. (This is not to say that all of us will have the same reactions to people or things in the environment. The people of Quebec seem to take a pride in the extremes of their weather, while of course, the people of California and Florida take pride in the evenness and moderation of their climates.) A few moments reflection will convince us that not only are we aware of and perceive various elements of our social and physical environment, but that we have attitudes about it and that these attitudes structure the content of our reactions to it. Never is the response to our environment a direct one, but rather such responses are *mediated*, as it were, by our attitudes. These attitudes to the external environment are not the sole content of our reactions, however, and our awareness of internal events, the *covert* aspect of our reactions, must also be accounted for. These internal events may, and often do, have a priority in importance over external events. When we are *self-conscious* or *self-aware*, our bodily feelings, our awareness of our bodily appendages, such as arms and legs, our evaluations of others' reactions to ourselves are all self-attitudes. Our self-image is a composite of all such attitudes held at any given time. This may be only partial ("My date liked me") or, as in prolonged self-absorption and introspective analysis, more comprehension of the total self-image is achieved.

Acquired primarily in social interaction these self-attitudes, paradoxically, are not understood except in the light of the individual's relations with others. This social nature of the self is one of the deepest insights into the total person achieved by the $A \rightleftharpoons B$ focus of social psychology. *A* "knows" about himself as he has "seen" himself in the eyes of *B*. His self-attitudes are not simple reactions, but are reflections from *B* as a looking glass. Hence, we speak of self-attitudes as reflexive attitudes.

Self-Attitudes as Reflexive Attitudes

Social psychologists divide sharply on many questions pertaining to the self. Nevertheless, there are several broad statements about the self and its involvements which meet with widespread acceptance. The most important of these is that the way in which the individual becomes aware of and forms attitudes about other persons and things differs from the way in which he becomes aware of and forms attitudes about himself. These latter attitudes, which we have called "self-attitudes," are

acquired in the process of socialization as are all attitudes, but they have a special kind of history. All attitudes have the self as an anchor point. *I* like to play golf, *I* dislike examinations, and so on, but *self*-attitudes are such anchor points in themselves. Early in life the individual becomes aware of the fact that certain attributes of his personality become very important to him because of their effect on other people and their treatment of him. The self consists of *those aspects of his person to which he reacts*, consciously or unconsciously. It is thus a more narrow concept than self, as the term is used in philosophy, and ego, as the term is used in psychology, as we shall see later in the chapter. Social psychology is concerned with what the person "knows" about himself. The experiencing subject "knows" about himself, as G. H. Mead has stated it, "when he becomes a social object in experience to himself." His chief sources of information about himself are the reactions of others to him. This reflex arc of self-evaluating-self-as-reflected-in-the-eyes-of-others was, of course, part of what Cooley was talking about when he developed his concept of the "looking-glass" self. It will be recalled from our discussion in Chapter 2 that the essential stages of the looking-glass process are (1) the imagination of the other person's perception of us, (2) an evaluation of that person's judgment of us, and (3) "some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification." Doubtlessly the importance of conforming to the expectations of others can be such a morbid preoccupation as to deprive the person of his individuality and constitute a continuous source of anxiety to the overly susceptible. Nevertheless the essential role of the other in the formation of self-attitudes and consequently in the total development of personality must be considered central even to the development of normal personality.

Perhaps no other theoretical scheme has pointed up the importance of the other in the development of the self as has Mead's conception of "taking the role of the other." In the social act of person-to-person interaction, self-conceptions become modified, augmented, altered, according to Mead, by the process of *identification* of self with the other. One of the essential features of every social act is that each person has to "become," in a sense, the other person in order that communication can take place. In the social act $A \rightleftharpoons B$, let A be a long-suffering wife and B the husband who has been playing poker with friends until a very late hour. As his attention is diverted away from the card game and the importance of making an entrance into his home becomes his domi-

nant concern, he begins imagining what it must be like to be a wife who has been left alone all evening, perhaps worrying about the loss of money, or about an accident to her husband. He takes her role in order to understand what he is going to be up against. He puts himself in her place, because in the approaching social act, fraught with stress for himself, he hopes to find some communication link which will help him get over the crisis. On the other hand, she is imagining herself in his position and is mobilizing her personality to meet the situation. The situation, of course, need not be so dramatic. The very next person we meet we shall have to exchange roles with. We put ourselves in the place of the other and imagine how our greeting will fall upon his ears. It is the normal every day way of communicating with others. But also, it is the process of *identification* which has a deep and incisive role in the development of our self-systems. In recapitulation, then, it is necessary for *A* and *B* to take each other's roles in the social act in order to ensure that words and gestures will have the same meaning for both. But this cross-identification is only half the process by which the self or reflexive attitudes are formed.

In addition to identification another sociopsychological learning concept must be added, that of *introjection*. When identification has taken place only half of the arc has been completed. Through identification self becomes other. Through introjection self becomes self again, although modified by virtue of its having been, even if momentarily and only in imagination, a part of the other. While identified with the other, one "learned" facts about himself. Through introjection these "facts" about self are internalized and become part of one's reservoir of self-notions.

Thus far we have achieved only a few of the objectives of this chapter. We have distinguished between attitudes and self-attitudes and we have explored the processes by which these reflexive attitudes become part of self. We have not yet, however, considered any of the *functions* of self-attitudes, perhaps the chief of which is the *organization* of one's responses to the outer environment.

Self and Selective Response

Understanding the system of self-attitudes helps us overcome the notion that personality is just a bundle of potential reactions accumulated by chance in life experiences, a behavioristic error that permeates learning theory. Actually, as we have pointed out in this chapter, atti-

tudes *mediate* between the person and his environment and self-attitudes perform a special kind of this mediation—they determine what elements of the environment are “important” or “significant” for the person in terms of his needs. We shall explore at a later point in this chapter the relationship between the self-system and the needs of the individual (that is, between his “motives,” *what* “moves” him, and his self-mechanisms, *how* he is “moved”). Let us at this point concentrate upon self as a *selective* set of responses to the environment so that we may understand something of the *structuring* or organizing function of the self-system. Any theory of learning which overlooks this feature of the self is too simplistic to explain human learning and human responses. Yet, it may be to our advantage to review briefly the frame of reference which the learning psychologist uses and then to modify it to *include* the selective responses of the self, so that we may integrate the material covered in the preceding chapter and the material on the self-system which is our present subject matter.

The main essentials of the learning psychologists’ frame of reference are, of course, an *organism* (with its original biological nature) living in an *environment* (which for the human being is chiefly the social environment of other people). The processes that occur are (1) the *stimulation* of the environment (symbolized as *S*), (2) the *response* of the organism (symbolized as *R*), (3) the *rewarding* or *punishing* of the organism by the environment, which is a consequence of the organism’s *R*, and (4) the *habituation* or *reinforcement* of *R*’s which have been rewarded and the *extinction* of *R*’s in the organism which were punished. (The rewards and punishments are not to be thought of in the classical hedonistic sense but rather in terms of the law of effect.) We do not deny that this paradigm provides us with a valuable starting point for the analysis of learning and behavior, but we must qualify it in at least two important respects. First, it still retains the flavor of trial-and-error-learning psychology. Many learning theorists have rejected the assumption that experience is the only teacher. For example, the gestaltists demonstrated that even the chimpanzee gets occasional “insights” which make it unnecessary for him to exhaust all means at his disposal by trial and error. Further, and much more important for our present purposes, we may note that such haphazard trial-and-error learning may be characteristic of the human infant at an early stage, but that at an early stage, possibly as early as the second year of life (see Chapter 12, *Life Experiences in Age Groups*),

the infant begins to develop *self-feelings* which modify his reactions, form a basis for interpreting his experiences, and provide him with a basis for modifying or manipulating his experiences. From this time forward it is an oversimplification to think of his behavior in terms of social forces molding the biological animal. His responses to the environment become *purposeful* to an increasing extent, and his needs and wants, as self-perceived, come more and more to form a basis for a selective interaction with his environment. He *selectively responds*. Out of the potential barrage of all possible S's in his environment he attends to those stimuli which are perceived by him to be significant for his wishes. Conversely, he selectively ignores much of his environment, a matter which is discussed in greater detail in the more extensive treatment of the self-system, but which may be thought of at this point as the form of "self-protection" which blocks recognition of potentially self-threatening elements of a situation.


Once formed, this self-system becomes the basis for defining environmental (chiefly interpersonal) experiences in terms of the two main problems which are faced by man the social animal, viz., meeting the expectations of others and meeting one's own needs. Stated more precisely, from the social psychologist's point of view, his attitudes acquired in his socialization prepare or fail to prepare him for the statuses and roles which he will occupy in society. His goals or wishes will motivate him in his role taking, and the adequacy of his motivation is the measure of the success of this preparation. Thus, in addition to the view of self as *internal* organization where it structures responses to the external environment, which we have discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the self-system is also operative in *social* organization. Here it represents personal "involvement" in social structure.

The Self and Social Organization

Perhaps at first it may seem that nothing could be farther from helping us to understand the towering social structures of modern societies than the inner recesses of the individual personality. But as the subject is further explored it becomes apparent that the two—*STAND the* social structure and individual self-system—are intimately involved. *is impossible to free from one* One cannot be understood without the other. *used* In his analysis of social structure, the sociologist begins with the human being as the social unit. Experience has shown him the human being is not reducible to biological instinct or social molecule. Recognizing human nature and *are directly interrelated*

rationality as his postulates, he nevertheless is able to use a limited construct of the individual *in his social aspect*. This enables the sociologist to build constructs of social systems with this concept of the *social person* as his building block.

The social person, that is, the human person viewed under one aspect of his complex and composite being, can serve as a link for us between self-attitudes on the one hand and social systems on the other. Thus, in the diagram, self is viewed as the subjective aspect of the social person, of which social systems are the objective aspect. In this way we can grasp something of the *meaning* for the human being of his social participation and something of the *dependence* of social institutions upon self-image.



For each role performed by the individual he has a self-image, made up of a variety of self-attitudes. It has been said, thus, that the person has a self for every group that he participates in. This is a poetic way of illustrating an important truth but it is preferable to think of one total *self-system* in order to avoid the bewildering impression that there are hundreds of selves in the individual person without any unifying principle among them. As we shall see, the self-system is a unity.

Thus, the self is one side of a coin of which the other is the social person, the role player who functions in social structures in ways which he has learned in his socialization.¹

From the sociological point of view, the social personality is the sum of all the roles the individual plays. These roles are called social because they represent uniformities of conduct shared by many people. The role can be studied scientifically, analyzed in detail, and observed in operation, because many people perform the same role in relatively the same way. The typical father role, or salesman role, or teacher role can be recognized among the people around us in society. If this were not true,

¹ Joseph H. Fichter, *Sociology*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957, p. 201. Diagram above reprinted by permission of publisher.

the social scientist could not study organized social relations, nor could the society function in an orderly and systematic way.

The social personality is the total role system through which the individual "deals" with society. Each person participates in numerous groups, and in each of these he plays his part or enacts his role. He does not invent the manner in which he will do it; he does it the way it is supposed to be done. A man may be the father of a family, a salesman in his business, a vestryman in his church, the lead-off man on a bowling team, a member of a parent-teacher association, a precinct worker in the local political party. He is the same single person, but he is playing institutionalized roles in the basic familial, economic, religious, recreational, educational, and political groups of his community.

Oftentimes, the term *social self* is equated with the social person or social personality. In a roundabout way this is the same notion which we described as a "poetic way of illustrating an important truth" in that it points up the self-involvement of the individual with his various groups. But this is confusing, and we shall confine our usage of the term "self" to the description of internal events exclusively. The self is "social" in that it is acquired in social interaction, but it is internal to the subject. Then, too, mind is operative in the development of self-conceptions, as is Divine grace. Hence, we must not err in thinking of the self as purely a social product to which the individual has merely passively adapted himself.

But self-development is largely a social matter, that is, is dependent for its formation upon social interaction, just as satisfactory performance in social roles is ultimately an individual matter. Personal needs must be met in social participation, and if roles do not satisfy needs deviation and social disruption result. As we shall see, self-esteem is a prime requisite among self-attitudes, and social roles which do not provide enhancing self-attitudes are the least functional for the person acting out the role. Some roles are *assigned* the individual by his society and there are many such roles over which, we might say, the individual has little or no control. Family position, age, sex, socioeconomic status impose roles which the individual is called upon to perform. Here is the broad but essential relation between the social order and the individual self-system. If the society is to function properly its main institutional roles must provide self-satisfactions. Role adjustment, personality adjustment within roles, will reduce to such factors as emotional satisfactions or dissatisfactions, even when the individual is highly qualified

in terms of intellectual attitudes and skills required by the role. All of us know individuals in high places whose brilliance and competence is beyond question, yet whose behavior indicates emotional dissatisfaction with their role. If we view interacting individuals in social institutional roles in our "each to each a looking-glass" frame of reference, signs of approval and other reflections of self-worth must come from individuals whose approval *means something to us*. Hence, it may be that such disturbed individuals lack *significant others*, whose approval would provide satisfactions to their tortured emotional self-attitude systems. Movie stars in the middle of extremely successful careers have been known to commit suicide "because nobody loved" them, according to their suicide notes. Their funerals are usually attended by mobs of devoted and admiring followers pledging their devotion to the deceased. The question, then, is not so much of being "loved" but *by whom*. The term "significant others" was contributed to social psychology by Sullivan and refers to the select number of people whose reactions have special significance for us. They have an extreme potential for arousing guilt or anxiety, yet on the other hand their praise brings euphoria to the self. "Significant others" may include the beloved of the lover, parents, teachers, employers, the "crowd" one "runs around with." The concept of *reference groups* in sociology, the groups from which we derive our attitudes, is a somewhat similar, but broader, concept. We derive our attitudes from certain groups and not others because these reference groups contain significant others. But the mature person is not so "other directed" that all of his actions are designed to bring approval from significant others. His self-attitudes are understood by him as comprising a set of self-standards—This behavior is me—This behavior is immoral, not me. Thus, despite the importance of the significant others in behavior, the ultimate moral decisions are made by the individual and may be quite independent of significant others. While the two terms are so much alike as to be confusing, the subjective side of the self-appraisal process involves not the significant other but the *generalized other*.

The rather awkward term "generalized other" comes to us from the work of George H. Mead and refers to the *patterned whole of self-attitudes within a personality*. The term derives from the fact that self-attitudes are derived from interaction with others ("other"), become organized into a total whole, and provide a basis for general evaluations of self ("generalized"). We shall see in a later section of this chapter

that the self begins (at around age two) as an "antianxiety" system, that it is made up of identifications with others and introjections of their imagined appraisals of us. The generalized other includes the ideas and attitudes which are generalized out of these specific and concrete situations into more or less enduring, general, and abstract self-images. The child is governed by specific roles—Johnny not touch fire; Mary not play with Teresa's doll; and boys don't play with girls. The adult, if mature, has formed an integrated self. Hence, his participation in social structure, in his group, his community, nation (or even in the community of mankind), will be according to a firm well-integrated conception of who he is and what the proper standards of conduct are under the widest variety of circumstances. The generalized other is the integration of specific self-other, looking-glass impressions into strong moral *character*.

The Self and Social Control

Societies appeal to the conscience of their citizens (and the "conscience" as the term is generally used is much like the concept of the generalized other) and to the use of force in restraining their behavior should conscience fail. Which is the stronger appeal, to conscience or to force of arms? Phrased in this way the question is simple. There are not enough police officers to control us if we should suddenly all decide to throw off all social restraints and behave as we individually choose. But the question of social control is far more complex than this and resolves into the ways in which the social structure imposes restraints, not in the sense of barriers to our real desires but rather the restraints that are necessary in order that we may achieve our needs and desires. Often we are not even aware of such restraints, and we are coerced into conformity without the use of force but rather by the positive force of habit and the negative force of anxiety and psychic pain when on the verge of deviating from accepted norms.

The social structure in which we live out our lives imposes upon us the necessity of performing institutional roles. We must be a part of the division of labor in society. Hence, these roles place us in relation to figures of authority in the family, the school, the church, and other institutions. In our socialization we incorporate into ourselves a set of self-attitudes (through identification and introjection, it will be recalled) which give assurance that deference towards these authorities is "right" and "natural." Proper authority is, of course, right and natural to man

in society, but we are not concerned with this ethical concept here. Rather we are concerned with what makes the particular authority patterns of one's own society *seem* to the individual the only right and natural ways of regulating behavior.

In small folk societies whose dictates are sacred, the sense of self is submerged in a rather complete identification with one's own extended family or clan. The "we" feeling is exceptionally strong. The individual literally "belongs" to his clan and its tradition by virtue of his strong emotional identification of self with it and the resulting psychic pain which is induced in him at the very thought of bringing about any change in the way things are. The way things are is the way, to him, that they ought to be. Consequently, he would be the last to initiate deviant behavior—in this instance any change from the behavior prescribed by tradition. The "generalized other" of the primitive is the anchorage of the self in social tradition, and his "significant others" are his family or clan who hold themselves responsible for his right conduct. Patterns of authority remain the same for generation after generation under such circumstances. In our rapidly changing modern society, patterns of authority have been known to change sometimes within a generation. Self-attitude and social control are obviously a much more complex problem in modern secular society than in the folk society where tradition and self-attitude are more securely wedded.

The American family has undergone an historic transformation in which the patriarchal family form of the Pilgrim Fathers (and of certain immigrant groups) has been greatly modified. Fear, respect, and awe of the father have diminished. The father is still a significant other as is the mother. However, more and more institutions have taken over functions formerly performed by the American family. We might say there is a diffusion of significant others outside of the family. Social control is no longer exclusively a familial function. Teachers, clergymen, recreation workers, and others who hold headship in social-role systems tend increasingly to become of greater importance in social control. The "head role" thus becomes crucial for control in modern societies, and recognition of this facet of headship—its role in strengthening the social fabric—becomes one of the moral requisites for modern social leadership.²

² Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1953, p. 13.

The "head role" of an institution is very important in the psychic life of the other members of the institution. What the head "thinks" of them in their respective roles, or what they conceive him to think, is internalized, that is, taken over, by them. In a strictly patriarchal family, the head, the father, is looked up to; his is that most important attitude toward the child that may determine the child's attitude toward his, the child's own conduct and perhaps toward his self; in taking over this attitude the child builds up an "other" within his self, and the attitude he conceives the other to have toward him is a condition for his attitude toward his own self. Other persons in other roles also have attitudes toward him and each of these may be internalized and eventually form segments of his self-conception. But the attitude of the head of a major institution in which we play a role is a decisive one in our own maturation. If "he says it is all right," we feel secure in what we are doing and how we are conceiving our self. When his attitudes are taken over into the self, this head constitutes in a concrete form a "particular other." But he is not seen merely as a particular; he is the symbol and the "mouthpiece" of the entire institution. In him is focussed the "final" attitudes toward our major roles and our self within this institution; he sums them up, and when we take over these attitudes and expectations we control our institutional conduct in terms of them. It is by means of such internalized others that our conduct, our playing of roles within institutions, is "self-controlled."

This conception of self-involvement in social structure is the most reasonable explanation of social conformity. Of the many and varied other attempts to explain the conformity of men to the dictates of social structure and even of crowds and mobs, *imitation* and *suggestion* have most often been advanced as explanatory concepts. Lacking logically adequate grounds for action the individual does that which he sees other individuals doing. The basic notion involved here is the *emotional* character of human behavior. Missing completely is the concept of the *purposive*, goal-oriented character of human behavior. Hence, while many of man's appetites have their origins in his emotions there still remains to be considered (1) his recognition of his wants and (2) the means taken to satisfy them, both of which are not emotional but rather rational processes. (In Chapter 15, suggestion and imitation are considered in their relation to *collective behavior* where their explanatory role is much greater.) So the participation of the individual in social structure is not explained by imitation and suggestion but rather by the *needs of self* as subjectively understood and the *means* taken to satisfy

these needs, which involves social participation, usually by conformity to social norms but sometimes (as in theft, premarital intercourse, bigamy—see Chapter 13, Normalcy and Deviation) by deviation. Hence social participation is “logical” in the sense that it involves goals and a selection of the logical means for achieving these goals, even though we cannot always agree with the “logic” involved. Perennial attempts are made to reduce the question of the self and social control to purely emotional terms. Although we can demonstrate at the empirical level that cognitive elements are involved in self-attitudes, the question of what *really* constitutes self is a philosophical one. We can make some important distinctions by comparing philosophical conceptions of the self with those developed in social psychology.

Philosophical Conceptions of the Self

While social psychology is faced with the task of *describing* concepts of identity and finds it necessary to postulate some type of entity toward which self-concepts are oriented, it is much more difficult to get at the real nature of identity. Since this kind of explanation is the task of philosophy, to probe to the real natures of things, social psychologists, with a sigh of relief, leave this perplexing problem to the philosopher. This quotation probably sums up pretty adequately the position of the social psychologist:³

The social self is difficult to define. Ellsworth Faris emphasizes the reflective aspect of the notion of self, saying that a self is that which is pervaded by the feeling of self. The feeling of self is one of our fundamental configurations, which no one has been able to analyze satisfactorily, but which anyone can recognize from his own experiences. It seems to be a compound of kinesthetic sensations, an appropriative sense, pride, and a perception of the coherence of these things. Metaphysical discussions of the self are fruitless; let us point to the indescribable feeling of self and permit the matter to rest there. We cannot define the self and we cannot define the color red, but we know what we mean by both.

While we might be tempted to follow suit and evade the task of defining self on the grounds that it lies outside the scope of social psychology, to do so is to invite unacceptable postulates into our science. One of the most common of such postulates is that the self is somehow a function of the body. One of the ever-present dangers of dealing in

³ Willard Waller, *The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation*, revised by Reuben Hill, New York, The Dryden Press, Inc., 1951, p. 44.

constructs such as the self without relating them to the reality to which they only incompletely correspond is that the construct tends to be *reified*. A set of logically interrelated notions is made into a theoretical view of a part of human nature. The overzealous and the naïve then make a *real thing* (hence “reification”) of this partial explanation. It is assumed to be an entity in itself capable of immanent action.

Actually, the self, as understood in social psychology, that is, the totality of self-attitudes which the individual possesses, is not an entity in itself but is rather *the totality of socially reflective and self-referring intellectual and sense memories* which the individual possesses. The individual is conscious. Consciousness is so basic a datum it has never been defined nor does it need to be to the human who, rather, experiences it for himself. It is synonymous with “awareness.” Here we can wed philosophical conceptions with those of social psychology. At the beginning of the present chapter we discussed two kinds of awareness in terms of attitudes, self-attitudes and those which pertain to the external environment. Hence, the individual is self-conscious as well as extra self-conscious. That which makes such consciousness possible is the human soul. But the relationship between the soul and the self is not merely consciousness. The relationship is a much more involved one. In the hegemony (authority or rule) of the soul in the body, the basic fact of identity is the *realness* of this human person as a fusion of *this* body and *this* soul. Through the agent intellect of the soul, various self-knowledges can be understood and “stored” in the intellectual memory. Some of these self-knowledges are accompanied by bodily reactions, such as pleasure, shame, anxiety about self, and the like, which are stored in the sense memory. The human intellect is the organizing principle which makes possible the organization of all of these self-images and self-attitudes into the generalized other. The question is rather an involved one in that language and the content of thought can rightfully be understood as outcomes of social participation while the *principle* by which man thinks and wills his acts cannot be studied by the methods of empirical science. Hence these understandings are rightfully considered postulates of social psychology rather than social psychology itself.

The Self and the Ego

The situation is even further complicated when the self, as conceived in social psychology, is equated with the *ego*, as conceived in general psychology or the psychology of personality. Since, increasingly, Freudian

conceptions of the ego permeate psychological writing on the subject of the ego the concept is more rightfully equated with the soul rather than with the psychological concept of the self. The ego "does" more. Indeed the self, in itself, is not capable of initiating action; it is not an agent of action but rather is the *content* of self-reaction—my awareness of myself here and now and my past self-awarenesses which I have retained as memories. Conceived in this way, the self does not "push and pull," that is, it does not manipulate other parts of the personality as does the ego, which much more closely equates with the active nature of the human soul. While it is perfectly proper for psychology, especially depth psychology, to push further its understandings of total personality, it seems undesirable for social psychology to push any farther into total personality than is required by the $A \rightleftharpoons B$ focus. Consider the following conception of the operations of the ego.⁴

The keys to reality—perception through the senses, notions of space and time, of cause and effect, command of body movements, conscious thought—are located in the Ego. Two legislatives, the Id and the Superego, urge their unworldly desires on a practical executive agency, the Ego.

To avoid being swamped by orders of its two principals, the Ego erects defenses and ignores signals and importunities when they might lead to ruin in reality. Such defenses are needed also because overwhelmingly strong impulsions might flood the Ego so that it would be unable to restrain or satisfy them.

Such conceptions of the ego have their validity where a general theory of personality is being sought. We need not concern ourselves in such a specialized discipline as social psychology with such broad conceptions, except to note that the Freudian and other psychological conceptions of the ego must ultimately be placed in their context of philosophical and theological conceptions of the total person. Some of this important work of integrating psychological and philosophical interpretations of personality has already been accomplished. Our purposes are fully served, however, when we note carefully the difference between the philosophical conceptions of the soul, the psychological conceptions of the ego, and our sociopsychological concept of the self. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall develop, entirely within the focus of social psychology, empirical observations of the origin of the self and its intimate relation-

⁴ Ralph Ross and Ernest van den Haag, *The Fabric of Society: An Introduction to the Social Sciences*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1957, p. 24.

ship with social motivation, the "social appetites" as it were, which derive from the needs imposed by self-attitudes.

✓ The Origin of the Self

As we have observed repeatedly, the self arises in social interaction when the individual becomes an object in social experience to himself. The beginnings of the self coincide with the learning of language in the young, and for this reason the relationship between language and the self has long been the subject of study by the social psychologist. There can be little doubt that the self arises in the medium of language. Indeed, language performs for the human young many essential functions such as providing him with the means of social interaction, transmitting to him the culture which will constitute his *Weltanschauung* or "life view," making it possible for him to conceptualize his thoughts and emotions and communicate these to others. In a later chapter, Life Experiences in Age Groups (Chapter 12), we shall develop further the processes by which language becomes part of the communicative tools of the infant and child. At this point we are concerned primarily with the role of language in the development of the self.⁵

The child's learning of language is not merely an intellectual matter; it is also a significant factor in the development of his personality. Language puts the child in touch with his parents and playmates in new and significant ways and initiates his acquisition of broader, more socialized perspectives. It introduces him to new pleasures and satisfactions and also creates a great many new needs and problems. Through learning language he learns of the rules and standards that regulate social relations and develops ideas of morality and religious matters. Language is also the means whereby he is gradually prepared for and later inducted into the roles which he is destined to play and through which he learns to grasp the viewpoints and understand the feelings and sentiments of other persons. By means of language he becomes aware of his own identity as a person and as a member of groups in which he seeks status, security, and self expression and which in turn make demands upon him. It should be kept in mind, then, that learning the language is much more than the mechanical acquisition of a skill or intellectual tool; it involves a fundamental and significant reorganization of the entire personality.

In summary, through language, the infantile and *autistic* (unsocialized, "selfish" in the everyday sense of the term) self-feelings undergo a trans-

⁵ Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, *Social Psychology*, rev. ed., New York, The Dryden Press, Inc., 1956, pp. 159-160.

formation. A social self is born, a self that is self "seen" rather than merely self-felt. These raw self-feelings become a socialized organization of attitudes to self which are moral in the sense that they are evaluations according to societal standards. He becomes conscious of the *obligations* as well as the advantages of social participation. His identity is "seen" by himself through language symbols which adults have invented in countless generations past within the beliefs and assumptions of their culture. Thus, subjectively, his identity is, through language, culturally bestowed.

The process of human development is so profoundly complex, however, that even a full understanding of the myriad intricate ways in which the self-attitudes are influenced by language (an understanding which modern social psychology by no means possesses) would not explain the *reasons why* the self develops. What is the internal *compulsion*, shall we say, for the child to become social? Instinctivistic answers, as we have seen, have failed to explain the emergence of self-consciousness and its essentially social character. The "instinct of gregariousness" is a concept more applicable to a herd of animals than to human beings, as is "consciousness of kind," although the latter concept has a certain validity when stripped of any biologicistic overtones and used to explain the preference of the *socialized* person for participating in primary groups of individuals most like himself. Still, of course, this does not tell us why the *unsocialized* person develops a social self.

While there is room for the suspicion that much remains to be perfected in the theoretical construct of the self as an *antianxiety* system, nevertheless much speculation in modern social psychology centers around the explanation of the origin of the self in those terms. Probably it is safe to say that the final answers to the question of the origin of the self can be understood within the broadest statement of this "anti-anxiety" construct, while many of its details as presently understood will be found to require modification.

While the concept of the self as an antianxiety system comes to us from H. S. Sullivan, much of it is compatible with the concepts of G. H. Mead and others on the subject, and the terminology used is a mixture of concepts from various theoretical systems. The "I" concept has been used in a variety of ways, but let us use it here in the Meadian sense. We may think of the "I" in the way Freud conceived of the "id," which consists of the animal drives and appetites of man, apart from his higher faculties. Hence, the "I" in the human is ever pleasure-seeking

and ever pain-avoiding. The "me" in social psychology has the universal meaning of the reflected image of self, self as "seen" in the eyes of the other. Hence a "me" can be conveyed to a child by the frown of an adult, to an athlete by the smile of the coach. Each individual "me" is a fragment of self-knowledge. The total organization of these "me's" into a conception of self and a "conscience" is, of course, the "generalized other" which we have already considered.

With this handful of concepts as our tools, let us speculate about the origin of the self as Mead, Sullivan, Cooley, and others have done. The first self-sentiment awareness of the infant is, of course, of the "I" variety. He feels the comforting, warm, and soothing ministrations of the person mothering him. If he were able to form words he would surely apply the term "good mama," which he later learns, to the person who supplies these euphoric satisfactions. In the crude but subtle communication between mother and child (called by Sullivan "empathy") the child also perceives an aspect of the mother which is unpleasant and anxiety-producing when she is impatient with him, preoccupied with other tasks, or anxious herself. Here again, if language were already learned it is likely that the child would designate this aspect of the mother "bad mama." Sullivan insists that these are the first personifications of the *me*.⁶

Good-me is the beginning personification which organizes experience in which satisfactions have been enhanced by rewarding increments of tenderness, which come to the infant because the mothering one is pleased with the way things are going. . . . *Bad-me*, on the other hand, is the beginning personification which organizes experience in which increasing degrees of anxiety are associated with behavior involving the mothering one in its more-or-less clearly prehended interpersonal setting. That is to say, bad-me is based on this increasing gradient of anxiety, and that, in turn is dependent, at this stage of life, on the observation, if misinterpretation, of the infant's behavior by someone who can induce anxiety.

Sullivan points also to the *not me*, a third personification, yet one which is so fraught with possibilities for horror, awe, and anxiety that it is internalized as not me and appears usually only in dreams. This not me is beyond discussion and having been learned in intense anxiety-producing situations is certainly not good me, the object of the "I" which is most pleasurable and acceptable, and is more bad me than the "I"

⁶Harry Stack Sullivan, *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry*, New York, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1953, pp. 161-162.

can bear, since avoiding psychic pain is as much to its nature as seeking pleasure. Hence, the not me is in the private self which is not within the focus of social psychology but rather of psychotherapeutics, although, of course, occasionally relevant to such problems as anxiety in interpersonal relations and the like.

In these terms, the self arises in social interaction when the "I" with which the infant was born is subjected to the necessary societal restraints of toilet training, restraints upon crying, upon certain eating habits by one whose involvement with the infant is an intimate one, one who becomes to him a "significant other." Hence, the "me's" of early childhood are the first forerunners of the self, they are relative always to the body (the "I"), and they are distinguished from everything else by their self-sentient character. These personifications organize experience, and through identification and introjection (processes with which we are already familiar) they become learned, organized, educational experiences on how to live with others. As we have said, the self-system is an explanatory concept, *not a thing* but a construct which helps us explain how individuals achieve workable, satisfactory relations with others and simultaneously derive intellectual and emotional gratification from these role relationships.

Can the Self Change?

As is usually the case in scientific discovery, a small number of enthusiastic pseudosocial-scientists seized upon the clinical findings of the importance of infantile experiences for the origin of the self and personality and advanced from these findings theories of infantile determinism, some so ridiculous as to support even foetal determinism. These have no more relation to social psychology than astrology to astronomy, nor phrenology to anthropometry, but like the examples given are pseudosciences. Nevertheless, they do raise an interesting question pertaining to the extent to which infantile experiences do influence personality.

The answer to the importance of infantile experience is a qualified yes, to the question of infantile determinism a resounding no! There is a thread of continuity between present self and the rudimentary self-system with which the individual began his social life. At various crises in life sometimes severely disruptive experiences do occur. When a person, for example, is taken to an induction center, is issued an entire new set of clothing, and has his hair all but shaved off (if he is

taken to a United States Marine Corps induction center, his head is literally shaved), what he had considered his rights to privacy as an individual are thoroughly violated; he is likely to feel a strong alienation from his former self. Actually, however, the "generalized other" is pervasive and persistent. It is not long before the new soldier, sailor, or marine identity achieves a continuity with the past civilian identity. This continuity we have described is much like the continuity in the life history of the oak tree and its beginnings as an acorn. The history of the relationship is there but to what extent is the acorn causal of the tremendous and beautiful organism which is the tree? On this vastly complex question let us satisfy ourselves with two observations, both by noted psychologists.

William James used to speak of his son, who was round-shouldered and took exercises for some time to correct his imperfect posture. The exercises were quite helpful. James would say, wryly, "My son is now square-shouldered, *in a round-shouldered sort of way*." This, of course, was the celebrated scholar's way of illustrating the *processual* nature of change in the human organism. One state or stage does not change abruptly, but rather each state of human development blends into and becomes a part of the next. Hence, in this light, a full autobiography would tell the individual the full story of the continuity of his "generalized other" from late infancy to the present time.

On the other hand, the *caveat* of Gordon Allport, another celebrated psychologist, is also appropriately applied to this problem of continuity and change in the self-system. Allport's concept of *functional autonomy* refers to the fact that our attitudes, including our self-attitudes, are what they are here and now, and all that is required to explain our behavior is present here and now. He rightly points out that there is, of course, an *historical* relationship between the acorn and the oak, between the child and the man, but there is not a *functional* relationship. The man does not do a thing *because* he had a certain experience as an infant or child. In philosophical terms, Allport's concept of functional autonomy can be expressed in this way: He does so because here and now his intellect searches his self-system, his "generalized other," if you will, and finds this behavior appropriate or inappropriate because of what he is here and now (as of course, subjectively conceived).

The child, it should be remembered, operates at the level of punishment and reward (the law of effect of Thorndike as he modified it to place much more emphasis on reward than on punishment). If he does

not "behave" he may be deprived of the thing or the comfort he is seeking, or he may be made to feel anxiety and insecurity by the adult's withdrawing his affection until conformity is produced in the child. The generalized other of the adult does not work in this crude fashion. Referring back to Allport's concept of functional autonomy, we can say that the adult's generalized other (unless immature and inadequate) functions autonomously; others may make it easy for him to maintain his self-image or they may be functioning in ways which are destructive of his self-image, but the point is that he *has it* and the child is merely developing it. Further, he can *change* his *significant others* and by changing his social situations preserve and cling to his self-conceptions when they are challenged by those around him. Or he can come to have a changed self-image which makes his lasting life situations odious to him and a social change of scene necessary. Job changes, social mobility, both vertical and horizontal, and other social interactional phenomena can often be understood primarily in terms of the self-conceptions of the individuals involved. These are phenomena which explain changes of various sorts, but self-conception normally involves not the feeling that one's social peers are unlike one's self, but rather that the people with whom one associates are rather like one's self, which is a good thing and makes change unnecessary. There are good reasons for this perception and evaluation of others according to one's own image.

The Self and Evaluation of Others

The gravest "threat" to the student clinical psychologist in the mental hospital setting is probably the "glowering" patient. This type of patient is usually a paranoid schizophrenic, one who (among many other difficulties) has a seriously deranged self-system and few healthy attitudes toward self. The "threat" is sometimes all bluff (although this should never be depended upon), and the glowering and fist clenching are reactions to his beliefs that other people disapprove of and are plotting against him. All of these fears of other people stem from his personal inadequacies and fears. Hostility toward himself is the basis for his hostility toward others. Only those who have a wholesome self-regard are capable of loving others. We can "see" in others apparently only what we "see" in ourselves.

Let us examine Allport's "qualifications for a good judge of others," a construct based on a great deal of research evidence which will help

us to see the self components which enter into our valuation of others.

1. *Experience*. The best judges of others are mature in age and rich experiences:

The youth sees people in the narrow perspective of his limited experience, and when forced to judge those whose lives differ markedly from his own, frequently resorts to such callow and inadequate clichés as “a good sport,” “an old stick-in-the-mud,” or “queer.” The jargon of adolescents contains any number of such characterial clichés. In spite of the protest of each younger generation that the elder fails to understand it, the chances are vastly in favor of it misunderstanding the elder.

2. *Similarity*. Understanding the other, as we have said, involves similarity of a sort between the perceiving self and the object of perception. Allport relates this notion to the preceding notion of experience.

Similarity is . . . a special case of “experience.” The more an associate resembles me, the more experience, so to speak, have I had with *him*. It is for this reason that members of the same racial, religious, or occupational group are ordinarily the best judges of one another.⁷

Other factors involved in good judgments of others are: *intelligence*, *insight* (especially self-insight, “knowing one’s self”), *complexity* (people have difficulty understanding others whose selves are more complex than their own), *detachment* (one of the few asocial trends among the best judges), the *esthetic attitude* (“seeks always to comprehend the intrinsic harmony of the object”), and *social intelligence* (the “social gift,” “traits making for frictionless personal relations,” the ability to foresee what the most likely response of the other will be). Hence, while the organization and maturity of one’s own generalized other is not the sole factor in evaluating others, it can be seen to be the most *fundamental* of the factors separating those who judge others well and those who do it poorly.

While the self is not the core of personality as the core is to an apple, nevertheless it constitutes the self-other orientation in which the agent intellect and the will conceive and execute social activity. Hence of all the departure points from which we might explore the question of social motivation—what “makes” *A* and *B* do what they do in social inter-

⁷ Gordon W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*, New York, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1937.


action—it seems most reasonable to approach the question from the standpoint of the interrelationships of the motives and the self.

THE SELF AND MOTIVATION

One of the most puzzling problems in social psychology, or in any of the behavioral sciences for that matter, is the question of motivation. Starting with the basic assumption that no behavior is without a cause, social psychology is faced with the problem of explaining why people behave as they do in the social situation. If the answer to the question, "Why?" lay in the operation of various instincts which cause people to behave in specified ways, the problem would be vastly simplified. In rejecting the instinctivistic "solutions" we have left a gap in our social-psychological theory which must, of course, be filled. The variety of the proposals for filling this gap has even further complicated the picture. We could not possibly do justice to the large number of proposals which have been advanced for the understanding of human motivation, but we can examine some of the more influential theories.

Theories of Motivation

If the study of motivation is the study of what "moves" people to behave as they do in the social situation, we can divide the theories of motivation into three main categories without denying, of course, that inevitable marginal theories will be difficult to classify in our categories. The first category is that which treats of motives as inner "pushes" to behavior, the second subsumes those theories which treat of motives as outer "pulls," and the third consists of those theories which deal with motives as simultaneously inner and outer phenomena. Thus we have three main views:



The instinctivistic theories are the extreme of the inner "push" theories where the compulsion to action on the part of the individual begins with an internal disequilibrium or "tension" as we have previously described it. In modern social-psychological thought, the Freudian concept of such tension is the most influential and for that reason we can think of it as the prototype of inner "push" theories. Freud held that all behavior is motivated; that not even the most apparently casual

of all acts is without its motivations. All behavior can be explained if the analyst but probes deeply enough into the personality for the underlying motive which will inevitably be found to be related to *survival* or *death*. This implies two conceptions of motivation which should be noted: first, that the motives of an individual may be and often are well beneath his conscious awareness of them, and second, that motivation is essentially a *conflict*. The motivation of man is therefore a striving to reduce the tension within him. There is no tensionless state but rather a balance or equilibrium of life and death forces. The life forces are in the id. These are the libidinal sexual drives under which Freud subsumed affection and love as well as erotic body pleasures and concupiscence. The death instinct is in the superego, which constantly exercises a repressive force upon the life instincts which the ego is forced to repress into the unconscious. The Freudian construct of man's motives projects an image of an anthropoid ape retaining his primordial urges and instincts yet caught up in the exigencies of modern social structure. The dynamic of his behavior is the constant struggle between imperious biological forces from within against rigid and unyielding social barriers from without.

Since Freud's theory of motivation is not personal-social but rather personal vs. social, we offer his theory as an example of the inner "push" category. One aspect of Freud's theory of motivation which has spread to the other categories is his emphasis upon early childhood in the development of personality and motives. Despite the attacks of psychologists such as Allport, whose concept of functional autonomy tends to minimize the importance of early childhood experience, the emphasis upon socialization in the parental family in the early formative years is solidly entrenched in modern social-psychological theory. There have been a number of variations upon Freud's theory of motives and probably the chief variation has been the substitution for *sex* as the primary motive by such equally simplistic concepts as "the drive for mastery" of Adler, the need for security or safety (in a dynamic and unstable society) of Sullivan and Horney, but these, of course, still remain inner "push" theories. Perhaps Maslow did the best job of putting together a holistic view of such inner "push" theories by avoiding the simple one-prime-instinct approach and substituting instead a "hierarchy of motives" scheme. It remains instinctive in the sense that at its very base are conceptions of the pre-potent, innate, and inborn tendencies to behave based on such physiological needs as hunger and

thirst. We would be tempted to chuck it out with the rest of the instinctive theories if it were not for the fact that it allows for social appetites, when these basic desires have been met. In other words when man has plenty to eat and plenty to drink, when, we might say, his belly is full, *other and higher needs emerge* and these, rather than the biological drives, dominate the person's motives. When these are satisfied, newer and higher needs emerge, and so on. His list of needs indicates this pyramid view of motives:

Highest	The need-to-know—philosophizing self-actualization needs
	Esteem needs—for achievement and recognition
	Love and belonging needs—affection, etc.
	Safety needs—shelter, protection
Most basic	Physiological needs—hunger, thirst

This motivational scheme has the advantages that it takes into consideration the valid insights not only of the physiologist and learning psychologist but also of the social psychologist, the sociologist, and the anthropologist. Further research on the inmates of concentration camps in the Second World War, where privation was often extreme, seem to support, if not in full, the biologicistic elements of Maslow's theory in at least the concept of the emergence of higher motives. Men and women were often thrown together indiscriminately, and where the diet was extremely low in caloric content and safety needs unmet, affectional relations were secondary to these more primal needs. Finally, it is one of the few inner "push" theories of motivation which is adaptable to the widest variety of social situation.

The extreme of the outer "pull" theories of motivation is, of course, the behaviorism of Watson and his followers where the manipulation of the environment was seen as primary to whatever "pushes" there might be inside the individual. In this latter connection, Watson had, by the time he was overtaken by death, reduced the instincts to three in number. Indeed, he was willing to call these (joy, or love, fear, and rage) "emotional reactions" rather than "instincts." In the days when it was popular to number the instincts in the hundreds this was a devastating sweeping out of internal drives in the individual. Experimentally induced changes in laboratory animals strengthened the behavioristic position, and there are still those who see the subject as almost completely malleable to environmental influence.

A much less naïve outer "pull" theory is that of the field theorists, whose major spokesman was, of course, Lewin. In this scheme the unit

of analysis is, as we explained the matter in relation to learning, the situation under which the behavior is occurring. Field "forces" elicit responses from the subject. If we were to conceive of the inner and the outer theories of motivation as forming a continuum rather than a dichotomy, we can say that the Lewinian scheme is the least extreme of the outer theories of motivation and does not postulate that there are no inner dynamics in the individual's motivation as do many environmental determinists.

The very number of "wishes," "interests," "drives," "motives" and so on which have been proposed (and of which we have selected only a few for treatment here) to explain human motivations has led many students to the erroneous conclusion that the fundamental concern of social psychologists is, and must be, with the *number* of human motives. The problem is, rather, one not of numbers but of *kind of motivational scheme*. In other words, the $A \rightleftharpoons B$ interactional focus of social psychology calls for an interactional motivation theory. Few if any social psychologists are naïve enough to believe that sufficiently precise language or mathematical concepts exist so that we may effectively label all human strivings and appetites under any and all situational circumstances under which they occur. Rather, social psychologists rightly look for the kind of motivational scheme which can be best adapted to their $A \rightleftharpoons B$ focus and within that focus explain the major dimensions of human motives in social interactional terms. The complexity of human hopes and aspirations is such that for the present, until our theoretical formulations are greatly advanced, that is the best we can hope for. Consequently, we find no special merit in schemes which advance specific numbers of motives. Also, since our interactional frame of reference requires that we transcend the individual and find both a situational objective and something within the individual which prompts him to strive for that objective, theories of motivation which fall short of both inner and outer orientation will not serve our purposes. Schemes which focus on the objectives in the situation (values, interests, goals) must also be supplemented by schemes which provide a correlative inside the individual, some reason or reasons why that objective is being sought. Without belittling other theories of motivation, especially those of Freud, Maslow, and Lewin which have their important place within their respective foci of the psychoanalytic, the psychological, and the field frames of reference, respectively, we must look for an inner and an outer perspective and a concept which relates the two.

At present the elements of social-psychological theories are the biogenic drives (sometimes called "primary drives") and sociogenic motives (sometimes called the "secondary drives"). The concept which relates the two is the self-system. The biological drives are the motivating forces in the newborn infant and dominate his behavior until, in the process of socialization, the rudimentary forms of the "generalized other" appear. From that point on his behavior is caught up in and is a part of his conception of himself and what *he* wants, wishes, or needs on the basis of social attitudes, and from that point on his physical needs are said to be *bio-genic*, in that they arise in tissue needs. They are *biological* in origin but *social* in expression. Fashion can dictate the extent to which food is to be eaten and the "figure" maintained as well as when and where food is to be taken. In other words, referring back to Maslow's levels of motivation, the social psychologist formulates his theory of motivations at the level above those of pure biological survival. Once socialized, and assuming that no such "desocialization" as becoming a prisoner in a concentration camp or a starving castaway on a desert island occurs, the social appetites of the individual follow something of the "four wishes" of Thomas, although neither he nor we would attach any absolute and final significance to these "wishes." They seem to explain a great deal of social participation and, most importantly for our purposes, they all show the *self-system as mediating the relations of self and other*, thus satisfying our criteria for a motivational scheme for social psychology. The four human wishes, according to Thomas, are:⁸

1. The desire for new experience
2. The desire for security
3. The desire for response
4. The desire for recognition

The *desire for new experience* links the pleasure-seeking aspects of the "I" on the one hand with the self-image on the other. In other words, the physical gratification connected with pride is linked with the desire for new experience and self-actualization and self-assertion. Admiration of and identification of the self with the daring athlete, war hero, or even the swashbuckling type of criminal (frequently the "Robin Hood" myth is involved) carries with it a vicarious nervous and bodily excitation. Innovation and social deviation may provide actual rather than

⁸ Edmund H. Volkart, *Social Behavior and Personality: The Contributions of W. I. Thomas to Theory and Social Research*, New York, Social Science Research Council, 1951, p. 121ff.

vicarious excitation of this type. Some cultural provision may exist for the warrior or the hunter to achieve this desire within the bounds of cultural acceptance. Lodge night and the annual lodge convention are among such provisions in the American middle class. Frequently, however, such excitation is sought outside the bounds of cultural propriety. While a certain extent of such deviation may be permitted, even institutionalized as in the case of the Mardi Gras and other festivals, when it appears as the predominant wish of an individual who is willing to forego social approval to pursue it, a condition exists which corresponds to the psychoanalytic concept of the "psychopathic personality" in whom the superego is not sufficiently developed. This is one of the rare areas in which the "wishes" and the psychoanalytic conceptions of motivation converge. In the remaining "wishes" the emphasis is upon the *gratification* of personal desires *through social participation*, where the Freudian scheme emphasizes the *restraining* aspects of social structure.

The *desire for security*, on the other hand, relates the pain-avoidance aspect of the "I" to the self-image. There is, apparently, a primal and basic need for the individual's identity to be anchored in some sort of persisting group of "significant others." He must belong and be accepted.

The *desire for response* reinforces the desire for security, but is something more. Not only does he have a need to belong but he has the further need to have affectional relations with others, to be intimate, to form sentiments about others. Romantic love is a reflection of the desire for response, and its inordinate desire is a reflection that neither the desire for security nor the desire for response are being met. Hence, this desire supplements the pain-avoidance function for the "I" of the security wish with the pleasure seeking of intimate response even to the thrill seeking of romantic love.

The *desire for recognition* is also an intermediary between the pleasure-seeking aspects of the "I" and the self-image. Unlike the desires for security and response, it is not a wish to be like others or to be intimate with them but, rather, to be above them. And, unlike the desire for new experience, the desire for recognition is a self-assertion in terms of the existing social structure rather than a departure from it. Not because he is one who takes liberties with the social conventions but rather as one who has an important and responsible place within it, through this desire the individual seeks self-esteem and prestige among men.

However adequate (and it should be recalled that no extravagant claims are made along this line) the "wishes" may be for explaining social motivation, there are two important limitations upon its universal application which should be carefully noted. First, the "wishes" are not "culture-free." In other words, cultural prescriptions restrict the alternatives for the individual, as for example, the common cultural prescription which restricts the activities of women more than men. The "desire for new experience" will have a differential meaning for men and women, then, according to cultural prescription. Whatever a psychology of the sexes might be, it is a subordinate interest in social psychology to the cultural prescriptions and definitions of sex differences. Second, even within the same culture the life experiences of individuals will relate importantly to the way in which given wishes predominate in them. Hence, this present chapter, at least with respect to the question of motivation, should be seen as a unit with the following chapter on the relationship between culture and personality and the chapter which follows that on life experiences in age groups.

SUGGESTED READING

- Allport, Gordon W.: *Personality*, New York, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1937, p. 204ff.
- Britt, Steuart H. (ed.): *Selected Readings in Social Psychology*, New York, Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1950. See especially Guthrie's article on motives.
- Gerth, Hans, and C. Wright Mills: *Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1953. Classic statement of relationship between self and social structure.
- Klineberg, Otto: *Social Psychology*, rev. ed., New York, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1954. See chaps. 5 and 6.
- Maslow, A. H.: *Motivation and Personality*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1954. Motives and their role in adjustment.
- Murphy, Gardner: "Social Motivation," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1954, vol. II.
- Sullivan, Harry Stack: *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry*, New York, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1953. See Sullivan's treatment of the self as an antianxiety system.
- Volkart, Edmund: *Social Behavior and Personality: The Contributions of W. I. Thomas to Theory and Social Research*, New York, Social Science Research Council, 1951. See especially "The Four Wishes," chap. 8.
- Young, Kimball: *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953. See chaps. 5, 6, 7, and 8.


Chapter II

THE RELATIONSHIP OF CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

Every man is in certain respects

- a. like all other men,
- b. like some other men,
- c. like no other man.¹

With these words, Kluckhohn and Murray open an already classic essay on personality formation. In its major dimensions, at least, their conception of personality is similar to our own. Let us correlate our conceptions of the major elements of personality with these provocative statements about "every man." By reproducing our diagram of the three interactive variables in personality development, biological constitution, culture, and life experiences, we can summarize the preceding few chapters in their relevance to the issue at hand:



In Chapter 8 we explored the major elements of the biological constitution as they comprise the physiological substrate of personality;

¹ Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry Murray (eds.), "Personality Formation: The Determinants," in *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture*, 2d ed., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1954, p. 53.

Chapter 9 covered the processes by which the physiological constitution is modified (learning); and the special understanding required for human learning as a consequence of man's unique qualities as a self-conscious animal (the self and motivation) were discussed in the preceding chapter, Chapter 10. Armed with these background understandings about the biological constitution and the processes of its modification, we are prepared to move into the two remaining circles: culture and life experiences.

In a word, these preceding chapters have shown us how "every man is . . . like all other men." Biological endowment, in its major, functional features, at least, is universal to the human race. Further, every man is like all other men because laws of learning (whatever they might ultimately prove to be) are applicable to the entire human race; one set of learning principles does not apply to one group of human beings and another set to other human beings. Finally, every man is like every other man in that the "stuff" of human aspirations and human motives is everywhere the same since men also have in common the same kind of environment, viz., the social world as opposed to the world of nature. Unlike the other animals, the drives and motives of man are not a direct response to the physical environment but rather are an indirect response (twice removed, since his attitudes mediate the culture and the culture mediates environment) to that environment through the world of artifacts and ideas into which he is born. This man-made or cultural environment teaches him (through previously enculturated people) the proper ways of behaving, and these ways are, universally, man's substitute for the instincts of animals.

Now, in which ways is "every man like . . . *some* other men"? Referring back to Fichter's comments, page 212, we can see that social systems impose social roles which are enacted rather uniformly by individuals within the social system, and some roles are assumed because people take them by choice. Hence every man is like some other men, like those who enact similar roles. Also, social units have a characteristic ethos, or "way" of doing things. Thus ethnologists speak of the "Hopi way," the "Apache way," and the "Navajo way." Sociologists even generalize about a social class within a nation. For example, we read of the "middle-class" mores. Hence, every man is more like those who share his culture than he is like the men of other cultures. In this present chapter we shall address ourselves to the problem of why this is so.

In terms of the biological constitution and the laws of learning and motivation, then, the human race can be thought of as one. In terms of behavior differences, men differ for cultural reasons, or, within cultures, by virtue of differential life experiences. Finally, these life experiences are not "taken up" into personality, are not perceived, defined, and reacted to in exactly the same way by every man—hence, every man is "like no other man." But we shall return to this concept of differential life experiences in the following chapter; let us concentrate in the present chapter on the way in which culture produces homogeneity among the people who share it, thus making them "different" as a whole from other cultural units.

One of the things we shall have to be careful about is the way we often think of people who are different in terms of the odd or the unnatural. Since our own culture is so "normal" and "natural" to us, we often tend to think of the ways of other peoples as, to say the least, quaint or even bizarre. If we are to investigate questions involving culture, we must divest ourselves of this habitual culture-centeredness (*ethnocentrism*). It may seem inevitable that we must use our own cultural ways as criteria by which we can evaluate the ways of other cultures, yet the science of *ethnology* has developed techniques of studying culture which can give us some guidance in achieving objectivity and avoiding provincialism and ethnocentrism.

The *plan of the present chapter* is first to acquire this methodological frame of reference of the science of ethnology and then to turn our attention to some comparative studies of culture. From these comparative studies of culture we wish to learn why it is that men, so much alike the world over, should have developed such a diversity of cultures, and why it is that men become so much like each other when they share the same culture. Then we shall switch our attention from culture to personality and ask what the processes are by which men come to be so similar to those with whom they share a culture, and this can help us to understand also why deviation occurs and why all men in the same culture do *not* respond similarly. Then we shall raise some questions that will occur during the foregoing discussion, chiefly concerning the extent to which the generalization from ethnology, built up from observations of small primitive societies, are applicable to modern "civilized" nations and their subcultures. It is rather important that this plan for the chapter be kept firmly in mind. Experience shows that students often become lost in the interesting details of exotic primitive cultures

and forget just what broader purposes they had in mind for studying them! First, then, let us turn our attention to the science of ethnology and the aspects of its methodology which will guide us in our task.

The Science of Ethnology

The focus of ethnology is, of course, upon the ways of thinking and acting of a people (together with their material artifacts) which are handed down from generation to generation. In fact, *ethnos* translates from the Greek as "nation" and is the nearest term in Greek to the modern notion of culture. Hence, ethnology is that branch of anthropology (the study of man) which concerns itself with man's culture. As such, ethnology (cultural anthropology) and social anthropology (the "sociology" of primitive tribes) are the areas of interest which qualify anthropology as not only a natural science but also as a social science. The essential viewpoint of ethnology is that *all cultures are equally valid*, and from this viewpoint a valuable theory and methodology for the comparative study of cultures has been developed.

Misconceptions. Two questions have often arisen as misconceptions of the anthropologist's interest in primitive people and his formulation of generalizations about their cultures. First, the ethnologist's interest in a primitive tribe is not an ethical but a scientific one. He does not view with horror (except, perhaps, outside of his professional role), for example, the practice of cannibalism among a people. Rather, he asks what *function* this practice has for the culture as a whole—what part cannibalism plays in the "life way" of this people. Only a handful of unprofessional ethnologists have exploited their scientific status to advocate that the practices of primitive peoples (especially alleged sexual promiscuity) should carry over to our society. Second, he is concerned with primitive people not especially because they are, to us, exotic and bizarre but because they are *simpler* and their culture is much more amenable to study as a whole than is our own. More and more, ethnologists are studying modern societies, but in the beginnings of the discipline this was not the case. Primitive societies the world over were becoming influenced by the rolling tide of Western imperialism, and ethnologists simply wanted to get the primitive cultures "on record," as it were, before they became westernized. Hence, the charge of "cultural relativism" as *an ethical standard* should not be applied to the scientific field of ethnology but only to those naïve enough to take a scientific frame of reference as a life philosophy (there are very few who take this

kind of philosophy seriously since the "moralities" of Hitler and the Soviets applied such relativism to the conduct of human affairs). Neither should the preference for the study of primitive tribes be mistaken for a reluctance to face the modern world and its problems. After all, the aim of ethnology is to employ its methodology for building up a theory about culture which will be applicable to modern man and his problems.

Scope. Since the anthropologist studying primitive tribes uses *essentially* the same methods as the sociologist, much of what we have said in an earlier chapter about objectivity in observation, recording, analysis, and theory building applies also in a modified way to ethnology. Nevertheless, anthropology is a natural as well as a social science and this fact flavors its method.²

Anthropology owes one of its major differences from sociology to its natural-history antecedents. The natural sciences, such as botany, zoology, and geology, recognize a professional obligation, over and above the investigation of theoretical problems, to record systematically the forms of plants and animals and natural formations in all parts of the earth which they visit. Anthropology shares this sense of obligation. Field work is the *sine qua non* of professional standing, and the ethnographer, whatever special problems he may go to the field to investigate, is expected to bring back and publish, not only an answer to his special problem, but also a descriptive account, as complete as he can make it, of the entire culture of the people studied. The result has been the accumulation of a vast body of professionally gathered descriptive materials on the approximately 3,000 peoples of the primitive world.

The significance of this vast storehouse of ethnographic monographs is that it makes available data which can throw light on general problems of culture as well as on individual cultures. In the next section of this chapter we shall see how Ruth Benedict drew upon these data to throw light upon questions about cultural variability and culture patterns. Studies have been accomplished which show, for example, that every primitive culture provides certain essentials for child rearing, social organization, myth, magic, and religion. These studies could not have been accomplished without these monographs.

Methods. The state of methodology in ethnology nowhere nearly approximates the more sophisticated scientific methods of sociology and psychology. This, of course, imposes severe limitations on the extent

² George Peter Murdock, "Sociology and Anthropology," in John Gillin (ed.), *For a Science of Social Man*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1954, p. 20.

to which validity can be attached to conclusions derived from ethnological materials. The method of ethnology is, of course, adapted to the types of data available for analysis. Says one candid ethnologist:³

There are, I believe, only three types of data in cultural anthropology:

1. *An identified individual in such-and-such a recorded context said such-and-such, and was heard by an anthropologist.*
2. *An identified individual in such-and-such a recorded context was seen by the anthropologist to do so-and-so.*
3. *Artifacts (tools, works of art, books, clothes, boats, weapons, etc.) made and/or used by such-and-such individuals in such-and-such contexts.*

In other words, the ethnologist interviews his subjects, hence he must learn the language or use bilingual informants (for an interesting use of such an informant see the treatment of "Boy" in the Gros Ventre monograph in the suggested readings for this chapter). He sees and records the interactions of the people and their use of artifacts in various cultural contexts. From these interviews and observations he writes his "word picture" or monograph of the society which he studied. From this kind of monograph others then do analyses such as those presented in this chapter. Two canons of any social research are that (1) the data are no better than their initial recording and (2) the farther removed from the actual situation, the more chance for misinterpretation of the data. These two canons should be in the back of our minds as we turn our attention to Benedict's and other studies of culture and personality.

PATTERNS OF CULTURE

Benedict's study⁴ of three primitive societies was directed to the problem of uniformity and variability in culture and personality. She was inquiring into those human adjustments that are culturally conditioned and those that are common and universal in mankind, regardless of the culture in which they are found. Although there has been some criticism of her methodology, her approach was scientific to the degree that she

³Gregory Bateson, "Sex and Culture," in Douglas G. Haring (ed.), *Personal Character and Cultural Milieu*, 3d ed., Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1956, p. 145. Reprinted from *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 1947, vol. 47, pp. 647-660.

⁴Since the paperback copy of Ruth Benedict's *Patterns of Culture*, Boston, A Mentor Book, reprinted by arrangement with the Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934, is so often purchased by students for "outside" reading, all page references are to that edition.

relied heavily on ethnological monographs of the type we have described, both of her own and of her colleagues in anthropology (notably Fortune and Boas). Working with these data she analyzed the cultures of the Zuni Indians (a Pueblo people of New Mexico), the Dobu people of Melanesia, and the Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island on the north-west coast of America as these cultures operated to shape the personality structures of their respective peoples. Her reason for choosing such diverse tribal societies was to obtain a sufficiently wide variety of cultures so that she might have some indication of the flexibility of human nature in its adaptations to cultural demands. It should be noted in passing that after analyzing the three different personality patternings wrought by these cultures—in themselves evidence of an enormous capacity of human nature for adaptation to different types of culture—Benedict still demonstrated that her three subject cultures had used up but a portion of the great arc of human potential for cultural adaptation.

Her analysis of the three cultures studied proceeded from her theoretical framework of generalizations about culture which provided the working concept of culture in later studies of culture and personality and provided a basis for the analysis of personality patterning within each of the three cultures she was studying. The first of these generalizations relates to *the diversity of cultures*. With respect to any problem of human life with which a society is faced, there appears to be a myriad variety of cultural “solutions.” Family organization, for example, may be monogamous or polygamous (polyandrous or polygynous). One tribe may reckon kinship and descent through the mother’s line (matrilineal) and another through the father’s (patrilineal), or the authority in the family may inhere in the mother role (matriarchal) or the father role (patriarchal). The biological and psychological problems of mating and the social problem of survival of the culture are met by as many solutions as are possible within the limitations imposed upon culture by human nature. Private ownership of property in one tribe is offset by various forms of socialism in other tribes. The first impression from the data pertaining to the three tribes analyzed by Benedict was of complete heterogeneity of cultural form and practice.

The second generalization from this study is, however, that these *cultural forms do not occur randomly or haphazardly*, within each tribe. There is always some degree of *integration of culture* within a society—there are integrated systems which enable the individual to organize his attitudes and behavior around a few relatively stable patterns of ideas,

beliefs, and practices. In other words, within the cultural practices of each society there is a *core* set of practices with which all other practices are more or less integrated. It is in this complex interweaving of culture traits that the different identities of cultures are found.⁵

This integration of cultures is not in the least mystical. It is the same process by which a style in art comes into being and persists. Gothic architecture, beginning in what was hardly more than a preference for altitude and light, became by the operation of some canon of taste that developed within its technique, the unique and homogeneous art of the thirteenth century. It discarded elements that were incongruous, modified others to its purposes, and invented others that accorded with its taste. . . . What was at first no more than a slight bias in local forms and techniques expressed itself more and more forcibly, integrated itself in more and more definite standards and eventuated in Gothic art. . . . What has happened in the great art styles happens also in cultures as a whole. All the miscellaneous behavior directed toward getting a living, warring, and worshipping the gods is made over into consistent patterns in accordance with unconscious canons of choice that develop within the culture.

Benedict warns of (1) attaching a mystic significance to the processes involved in the integration of culture and also warns against (2) the assumption that all cultures have achieved such integration. (In later sections of this present chapter we shall investigate this question further.) From these concepts of the *diversity* of cultures and the *integration* of culture, Benedict begins her analysis of life within each of the cultures she has selected to study in order to illustrate that life experiences within each society, the Zuni, the Dobu, and the Kwakiutl, produce personality patterning unique to the society in which the individual has lived his life. From the beginning of her analysis of the Zuni people, it is apparent that the major factors imparting cultural identity to personality are the *common goals* which the members of the society possess and the *means of pursuing these goals which are available in the culture*.

The Zuni. The Zuni goals are centered around oneness with the universe and the supernatural and the Zuni means of pursuing these goals are *ritual* and *magic*. The complex ceremonial life of the village provides the core of Zuni living with its crowded calendar of religious activities. The division of the ritual labor of its people occupies the major share of their attention—the memorization of their roles in rituals and

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

small talk about past or future ceremonial events takes up a large share of the waking life of most Zuni adults. Imitative magic is strongly emphasized and firmly believed in. Many of the elements of ceremonial ritual are symbolic of thunder and rain, the petition of which is a major religious concern in the sun-parched desert of Zuni country. Stones are rolled on the floor to create a sound similar to thunder, water is sprinkled to cause rain. These and other magic rituals have a great efficacy when properly performed, and great care is taken to ensure exact compliance with every ritual detail.

Prayer is, therefore, not a personal and individual communication with the supernatural with the fervor and deep emotion that often characterizes the prayer of Christians, Moslems, and Jews but is, rather, mild and quite formal. Most prayers are, as we have said, for rain which is essential for the fertility of the soil and the fertility therefore of human life. The ceremonial structure breaks down into *priesthoods*, with various objects, retreats, dances and prayers in a year-round program; the *masked gods society* in which the members have similar magic possessions and are responsible for the great tribal mask ceremony, the Shalako; and the *medicine societies* in which, as with the other ceremonial agencies, the major concern is with the exactness of tribal ritual performances. Wealth and other pursuits of other cultures do not have the same urgency for the Zuni, who uses wealth chiefly to assist him in securing the required accoutrements for his parts in ritual ceremonies. Prerogatives in the area of ritual, usually accompanying clan position, outweigh wealth in their importance. The basic factor which sets the Pueblos apart from the other North American Indians is this formal relationship with the supernatural which offers a sharp contrast with the highly individualistic character of religious experience observed in many other North American tribes. This contrast enables Benedict to conceptualize the personality differences between the Zuni and other North American Indians as the difference between the Apollonian and the Dionysian⁶ personalities. These personality differences arise from strikingly different means of arriving at the values of existence:

<i>Apollonian</i>	<i>Dionysian</i>
Distrustful of all excess	Annihilation of the ordinary bounds
Often has only a limited idea of the nature of experiences prized so highly by the Dionysian	of existence—escape from the boundary imposed by the five senses

⁶ Terms used by Nietzsche in his studies of Greek tragedy.

*Apollonian**Dionysian*

Outlaws from his conscious life such
depth of emotion

Measured (in the Hellenic sense)

Middle of the road

Does not meddle with disruptive psychological states. Even in the exaltation of the dance he remains what he is

Transcendence of this order of experience

Press toward euphoria and excess

The closest analogy to the emotions he seeks is drunkenness, the illuminations of frenzy

"The path of excess leads to the palace of wisdom"

The Zuni are, of course, Apollonians. Distrust of individualism is a logical consequence in a people who stress precedent and tradition. Unlike other North and South American Indians (fervently Dionysian), the Zuni dislike violence and any change in the usual or the routine. Fasting, visions, and other deeply psychological religious experiences so characteristic of the Plains Indians are not for the Zuni. The prototype of the ideal man of the Zuni is not this zealot but rather the non-assuming person of dignity who evokes little comment from his neighbors and stands out in no respect whatsoever. Thirst for power, knowledge, or any kind of superiority has no place in a tribe where becoming conspicuous is to become suspect. The Zuni avoids conflict even when he is in the right. The individualist, so highly prized in American culture, is viewed with distrust by the Zuni. Too much individualism can cause one to be defined out of the universe, that is, tried for sorcery and put to death. The Zuni world simply has no place for the "great man" whom we in America prize so highly.⁷

Like their vision of man's relation to other men, their version of man's relation to the cosmos gives no place to heroism and man's will to overcome obstacles. It has no sainthood for those who fighting-fighting-fighting die driven against the wall. . . . They have made in one small but long established island in North America a civilization whose forms are dictated by the typical choices of the Apollonian, all of whose delight is in formality and whose way of life is a way of measured sobriety.

The Dobu. The Dobuans of Melanesia, on the other hand, Benedict sees as lawless and treacherous. "Everyman's hand is against every other man." "The social forms which obtain in Dobu put a premium on ill will and treachery in making them the recognized virtues of their society."

These social forms provide a loose cohesion for the various designated localities of from four to twenty villages—these named localities com-

⁷ Benedict, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

prising in their totality what might loosely be described as Dobu society. Each locality is a unit perpetually at war with every other such locality. In early days, prior to the white man's control, no Dobuan would enter any locality other than his own except for the purpose of warring on the other locality. While hostility thus prevails among these localities the most intense flames of hostility are fanned *within the locality itself* by the practices which have become institutionalized as *everyday means of conducting life*. Harvests, economic exchanges, marriages, births, and deaths are occasions for acts, both overt and surreptitious, of aggressive hostility toward one another. Each person is a magician and sorcerer (although with varying degrees of knowledges and sorcerous skills), and the primary objects of his incantations, charms of ill will, and harmful intentions are certain of his fellow villagers. Those with whom he shares the daily life of the village, exclusive of members of his *susu* (his mother's line), are the witches and sorcerers most capable, in turn, of harming him.

He enjoys a certain immunity from the witchcraft of others within the *susu*. While not a true family in that the father and other relatives considered "close" in Western civilization, not being blood members of the mother's line, are not included, the *susu* offers the nearest thing to the psychic security of family life that Dobu culture permits. Even this minimum security against hostility is denied him every other year when he must live as an outsider in the village of his wife. This pattern of living one year in the relatively hostile village of one's mate and the next in the security of one's own village allows for a great deal of "getting even" for the grievances accumulated against the mate and the mate's relatives during the time spent as an "in-law" in the mate's village. Marriages between individuals of different villages is necessary because of the Dobu system of reckoning descent, of establishing inheritance rights, and all of the conditions made necessary by the fact that the core institution is the matrilineal *susu*. These intervillage marriages provide a basis for a degree of social intercourse between the two villages involved, but this is very grudging and carried on within the typical Dobu climate of suspicion and hostility.

"Marriage is set in motion by a hostile act of the mother-in-law." After a nocturnal visitation to her daughter's hut by a young man of another village she may block the door so that he cannot escape. After a brief public acknowledgment of the new marriage, the groom becomes subject to the commands of his new parents-in-law, and their dictates

are often harsh and demanding. The groom's own relatives have what are often heavy obligations in the matter; valuables must be carried to the village of the bride and bestowed upon the gloating parents of the bride. Generosity is not the motive underlying these gifts but rather a dour acknowledgement of obligation. The involvement of the groom's relatives, while painful to them, carries the consolation that they will be able to force the bride into a role of humiliation when, in the following and every alternate year thereafter, she must come to live in the village of the groom.

"The fierce exclusiveness of ownership in Dobu is nowhere more violently expressed than in the beliefs about hereditary proprietorship of yams. The universal dogma of their society is that only yams of one's own blood line will grow in one's garden brought to fruition by the magic incantations that have descended with the seed." This is in keeping with one of the core beliefs of the Dobu that nothing comes about except through magic. The belief that the yams mysteriously travel at night from garden to garden helps to shore up another core belief of the Dobu that every gain of one's own involves another's loss. Hence, if through witchcraft and sorcery one can manipulate things so that a minimum of his yams travel to other gardens and *a maximum number of yams will come to a final rest in his own plot*, then success has been achieved. The same logic applies to other gains whether economic or emotional. Disease-causing potions and love charms are common, and the more malevolent the curse upon one's numerous enemies the better, for the successful person is the one who holds the greatest power to harm others. Suspicion of others runs to paranoid lengths in these villages where others possess so many terrifying weapons that can be used to call down every form of disease, misfortune, or even death upon those who are not constantly watchful with whatever antidotes are available.

The most potent and terrible curse is the *Vada* which, if carefully planned and properly invoked, can strike the Dobuan to the ground, where, writhing and incontinent, he suffers agonies which end in wasting away and death. This is the extreme form of malevolence which illustrates the lengths to which Dobuan suspicion and terror can be carried.

Dobuan economic exchanges are also carried on with a passion that partakes of the same treacherous character as that which predominates in the marital, agricultural, and other life activities of the villages. The Dobu, ardently striving for success and, equally ardently, resenting the success of others, sees putting something over on someone the highest

goal which can be achieved in bartering. Since a successful harvest of yams must be gathered surreptitiously (lest those whose yams were seduced should take retaliatory action in the form of incantations and curses), sharp dealing is the only public means of displaying economic prowess.⁸

Life in Dobu fosters extreme forms of animosity and malignancy which most societies have minimized by their institutions. Dobuan institutions, on the other hand, exalt them to the highest degree. The Dobuan lives out without repression man's worst nightmares of the ill-will of the universe and according to his view of life, virtue consists in selecting a victim upon whom he can vent the malignancy alike to human society and the powers of nature. All existence appears to him as a cut-throat struggle in which deadly antagonists are pitted against one another in a contest for each one of the goods of life. Suspicion and cruelty are his trusted weapons in the strife, and he gives no mercy as he asks none.

The Kwakiutl. In contrast to the Pueblo Indians of the southwest, as illustrated by the Zuni, the tribes of the northwest coast of America were Dionysian in their approach to the mysteries of life. The Kwakiutl strove for ecstasy and freedom from the restraints of everyday life in their religious ceremonies. Initiates into religious societies, under the aegis of supernatural patrons, engaged in orgiastic attempts to transcend the ordinary world of experience and achieve entry, if only briefly, into the world forbidden to ordinary mortals. The extreme illustration of this practice is provided by the initiate into the cannibal society, the highest ranking of the various religious societies. The cannibalism of the Kwakiutl was, as Benedict says, "at the furthest remove from the epicurean cannibalism of many tribes of Oceania or the customary reliance upon human flesh in the diet of many tribes of Africa." The eating of human flesh was, on the contrary, viewed with a repugnance so extreme that its practice was regarded as the ultimate achievement of Dionysian penetration into the realm of the forbidden.

The Dionysian ideal was present not only in their religious performance but also in this extreme form in their other major life activities. They are at the opposite pole from the Apollonian Zuni in the way they attempted to structure their life experiences so that they could achieve success in the manipulation of property and wealth in such a way as to bring personal glory to themselves. This great emphasis upon status

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

dictated that a great share of their life activity was directed toward the megalomaniacal goal of setting oneself up at a higher prestige level than others.

At a very early age any Kwakiutl who had any expectancy of occupying important statuses in later, adult life entered the competitive race. Preparation for marriage consisted of accumulating wealth, through borrowing from relatives, at exorbitant rates of interest, and through trading, so that the great economic venture of marriage could be entered into with the greatest possible advantage. A down payment validated the transaction and the greater the price paid for the bride the more prestige accrued to the groom-purchaser and his clan. The procedure was not without its material advantages for the groom, however, since the bride's father in turn transferred many prerogatives and wealth to his daughter's husband in return for the children resulting from the marriage.

The social organization of the Kwakiutl was divided into the *sacred* and the *secular* structures which were sharply divided by the weather cycle. In the summer the secular organization governed their life activities. This was the time when conditions for the acquisition of wealth were more advantageous—the time for hunting, fishing, berry-picking, and the like, the property rights to all of which were jealously guarded. In the winter the whole congeries of prestige systems appropriate to the summer, the titles of nobility and other secular rankings, were laid aside and the winter regime of religious ranking obtained. Status in the one was associated with status in the other organization, however, and one's relative ranking was usually comparable in the secular and the sacred structures. Instead of ranking according to one's titles and material wealth, the winter rankings had as their basis the power of the spirits who initiated one into the supernatural societies. One's earthly lineage was usually a guarantee of this supernatural patronage.

This concern with titles of nobility, material possessions, and status in supernatural societies⁹

. . . lays bare the mainspring of their culture. They use them in a contest in which they sought to shame their rivals. Every individual, according to his means, constantly vied with all others to out distance them in distributions of property. The object of all Kwakiutl enterprise was to show oneself superior to one's rivals. All the motivations they recognized centered around the will to superiority. Their social organization, their

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

economic institutions, their religion, birth, and death were all channels for its expression.

Chiefs might even display such extravagance as to leave them impoverished in public demonstrations, called *potlatches*, wherein rivals made ostentatious displays of giving away or destroying wealth for the purpose of humiliating the opponent unable to match these extravagant displays. Even though stripped of wealth, outdoing the rival brought unparalleled prestige. As mentioned previously, the material goods thus given away or destroyed in the potlatch had been painstakingly accumulated through bartering, borrowing, or through the payments of the father-in-law for the issue of the marriage. But there was a means even greater in honor for the accumulation of wealth. This was through the killing of another and coming into property rights to his goods and titles as a consequence of the act. By setting oneself up as a religious practitioner one could also charge for magic services rendered, and the healing arts were, consequently, in the hands of those sharp enough to convince others of their powers. The successful shaman was able to compete from this additional vantage point in the tribal struggle for superiority.

The society was characterized at every point by megalomaniacal needs for individual greatness and derogatory attitudes toward rivals. "They recognized only one gamut of emotion, that which swings between victory and shame." Death of a member was a matter of shame for the family, and the prompt beheading of a member of another family could stave off the shame and leave the other family with the occasion for mourning. When such an aggressive outlet for frustration is not open to the Kwakiutl, the recourse is to sulking and even to suicide which was relatively common. Ego security seemed to be to the Kwakiutl the only emotional problem life afforded.

Evaluation. From these analyses of culture and personality in the three primitive societies of the Zuni, the Dobu, and the Kwakiutl observations were made which laid the foundation for later investigations of the same general nature. Also many questions were raised which found convincing answers within the *Patterns of Culture* study itself.

From this study and from other pioneering attempts it became clear that societies do not have merely "strange" assortments of cultural traits, but that each culture has a distinct set of goals and means of pursuing these goals toward which persons in that society may bend their efforts. From this fact followed certain observations which later became the

questions posed in culture and personality research. Another question left dangling in Benedict's study, but which she fully recognized as a problem, is the question of societies which do not display this complete integration of culture patterns. Further, what are the processes by which personality is shaped to culture? Another important question relates to the extent to which we may generalize or carry over her findings to the question of the relationship of culture and personality in *modern complex societies* which offer a picture of only the loosest integration of many subcultures into a total whole. We shall address ourselves to these questions in the remainder of this chapter.

These questions are both sociological and psychological in nature. Both social structure and individual personality can apparently be shaped to the deeper values which permeate the culture. Timewise these values precede the individual, and his acquaintance with them begins in infancy and early childhood when pluripotential and malleable human nature is most adaptable to the cultural mold. "It is obvious that the sum of all the individuals in Zuni make up a culture which is beyond and above what those individuals have willed and created. The group is fed by tradition. It is time-binding."

Just as the Apollonian Zuni is the ideal man of his society, so is the Dionysian Kwakiutl the embodiment of culturally approved norms. A highly individualistic Zuni, as we have seen, would be maladjusted and his society would have no means of coping with him except to punish him as a sorcerer. This Zuni brand of "sorcerer" for the non-conformist is the ideal self-image of the well-adjusted Dobu whose greatest passion is to excel in the arts of magic and sorcery. Personality adjustment must therefore, in part at least, be considered in relation to the cultural norms of those to whom falls the task of judging him as "normal" or "queer."

One issue that is often raised concerns the extent to which biological bases produce different behaviors from group to group. Benedict, for the practical purpose of focusing upon cultural difference and its significance for personality, proceeded as if "human temperament were fairly constant in the world," as if all societies contained equivalent proportions of biological variations upon human nature. This practical working assumption has some justification, especially since in her own study the Kwakiutl striving for Dionysian experience contrasts so sharply with the measured Zuni Apollonian outlook, this difference in personality could not be biological in basis as both of these North American Indian

societies are of the same "racial stock." Another support for this assumption derives from the fact that the same racial group may, over time, go through extensive culture change. Thus, for Benedict's study, biological factors were irrelevant but, of course, always present as the substrate of the cultural behavior being studied.

For an understanding of human behavior it is rather the social forms, the institutions, of a society which tell us what behavior alternatives are provided in that society. Personality develops along the lines which are suggested by those institutions. The potential contained in human nature is vast and a given culture uses only a small portion of this "arc of human potential." This fact has been illustrated only by the three tribes studied. It is extremely improbable that these three societies present in the form of the modal personalities of the Zuni, the Dobu, and the Kwakiutl all the alternatives of the human potential. And within the institutional alternatives provided (for example, revenge as a substitute for mourning), cultural configurations present even more variations among societies (the Dobu, in effect, punishes the surviving spouse while the Kwakiutl punished, by beheading one of its members, a rival clan).

Thus, it becomes apparent from Benedict's study (and substantiated by other ethnological studies, Malinowski and others) that social *institutions and cultural configurations* as they pattern the major drives of a people are responsible for a deeper impress upon behavior than universal parent-child processes. This challenge to orthodox psychoanalytic dogma doubtless helped to stimulate cross-cultural studies by analytically oriented psychiatrists and ethnologists which are considered at a later point in this present chapter.

From all this analysis it would seem that the conclusions from Benedict's study add up to support for a cultural determinism which allows no play for other factors than culture in the emergence and development of personality. The purpose of the study was simply to drive home the message of the importance of a society's goals and means of achieving these goals, in the behavior of any member of that society. The uniqueness of individual experience within the culture was "understood" and, like biological variation, was assumed to be distributed randomly.

Cultural Themes and Personality. Using as his main source his own study of the Chiracahua Apache,¹⁰ Morris E. Opler developed a method

¹⁰ Morris E. Opler, *An Apache Life-way*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1941.

of cultural analysis in which there is not so much reliance upon the notion of cultural integration as there was in the Benedict study. As Benedict herself had noted, her scheme of analysis was limited in its application to those cultures which had developed a high degree of integration, as the Kwakiutl with their core-integrating postulate of the desirability of high prestige or the Dobu with their permeating institutionalized hostility. The advantage of Opler's thematic approach is that it can be applied to every culture, no matter how integrated it may be. In the thematic approach, integration is conceived of in a different way in that every culture is an integration or equilibrium of its various cultural themes. This approach takes the view that in any culture there are a limited number of *themes*, postulates, or positions, declared or implied, normally controlling behavior or stimulating activity which is tacitly or openly approved in a society. As an illustration, one postulate of the Chiracahua Apache society is that *men are in every conceivable way superior to women*. For the Chiracahua this is true not only in the physical sense but greater intellectual and moral superiority is imputed to the male. The fact that predictions of the sex of an unborn child are that it will be a boy if the foetus is very active in the womb and that a relatively inactive foetus will probably be a girl supports this theme. Success for the Chiracahua comes through a high degree of activity—hence activity is associated with superiority. Chiracahua women join their menfolk in looking upon themselves as the weaker sex, excitable and unstable, more likely to do the wrong thing and thus more prone to create domestic or interfamilial strife, are assumed to have less will power, more easily tempted in regard to moral deviation, and consequently of less worth in general.

The social forms of the Chiracahua reflect this theme. All tribal leaders are men. Etiquette prescribes that women assume a respectful position behind men when walking with them. At feasts, places are reserved for the men but the women must eat wherever they can find a place. Male guests are served first. There is discrimination also in the ceremonial activities—women are excluded from the sweat lodges and from ceremonial impersonations of the supernatural spirits. A variety of taboos confront the menstruating woman while no such "impurity" is attached to male sexual functions. Even the recreational life of the society reflects the postulate of male superiority. Women are not supposed to sing the social dance songs and the grounds where the hoop

and pole game is being played are off-limits to women. There are no such exclusive practices for women.

Opler calls these translations of a theme into concrete conduct or belief *expressions*, "a term by which is designated the activities, prohibition of activities, or references which result from the acceptance or affirmation of a theme in a society. The expressions of a theme, of course, aid us in discovering it." The difference between themes and expressions and the culture pattern-integration idea of Benedict's is that thematic analysis is possible in all cultures whereas Benedict's is not.

Consider the Chiracahua. If this society were in the same category as the Zuni, the Dobu, or the Kwakiutl in terms of "integration" as defined in Benedict's study, we should expect that male dominance would permeate every aspect of the culture. The notion of integration in Opler's thematic analysis is that all societies have a number of themes which maintain an equilibrium of theme and countertheme, some themes supporting others and some themes countering and limiting others. Thus, in the Chiracahua society there are several such factors countering the theme of male dominance. Residence after marriage is matrilocal, and the groom becomes the willing and respectful laborer of his parents-in-law. Needless to say, this provides a strong means of retaliation in the event of husbandly abuse of their daughter. There is no female infanticide, puberty rites are important social events, and girls are as welcome as boys as additions to the Chiracahua household. The food which the woman gathers and prepares rivals in importance the products of the hunt, hence no restrictions are placed on her free movement in the food quest. Private property was exclusively personal since death was greatly feared and property associated with the dead must be removed with the dead. The women had and used as many objects as men, so it seems that there were no restrictions concerning property rights.¹¹

Without multiplying examples, it is not difficult to see that the theme of male superiority and female subordination could never become a pre-eminent note of Chiracahua culture unless decided shifts occurred in other aspects of the culture as well. It is apparent that the Chiracahua conception of the place of women and of the proper behavior of women in relation to men crosses other themes and expressions of themes and these act as limiting factors and moderating influences.

¹¹ Morris E. Opler, "Themes as Dynamic Forces in Culture," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1945, 51, p. 202.

Evaluation of Comparative Culture Studies. Nowhere in social science is there a more significant contribution than the comparative studies of culture. They have shown the great potential of human nature for adaptation to the widest possible range of social forms and for developing personality in socially rather than biologically given circumstances. In addition to pointing up that great human potential for cultural adaptation they have also, indirectly, indicated the *cultural necessities which human nature imposes*. In other words, the variety of culture forms, for example, of the family, monogamy and polygamy (in its alternate forms of polyandry and polygyny), is dazzling, but beneath the superficial appearance of unlimited variation one underlying principle remains firm. Wherever human beings live together in societies *some type* of family institution will exist to meet the conjugal needs of adults and to provide for the orderly procreation and socialization of the young.

Hence, while Dobu do not behave precisely the same as Kwakiutls and Comanches (even though of the same racial stock) do not act like Apaches, all of these peoples are more *fundamentally* like each other than they are different. Yet in terms of the differences between them one statement seems indicated from the comparative studies of culture. *If we know the culture which they represent we can predict with a high degree of accuracy what their behavior will be.* We could not predict with full accuracy as we have indicated earlier—unless of course we had full knowledge of the life experiences and the unique effect of these upon the individual in question. But, speaking broadly and allowing for individual deviations, we can describe *personality on a cultural basis* and specify how persons of *a given social environment* think, act, and feel. This is one side of the coin. On the other side of the same coin the activities of the behaving individuals when seen in the broadest perspective can be described as *a culture* without any specific reference to the individuals enacting it. Hence, ethnologists, in giving us descriptive monographs on the cultures of the multitude of primitive tribes, have performed a valuable service in providing us with these broad perspectives. A valid criticism, however, centers around one question—Yes, but *how* does there come to be this intimate connection between culture and personality? What, in effect, are the *processes* by which the biological human animal comes to be a culture bearer? What is the *psychology* of culture and personality? We do not mean to imply that ethnology has ignored this question. All who have drawn attention to the relationship between culture and personality have attempted to explain the “how”

of it, chiefly in terms of childhood experiences. Perhaps Linton's is still the most lucid of this type of explanation:¹²

It is generally accepted that the first few years of life are crucial for the establishment of the highly generalized value-attitude systems which form the deeper layers of personality content. The first realization of this fact came from the study of atypical individuals in our own society and the discovery that certain of their peculiarities seemed to be rather consistently linked with certain sorts of atypical childhood experiences. The extension of personality studies to other societies in which both the normal patterns of child rearing and the normal personality configurations for adults were different from our own only served to emphasize the importance of very early conditioning. . . .

In societies in which the culture pattern prescribes absolute obedience from the child to the parent as a prerequisite for rewards of any sort, the normal adult will tend to be a submissive individual, dependent and lacking in initiative. Even though he has largely forgotten the childhood experiences which led to the establishment of these attitudes, his first reaction to any new situation will be to look to someone in authority for support and direction. . . .

Such examples could be multiplied indefinitely, but the above will serve to show the sort of correlations which are now emerging from the studies of personality and culture. These correlations reflect linkages of a simple and obvious sort, and it is already plain that such one-to-one relationships between cause and effect are in the minority. In most cases we have to deal with complex configurations of child-training patterns, which, as a whole, produce complex personality configurations in the adult. Nevertheless, no one who is familiar with the results which have already been obtained can doubt that here lies the key to most of the differences in basic personality type which have hitherto been ascribed to hereditary factors. The "normal" members of different societies owe their varying personality configurations much less to their genes than to their nurseries.

In other words, the comparative studies of culture take us as far as this:

1. Cultures differ widely.
2. These differences in culture are associated with differences in personality.
3. In some way or other the patterns of child nurture and training

¹² Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1945, pp. 141-143. By permission of Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.

are the means by which the culture patterns of adults are passed on to the young.

Studies support these generalizations. The literature is replete with illustrative and descriptive materials which amply testify to this. But the generalizations are of only the crudest sort and many refinements remain to be added. The question recurs that, granting, with Linton, that adults owe much of their personality "much less to their genes than to their nurseries," *what happens in the nursery* that this should be the case? Then, too, as Linton indicates, there are few "one-to-one" relationships such as being dominated by a parent and being submissive as an adult. Surely the complexity of adult behavior calls for a more complex explanation of predisposing factors of childhood. Finally, despite brilliant inferences of the relationship between personality and culture in primitive societies, how can these be meaningfully carried over to our modern complex society with its multitude of subcultures? These are problems to which Kardiner and others have addressed themselves. Since the basic difference between these investigators and those ethnologists who compiled the comparative culture studies is that their focus is upon the *psychological* processes involved in culture transmission, we have reserved for them the title of the "culture-and-personality" school, without losing sight of the valuable service performed by the ethnologists whose emphasis was more exclusively upon *culture*.

CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

The pioneering attempt to apply the technique of psychoanalysis to the study of societies was probably *The Individual and His Society*,¹³ by Kardiner and Linton. In a greatly improved fashion the later work, *The Psychological Frontiers of Society*,¹⁴ advances the method and the concepts of psychoanalysis even further in explaining the relationship between the social institutions and the personalities of the Comanche, the Alorese, and the people of Plainville, U.S.A. The Comanche and the Alorese were studied to provide comparisons of child-rearing practices among primitives. In studying the people of a small Kansas agricultural community (given the pseudonym of "Plainville") some at-

¹³ Abram Kardiner and Ralph Linton, *The Individual and His Society*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1939.

¹⁴ Abram Kardiner, *The Psychological Frontiers of Society*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945.

tempt is made to bridge the gap between the primitive and the modern worlds in terms of the relationship between culture and personality. In other words, small primitive "folk" societies and large mass-living "urban" societies constitute the two polarities of a continuum upon which a small rural community like Plainville would fall somewhere in the middle. Hence, to relate culture and personality in such a community is a start away from the complete absorption with primitives and a move toward the analysis of personality in modern society. This last-named type of investigation we shall consider in the concluding section of the chapter on national character.

Yet the prime purpose of *The Psychological Frontiers of Society* is the application of the Freudian analytical scheme to personality and culture in *any and all societies*. The three societies which Kardiner subjected to analysis had been studied intensively by the ethnologists Linton, DuBois, and West (a pseudonym for Carl Withers), participating in a seminar with Kardiner at Columbia University. These were, respectively, the Comanche, the Alorese, and the people of Plainville, U.S.A. While there are valuable bases for comparisons among these cultures we must keep in mind that their accessibility was the deciding factor in their choice so that they do not constitute a *sample* of cultures from which generalizations about all cultures can be made. Rather, they provide a basis for *illustrating* already conceived notions of Freud and of Kardiner, Linton, and others in the seminar.

Theoretical Framework—Basic Personality Structure. The study, however, did not rely exclusively on Freud's psychoanalytic conception but in great measure was a crystallization of various notions that had been "in the air" in ethnological circles for a decade or so. These half-formed hypotheses about culture and personality were arranged logically and, in a sense, put to the test in *Frontiers*. In the foreword of the study, written by Linton, the central conception of this group of investigators, the concept of *basic personality type*, is spelled out:¹⁵

It rests upon the following postulates:

1. That the individual's early experiences exert a lasting effect upon his personality, especially upon the development of his projective systems.
2. That similar experiences will tend to produce similar personality configurations in the individuals who are subjected to them.
3. That the techniques which the members of any society employ in the care and rearing of children are culturally patterned and will tend

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. vii

to be similar, although never identical, for various families within the society.

4. That the culturally patterned techniques for the care and rearing of children differ from one society to another.

If these postulates are correct, and they seem to be supported by a wealth of evidence, it follows:

1. That the members of any given society will have many elements of early experience in common.

2. That as a result of this they will have many elements of personality in common.

3. That since the early experiences of individuals differ from one society to another, the personality norms for various societies will also differ.

This thinking, of course, led to the concept of the basic personality type peculiar to each culture, or at least to the majority of people within each culture, since they have in common many childhood experiences. Their conception of personality is not as all embracing as the conceptions of general psychology and the psychology of personality. Rather, theirs is much like the conception of personality developed in this present textbook, i.e., in terms of the attitudes which an individual possesses which predispose him favorably or unfavorably toward objects and values in his social milieu. Hence, the term "*projective systems*," used extensively by Kardiner and Linton (see Linton's first postulate, above), can be translated into a social-psychological frame of reference. In the situation $A \rightleftharpoons B$, *A's definition of the situation* (as is *B's*, of course) is a projection of his previously acquired attitudes into the situation, as it were. His deepest experiences of childhood led to the development of his self-system, his values, and his hierarchy of wishes, *which are his projective systems* in Kardiner's terms. So his conceptions of his statuses and roles are dependent upon his generalized other, the product of previous social interactions. Unfortunately, this convergence of culture-and-personality study and the social-psychological focus does not extend to agreement upon *how* the individual acquired his projective systems. This interpretation, by the psychiatrist Kardiner, was and remains the chief weakness of this type of culture-and-personality study—the complete reliance upon the Freudian psychology, its basic assumptions and even more important, its method.

Method. Basically, the psychoanalytic technique is not adaptable to

research for several reasons. The main difficulty stems from the fact that the validity of the findings rests exclusively on the genius and skill of the psychoanalyst who is making the analysis. This reliance upon one individual, without recourse to replication studies and without making the data available for others to check and analyze, violates the basic tenets of scientific inquiry. Yet, as Kardiner points out in his preliminary discussions, the scientific psychologies are not appropriate for such new ventures as the analysis of tribes and nations. "Generalizations which codify the obvious are not techniques capable of yielding new information." Whatever we may think of the psychoanalytic method as a whole it provides a bold and sweeping way of summing up and characterizing persons and groups. Also, there are elements of the method which are not too disparate with the methods of social psychology and which provide some basis for evaluating the results, psychoanalytically derived, of culture-and-personality study.

The chief overlap of psychoanalytic and social-psychological methods lies in the fact that all psychoanalytic approaches are to some extent also life histories (see the *genetic* approach, p. 54), and we can, from the canons of scientific method applicable to the interview, case-history technique (such as they are), evaluate to some extent the validity of psychoanalytically derived findings. Again, we find ourselves in social psychology's usual position of heralding with interest a bold and exciting new area of inquiry, all the while with tongue in cheek because of the methodology which is always and necessarily primitive in such pioneering efforts. We can only say that the usual caveats apply even more strongly to the findings presented in this present chapter. Nevertheless, we can examine some of the relationships between the projective systems of individual Comanches, Alorese, and Plainvillers and the institutions of these societies for their suggestive worth without accepting uncritically the entire content of psychoanalysis.

The Comanche. Socialization process was examined in the light of the successive influences to which the individual was subjected in childhood. The parental role was seen to be limited in scope compared with its dominance as a factor in personality development in other societies. Parental responsibility for the young ended after the first adult activities of the youth, such as the first hunt in which the youth participated. Yet parental influence, of course, was seen to be of profound and ongoing importance for the youth's projective systems. There were few taboos surrounding the biological aspects of child bearing, children were loved

and wanted, the child-rearing processes were unambiguous and free of contradiction, and the atmosphere of childhood was free of undue anxiety or hostility toward the parents. Childhood was, indeed, a relatively tension-free apprenticeship for adulthood. The necessity for repressing strong drives was slight, hence there was a dearth of fantasy and daydreaming among the young. The Comanche was raised to deal with the problems of the outer world and not to deal with problems of the inner life such as anxieties and fears.

The institutional life of the Comanche centered around the roles of the young, with more significance attaching to the roles of the male rather than the female. Yet the female also had fewer fears, anxieties, and tensions than females in societies where child rearing is more strict. Neither male nor female had severe security problems in a culture which stressed group accomplishment and cooperation. Yet individual personality was strong, at least for those who could satisfactorily perform the roles of young adulthood. Comanche cooperation did not stem from the banding together of the weak to accomplish what individuals could not. Rather, the strong competitive element of the culture was an important source of its cooperative activity; those most responsible for the community profits received the greatest share of them.

Only the old had security problems when they were no longer able to perform the normal adult roles. The restrictions imposed by other societies were, in Comanche, secondary to praise and rewards, and the great emphasis placed on *activity* there meant that those who were no longer able to be active faced adjustment problems. Hence, the dominant interest of the Comanche was in the strong and enterprising young adult (an interest which is readily understood in the light of its history as a swashbuckling, cavalier society), and this interest polarized its institutional life—it was advanced on the one hand by child-rearing practices which permitted the development of strong personalities and on the other by an institutional nexus which rewarded them.

The Alorese. They are a diseased people on a small island in the Netherlands East Indies, about 600 miles from Java. Unlike the Comanche, the people of Alor were never and are not now a warlike or especially active society. Neither strength nor skill are highly prized, hence, also unlike the Comanche, a greater amount of time is spent in the management of anxiety than upon action upon the outer world.

The child-rearing practices impose severe psychic burdens upon individuals which in turn impose such burdens upon the social order

that, though ancient, it survives tenuously. In this regard Kardiner says that "a culture which sacrifices adequate maternal care for infants to other interests starts a cycle which never ends." Of this, the Alorese are an excellent example. The women assume charge of the subsistence economy and till the fields while their children receive at best only surrogate parentship. Only one of the Alorese biographies revealed any real affection of the child for such a substitute parent. The child-rearing situation is one of frustration for the mother and unstable roots for well-developed personality in the children. Thus the children grow up ill-equipped to carry out the cultural or group solution to the problem of survival in the environment.¹⁶

Female division of labor: women work fields, neglect children

↓ Maternal frustrations

Mistrust; unstable marriages

Lack of interest in outside world

Lack of constructive ability and systematization; no interest in crafts, absence of idealization, poor aesthetic development

Easy abandonment of hope and enterprise; religious ideologies, low standing of seers


↓ Reinforcement of repressed cravings for maternal protection: release through predatory trends; dominant value of financial competition

Thus Kardiner relates the "get something for nothing" attitude of the adult Alorese to the failure of the parental family to provide a climate in which the child receives the proper mother love and the mother releases maternal tensions through caring for the child. The assertion is also made that the Alorese are more religious because they are less self-sufficient than, for example, the Comanche who were somewhat religiously indifferent in many respects. This, of course, only holds true if religion is conceived of as a palliative to anxiety in dependent individuals, which, of course, restricts the concept to a very narrow and myopic usage. This and other projections of Freudian orthodoxy into Kardiner's analysis need not detain us, however, as our central concern is to note his relating of child-rearing practice to adult institutional participation and the social order. This relationship, for the people of Alor, he has made quite clear.

Plainville, U.S.A. For the people of Plainville, Kardiner's scheme of analysis as he had applied it to the Comanche, the Alorese, and other

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

primitive tribes required some augmentation. The main variables in his scheme were, as we have seen, simple:



It is not, he contended, that these basic steps are different for modern societies (of which Plainville can be considered a rudimentary type) but rather they become vastly more complicated. The complexity of modern cultures does not, however, produce an infinite variety of modern basic personality structures, but rather *Western man*, Hebrew and Christian, has one basic personality structure of which the German, the Frenchman, the Englishman, the Yankee, and other national and cultural representatives are *merely variations*. This is so, according to Kardiner, because in their projective systems Western men have attitudes to their father and mother which derive from the personifications of God the Father in the Judeo-Christian tradition and of the Virgin, St. Joseph, and other parental figures in the Catholic religion and in Protestant variations. The element of Freudian orthodoxy injected into the analysis here is, of course, but a variation on the Oedipus complex. But the analysis has interesting suggestive value and we can see Kardiner's analysis of Plainville folk as a step toward the conceptions of national character which follow.

West, in his original analysis of Plainville, had noticed that the "class system of Plainville provides natives with a master pattern for arranging according to rank every individual and every family, clique, club, lodge, church, and other association or organization in Plainville society." This master pattern is blueprinted in a diamond-shaped numerical distribution of the population according to social ranking. The greater the width of the diamond the more people are represented. Hence, the adult of Plainville is faced with problems of status, social class, and prestige, with the universal American emphasis upon success and the equally universal competition pattern which assures only part of the population even a modicum of "success." The high-status person has anxieties as does the low-status person who is striving:¹⁷

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 365.




FIG. 12. The social ranking system of Plainville, U.S.A. Reproduced with permission from James West, *Plainville, U.S.A.*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945.

This common goal, with varying capacities on the part of the individual to achieve it, makes for a social instability in so far as statuses cannot be inherited and because there is a constant turnover from underdog to overdog and vice versa. Another source of instability is that anxiety is mobilized on the part both of those who have status-prestige and of those who have not. Each will seek appropriate defenses for his respective position. That is, one side will seek measures to insure greater social mobility, the other to limit it.

It should be remembered that as representatives of a small, rural farming community the people of Plainville have these problems of adjustment to a status-prestige system to a lesser degree than in more modern urban communities. What is found to be true of Plainville is true, only more so, in larger cities. We can only conjecture about the emotional aspects of adjustment; they may be more intense for the person in the small community where social lines are more rigid and one is under the gaze of his "betters" or his "inferiors" during the course of a normal day. Nevertheless, the complexity of the adjustment to the urban society is unquestionably greater.

If adult social participation in Plainville society shows us something

of the problems of personal adaptation to modern social structure, then it is of great interest also to focus upon child-rearing processes there. Kardiner is especially concerned that we consider Plainville in this respect as a *base* upon which we can build generalizations about Western man. His starting point of analysis is that *Plainville infants receive good mothering*. The mothers are affectionate and take excellent care of the child's needs. As a consequence, there is a strong attachment to the mother and an idealization of her. This carries over to the father when the time arrives in the infant's development when the father's significance is recognized. Hence, infancy and early childhood are such pleasant stages that adjustments beyond those stages are made more difficult! Both the biological adjustments of growth and the social adjustments, i.e., the meeting of adult expectations, set up frustrations. Especially, and again allowance must be made for Freudian orthodoxy on the part of Kardiner, the psychiatrist, such frustrations center around the blocked action of sexual impulses.¹⁸

The blocked action system created in this domain may spread to all activity and introduce timidity, lack of enterprise, and anxiety. This constellation was identified by Freud as the Oedipus complex and represents the consequence of an anxiety situation caused by repressive mechanisms. The Oedipus complex is therefore the record of such a repressive process, not, as is commonly assumed, the cause of it.

But good mothering has consequences other than the blocked systems created by sexual and other restrictions. One of these is the stimulation of curiosity, the "desire to explore, create, invent, and investigate." This, together with the long dependence upon the parents, makes for educability in the young to a wide variety of cultural adaptations. Hence, the tensions resulting from the blocked systems, together with the capacity for idealization, results in instability of social forms. Plainville culture is breaking up as the success goal of the broader culture, through communication, becomes the dominant theme of Plainville life activity.

Despite the fact that there are areas where the focus of social psychology and the focus of psychoanalysis have no overlapping elements in common, there are elements of convergence in social-psychological theory and the "culture-and-personality" approach. The two approaches to personality are *genetic*. The emergence of personality is traced back to patterns of mothering and child rearing. The personality of the adult

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 374.

is related to these on the one hand and to adult role systems ("the situation") on the other. The self-system in both foci can be seen as an antianxiety system (at least in modern man). The focus of social psychology places the *interacting* individual in the foreground, however, and relegates to the background the biological concepts which play such an important role in psychoanalytic conceptions. Hence, in this present textbook, the question of individual participation in modern middle-class social structure (the relationship of middle-class culture and personality) recurs constantly and is the central theme of the concluding chapter. It should be understood, however, that the guiding reason for including material in this present chapter is that the data were gathered under the focus and method of ethnology and were analyzed under the focus and method of psychoanalysis, which is of marginal but not central significance for social psychology. This applies even to the studies of modern societies where such foci and methods were employed.

National Character. We began this chapter with a quotation from Kluckhohn and Murray's *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture* and it is altogether fitting that we should conclude it with a quotation from the introduction to the same work:¹⁹

Most of the book is given over to the topic of personality formation because it is here that one sees most clearly how intricate and manifold are the connections between an individual's physique and the press of his total environment (ecological, biological, social, and cultural). . . . The most basic contribution of these studies is precisely that of helping us to understand other peoples—and ourselves. Insofar as one gains some knowledge of the variety of personality types in the world and of universal psychological processes, cross-cultural tolerance and genuine communication become possible. All research in this field is in the last analysis directly or indirectly oriented to one central type of question: What makes an Englishman an Englishman? An American an American? A Russian a Russian?

The obviously vital nature of the task, in the light of international tensions and world unrest, makes doubly meaningful the question of how far advanced our understanding is of such questions as these. Seldom are the theoretical problems of a science so gravely and directly related to practical problems of human living. *Patterns of Culture* was a promising start, especially in the light of Opler's corrective emphasis upon themes. But, as we have said, the *developmental* aspects of per-

¹⁹ Kluckhohn and Murray, *op. cit.*, p. xviii.

sonality were untouched in that type of culture configuration study, no matter how valuable and insightful from the ethnological point of view. The b.p.s. (a widely used abbreviation of basic personality structure) construct has a great deal of promise and it appears in the analysis of nations as *modal personality*, *national character*, and the like. Yet it remains unduly influenced by Freudian orthodox (despite protests to the contrary) biological assumptions of man's nature and his needs and desires.

Admittedly tentative gropings toward more solid theoretical formulations, such characterizations as Gorer's of the Russian adult personality as profoundly influenced by the child-rearing practice of wrapping infants in swaddling clothes (thus inhibiting masturbation and producing tensions), or Dicks's treatment of the Russian character as "oral" with a strong need for maternal affection, love, security, oral gratification, and response in social situations (all related to patterns of nursing and weaning infants), illustrate the sweeping, daring, yet unsupported and unscientific nature of such conceptions at the present time. As interesting attempts at modifying Freud's concepts to apply to national character analysis several such works are cited in the suggested readings for this chapter. Their basic methodological and conceptual weaknesses qualify them as nothing more than "shots in the dark." It is hardly worth mentioning that it is not to be held against them that they fixate on sex, but rather that they fixate on *any one* aspect of human life and attempt in terms of it to describe the whole.

Scientific theories of learning, of perception, of motivation, of personality development, of socialization, and enculturation soundly conceived and thoroughly tested are the only solid alternatives to such imaginative speculations. Until such time as these are a part of man's weapons against social problems, such as hostility between nations, we can only rely on such intuitive insights. It is probable also that we shall never be able to speak of the American character or of any other character on a national scale without specifying *social class* (which Kardiner introduces as a required new dimension when switching from primitive to modern frames of reference) and the *differential child-rearing patterns of varying social classes*, a subject left dangling by Kardiner which we shall discuss in the next chapter. Then, too, even if all that could be known about nation (culture) or region (subculture) and personality were known, we should still not know the personality in full, without,

as we have said, taking into consideration the life experiences and the uniqueness of the *man*.

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- Firth, Raymond: *We, the Tikopia*, 2d ed., London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1957. Preface and chap. 1 contain excellent insight on the methods of ethnology.
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Chapter 12

LIFE EXPERIENCES IN AGE GROUPS

Of the three interactive variables which social psychology analyzes to throw light on personality (biological constitution, culture, and life experiences) the most universally patterned, fixed, and "determined" is, of course, the biological constitution. Man is born but to die, as the expression goes. Birth begins a long series of biological developments which ultimately end in decline of the organism and its death. Infancy, childhood, preadolescence, adolescence, young adulthood, adulthood, senescence, and death are universal stages of the physical life cycle to which every individual is subject (provided, of course, that he survives long enough) and with which every tribe or society must come to grips. Yet, the physical cycle is taken up into and absorbed in culture so that each stage of the cycle has a social definition peculiar to the society which so defines it. In some societies infancy encompasses only a brief period of time; in other societies it is extended well into what is considered childhood elsewhere. Speaking physiologically the male and female members of every society have a preadolescence and an adolescence but the *stormy upheaval* which many in our society consider an essential characteristic of puberty and adolescence is lacking in many other societies. The transition from childhood to adulthood is accomplished so smoothly that for all practical purposes it is as if adolescence does not exist in those societies. Hence, it is quite clear that culture mediates the stages of physical development and decline and, of course, their meaning for the individual will derive from the cultural definition of them rather than from the physical changes themselves. The biological is always present as a limiting and facilitating in-

fluence in social life, however, and must constantly be taken into account.

In considering age groups in this chapter then we shall have to take into account as a minimum the biological aspects of and the social roles assigned to each stage of the life cycle. Our social-psychological focus demands also that we consider the *interacting individual* as he learns and adjusts himself to his biological changes on the one hand and the social definitions of them on the other. Hence, for each stage of the life cycle we shall consider (1) *the biological aspects*, (2) *the social roles*, and (3) *the learning and adjustment* which occur in the particular stage.

Before proceeding to this task, however, let us consider briefly what the present chapter can contribute to our understanding of personality. We have examined in previous chapters the workings of the biological organism, its modifications through learning, the uniquely human qualities of self-consciousness and motivation, and the molding of man in culture. Shall we in the present chapter exhaust all of the possibilities for probing into the development of personality? The answer is no, of course, because we leave to the psychologist and the psychiatrist the task of understanding the unique personality, that is, of *this* man, not just of some men or of men in general. We leave to the philosopher and the theologian the task of understanding man's nature and his destiny. And even with these limitations in our scope recognized, we still have further limitations *within* our legitimate focus, in areas where insufficient research has been accomplished or where the thing we are trying to explain is so complicated that we must deliberately limit our attention to one aspect of it in order, at least, to understand that aspect well. In analyzing the experiences, both biological and social, which occur in the various physiological age stages of man a more complete analysis than we shall attempt would necessarily include differences in these stages as defined in *primitive* and *modern* societies. The absence of printed language and the more fundamental and functional education of the savage youth mean that his age stages will differ radically from those of modern youth. Having made this distinction between primitives and moderns, we should then also distinguish between the various *social classes* of modern society since it is a well known fact that child rearing, socialization, and social definitions of age groups differ from class to class. Obviously, whole volumes could be devoted to the subject, as some of the titles in the suggested readings indicate, and it is necessary

to delimit the subject to its most meaningful aspect in order that we might accomplish the most in the present chapter. While occasional references are made to primitives in the present chapter and some more systematic comparisons between folk and modern man are made in Chapter 16, our only systematic reference in the present chapter is to modern man. Even fewer references are made to the upper and lower classes—uniformly we shall be discussing age groupings in terms of the American middle class. The reasons for this are that the middle-class values permeate our culture; to the extent that there is an “American culture,” it is made up of American middle-class traits. This kind of thinking about social class in America, in many ways well justified, has led the social psychologist to concentrate heavily upon the middle class in his research. Even if we should wish to do so, we would have difficulty studying upper and lower classes because less data are available on these classes. Let us turn our attention to the biological aspects of infancy, to the social roles assigned to infants in the middle class, and to the middle-class infant’s learning and adjustment within these roles.

INFANCY

Biological Aspects

Beginning life as a simple cell, the bodily organism becomes sufficiently differentiated in the uterine environment to exist outside of it. The human infant ranks extremely low on the animal ladder with regard to the ability to care for itself at birth. Not only is the human infant helpless but he is even only partly ready to adapt to being cared for! This “finishing off” of the development begun before birth occurs during the *neonate* phase, the first few weeks of life of the newborn full-term child. During this period the highly flexible neural system of the infant achieves a rudimentary coordination between the various body systems. Those receptors and effectors which were not previously functional for the organism begin to be conditioned for an immediate or ultimate function. This conditioning is largely, but not exclusively, a function of *internal* changes. The respiratory, circulatory, digestive, and eliminative systems achieve a functional interrelationship through the medium of the nervous system. Hence, the neonate period is the bridge between uterine life and life in the outside world.

Increasing physiological modification of the infant as the consequence

of *external* factors is noticeable at four weeks, the end of the neonate phase.¹

He manifestly attends to the sensations of gastric well-being which suffuse him after a meal; and to the massive warmth of a bath. Sometimes he immobilizes with interest as he regards the face of his mother. His emotional patterns are very simple, if we may judge by the general impassiveness of his physiognomy. Nevertheless, he reacts positively to comforts and satisfactions; negatively to pain and denials. He cries. He listens. Occasionally small throaty sounds emerge from his larynx.

In all these behavior tokens we see the germs of language, of sociality, perception, intelligence, body posture, and even locomotion. The neuro-motor system is organizing apace. The mind is growing.


Whenever the "small throaty sounds" emerging from his larynx become articulate speech, we might say that infancy ends and childhood begins. The reasons for this somewhat arbitrary choice of a dividing point between infancy and childhood are twofold: the physiological changes begin to slow down from their fast pace of infant development to the longer, slower development of childhood, foundations are laid in infancy upon which childhood builds slowly and well; second, from the socio-psychological point of view the interaction between mother and infant prior to the rise of speech in the infant is only a rudimentary empathic process, true social interaction is *symbolic* and excepting for a few autistic inventions of the mother and child the relationship involves sympathy and crude communication but no true "conversation" of attitudes by the means of symbols. We shall return to this later under the infant's "learning and adjustment," but of special note here are some additional physiological features of infancy as related to the *cry*. The very rapid weight increase and the tremendous volume of physicochemical growth and differentiation into structure point up the enormity, as it were, of the infant's needs. One need only imagine doubling one's own weight in six months, tripling it in a year and then gaining three to five pounds the second year to get some idea of the scope of physical activity involved. The cry plays an important role in all of this—the first cry brings aid and succeeding cries bring food, relief from such things as irritation, pain of various sorts, temperature extremes, mere vague discomfort. As in Plainville, U.S.A., the mothering in the Ameri-

¹ Arnold Gesell and Frances L. Ilg, *The Child from Five to Ten*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1946, p. 46.

can middle class is good and the mother is very sensitive to the cry, so the infant is not without the physical means of communicating (if the term is not overextended in that context) his needs.

Social Roles

Thus, with the child's cry and the mother's response a role system is enacted and it is within this $A \rightleftharpoons B$ (where A is the infant and B the mother) interactional situation that some of the important foundations of A 's personality are laid. Some of the mother's behavior in her role is, of course, due to her particular temperament and personality (see the discussion of personal-social differences, page 8), but much is imposed by the dictates of role systems which derive from the broader culture. In many ways the content of infant-mother interaction is structured by such role systems.



We shall have more to say about other aspects of the father's role in relation to the child, but here we are speaking of the role systems into which the child is born that relate him through his family to the social world outside the family. These are the roles that "lie in wait" for him, as it were. Early in the chapter we decided to confine our discussion to the role systems of the American middle class. Let us explore the significance of having been born into the middle class in terms of the reactions and expectations of others in the family vis-à-vis the infant, which in turn can be viewed as the roles within which he must accomplish his learning and achieve an adjustment. That these reactions and expectations differ from social class to social class is well known to sociologists.

Unlike the upper-class family where clannish ties are often bound up in family name (as for example, the Cabots and the Lodges), the middle-class family is a nuclear unit of father, mother, and dependent (unmarried) children. Unlike the lower-class family, the nuclear middle-class family is small in size. This is not to say that relatives are

necessarily very far away and that visiting is rare, but rather, that the situation where other relatives live under the same roof is relatively rare. *The mother is on her own* in the small nuclear family. Further, there is little tradition to guide the middle-class family; it is independent, free of kinship ties, and wants to be a part of the next social segment above it (upwardly mobile) rather than in its present segment or (even more to be avoided) in the social segment immediately below it, where one or the other, or both, of the parents may have spent their childhood. Great stress is placed on education and the middle-class mother has the added competency of having had, at least more probably than in the upper-class family, some kind of outside employment. The mother's being on her own, her education, and her competency add up to a great interest in "scientific child care."²

They strive to be intellectual about their parenthood, reading special magazines and articles in newspapers and women's magazines written for parents by educators, physicians, and child psychologists. They compose child study groups, listening to specialists in child training; and they are the bulwark of the Parent-Teacher Associations. . . . They attempt to follow not only what the specialist tells them is the correct way to feed or train their children; but also to understand some of the theories that underlie the advice. Thus, they often attempt to curb their natural impulses to love and caress or to mete out swift punishment, in order to conform to the current theories of child training. . . . In the middle class, each young couple in their independent isolation must learn anew what can be expected of children and how parents should react to the abilities and deficiencies, the goodness or badness of their children.

Unlike the savage child who "belongs" to his totem or clan, the American middle-class infant "belongs" to his parents, and their reactions to him are crucially important; *their* emotional needs and responses, *their* commands have a far greater significance than in a primitive society where one belongs to many others. In middle-class society, the parent-child roles include:

B—the mother role

1. primary function—love and affection
2. secondary function—"scientific" child rearing

B—the father role

1. primary function—instrumental
2. secondary function—love and affection

² Ruth Shonle Cavan, *The American Family*, New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1956, p. 163.

For the infant the following interactional situations are possible:

$A \rightleftharpoons B$ (where B is the mother)	Dominated by (1) love and affection or (2) "scientific care" depending upon the "make up" of the mother
$A \rightleftharpoons B$ (where B is the father)	Dominated by (1) teaching the proper conduct or (2) love and affection depending upon the "make up" of the father
$A \rightleftharpoons B$ (where B is other than a parent)	Dominated by love and affection since middle-class independence of nuclear family precludes any "interference"

Our outline, of course, requires some explanation. The father does not, upon bringing the infant home from the hospital, impress upon it the need for successfully competing with other infants—but he does this as soon as the infant has developed sufficiently for bowel and bladder training and antimasturbatory and antithumbsucking discipline. His and the mother's anxiety over these matters stem from different sources. The mother's anxiety stems more from mother love, and the father's anxiety arises more from fear that his child might not be normal and hence, ultimately, not successful. The father's reactions of love and affection to the child are importantly modified by this type of anxiety, as are the mother's to a much lesser extent. We shall return to this nuclear family role system when we consider childhood, below.

Learning and Adjustment

It seems rather clear that the infant has no self-system but that self as we have defined it appears with childhood at about age two. This is not to say that he is not motivated during the first two years of life nor that the rudimentary beginnings were not then laid, because this is almost certainly the case. The motivation and learning of the infant are at a lower level than that of the child. Here, indeed, is the stage when we can speak of the "organism in environment" in physiological terms. Yet, even here, it is necessary to make certain qualifications:³

The infant develops patterns of behavior through maturation which enable him to take greater advantage of environmental opportunities and to improve his adjustment to the many stimuli that fall upon his sense

³ Richard Dewey and W. J. Humber, *The Development of Human Behavior*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1951, p. 259.

organs. The fact that the child's maturation of behavior patterns involves higher nervous centers means that he is not imprisoned in unlearned, stereotyped behavior characteristic of the instincts of lower organisms. The human infant develops behavior patterns which are consistent with his structure and function but which do not so restrict him that he cannot adapt, modify, and improve by exercise, education, and insight the use he makes of his unlearned basic behavior.

But here there should be a caution on the caution. Such "exercise, education, and insight" seems to be effective only after about age one. The evidence from cross-cultural comparisons of infants seems to corroborate "the view that the characteristics of infancy are universal and that culture overlays or modifies a more basic substratum of behavior."⁴

This physiological substratum is extremely sensitive to and profoundly influenced by its environment, of course, and the apparently universal behavior patterns of infants up until age one does not rule out the influence of the interpersonal circumambient atmosphere as an influence on the infant's development. It is rather that, universally, a "mothering" person must be provided or the child will not survive. Further, this mothering role must include not merely a bare minimum of custodial care but rather *must be elaborated over and beyond mere reactions to the infant's physical needs*. There must be identification with the infant, sympathy, and concern with it, in a word, there must be *empathy* on the part of the mother. The rhythmic motion of the pregnant woman's body as she walks with her peculiar gait foreshadows the intimate complementariness of mother-infant relationship as the foetus takes on a position imposed by the gait. So it is with the infant's psychic structure during the first two years of life and, of course, beyond. There is a subtle mode of communication between mother and infant that often defies analysis. Nonverbal facial and postural gestures both of mother and of infant often convey meanings which are not understood by others.

If a machine could be devised which could care for all of the bodily needs of the infant it seems unlikely that the infant thus "cared for" would develop a personality. It is through the personifications of these experiences of "good mother" and "bad mother" that the self-system arises, as will be recalled from the discussion on page 223. And, of course, from "good me" and "bad me" ultimately develop the "generalized other." Hence, infant care by the mother is of profound importance for

⁴ Wayne Dennis, "Does Culture Appreciably Affect Patterns of Infant Behavior?" *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1940, 12, p. 307.

the development of personality both in infancy and childhood and as these influences remain as vestiges in adult life. Nevertheless, the striking and dramatic developments of infancy are no more significant than the seemingly more prosaic developments of childhood.

CHILDHOOD

Biological Aspects

Physiologically the organic growth patterns of childhood are stable and predictable, and psychologically habit patterns seem to develop similarly. It is common to contrast the quiet stable period of childhood with the turbulence of adolescence on that basis, yet such comparisons should not be made on the basis of biological factors. The social roles of childhood and learning and adjustment within these roles are not so much the source of confusion and contradiction as are these factors for adolescents. Physiologically, childhood is a period when the striking gains of infancy are assimilated (and we do not refer here merely to weight gains, but also to the gaining of control over the other bodily systems by the nervous system), so that the child's actions and thoughts, earlier vague, undifferentiated, and global, become more precise, coordinated, and specific. It is a period, of course, of genital dormancy, but otherwise the general developmental pattern, with wide individual differences, is toward over-all development of the organism.

Social Roles

The social roles of childhood are much more complex than those of infancy, and the possibilities for conflicting roles are much greater. Recalling that the role system within the nuclear family prescribes affection and care for the child by the mother and a more directive and guiding role for the father, in childhood there is added to this role nexus the roles in *sibling* and *peer groups*. Let us contrast the features of these roles. As we have said, the infant in the middle class "belongs" to the father and mother. Their emotional needs for affection and response, their anxieties and fears underlie their treatment of the infant. The things they instruct the infant to do are things which they *need* for the child to do. Early in childhood, however, other role systems, with other sources of compulsion for the child and other sources of authority, assume strong proportions in the child's behavior. The first such possi-

bility, of course, would be the interactional systems which encompass the child and his brothers and sisters. *Ordinal position in the family*, that is, whether the child is first, last, the middle child, and so on, has been much studied by social psychologists, and we shall consider it under "learning and adjustment." In the small nuclear family, there is a good chance of being the "only" child, in which case, of course, there are no sibling roles to be considered. But even where there are only a few siblings the number of role patterns is large, since, as one family sociologist has put it: "The addition of each person to a family or primary group increases the number of persons in simple arithmetical progression and the number of personal relations in the order of triangular numbers."⁵ Thus, in addition to the roles assigned to the infant which we described above in the relation to the father, mother, and other adults, there are also roles which order a child's relationship to the other children in the family. The first child of several will be "the baby," of course, only to the parents, while the second and succeeding children will also be "the baby" to the first born, who may comparatively soon become "Mama's big boy" or, if a girl, a "little mother" to the others. The youngest, of course, is "the baby" to all of the others in the family, sometimes ordering the relationships between this child and the others well into adult life.

But the sibling roles, while of profound importance for the learning and adjustment of the child, as we shall see, fall under the dominance of the parents—they comprise a pattern superimposed upon the role relationships of parent and child. An entirely different set of child role relationships may and often does arise spontaneously in the peer groups of neighborhood children:⁶

When given the opportunity, children have something of their own society—a fact that adults tend to overlook. It consists of local myths, legends, games, and modes of conduct, local child "heroes"—not the least of which is the bully—and local objects of unveiled contempt—the "fair-haired boy" or the sissy of the neighborhood. . . . Associated with these cultural elements of child society are the loyalties, the mores, and the practices that arise from gang plan and often contrast sharply with adult standards.

⁵ James H. Bossard, "The Law of Family Interaction," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1945, 50, p. 292.

⁶ Richard T. LaPiere and Paul R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology*, 3d ed., New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1949, p. 135.

This child society has its institutions and its means of social control. The emphasis upon good mothering in the infancy of the middle-class child is so great that we often tend to overlook the fact that the child has other desires, "wishes" to be satisfied, than merely the need for security which the mother usually satisfies at least moderately well. The wishes for new experience, response, and recognition motivate children (together, of course, with the purely physical release of tension which play provides) to social participation in peer groups and often these group memberships have a stronger claim on the emotions of the child than do the relationships with adults. As a consequence, the "rules of the game," the role prescriptions governing behavior in play situations, have a great significance for the personality of the child.

In summary, the role systems of the child are vastly more complicated than those of the infant. In addition to his role relations with his father and mother he is involved in sibling relationships and in peer group "societies." For the sake of simplifying our presentation of the learning and adjustment problems of childhood let us consider first those inside the family and those outside of it. In addition to helping us with an orderly presentation, it should also help to highlight the areas where the two role systems, the familial and the play group, are in conflict with one another.

Learning and Adjustment

In the family, when viewed as an arena of interacting personalities, we can observe the most significant interpersonal relations for the development of personality in young children. There are five main reasons, as summarized by Waller and Hill,⁷ why the family is so important in the life of the individual, and we must particularly note that childhood stands out much more importantly than infancy as the list of reasons develops.

1. *The family affects the individual first.* This simply refers to the fact that later developments will have to be built on the foundations laid in infancy. Since the baby arrives in the family at the most plastic stage of his life, he is "processed" first, as it were, in the family.

2. *Family experiences are repetitive.* This refers to the long period in which the family is the constant influence upon personality and points

⁷ Willard Waller, *The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation*, revised by Reuben Hill, New York, The Dryden Press, Inc., 1951, p. 30ff.

to the true importance of childhood as compared with infancy. Childhood is primarily of profound importance for the development of personality because of its *length*. Even though, as we shall soon see, the peer group threatens the family, the family survives it and in the long run wins out in its influence on the child.

3. *The family is the major agent for transmitting culture.* The family mediates the culture for the growing child. He absorbs culture as he learns it in the family, in other words, with its peculiar stamp upon it. A great deal of this family influence is unconscious, in the sense that attitudes learned there may have been acquired without awareness that one is acquiring them. Many racial and ethnic attitudes, attitudes toward cleanliness, sex, modesty, and prurience, are "picked up" in the family. Important differences in the behavior of people of various social classes attest to the importance of the family and its class position.

4. *Family conditioning has a special emotional quality.* While the child is exposed to extrafamilial influences such as peer group, school, and church as his ever widening social horizon increases with age, nevertheless, the character of family relationships are deeper, more penetrating, and more inclusive of the whole person. The strongest wishes for security, response, and recognition are met in the family. Hence, the necessary reactions of others which will satisfy these desires have a *strong compulsory effect* upon the child. He will be most deeply motivated to perform acts which will produce the desired reaction in the most significant of all the "significant others," his mother, father, and siblings.

5. *The family is a status giver and as such fosters interdependence.* The child is related, through the extrafamilial (chiefly the occupational) roles of his father and to a lesser extent of his mother. That which relates him to the middle class and bestows middle-class status upon him is therefore, of course, his family orientation. He is strongly dependent upon the family for his status, so highly prized in America, since until he is well past childhood he can do little to achieve status for himself. After he is "established" in his occupation, of course, he does achieve independent status and passes it on to his children through the new conjugal family which he establishes with the mate of his choice; the cycle begins anew.

Needless to say, there are individual differences in the ways in which family life will influence the child. One of the many possibilities for

study in this connection is *ordinal position* in the family which we defined above, when we considered the roles of childhood. Adler remarks that:⁸

It is a common fallacy to imagine that children of the same family are formed in the same environment. Of course, there is much that is the same for all in the same home, but the psychic situation of each child is individual and differs from that of others, because of their succession.

Again, a sociologist specializing in family study holds that "no one who has had the experience of living as a child in a family in which there are other children will deny that their relations are influenced at every turn by the order of their appearance in the family."⁹ The various roles imposed upon children are as follows: the "only" child, the oldest child, the intermediate child, and the youngest child. The problem of the "only" child is, of course, the absence of young people in his psychic environment and a concomitant overabundance of adult companionship. He often becomes precocious and unpopular with his peers. The oversolicitous care of his parents may induce attitudes that are overly cautious and fearful. Yet these possible disadvantages are partially offset by several positive factors. He has an abundance of love and is likely to be better off economically and educationally because of his "only" status.

The first child has the experience for a time of being the only child with the advantages accruing thereto. He suffers what Adler called a "dethronement," however, when the succeeding children are born. He is the baby most likely to have colic, most likely to have been subject to stricter discipline, since inexperienced parents are more prone to it than are more experienced ones. They learn on him, as it were, and are more relaxed with the others. As with all ordinal positions there are offsetting factors which at least partly compensate for its disadvantages. The oldest child learns more about responsibility and leadership. He is constantly adjusting to the role of model or example for the younger children, and, of course, this leadership tends to carry over into adult life.

The intermediate child has more complex adjustments to make. He is subject to the parents and to the first born on the one hand, and is

⁸ Alfred Adler, *Problems of Neurosis*, New York, Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1930, p. 417.

⁹ James H. Bossard, *The Sociology of Child Development*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1954, p. 108.

displaced by the baby or babies on the other. Lacking the compensations of being the oldest and the pampering of being the baby he often finds it difficult to find his "place in the sun."

The youngest child has perhaps the most complex of role adjustments. He does not learn the lessons that come with "dethronement" by another child, or sharing his possessions with other children and the other privation which his siblings must endure. Thus he fails to learn self-control and generosity with others. His discipline is the most lax of all, in keeping with the tendency which we described above for experienced parents to relax discipline. Further, this "baby" role tends to be prolonged as usually parents do not wish to relinquish the special parental roles associated with babies. The consequences, if not compensated for, are, of course, that the child is handicapped in adult life.

Yet, too much must not be made of ordinal position in the family. Certainly, it is absurd to think of adult personality types in terms of ordinal position alone. As a minimum, other factors which would have to be taken into consideration would include parental differences in temperament and personality and their handling of the problems of each child (just as in infancy there is good and bad mothering, there is in childhood good and bad handling of children's problems). To this list surely must be added the sex factor; it is one thing to be the first-born girl and another to be the first-born boy. We have already suggested the importance of social-class position of the parental family, to which we might add religious status and a host of other factors. One exhaustive study of the research literature on the subject of ordinal position in the family reveals clearly that while these differences can, of course, be observed as they are occurring in the family, tests given in later, *adult* life reveal no strong demarcation of subjects into personality types on the basis of ordinal position.¹⁰ As we have suggested, the operation of all of these other variables tends to obscure such differences. The complexity of all the variables bearing upon personality within the family is matched only by the complexity of variables in the extrafamilial group life of the individual to which we now turn our attention. As with learning and adjustment within the family, we can only select a few role areas of difficulty and refer the interested student to the suggested readings list of more extensive works on the subject.

Extrafamilial group roles have just as much influence (if not more)

¹⁰ Sister Francis Ann Kelley, S.L., "The Effects of Ordinal Position in the Family on Personality," unpublished M.A. thesis, St. Louis, Mo., St. Louis University, 1956.

on the child *for a time* as do his familial roles. The "child societies" which develop in unsupervised play activities of children parcel out statuses and roles which compare in influence with ordinal position in the family. The "only" child may learn some of the "give and take" with his peers which may offset some of the disadvantages of his home life, where all is "take." Or another possibility is that he will carry over his dependency role into the group and be rejected by his peers, who are not willing to give something (in this case, status) for nothing. The same applies to the "oldest" who expects that his leadership role will carry over to the play group; the problem, of course, centers around the composition of the group and his ability to make his leadership "stick." The intermediate child may derive some leadership privileges from the peer group, but only, of course, if the group extends leadership to him. The family "youngest" resists taking any other role in the peer group, and again his problem is one of "making it stick" because his peer group (by definition composed of his own age) in the American middle-class neighborhood is likely to contain others who wish the same role.

It is obvious that we can only suggest a few of the relationships between role adjustments in the home and those in the peer group, but even these few examples point up one important fact. The sources of status in the family are chiefly the parents and only secondarily other children, i.e., the siblings. The sources of status in the unsupervised play group lie in the *rules of the game*, about which Piaget writes:¹¹

Children's games constitute the most admirable social institutions. The game of marbles, for instance, as played by boys, contains an extremely complex system of rules, that is to say, a code of laws, a jurisprudence of its own. . . . If we wish to gain any understanding of child morality it is obviously with the analysis of such facts as these that we must begin. All morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules.

Let us carefully note that "morality" has certain connotations in French (the language from which Piaget's work was translated) which might almost as accurately be translated as "consensus" or group agreement and morale. We are not concerned here with morality, as properly conceived, but with "morality" as a set of rules to which children adhere,

¹¹ Jean Piaget et al., *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, trans. by Marjorie Gabain, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1948, p. 1.

and the most relevant fact about this set of childhood role systems is that they differ from the codes regulating conduct which the child is taught to respect by the parent. Even the simple social games of childhood are elaborated by the children alone and provide a means of illustrating the singular significance of childhood associations for the learning of standards of justice and the ways in which people "ought" to behave toward one another.¹²

The little boys who are beginning to play are gradually trained by the older ones in their respect for the law; and in any case they aspire from their hearts to the virtue, supremely characteristic of human dignity, which consists in making a correct use of the customary practices of a game. . . .

Before playing with his equals, the child is influenced by his parents. He is subjected from the cradle to a multiplicity of regulations, and even before language he becomes conscious of certain obligations. These circumstances even exercise . . . an undeniable influence upon the way in which the rules of the game are elaborated. But in the case of play institutions, adult intervention is at any rate reduced to the minimum.

So there are role systems which are handed down from generation to generation among children just as there is such cultural transmission among adults. With overlapping, of course, the one is taught to the child by other children and the other, primarily by the parents. The rules taught by the adult have the finality of *absolute authority* while those taught by other children are *experimentally derived*. That is to say the final recourse of the parents is "because I say so" while the recourse in the play group may take various forms of scorn, avoidance, or even a "sock in the eye." And, of course, individuals' responses are not uniform—one wheedles, one commands, one bribes, one fights, one runs home to Mama. Thus, there is, as always, the personal-social aspect of participation in culture, and the unique personalities of the child and his fellow participants always enter into and modify the circumstances under which the "rules of the game" apply.

In addition to these personal-social factors, at least two other important elements of the playgroup are essential to the understanding of their influence upon the child, viz., its *sexual composition* and its *size*. The more obvious of these is, of course, the difference between the kinds of activities undertaken by groups of boys, such as marbles, baseball games, cops and robbers, cowboys and Indians, and those un-

¹² *Ibid.*

dertaken by girls, such as sewing, playing house, and other more sedentary activities. The importance of these for self-conception and the "generalized other" cannot be overstated. In "taking the role of the other" the girl has her mother as a model and in taking her mother's role she "internalizes" elements of the mother's role and has little difficulty in seeing herself as a woman. The play activities of middle-class boys present a more ambitious picture. The father is not available as a model and even if he were home long enough, the middle-class occupational roles, such as paint salesman, high school teacher, plant foreman, are too prosaic as models for little boys. Yet, having imbibed the middle-class emphasis upon success concurrently with his conception of himself as a male, boys tend to be aggressive and competitive in their games, and more active heroes such as Hopalong Cassidy, various big-league baseball stars, firemen, and policemen tend to be the models whose roles are taken by the boys.

Finally, even such factors as the *size* of the group will have important aspects for the course of patterns of interaction within the group and in their impact upon the youthful participants. This is usually a difficult concept for the beginning social psychologist to grasp. It is, of course, not size *as such* but rather the conditions which size imposes which affect the $A \rightleftharpoons B$ interaction. For example, the child may be a part of a three-child play group, composed let us say of himself, *A*, child *B*, and child *C*. Analysis of such triads has revealed that when there are three in a group there tends to be *two* and one other.¹³ Hence, the adventitious factor of *B* and *C* having a strong attachment for each other might result in *A*'s feeling rejected and unworthy. A group of four would offer more possibility for maneuvering and hence, for more close companionship for each child. These relations between size of the group, interaction patterns, and implications for personality need much more exploring, since the small amount of research already accomplished has been extremely rewarding.¹⁴

Notice that in the preceding discussion of childhood roles and adjustment no reference has been made to roles which relate to heterosexual emotional attachments or to occupational roles. In the American middle class these are roles reserved for adults. Yet when the child

¹³ Georg Simmel, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1950.

¹⁴ Theodore M. Mills, "Power Relations in Three Person Groups," *American Sociological Review*, 1953, pp. 18, 351-357.

reaches the age when in other societies such roles are assumed he is still not culturally defined as an adult. Therefore it is necessary to speak of his transition from childhood to adulthood as "adolescence," the bridge between the two age periods.

ADOLESCENCE

Biological Aspects

While there are important physical developments during adolescence, especially in the area of sexual maturity, these are no longer considered stormy and stressful *in themselves*. There is an acceleration of growth in height and weight and, of course, in the muscle coordination needed to bring the larger mass under control. "Awkwardness," which is often noticed in adolescents, is in certain instances a result of growth which has temporarily outstripped such coordination or, as is more usual, the apparent clumsiness really stems from uneasiness, lack of composure, or anxiety over satisfactory performance in roles which are not as yet thoroughly mastered. Yet, physically, the organism is mature once sexual development is complete, which occurs between the ages of eleven and sixteen for adolescent girls and about a year or so later for boys. Physically, they are then mature adults. Many primitive tribes recognize this fact with rituals of various sorts and adult status is then assumed by the young initiate immediately following this *rite de passage*. In modern societies the adult roles are too complex, and adolescent "training roles" are assigned to the young.

Social Roles

These are somewhat ambiguous from the standpoint of the adolescent, though relatively clear as seen by adults. They are to train themselves for a worthy occupation, preferably on or above the level of the father, in the case of the boy, while the girl is expected to be preparing for marriage at the appropriate social level with, increasingly, some preparation for working during her quest for a husband and until they "get on their feet." Both sexes feel strongly that the nuclear families which they are to establish must be financially self-sufficient. Hence, we might summarize the expectations of adults in terms of preparation on the part of the adolescent for work and marriage, in that order.

As with children, adolescents have social systems and social institutions of their own and these often carry role prescriptions which conflict

with those of adults. The best date may be one who spends money lavishly, is not a "grind," and spends as much time as possible with the "crowd." It can easily be seen that, from the standpoint of adult expectations, the best date would be the one who conserves his money, has a high grade average, and spends a great deal of time at his studies, since these are all predictive of stability in marriage and success in adult occupational roles. The roles of the adolescent culture are not independent of the role expectations of the adult culture. The social systems of adolescents are contained within the broader social structure and are delineated by the family statuses of the adolescents. In a study of eight sociological surveys¹⁵ selected so as to provide the widest possible representation of types of communities in America, it was discovered that the family status of the child was the most predictive factor of the type of education he would receive and the occupation he would eventually enter. Of these surveys, one conducted by Hollingshead extended this conception even further by declaring that, not just in education, but generally—"the social behavior of adolescents is related functionally to the positions their families occupy in the social structure of the community."¹⁶ It seems likely therefore that the roles of the adolescent, both in terms of adult expectations and the roles assigned by his peers, differ significantly from social class to social class and that adjustment problems will differ accordingly.

Learning and Adjustment

Often seen as the period when physical maturation is frustrated by societal mores, the period of adolescence might as well or better be seen as a period when societal ambivalence in its work and sex expectations creates certain inevitable tensions and anxiety. Learning and adjustment in adolescence then involve acquiring the proper intellectual attitudes, the "know-how" attitudes acquired in educational roles, but they also involve emotional training in the handling of anxiety.

With the ever-spiraling standards of occupational competence in modern society come increased adult expectations of adolescent accomplishment. If he accepts the challenge he must soon learn to handle anxiety in increasing amounts. Cultural contradictions induce anxiety

¹⁵ Jack H. Curtis, "The School in Eight Sociological Community Surveys," unpublished M.A. thesis, Albuquerque, N.M., The University of New Mexico, 1950.

¹⁶ A. B. Hollingshead, *Elmtown's Youth*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1949.

in the individuals enacting such contradictory roles, and in the American middle-class role system we have the perfect example of this—on the one hand, a great emphasis is placed upon success, and on the other hand, openings “at the top” are few in number. Any failure which is indicative of falling short of occupational success is doubly serious for the adolescent in the light of this overweening emphasis on success. This anxiety also carries over to the area of success in love and marriage. It is no wonder that adolescents are strongly attached to one another in “crowds.” It is quite likely that these crowds constitute the only “significant others” which understand their problems. For if the adolescent tries to *innovate* some more realistic way of “getting ahead” than by competing with others who are obviously in a better position to compete through better family background or personal endowment, he is likely to be considered a juvenile delinquent. He may reject the success goal and “tread water” at a job far beneath his capacities and go steady with a girl whose desirability lies more in her readiness to go steady than anything else. The adolescent may abandon efforts to meet the expectations laid down by the adult culture and form rebellious gangs with substitute norms and standards of their own. These gangs are not as numerically strong as is popularly believed nor are they the major problem throughout the nation that they are in New York City. Their significance for our discussion here is that they represent one alternative for the managing of anxiety on the part of the adolescent. One alternative remains and it is by far the most frequently adopted solution, that of *accepting* the success goal and learning to live with and manage the inevitable anxieties which result. Hence, adolescence in a modern society is not only a matter of preparing to assume the roles of adulthood in work and marriage, but also it is a period of learning to handle the emotional tensions which such roles entail in a modern society.

ADULTHOOD

Biological Aspects

Since, as we have said, the adolescent is fully mature physically, there is more decline than there is development in adulthood. This is normally the longest of the biological age cycles, where slowly and almost imperceptibly the process of aging is at work. There are wide individual differences, of course, but the pace of modern living contributes to

physical deterioration in terms of stress and "nerves" on the one hand and the luxuries of modern living contribute to flabbiness, overweight, and poor physical condition on the other. The result, of course, is a general "slowing down" and a gradual diminution of physical exercise which accelerates the normal physical decline of aging. The adult becomes decreasingly flexible and adaptable, yet it is not until old age that these physical features become of great significance. Unlike the adolescent period before it or the senescent period after it, the physical aspects of adulthood are not of great importance for the adaptation to social roles, unless, of course, chronic sickness or some other prolonged deviation from the normal, such as will be discussed in the following chapter, forces an atypical role upon the adult.

Social Roles

As we pointed out in the previous section on adolescence, the essence of adulthood in middle-class American society is *the acceptance of responsibility* in two main areas, occupation and marriage. In middle-class terms these are so closely related as to constitute one set of expectations, namely, that the individual become "independent." This independence means that the individual will no longer cling to the nuclear family of his birth, but rather will succeed occupationally to the point where he can take care of his own conjugal family. "Standing on one's own feet" precludes any other than occasional and purely voluntary aid from the parents of either of the mates. The very old and the very young may seek aid from relatives, but only in the most dire circumstances must the adult request aid; and there are few circumstances where the request does not bring with it reduced status in the eyes of others.

Aside from work and marriage, there are other, secondary roles in political, religious, and recreational groupings within the middle-class sphere of the major institutions of the nation. The adult is assumed to be sufficiently responsible for weighing the evidence on both sides of a political controversy and of being able to make the proper decision. He may be called for jury duty, where he is asked to weigh carefully the pros and cons of the case against one of his peers and make a suitable judgment on which may rest the fate of the accused individual. He is expected to obey laws without the restraining influence of the police (who, the middle class firmly believes, would not be necessary if their's were the only "kind" of people in society, perhaps with some justifica-

tion). The middle-class person is expected to be "God-fearing" although the term has lost much of its meaning. One may belong formally to a church or have a "private religion." More and more the middle-class person in America is conscious of the necessity for a "tag" or heritage which links him with the past, through a church rather than through a family line since the conditions of middle-class life militate against any extensive family heritage. Hence, he is first an American, second a responsible, respectable, and married merchant, salesman, or some other middle-class occupational designation, and only finally is he a Protestant, Catholic, or Jew. We are here speaking in terms of sociological reality, of course, rather than from the norm of how things ought to be, religiously speaking. Roles in recreational associations, such as bowling leagues and bridge clubs, often permit some deviations from the responsibility and success themes since they are by definition designed for the release of tension and for play. Nevertheless, the middle-class norms of respectability, responsibility, and success tend to permeate and structure interpersonal relations within these groups.

Learning and Adjustment

The concluding chapter of this book, *Man in the Modern World*, Chapter 16, is devoted to the subject of the social environment and the learning and adjustment of the modern middle-class adult, so it would be unnecessarily repetitious to develop the subject at any great length here. Yet we must anticipate, at least briefly, the central aspect of adult adjustment in order to maintain a continuity between the adjustments of the adolescent and that of the aged person, since, we might say, the adolescent is adjusting *to* and the aged person *from* what are defined as adult roles in the middle class. This continuity can be expressed as follows: the adolescent must learn to manage the anxiety which attends the American middle-class goal of success while the aged person must somehow relinquish the goal—the adolescent must enter the race while the aged person must fall by the wayside. It is a race which few, if any, really win.¹⁷

To say that the goal of monetary success is entrenched in American culture is only to say that Americans are bombarded on every side by precepts which affirm the right or, often, the duty of retaining the goal even in the face of repeated frustration. Prestigious representatives of the

¹⁷ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, rev. and enl. ed., Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1957, p. 137.

society reinforce the cultural emphasis. The family, the school, and the workplace—the major agencies shaping the personality structure and goal formation of Americans—join to provide the intensive disciplining required if an individual is to retain intact a goal that remains elusively beyond reach, if he is to be motivated by the promise of a gratification which is not redeemed.

Much of the tension and frustration generated by the struggle for success in occupational roles is absorbed by the family. Dire predictions by sociologists of a modern world in which the family will lose its importance and the individual will be cast adrift of a psychological mooring point are not borne out by studies of the activities and associations of modern urbanites.¹⁸ We might say that the tensions of the home are often discharged at work and the tensions of work in the home, although, to be sure, there are tensions left over. This is no longer true when the home becomes an “empty nest” and the children have grown up and taken their places in conjugal families of their own. Hence, the adult faces two major problems as he ages: the small family system soon deprives him of satisfactions at home and rapid technical advances tend to devalue him at work. The problem of aging is a major one in a modern industrial society such as our own.

OLD AGE

Biological Aspects

Individual differences are so great that no specific point in the life span can be called the point at which “old age” is reached. One person may be bald in his thirties and another may have a full head of hair upon his death at age seventy-five. Some die with good eyesight while others suffer loss of vision early in life. Yet in terms of the life span of any one individual we may speak of physical decline as beginning in the twenties and continuing for the remainder of life. Among the physiological changes of aging might be noted the gradual cellular atrophy and curtailment of all growth which extends to all of the bodily systems affecting sensory and motor functions, learning ability, and memory. Since so many individual differences occur, it is difficult to determine the extent to which aspects of physical and psychological decline are

¹⁸ See, for example, Scott Greer, “Urbanism Reconsidered: A Comparative Study of Local Areas in a Metropolis,” *American Sociological Review*, Feb., 1956, 21, pp. 19–25.

biologically determined and which are the result of life experience in any individual; still, over-all decline is an inevitable feature of any biological organism—the “way of all flesh.”

Social Roles

The low status and prestige of the aged in our society are, of course, related to the fact that, as an industrial nation, we are prone to place a high value upon the occupational contribution of the individual as the measure of his worth. For monied individuals the situation is somewhat different, but we are still speaking of the middle class, where the accumulation of large amounts of wealth is extremely difficult for the average person. The emphasis upon youth in our middle-class culture is a reflection also upon the secular character of our culture where the accent upon wisdom is minimal. Rapid technological change tends to minimize the importance of technical “know how,” the only kind of “wisdom,” if it be such, that is highly valued. A person may spend a lifetime learning a trade only to find that the trade is obsolete. The blacksmith, the machinist, the railroad steam engineer are examples of once-esteemed occupations which have almost disappeared from the American scene.

The small family system of the middle class with its stress upon the independence of the conjugal couple also renders ambiguous the familial role of the aged. Older people have no less need for affection and acceptance than younger persons, yet their opportunities for intimate family life are increasingly lessened. The role of “baby-sitter” provides a place, however, for the grandparent, and there is a pattern of visiting which tends to give the older people a “place in the sun” on holidays and on other occasions of family reunions throughout the year. Yet, the roles assigned to the aged are peripheral ones and do not rank with that of worker or housewife (with young children).

Learning and Adjustment

The aging person in our society has lived the success tradition, if we may call it that, and has no less a need to be successful than when he was young. His aspirations may not take the same form but they are still as high as ever. Yet, the social structure presents patterns of expectancy greatly at odds with his aspirations. Strongholds of older people in Florida are fertile beds for innovations in terms of old age pension plans and other concessions to the aged. Elsewhere ritualism

and retreat from the social goal of success are the only adjustments possible, despite the painful nature of such adjustments, for it means saying goodbye to the social level so faithfully striven for and held during the years of young adulthood. Settlement houses and parish recreation centers strive to function in easing the adjustment of the aged. "Golden Age" clubs are formed. Pensions and retirement funds are receiving greater attention as the proportion of the aged in the population increases. Yet all these measures merely ameliorate the basic problem which is the over-all cultural de-emphasis of the aged.

The individual is not helpless in the face of such cultural prescription, however, and adjustment can be facilitated by planning for old age. A realistic program may even provide satisfactions never before achieved and can be accomplished through limited sports activities, associations with others of the same age and interests, and, as has been said, "by living a full life." With this in mind old age can be looked forward to as a time of summing up and evaluating the meaning of one's life.

We have suggested in this present chapter the social roles of each of the age periods of the life cycle of individuals who have faithfully "carried water and hewed wood" within the prescriptions of the American middle class, and we have suggested briefly the kinds of adjustment problems characteristic of each age group. In the following chapter we shall consider deviations from the "normal." These deviations involve substitute goals in some instances and substitute means in others. Hence, they can be understood best against the contrast of the middle-class goals and means discussed in this present chapter.

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Chapter 13

NORMALCY AND DEVIATION

“Normalcy” and “deviation” are terms which may apply to any one, to any combination, or to all of the three variables which social psychology analyzes to throw light on personality. Thus there may be a normal or deviant biological constitution, normal or deviant life experiences, and normal or deviant cultural background. Our three variables are not *summative*, that is, we do not merely add up all three to understand personality; we seek to understand the way these *interactive* variables are interwoven and interrelated, each affecting the others and in turn being affected by the others. Nevertheless, in most cases of deviation we can say that if it were not for this biological factor, or these unique experiences, or for some element of cultural contradiction this *particular kind of deviation* would not have occurred. Admittedly, we would often be mistaken, since unraveling the skein of deviant development is a most complex, sometimes even hopeless, task. Yet, by thinking of some deviations as *biogenic*, that is, as biological in origin, *sociogenic*, as arising from interpersonal relationships, or *culturogenic*, as arising more directly from group codes of behavior, we have three convenient divisions for analyzing deviant behavior in the present chapter, even though, as we shall see, there is a great deal of inevitable overlapping.

THE CONCEPT OF DEVIATION

Yet, before proceeding to the analysis of biogenic, sociogenic, and culturogenic deviation we should probably determine just what “devia-

tion" is, since there are conflicting approaches to the subject. The first conception of deviation is the statistical one. For any given anatomical, physiological, or psychological characteristic a "curve" can be formed by plotting large numbers of individual cases on a graph, the "shape" of which distribution can then be observed. The bell-shaped "normal" curve is one which is often approximated when the distribution of a single characteristic for large numbers of cases is portrayed in this fashion.




FIG. 13. The normal curve of distribution.

Most of the cases cluster around the central value (the mean, median, or mode, which were defined on page 73), and cases which fall some distance from the middle, in either direction, are considered abnormal or "deviant" because they occur so infrequently. Such a concept of deviation is, of course, a *relative* one since the standard of "normalcy" is established by the majority of the cases rather than by some absolute standard. "Deviation" is not always defined *socially* in this way. For example, skin color, when plotted for a large number of cases, might take on the bell-shaped form of distribution with some very light-skinned persons at one tail of the curve and some very dark-skinned persons at the other, yet in areas of racial tension such fine distinctions are not usually made—one "belongs" either in the majority or the minority group, according to social definition. "Deviation" in this sense is also "relative," not to the majority of cases observed but rather to a social norm. Deviation can also be ethically evaluated in terms of the Ten

Commandments or in terms of the natural moral law. At first glance, it would seem that "deviation" is a hopelessly unworkable concept because of its various equivocal usages.

Once again, however, we are "rescued" by the $A \rightleftharpoons B$ interactional scheme, the focus of social psychology, in a further demonstration of the value of such a focus. In the "definition of the situation," if either is perceived by the other as "deviant" and behaves toward the other on the basis of this perception then "deviation" has occurred. It might be argued that deviation is present in both A and B since one must have an attribute which is perceivable and the other must have *an attitude* toward that attribute, on the basis of which he defines the "deviance." This is, of course, quite correct. One of the limitations of our focus is that deviation must be *socially visible* to be meaningful in our frame of reference, and other deviations which do not have this social aspect must be analyzed by some other means. Another unfortunate aspect of our focus is that the term "deviant" has the connotation of guilt or blame and the blameless member of a minority group or an equally blameless victim of a physical blemish are categorized as "deviant" on the basis of what is really an uninformed attitude in others. The antidote to this, of course, is to free the term "deviant" of any such connotation where personal guilt is obviously not a factor. Another, related exercise in objective, scientific detachment is to view deviant behavior not as the opposite of normal behavior but as a special case of the latter. In other words, deviant behavior involves the same basic processes as all human behavior; the deviation comes in at the level of *subprocess*, either arising from biogenic factors which come to have significance in the $A \rightleftharpoons B$ interactional situation, from sociogenic factors resulting from unique interactional situations themselves, or from culturogenic factors which enter into and disrupt the course of the $A \rightleftharpoons B$ interaction.

BIOGENIC DEVIATIONS

If it were not for our focus upon the interactional situation, it would not be possible to bring any kind of order into the subject of the myriad number of physical variations on the biological constitution. It hardly helps at all to *limit* our discussion to those physical variations which become socially defined as "deviant," because in our society physical deviation as reflected in the normal curve, i.e., by the extreme cases at the tails of the curve, *tend also to be socially defined as deviant*. In

other words, ours is a conforming culture and great emphasis is placed upon being like others in every respect. Deviation from the mean of physical attributes, therefore, carries with it almost certainly the problem of adjusting to atypical social statuses. Our interactional frame of reference is extremely helpful in assisting us to understand the *basic* social interactional processes at work in such instances where in the $A \rightleftharpoons B$ interactional situation A is defined by B as deviant because of physical variation.

A suggestive, and by no means complete, list of deviant physical characteristics might include:

- Endocrine imbalance
- Body form and stature
- Physical handicap
 - Blindness
 - Deafness
 - Lameness
 - Palsy
 - Mental deficiency
 - Organic psychosis
- Chronic illness
- Disfigurement

There are, of course, overlapping concepts in the list, and it seems harsh to place in the same category such widely diverse individuals as an extremely intelligent deaf person and a gravely mentally deficient imbecile. First, only those persons whose physical impairment is not so great as to preclude social interaction should be considered in this category, hence the extremely mentally retarded should not be included. Second, and far more important, we are categorizing these individuals for one purpose only, that of analyzing the social psychology of the handicapped. There are generalizations which can be made about them as a category and, of course, there are special considerations which apply only to a specific type of handicap. We must limit our attention, of course, to the first of these.

The Handicapped

Unlike the life experiences of the normal, middle-class child which were discussed in the previous chapter, the handicapped child has atypical roles in the family which systematically set him apart from

other children and often prepare him only for minority status as an adult. For the normal person who becomes handicapped later in life the process is much the same except that it is much more abrupt, and he lacks the preparation for deviant status of the person who has been handicapped from infancy or childhood. The characteristic socialization pattern for the handicapped youth is, in the earliest years of life, one of solicitous care, help, and attention. Unfortunately, in a success-oriented society it is difficult or impossible for many parents to rid themselves of guilt, which gradually communicates itself to the child, and the rejecting attitudes of the parents may become part of the "generalized other" of the child who thus comes to resent both himself and his parents. This handling of guilt on the part of the parents may take the form of "either-or" treatment of the child. They may go too far in either the direction of being hostile toward the child or in the direction of overprotection. His path in the social structure is similarly obstructed:¹

As the child grows to adulthood, he becomes categorized as a member of a minority group. In many instances he is socially ostracized and rejected by physically normal persons. He is discriminated against in employment, even for jobs which he is physically able to perform. The handicapped person is a marginal person—physically, socially, and economically; the many avenues of normal relationships which are blocked for him, either actually because of his disability, his attitude toward his disability, or social pressure, then tend to produce more frustration and conflict. Thus, the physically handicapped individual may bear the added burden of social rejection and emotional conflict.

The adjustment of the handicapped person is hampered by the roles which are assigned to him by the "normal" person. In a success-oriented society the nondisabled majority believe that the disabled should assume lower status, and if this viewpoint is a part of the "significant other" of the handicapped, he may come to take the same view of himself. As we have said, the basic processes of development of attitudes and personality are the same for normal and deviant persons. The "four wishes" of security, response, recognition, and new experience are basic needs of all, at least in American society, and the problem of adjustment for the disabled is to secure, at least in minimal measure, the

¹ James F. Garrett (ed.), *Psychological Aspects of Physical Disability*, Washington, D.C., Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Rehabilitation Service Series No. 210, 1953, p. 5.

gratification of these wishes. Often, as a defense measure, the attribute which the disabled lacks, such as personal beauty, he comes to deride as being unimportant. A better adjustment is made by other similarly disabled persons who cling to the value that beauty is desirable but consider themselves no less worthy for not possessing it.

Strong identification with groups of individuals sharing the same handicap provides a handicapped person with a "significant other" which can be the source of great security to him. Unfortunately, such groups often, in retaliation against the social obstacles contributing to their isolation, "lash out," as it were, against the representatives of the nondisabled majority who are most accessible. For example, few blind subcultures exist:

Where blind sub-cultures do exist, however, they are commonly linked to negative rather than to positive goals. The cohesive forces stem wholly from aggressive attempts to strike back at members of outgroups who have themselves been traditionally concerned with the blind. Specialized agencies and organizations are increasingly bearing the brunt of these attacks, and gradually the blind are gathering onto themselves a sense of the oppressed minority.²

In view of this quite normal tendency for in-groups to develop attitudes of aggression toward out-groups, it seems more social-psychologically sound that the handicapped (1) cling to the success goal of the non-disabled, yet view his own successes not in comparison with the non-disabled but in terms of the "longer distance" he has to travel, and (2) seek his adjustment in the world of the nondisabled, to the extent that it will admit him, rather than in the protective comfort of home or disabled subculture. (In this connection, also, see Adler's comments on social isolation and neurosis, Chapter 6.) Finally, if the adjustments of the handicapped seem difficult, we should note that, consistently, studies show 35 to 45 per cent of the disabled subjects as well or better adjusted than "normals."³ While, of course, there is more frequent maladjustment among the disabled, the situation is far from hopeless. The degree of disability and the personal-social reactions of the disabled are, of course, variables of prime importance. We turn our attention now

² Alan G. Gowman, *The War Blind in American Social Structure*, New York, The American Foundation for the Blind, 1957, pp. 52-53.

³ Roger G. Barker (ed.), *Adjustment to Physical Handicap and Illness: A Survey of the Social Psychology of Physique and Disability*, New York, Social Science Research Council, 1946.

to those deviants whose personal-social reactions alone are the source of their social isolation.

SOCIOGENIC DEVIATION

Deviants whose statuses are, in some respect at least, different from the normal but for which there is no organic basis we call *sociogenic* because they developed their deviant attitudes in the process of living out their unique set of life experiences in interpersonal situations. The objection might be raised that biogenic and culturogenic deviations arise in the same way, that is, in interpersonal relations, since biological deviation does not become relevant to status and role until it becomes a part of the "definition of the situation," and culture, similarly, is transmitted only in the interpersonal or other communicational situation. The answer is that abnormal biogenic factors are not present to any significant degree in this category, on the one hand, and on the other, that they occur at least sufficiently rarely to be viewed as deviations from culture rather than as culture itself. The culturogenic category of deviants we reserve for those whose statuses and roles are consciously recognized and purposefully passed on from generation to generation and for those statuses and roles which present conflict because of conflicts in the culture. Finally, we must admit, in view of the interactive character of the three variables, that our distinction is, after all, primarily one of convenience in analysis.

Although not a completely exhaustive list, it is worthy of our attention to note three distinctive kinds of sociogenic deviants, *the eccentric*, *the disturbed*, and *the criminal*. Broadly speaking, there is "no place" in the culture for these deviants, yet provision for them must somehow be made. Since the major institutions of our society are geared to normal needs and wants and to the controlling of behavior so that threats to the social order can be averted, these individuals represent something of a societal anomaly. Statuses and roles, even though not very prestigious ones, are parceled out to biogenic deviants and to cultural minorities, yet the sociogenic deviant, especially adults in this category, offends the nondeviant whose outlook on the importance of assuming responsibility precludes any middle ground between custodial care for the irresponsible deviant and prison and reform for the "responsible" one. There seem to be important differences in the modes of adjustment for the three classes of deviants we are considering here. For example, we

can speak of "criminal subcultures" where consensus, loyalty, and even a common jargon often unite criminals of certain types; to a lesser extent, where local conditions such as the anonymity of the large metropolis permit, some eccentric subcultures are formed and sustained by homosexuals, and "hobohemias" provide a haven for the vagrant. Yet emotional disturbance, or "mental illness," outside of mental institutions has no subcultures. The difference is that such subcultures assist in the adjustment of the deviant *to his deviant role*. The eccentric and the criminal may have *organized* their lives around their deviation, while, of course, the "disturbed" lacks this life organization. These and other important distinctions make it worth our while to consider separately some of the broader aspects of each of these types of sociogenic deviation.

The Eccentric

As with all behavior both attitudes and social situation must be taken into account if we are to achieve even an elementary understanding of eccentric deviation. The situations in which the individual acquired abnormal attitudes in the process of socialization and the situations in which he exhibits abnormal behavior here and now must both be taken into account. Many "normal" individuals would exhibit eccentric social behavior if the situation were favorable. On the other hand, many eccentric individuals are maladjusted to their present roles and if their circumstances were changed, facilitating their adaption to more usual roles, their life adjustment would be greatly benefited. The analogy of the square peg and the round hole is often used to express this relationship between life history and life circumstance. Many individuals have been prepared *basically* as round pegs (normal individuals in society) and through misfortune, bad judgment in the choice of companions, and the like find themselves in "square holes." On the other hand, many persons who live a normal conforming life are deterred from deviant behavior only by the possibility of sanction. They have the preparation for becoming a square peg, but the situation has never presented itself. Finally, there is the type whose life preparation predisposes him toward deviant behavior and whose life circumstances are such that his *modus vivendi* includes deviant behavior. Here we encounter the confirmed homosexual, the hobo, the town "ne'er do well," and other deviants whose behavior, while it is disturbing to others, is not so disturbing to themselves.

Socially eccentric deviation then, if the term is to have a specific meaning, refers to those whose socialization was atypical and whose life organization includes taking statuses and roles which lie "outside the pale" of normal society and are usually bestowed by others who share in the eccentricity. Colonies of the "beat generation," hobohemias, centers of self-styled *avant-garde* individuals, and other eccentric colonies indicate the need for a "significant other" on the part of such deviants and constant support for the "generalized other." Reinforcement for the self-image which the eccentric individual needs in order to maintain a sufficiently high self-esteem and group-approved scorn of "the masses," help to offset the disapproval of the conforming. The *situation* of the eccentric sets him off from the disturbed person (although we do not mean to imply, against all the evidence, that there is not a greater than average amount of emotional disturbance among the eccentric), since the disturbed person has no colonies to support his self-image, but rather faces the expectancies of the normal population and is judged in terms of his performances in normal roles.

The Disturbed

There can be little doubt that emotional disturbance disrupts effective participation in social interaction, in communicating needs to others, and in meeting the expectations of others in the *quid pro quo* of social life, and that continued and excessive emotional disturbance incapacitates the individual for social roles. *Functional* as well as *organic* behavior disorders have the effect of inhibiting the social functioning of the individual. However, functional behavior disorders are traced to breakdowns in previous social functioning (previous social learning), while organic disorders are due to some physical property of the body and its malfunctioning. Since we are not concerned with organic disorders except as they enter into social relations, our concern here is with the functional disorders.

A strong case has been made for functional disorders as *culturogenic* phenomena. This view has much to support it since even the concept of abnormality itself varies from one culture to another. Recalling Benedict's study, it would be an abnormal Kwakiutl who could survive long among the Zuni, and only the most paranoid of the Zuni could have adjusted to the persecutory atmosphere of the Dobu or to the megalomania of the Kwakiutl. Withdrawal and the substitution of fantasy life for the world of reality, common features of schizophrenia, are normal

modes of "adjustment" for the Balinese and the Buddhist. The list of "aberrations" which appear as a modal "adjustment" in one culture or another can be extended at great length, but the point seems obvious. Culture must inevitably be a starting point for the diagnosis of functional "mental" disorder; cultural prescription for "normality" must be the reason why a given individual "stands out" as a deviant and is defined as being in need of special care. Nevertheless, there are universal physical and psychological states which are "culture-free." No society has been found whose members are completely free of anxiety: the defenses of the human being against anxiety transcend cultural boundaries.⁴

Anxiety with its several manifestations can well stand as the initial indicator of psychopathology. Manifestations of anxiety include the racing, pounding heart; rapid, shallow, or difficult breathing; trembling, a sweaty, flushed, or pale skin; incontinence, and a feeling of impending catastrophe and panic that has been labeled "fear of catastrophic breakdown." That everybody at some time or other experiences anxiety in one or another of these forms, is, of course, no serious argument against the utility of the definition. . . .

Individuals learn in one way or another to guard against the full impact of anxiety. Pervasive defenses like phobias, obsessions, and compulsions furnish additional criteria by which to recognize psychiatric abnormality.

Hence, in the last analysis psychological disturbance does not stem from culture directly, but rather from the life experiences of the individual within the culture. The people with whom he has interacted have placed their unique stamp upon his cultural participation and his development of attitudes toward others and ways of dealing with others are unique to the individual. After all, social roles (cultural prescriptions) merely set down the script for the actor to enact. He may overplay or underplay the role depending upon his peculiar psychic needs; in case of striking personality needs he can innovate. The deviant becomes socially "visible" when his behavior thus violates cultural prescription, but *it is his underlying uneasiness* within the cultural role which causes his deviation.

⁴ John J. Honigmann, "Toward a Distinction between Psychiatric and Social Abnormality," in Douglas G. Haring (ed.), *Personal Character and Social Milieu*, 3d rev. ed., Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1956, p. 440. Reprinted from *Social Forces*, 1953, 31, pp. 274-277.

The policeman who becomes an authoritarian colossus overplays his role; the Crow Indian who holds back from battle because of the fear that he may be killed underplays a role. The purveyor of a new religion represents an innovator.⁵

We have, therefore, at the most basic level, a psychological disturbance of the emotions and an attempt by the individual to defend against or escape from anxiety. He has "learned" his anxiety in the sense that it can be traced back through the history of his social participation to his infancy and the "bad mama" reactions out of which grew "bad me" reactions in the self-system. He has "learned" how to handle or manage his anxiety in interpersonal relations in his family, peer group, and other interpersonal attachments. If his defenses do not place too much stress upon his social roles he is not a deviant, but if his defenses include enacting his roles in ways which are unacceptable to others—too much underplaying, too much overplaying, or too much innovation—societal reactions and repressive measures will enter the picture. Hence, functional behavioral disorders are personal and sociogenic, and only secondarily culturally relative.

There are important reasons also for paying special attention to the physiological aspects not only of organic behavior disorders but also of functional ones, since evidence exists that important differences between the adrenal reactions of schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics may be *related* to the behavior differences between them. ACTH (adrenocorticotrophin) is secreted by the pituitary to control the reaction of the adrenals (very decidedly related to anxiety reactions), and it is suspected that some disruption of the control of the adrenal glands by the pituitary occurs in schizophrenia.⁶ The fact that schizophrenia is not hereditary and that a characteristic "life history" of interpersonal relationships is so frequently observed lead to the conclusion that the functional disorders are socially dysfunctional habit patterns, slowly and gradually developed in interpersonal relations, and constitute an escape from reality and the substitution for reality of fantasy delusions. This developmental pattern of disruptions of interpersonal relationships will have included the accompanying psychological states of *inordinate anxiety* with its physical correlatives of the racing, pounding heart, rapid breathing, intensive adrenal reaction, and all of the attendant physical features of anxiety. In this view the physicochemical differences between

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 442–443.

⁶ Reported in C. S. Mihanovich and J. B. Schuyler, S.J., *Current Social Problems*, 2d rev. ed., Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Company, 1956, pp. 407–408.

normals and those suffering from functional behavioral disorder are *effects* rather than *causes* of the "interfered with" social development of the emotionally disturbed. If this were not the case, of course, the functional behavior disorders would be better understood by considering them together with physical disorders and organic psychoses.

The functional behavior disorders of the "disturbed," as we have chosen to call such individuals, include a variety of *neuroses* and *psychoses* which can be understood, as we have seen, against the background of *cultural* definition of adequacy and inadequacy and against the background of *physical* response—the abnormally high incidence of anxiety states in the disturbed as opposed to the "normal" individual. Our understanding of the "disturbed" in terms of our $A \rightleftharpoons B$ interactional focus in social psychology is rendered all the more necessary by the current belief among behavioral scientists that the *social* situation is not merely an important background factor but is indeed the locus in which functional neurosis and psychosis arise. For this reason we shall turn our attention to the *developmental process* of neurosis and then to the *developmental process* of psychosis within the social-interactional frame of reference.

Neurosis is, while more frequently encountered in some cultures than in others, fundamentally a personality conflict with *roots in the family relations of childhood and the failure to develop wholesome attitudes toward authority on the one hand and toward self on the other.*⁷

The child does not meet society directly at first; it meets it through the medium of his parents, who in their character structure and methods of education represent the social structure, who are the psychological agency of society, as it were. What then happens to the child in relationship to his parents? It meets through them the kind of authority which is prevailing in the society in which it lives, and this kind of authority tends to break his will, his spontaneity, his independence. But man is not born to be broken, so the child fights against the authority represented by his parents; he fights for his freedom not only *from* pressure but also for his freedom to be himself, a full-fledged human being, not an automaton. Some children are more successful than others; most of them are defeated to some extent in their fight for freedom. The ways in which this defeat is

⁷ Erich Fromm, "Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis," *American Sociological Review*, August, 1944, 9, reprinted in Arnold Rose (ed.), *Mental Health and Mental Disorder: A Sociological Approach*, New York, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1955, p. 287.

brought about are manifold, but whatever they are, the scars left from this defeat in the child's fight against irrational authority are to be found at the bottom of every neurosis.

The developmental process which results from failure on the part of the parents to replace *irrational* with *rational* authority weakens the self-reliance of the young person, causes him to be overly concerned with what other people think of him; indeed, a weak and befogged "looking-glass" self-conception is substituted for his feeling of "I am." While we have not space here to consider all of the ways in which the neurotic's modes of adjustment to others stem from poor interpersonal family foundations and unhealthy life experiences, we can note a few examples in this direction. The child may be made to feel guilty about sex and the normal bodily functions by adults whose attitudes are unhealthy in this connection. Guilt is induced as a punishment for disobedience, and, here we depart from Fromm and the neo-Freudians very briefly, the ability of the human intellect to scrutinize a moral situation directly and properly is interfered with; morality comes to be equated with the emotional aspects of guilt rather than with the application of reason to the problem. To return to the neo-Freudian frame of reference, sex and guilt come to be related to the point where any normal impulse is resisted. Shame, guilt, and anxiety, normal emotional reactions for all persons and even appropriate ones under certain circumstances, *plague* the neurotic. Fear and apprehensiveness about the unknown are ever-recurring problems to him. Characteristically, this deviation takes two major forms, *dissociation and compulsion*.

Hysteria is, perhaps, the best example of the adjustment of a neurotic person through dissociation. Through "hysterical conversion" anxiety is handled by unconsciously converting mental conflict into physical symptoms.⁸

Once he has done so he is likely to be remarkably indifferent to his disorder, sometimes assuming the air of "the patient sufferer." Almost any function of the body may be involved. Cases have been reported of such widely different ailments as hysterical blindness, paralysis, mutism, heart conditions, and blisters.

The significance of hysterical conversion in terms of the $A \rightleftharpoons B$ interactional focus is, of course, that *A* finding himself with attitudes of guilt

⁸ Sister Annette Walters and Sister Kevin O'Hara, *Persons and Personality: An Introduction to Psychology*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953, p. 367.

and anxiety is fearful in interpersonal situations where he fears his (largely imagined) guilt may be "found out" by *B*. He finds that not only has he lost his sight (using one of the examples from the quotation above) and is unable to see what formerly was disturbing him, but he is also now in a position where *B* accords him, as an unfortunate invalid, role expectancies far below those which *B* holds for those who are not so afflicted. This is an extreme case, of course, but illustrates the basic element of "escape" through somatization which is the characteristic feature of such a neurotic defense.

On the other hand, *compulsive* neurosis can be equally bizarre, as when a housewife endlessly washes her hands, her woodwork, her floors in an attempt, through this ritual, to rid herself of guilt and shame—to wash herself clean. The anxiety suffered by these individuals is so intense that even the brief relief accorded by such a compulsive action is well worth the effort. Hence, there is an almost irresistible aspect to the behavior which they perform over and over again. In both the compulsive and the dissociative types of neurosis the end result is disruption of the interpersonal relationships of which the nonneurotic is capable. Adler's description of the course of such a neurosis as a withdrawal from the social world is particularly appropriate here.

The disturbance of the interpersonal relations of the psychotic are often even more dramatic and marked than those of the neurotic. The functional psychoses have in common the fact that communication between the disturbed person and those around him is severely disrupted, even more so than in the case of the neurotic. Schizophrenic disturbance of social relationships is characterized by a withdrawal from reality entirely different from that of the neurotic. Instead of the fluttery emotionality of the neurotic, the "speed-up" of mania or the "slowdown" of depression, we find here the flattening of emotional response to the situation, which might lead us superficially to believe that the disturbance of these individuals is purely intellectual rather than emotional. However, the "disturbance" of these individuals is historical and the emotional roots of the present problem can be found somewhere in the history of each case. While the disturbance is an intellectual one in the light of the individual's being out of contact with the normal social world it is important to note the emotional pain and anxiety which is being avoided by the escape route of schizophrenic psychosis.

Following the classical division of the functional psychoses into (1) *affective disorders* (emotional extremes, such as mania or its oppo-

site, depression), (2) *schizophrenic personality disorganization*, and (3) *paranoid* disorders, we have an overly simplified but convenient means of considering the social-interactional aspects of each "type" of disorder. We must recognize at the outset that no one individual is likely to represent a pure type but rather that combinations are more frequently the case. The cases can only be classified on the basis of the dominant characteristics of the behavior displayed.⁹

In the great majority of functional depressions, hopelessness and either sadness or an overwhelming anxiety dominate the picture; in manic excitements optimism with great joy or self-assertion usually prevail. In both of these latter groups there is relatively little disorganization of thought, speech, and action. The experienced normal person is therefore more easily able to keep in satisfactory rapport with these patients than with schizophrenics. The manic patient is, of course, quite easy to differentiate from the depressed, since the prevailing emotional disturbance appears to be in an opposite direction.

The schizophrenic patient can readily be distinguished from mania and depression if, as is often the case, he shows definite disorganization; otherwise the distinction may be arrived at only after prolonged study of the case. There is still considerable need for better techniques in uncovering slight or merely thought disorganization even though much research in the past decade or two has been devoted to this problem. The schizophrenic may be excited or slowed up but, unlike typical affective patients, his rapport with the experienced normal person is apt to be definitely poorer and less stable. He usually undergoes a certain degree of social disarticulation and in severe cases he may become almost completely shut off from the participative behavior of others. Marked oddities of thought, speech, and action often develop which may grow into extraordinary permanent mannerisms.

Finally, paranoia deserves separate discussion because of its potential psychological importance. In the paranoid we are dealing with delusional systems, often well and convincingly organized, which more or less dominate the individual's living but do not necessarily lead to noteworthy disorganization. Outside of the delusional system itself the person may seem fairly clear and reasonable.

As we have pointed out earlier, Meyer was among the first to look upon functional disorders as inability on the part of the individual to

⁹ Norman Cameron, "The Functional Psychoses," in J. McV. Hunt (ed.), *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1944, vol. II, pp. 871-872.

meet the social demands upon him. In this sense, as Meyer pointed out, functional disorder is a kind of social "bankruptcy." The individual does not have on deposit the social habits of adjustment which he needs to deal with his life situation. We have treated these disorders as sociogenic ones because it is apparent that their origin lies in inter-personal relations. Here and now the "patient" suffers from an inability to communicate effectively with others. He is seriously impaired in his role playing and society cannot long condone defective role playing. All this is, of course, quite obvious. What is less obvious but crucial to our discussion is that his *maladjustive social habits were acquired in earlier social interaction* through breakdowns in effective communication—defective role playing—*on the part of others* and thus his disorder is the result of social learning. Unhealthy patterns of living have been transmitted to him socially—not merely his passive adaptations to "bad examples" or to family and neighborhood circumstance, but deep and searing wounds to his self-esteem are found at the roots of psychosis as, to a less disabling extent, they are found in neurosis. Of course the type of family, the social class, the neighborhood, the local community structure, the social environment of personality as it develops—any of these can be a contributing factor to functional disorders of personality. Studies of the relationship between the incidence of functional psychosis and social environment show that mental illness is not distributed randomly in the populations studied but that social environment is related to the incidence of such disorder. More extensive investigations will have to be made to determine the processes which relate the social learning of neurosis, suicide, and psychosis to social class and neighborhood, yet such relationships, as statistical facts, are now known to exist. For example, the concentric-zone theory of internal urban structure has been applied to Chicago and other cities and the




FIG. 14. The concentric zone theory of city growth.

incidence of various deviant behaviors was observed in relation to the zone in which it was reported. One of the original investigators of the Chicago study reports:¹⁰

Thus, the findings from our original study which have been substantiated by other investigations appear to be the following:

1. That all types of mental disorder show a pattern of distribution within the city where the high rates are highly concentrated in and around the central business district with the rates declining in every direction toward the periphery.

2. That the schizophrenic rates in different cities show a pattern of distribution which is very similar to that of all types of mental disorder.

3. That the schizophrenic rates form an expected typical pattern with the concentration of high rates in areas of low economic status while the manic depressive rates show a much wider scatter within the city and show a lack of conformity to the concentric circle pattern.

4. That persons residing in areas not primarily populated by persons of their own ethnic or racial groups show much higher rates than those of the numerically dominant group. . . .

While it would be fruitless to speculate at great length on these relationships between neighborhood and functional disorder,¹¹ nevertheless a handful of generalizations seem warranted. Child-rearing practices and patterns of parental authority differ from social class to social class, hence from neighborhood to neighborhood; consequently it is quite likely that defective parent role playing may occur disproportionately in certain segments of the class structure. Turning from the possibility of maladjustive experiences of socialization, it is also conceivable that some neighborhoods do not offer the social ties which bind the individual to his neighborhood community. In the more urban districts the anonymity of the individual may contribute to his sense of social isolation. Whatever the cultural, subcultural, regional, or neighborhood influences in the formation of functional disorders, we must not lose sight of the fact that the origin of the disorder lies somewhere in the path of this *individual's* life experiences with other individuals. This *learning* must be "unlearned" and proper modes of adjustment learned

¹⁰ Warren Dunham, "Current Status of Ecological Research in Mental Disorder," in Arnold Rose (ed.), *Mental Health and Mental Disorder: A Sociological Approach*, New York, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1955, p. 171.


¹¹ August B. Hollingshead and Frederick C. Redlich, "Social Stratification and Psychiatric Disorders," *American Sociological Review*, April, 1953, 18, pp. 163-169.

before recovery in these cases can be effected. The same holds true of criminal behavior which can be explained, in great part at least, as socially learned behavior. Yet, since criminal behavior differs in significant ways from "disturbed" behavior a separate discussion of it seems warranted.

The Criminal

Of the many proposed solutions to the vexing problem of classifying criminals, the scheme which orders criminal behavior on a continuum from "individual types" at one end to "career-criminal types" at the other best serves our present purpose of illustrating the importance of social-psychological concepts such as attitudes and self-attitudes, social role, generalized other, and significant other as they throw light on deviant behavior.


Table 10. Selected Types of Criminal Behavior*



* Tables 10 and 11 are partial reproductions of Chart I, p. 201, in Marshall B. Clinard, *Sociology of Deviant Behavior*, New York, Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1957.

Career criminals differ in so many important respects from all of those deviants who fall to the left of them on the continuum that criminologists tend to think of them less as being outside the pale of society than as being outside the law but inside of the American social structure. Table 11 shows the types of career-criminal behavior which we might almost say have become institutionalized in American social structure:

Table 11. Selected Types of Career Criminals



Let us impose a cutting point (C.P.) on the continuum in Table 10 just to the left of "Career Criminals" and lump all categories together on the left side of this point as "noncareer" and all of the categories in Table 11 let us designate as "career" criminals. The choice of a cutting point is not arbitrary and the sociopsychological *differences* of the two categories thus designated are the most important factors for our consideration here. By contrasting the noncareer and the career criminal we shall be in a position to appreciate the contribution of social psychology to the study of criminal behavior.

Let us begin our contrast by describing the career criminal. He is not feeble-minded but of normal intelligence; he is not suffering from emotional disturbance, but rather the demands of his "profession" are somewhat higher than average with respect to control over the emotions. Although in terms of the natural moral law and positive legal codes his criminal behavior (only a very small proportion of his total behavior, incidentally) is morally objectionable, it is subjectively seen by him as consistent with criminal codes of conduct. There is some justification for his conviction that he is "more moral" than the businessman, who, while operating within the law is ever on the look-out for the "fast buck" (represented on Table 10 as "white-collar" crime). Social and cultural factors play a large role in the formation of the career criminal. Career criminals integrate their criminal roles into their life organization. There is identification with crime; among the "significant others" will be included criminal groups, usually, but not inevitably, of the criminal's own speciality, for example, fellow pickpockets or fellow shoplifters. "They develop techniques, a level of operations, and a

philosophy of life to go with it.”¹² Self-conception for this type of criminal is likely to reflect a curious combination of middle-class and criminal conceptions. He may see himself as one who wants the “good things of life” as defined by middle-class standards, as one who “knows what he wants and sets out to get it,” still an accepted middle-class conception, but he is too logically consistent, in a sense, to be bound by the rules governing the means by which success is to be achieved. With wide variations, of course, such criminals see themselves as outside the pale of society when they have been legally defined as criminal through the processes of the police and judicial machinery of the community. As with noncareer criminals and as with noncriminals, for that matter, qualitative self-appraisal ranges from strongly favorable (a basically “good boy” caught up in circumstances) to “no good and never will be.” For the career criminal the processes of becoming criminal were identical in kind with the processes involved in becoming a member of a nondeviant profession. First there was long and consistent exposure to values favorable to breaking the law; there was consistent association with criminals, socialization and development of attitudes appropriate to these criminal “significant others”; reinforcing the self-conception as criminal perhaps was an arrest or two which, from the standpoint of the law-abiding community, bestowed the status of criminal upon him which probably was taken up into his “generalized other” as a part of his images of himself.

What differentiates the career from the noncareer criminal? We have already seen that one main difference lies in the fact that the noncareerist has been arrested and convicted for reasons which relate to his individual personality make-up. The criminally insane is best understood in terms of his organic or functional psychosis as extreme sex deviates are better understood as disabled mentally and disturbed emotionally. Murder is seldom a career crime and murder is usually a first and usually the only criminal offense of the murderer. Partaking somewhat of the individual types of crime and somewhat of the social and cultural, the roles of prostitute and homosexual are outside of normal society and require on the one hand individual deviancy (of a type which is not yet fully understood by investigators) and, on the other hand, the sustaining force of a “significant other” in which the role is defined more favorably. Perhaps these sex deviancies can best be understood in terms

¹² Marshall B. Clinard, *Sociology of Deviant Behavior*, New York, Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1957, p. 202.

of the "eccentric," discussed on page 301. The habitual petty criminal, if a criminal, is almost a complete "flop" at it. His rewards are few in relation to the time spent in city and county lockups and there are few criminal techniques which he has mastered. He is likely to be a "normal" person in the sense that he is not actually a criminal but rather is a noncriminal whose problems are matters of individual personality. This leaves, of the noncareer criminal types, only "white-collar" criminals. Here the main difference, of course, is in self-conception. Violation of trust in high places, "slick deals," unethical (perhaps illegal but unprovable) failures to provide goods, services, or satisfactions in return for money received do not classify the wrongdoer as a criminal in our society, nor, in a society in which the success goal is so dominant, does the "smooth operator" see himself as a criminal. This type of deviation is so widespread that it may be considered in terms of the culture which induces it, which is the manner in which we shall consider it below. Hence, returning to the question of what differentiates a criminal in social-psychological terms we find that only the career criminal qualifies as a member of this category in the fullest sense—in terms of social role, self-conception, "significant other" criminal groups, "differential association" (a history of association with criminal as opposed to noncriminal groupings), and a life organization which includes being a criminal as an integral and adjustive part. Finally, in order to sum up our presentation of the criminally deviant, we can present the differences between the noncareer and the career criminal in such a way as to throw some light on the sociopsychological processes involved in learning criminality of whatever type. The processes are thought to start with *anomie*, which is experienced differently by members of different social classes but which may be considered generally as either (1) a breakdown in the external forces which normally constrain individuals to social conformity or (2) a contradiction in these external forces between goals and the means of achieving these goals. Either of these may produce in certain psychologically prone individuals a psychological tension which has often been called *anomia* (to distinguish the psychological condition from its social correlative, *anomie*). Theorists are somewhat divided on the development of the criminal *after experiencing anomia*, but there is general agreement that anomia is often experienced and managed within the law. Hence, it is not the "cause" of crime. Individual crimes are explained by individual failures to manage anomia and, of course, many undetected

instances of anomia, such as white-collar crime, are no less instances of anomia because they have not become socially visible.

The career criminal, on the other hand, is one who has experienced anomia and has had access to delinquent groupings. From then on the process of becoming a career criminal is thought to be a function of the delinquent subculture as follows:¹³

1. The individual learns the values of the delinquent subculture through his participation in gangs which embody that subculture.

2. The motivations of individuals for participating in such gangs are varied.

3. The malicious, non-utilitarian, and negativistic behavior which is learned through participation in the subculture is met by formal negative sanctions, rejection, and limitation of access to prestigious status within the middle-class system.

4. Thus, participation in the delinquent subculture creates similar problems for all its participants.

5. The participants' response to the barriers raised to exclude them from status in the middle-class system (that is, the "problem") is a hostile rejection of the standards of "respectable" society and an emphasis upon status within the delinquent gang.

6. The hostile rejection response reinforces the malicious, non-utilitarian, and negativistic norms of the subculture.

This approach strongly emphasizes, therefore, the delinquent gang route to career criminality. It is not intended to supplant the criminological approach or the psychological or psychiatric but merely proposes the $A \rightleftharpoons B$ approach of social psychology as a valuable adjunct to these approaches.

CULTUROGENIC DEVIATION

There remain to be considered two types of deviation which differ from the biogenic and sociogenic in important respects. These are (1) deviations which arise from adherence to minority group norms and (2) deviations which arise from contradictions within the broader culture. The first type of deviation is the *minority group* which is defined as a whole by the larger society and which is perpetuated from generation to generation, consciously and purposely maintaining its identity and membership through *culturally instituted and culturally*

¹³ John I. Kitsuse and David C. Dietrick, "Delinquent Boys: A Critique," *The American Sociological Review*, April, 1959, 24, no. 2, p. 214.

perpetuated means. These means of perpetuating minorities either arise and are maintained within the minority or from the superordinate culture or, of course, from both. Hence, in Wirth's classification of minority groups, the pluralistic minority simply wants a place in the existing cultural scheme of things; the assimilationist minority wants to be, but is not, indistinguishable from the majority; while the secessionist and the militant minorities wish to break away from the *status quo* and establish either their own political autonomy or a whole new social order, with, of course, themselves in control. Wirth's classificatory scheme of minority groups is as follows:¹⁴

1. *Pluralistic minority*. Such a cultural minority wants to maintain its subcultural characteristics within the larger culture. It seeks nothing more than tolerance for its way of life—its attitude is expressed clearly in the phrase "live and let live." This type of minority is found among the religious cults and sects who like their exclusiveness and do not proselyte. . . .

2. *Assimilationist minority*. They seek to become indistinguishable from the other members of the larger society. They abhor their distinct status and do what they can to escape it. Some of the European migrant groups . . . were more assimilationist in attitude until they met with rebuffs in their attempts to be "just American" and the vicious circle process curtailed some of their enthusiasm.

3. *Secessionist minority*. This concept is more applicable to political than sub-cultural minorities. Such groups are not satisfied with pluralism but seek political autonomy.

4. *Militant minority*. Such a minority is not satisfied with the status of the other minority groups above, but seeks to dominate others, to make them assume the in-groups' way of life . . . nearly all orthodox, proselyting religious groups are militant minorities.

Socialization into these minority groups could conceivably be painless, with self-conception, "generalized other," and an appropriate body of attitudes for membership in the minority group coming as the consequence of the gradual habituation of the child to the ways of the elders of the minority group. This ideal set of circumstances for the perpetuating of minority status is impossible in modern society where the necessary *social isolation* of the minority group cannot be maintained. The condition of *marginality* is prevalent among minority groups in

¹⁴ Louis Wirth, "The Problem of Minority Groups," in Ralph Linton (ed.), *The Science of Man in the World Crisis*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. 354-364.

modern society. The *marginal man*¹⁵ has, in addition to the roles, values, and beliefs of his own group, an alternative set of roles, values, and beliefs acquired through association with others who are not of his group. The "alternative" presents problems of doubt and uncertainty about the "right" way to perform when situations arise which call up conflicting attitudes—one set learned in a minority group and the other in the larger society. While the concept of the marginal man should be reserved for the person who is "torn down the middle," that is, feels equally strongly on both sides of such a behavioral problem, membership in a minority group in modern society inevitably raises such anxieties in greater or less degree. Individuals seem to find some degree of adjustment in efforts either of (1) attempting to live within the protective shell (if such is available) of one's own minority group or (2) seeking, like the assimilationist minority mentioned by Wirth, to lose minority identity altogether.

There are various ways in which membership in minority groups is attained; social learning and adjustment depend upon whether minority group status is attained by birth, by voluntary action, or by the ascription of minority status by others. These, in turn, are related to the kind of minority group to which the individual belongs. Pluralistic minorities (we are here still using Wirth's terminology) are made up of individuals who seek tolerance for their group's way of life. They are composed of adults, chiefly, who are drawn together by virtue of their atypicality and for whom the group constitutes a "significant other." There is little proselyting. Interested adult members are drawn to it. There is little or no "growing up" from child to adult within these groups.

Assimilationist minorities, on the other hand, present extremely grave socialization problems, especially to the first generation born in America. "Old Americans" have tended to ridicule the cultural customs of the newcomers and thus forced them to form into settlements or enclaves within the broader society. Through the school system (manned chiefly by middle-class personnel) and other contacts with the dominant group, American-born persons of another ethnic background became imbued with success standards that were unachievable for them as members of the lower class and as representatives of the "Old World" culture of their parents. It has been a matter of record that the first American-born generation has a higher incidence of delinquency and other barometers

¹⁵ Robert Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," *The American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1928, 33, pp. 881–893.

of anomia. Succeeding generations have found the adjustment problem to be decreasingly severe. Many have come to reject the assimilationist attitude in the hope of keeping alive their traditional ethnic tie.

Since secessionist minorities are more political than subcultural, they are not as directly relevant to our present discussion as are militant minorities where the socialization and adjustment of the children raises problems similar to those presented in the paragraph above. The goal of these latter groups is, of course, to raise their children to share their conviction that their group way of life should be that of all. It is very likely that Wirth meant for this category to include religious groups such as the Catholics and the Mormons. Interestingly enough, since Wirth's time, the emphasis among intellectuals of both these groups has been toward cultural pluralism. This would seem to indicate that succeeding generations have been responsive to other groups around them as well as to their own minority religion. This is disturbing to the adult member of this type of group only if such assimilation has included the violation of moral principle such as, for the Catholic, the use of artificial birth control, or for the Mormon, the use of alcohol and tobacco.

Turning from this brief treatment of the attitudes of persons belonging to minority ethnic groups, we turn our attention to the attitudes of those who constitute the majority, since these attitudes are often the final cause of the problem of ethnic and racial discrimination. These attitudes are usually either discriminatory or apathetic. The result has been that the majority (and it should be kept in mind that mere numerical superiority is secondary to power and social distance in this kind of "majority") has blocked the upward progress of minority groups while simultaneously looking down on them for being in the lower classes. This *prejudice*, by definition a prejudging of individuals of minority group status, has been one horn of the American dilemma with the Bill of Rights and the American creed constituting the other. The social situations which initiate and sustain emotional attitudes of prejudice have been studied and certain principles of the development of prejudiced attitudes have been developed. *False beliefs* about members of minority groups, such as the biological inferiority of the Negro, the superior financial astuteness of the Jew, and the credulity of members of religious minorities, contribute to the formation of prejudiced attitudes. These are all too often reinforced by *atypical experiences with members of the out-group*. These personal-social experiences unique to individuals reinforce group prejudices. A sharp-dealing Jew in a pawnshop may, through his actions,

influence countless numbers of individuals who reinforce in their conversations with others certain stereotypes of the Jewish "race" as a whole. Here, unfortunately for understanding between groups, negative cases count more than positive ones. A financial transaction in which a Jew has been generous and fair is far less likely to be communicated to others than the reverse type of case. By far the most intense source of attitudes conducive to prejudice is the maladjusted personality. Sexual inadequacies of a white man may lead him to fear the Negro, whom he imagines to be "oversexed." In our discussion of the authoritarian personality studies, in Chapter 2, we saw that the prejudiced person is liable to be projective in that he blames others for his own faults. This is often called "scapegoating" after the ancient custom of symbolically loading the sins of the tribe upon an animal and then driving it out into the desert. It is quite possible that there will always be such emotional reactions in individuals and that the compromise solution to group relations will have to come from increased respect for the law as it protects the rights of others even though the others so protected arouse emotional attitudes of prejudice.

There are other sources of prejudice such as *competition for scarce values*, the inevitable conflict that arises when economic pressure becomes severe, as for example, the tension between the poorer whites and the Negroes of the south. But the generic source of prejudice is ethnocentrism for the obvious reason that the view that one's own culture is the only right and natural one carries with it, of course, the corollary that those which deviate must necessarily be *unright* and *unnatural*. This kind of ethnocentrism has been the enemy of cultural pluralism in America since it holds no brief with minority subcultures while all the while preventing the members of such minority groups from escaping inferior status.

Freedom from minority status does not bring with it a freedom from cultural contradictions, however, since a condition somewhat resembling marginality is widespread in American society. This we prefer, following Durkheim, to call *anomie*, which is the result, as we have said, of the deviations which arise from contradictions within the American culture itself. Here we are unable to classify "types" of deviation except ones under which, at some time or another, we could classify almost everybody. The condition is widespread in our society since ours is one whose social structure exerts "*a definite pressure upon certain members in the society to engage in nonconforming rather than conforming con-*

duct.”¹⁶ The essence of the matter in our society lies in the disparity between our culturally defined goals and our failure to provide means of achieving these goals. We shall return to this problem in the concluding chapter of this present book. It is fitting to close the present chapter, however, with a consideration of some of the implications of this disparity of cultural goal and means of achieving the goal. The goal can be stated succinctly as “success,” usually, but by no means inevitably, in monetary terms. Biogenic deviants have essentially only one problem, they do not meet the standards of cosmetic excellence or of high performance which are norms laid down by the broader culture and there are none but inadequate institutionalized means available to aid them to pursue the success goal satisfactorily. From one point of view, the sociogenic deviants we have described in their diversity as eccentric, disturbed, or criminal all have this problem in common; they have either rejected cultural standards of success (and so have been rejected by society) or they have held firmly to the goal and have adopted deviant means of achieving the goal. These means, such as theft, organized crime, white-collar crime, even some psychosis, and other innovations, are disapproved, but the society, paradoxically, withholds from various socioeconomic classes, from minority groups, and even from many of its more privileged citizens the means by which the lofty goal of success can be achieved.

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¹⁶ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, rev. and enl. ed., Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1957, p. 132.

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PART THREE

COLLECTIVITY

Chapter 14

INTERACTION AND LEADERSHIP IN SMALL GROUPS

In the preceding chapters we have emphasized the socialization and development of personality in the individual. We were conscious of the fact that the social situation enters as an element in all behavior, and for that reason we were as careful as possible to specify the social situations within which the personality patterns of the individual developed. We granted a position of prime importance to family situations and specified also the importance of sibling, peer, recreational, educational, and other types of social situations in which the individual gradually turns from the family as the source of his values and norms to these other reference groups. We saw the importance of the "significant other" for the emotional development and satisfactions of the individual, and we observed that group membership is the prime factor of the individual's social motives and social participation. In this light *the situation links the individual and his groups*. In the social situation the norms of the group coerce the behavior of the individual. The impact of the individual personality upon the group is felt. Consequently, our emphasis is upon the interacting individual when we are analyzing the group, so long, of course, as we do not stray too far from group influence on the individual. In this chapter we shall first concentrate upon the social situation as a phase of a more enduring system of social relationships and then we shall deal with the significance of the small group as a social system for the individual.

In this present part (including the present chapter on interaction and

leadership in small groups and Chapter 15 on collective behavior), we shall reverse the procedure we have followed and place the social situation in the foreground and the individual in the background. This kind of analysis is possible for two reasons; first, because the group is an entity whose activities *as an entity* can be discerned, and second, there are processes operating within groups which, as they become more clearly recognized and understood, are susceptible to scientific analysis and generalization. So we can study situations, as such, without constant reference to the specific personalities comprising them. Of course, no two individuals will react exactly the same even in the same social situation. Their "definitions of the situation" will vary with their personal backgrounds and statuses and roles within the group, yet their mutual awarenesses of one another set into motion behavior in which *the reaction of each takes account of the reactions of the other*. In this light, the social situation is a microcosm of the larger social system of which it is a component part. It can be viewed as a miniature social system with the role relationships highlighted and individual personality role differences made a subordinate consideration. Hence, a group is "two or more persons of psychic interaction, whose relationship with one another may be abstracted and distinguished from their relationships with all others, so that they must be thought of as an entity."¹

In analyzing social interaction, the determinants in which we are interested will be, because of the special focus of social psychology, the individual as he is affecting and is being affected by others. Yet there are many other factors we must weave into our analysis so that it will not be oversimplified.²

The differential effects of social situations and their direction are not determined by just the presence of others in the performance of a task or by the sheer fact of participation in a discussion or a meeting. Inter-related factors pertaining to the motivations which brought individuals into the particular situation, the task or problem involved, the various aspects and characteristics of the participating individuals—all these have to be brought into the picture. When these various factors are brought into the analysis in an interrelated way, the properties of experience and behavior of single individuals in a given social situation and its positive or negative effects begin to be coherent.

¹ Earl Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology*, Boston, D. C. Heath and Company, 1932, p. 163.

² Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, *An Outline of Social Psychology*, rev. ed., New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956, pp. 121-122.

Among the interrelated factors which can become important in social situations, the following are cited without attempting to be exhaustive:

Factors related to individuals involved: Their number (size of the aggregate); homogeneity or heterogeneity in terms of their backgrounds (e.g., sociocultural, economic, educational affiliations, and ranks); age, sex, and the like.

Their relationships to other participating individuals: previous acquaintance and the existence or nonexistence of established relationships among all or some of the individuals.

Their particular motives related to participating in the situation, including the extent to which some motives are common to various individuals.

Factors related to the problem or task: Whether it is new or habitual; the degree of its structure (number of possible alternatives for attainment or solution); proportion of individuals present necessary for the activity; the capacities in which individuals function.

Special communication related to it, such as suggested lines of action or instructions; the content and source of communication.

Factors related to the site and facilities: The physical setting (laboratory, open space, auditorium, tavern, club, church, hotel lobby, etc.); tools and technological means available; the presence of nonparticipating individuals or groups in the surroundings and their relation to the individuals and events taking place; opportunities the site affords for movement and contact with others.

Factors pertaining to relations of an individual to others, the site, the problem, or task: Relation of the problem or task to the individual; its significance to the individual and within any existing scheme of relationships among the individuals, the related abilities and talents of individuals; the individual's relation to the content and source of any special communication; the existence or nonexistence of standards of conduct or social norms relevant to the locale, situation, problem or task, and other individuals.

Taking into account all of these possible variables in situational analysis appears to be a formidable task, but we are aided again by our focus on the $A \rightleftharpoons B$ interactional process. We are interested in their *perception* and *definition* of the situation. If factors related to the site enter into the course of the interaction they will do so primarily by their being defined as relevant to the situation through one or more of its actors. For example, if two men were wrestling near a cliff, the cliff itself would not appreciably affect their interaction unless it was believed

by at least one of the fighters that being thrown off the cliff were a possible part of the situation.

Yet, the definition of the situation by its actors is not the sole determinant of the interaction between them. There are factors of which the participants may be completely *unaware*, that importantly condition the situation and in so doing indirectly but importantly affect the course of interaction between them. *It is in the analysis of these factors that the social psychologist makes his most important contribution* because, of course, "common sense" might tell us all that we wish to know of the factors which individuals consciously act upon in social situations. Of all the factors which have thus far been mentioned in this chapter, *size* of the group has been investigated as one of these determinants of the social situation and has come to be considered of prime importance for the character of the interactions associated with it. We may distinguish social situations in the following ways: first, as those which do not involve any other than brief and transitory interactions between their participants, second, those which place into relationships between one another individuals from different groupings or, third, individuals of the same large groupings, and fourth, the most rewarding of all from the standpoint of social psychology, those situations which involve individuals of the same small group affiliations. The reasons for the important role of small groups in social-psychological theory merit our special consideration.

THE REASONS FOR STUDYING SMALL GROUPS

In the American colleges and universities of the early 1950s, some two hundred courses in sociology and psychology were directed to the phenomena of small groups. The number is presumably even greater today. In the early 1950s, also, in the journals of psychology and sociology there appeared roughly 150 items per year on the subject of small groups. Compared with the era at the turn of the century, the last decade of the nineteenth and the first decade or so of the twentieth century where only *one* such item per year appeared in the learned journals of the parent fields of social psychology, there is revealed a tremendous growth and expansion of interest in small-group phenomena.³

There can be no doubt that much of the current interest in small groups was generated by Cooley's penetrating insights into their nature

³ Fred L. Strodbeck, "The Case for the Study of Small Groups," *American Sociological Review*, December, 1954, 19, p. 651.

and their importance for the development of personality and what Cooley called "human nature" in the individual. The following is one of the most quoted paragraphs on the subject of small groups in the history of modern social psychology:⁴

By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling.

Cooley and the later theorists Mead⁵ and Homans⁶ see the tendency for the individual to develop sentiments of liking for those with whom he enters into association and with whom he undertakes activities. Yet harmony and love are not seen by these analysts as the sole basis for the unity of the group. There may be competition, individual status-striving, and other sources of friction between the individuals in such a group—there is even the adage "familiarity breeds contempt" to warn of the presence of hostilities between individuals of such groupings. Yet, despite these sources of dissociative attitudes, the nature of communication in general and especially in the face-to-face communications of small groups demands that one individual take the role of and participate in "the other." This forces some degree of sympathy into the situation. In the vernacular, "putting yourself in the other fellow's place" inevitably means a more sympathetic view toward his actions and behavior. Since communication is a necessary feature of human interaction the world over and the primary groups of the family, the play group, the groupings of elders are practically universal, this primary-group warmth and sympathy is seen, especially by Cooley, as "human nature."

⁴ Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909.

⁵ George H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934.

⁶ George C. Homans, *The Human Group*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1950. All quotations from this book reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Since these associations are so emotionally charged, they are termed "primary" by Cooley in the sense that "they give to the individual his earliest and completest experience of social unity"; the family is "primary because first" in influencing the individual. These primary groups, especially the family, mediate the larger society. The individual does not directly experience German society or American society excepting as his family reflects the spirit of the society in which it is located. On the one hand, primary groups mold the individual to standards of conformity; hence, social institutions are dependent upon them—nonconformity rings the death knell for institutions. On the other hand, the individual is dependent upon primary groups for his very "human nature." Thus, small, primary groups are essential for both "human nature and the social order" (the title of one of Cooley's works, it will be recalled).

By human nature, I suppose, we understand those sentiments and impulses that are human in being superior to those of the lower animals, and also in the sense that they belong to mankind at large, and not to any particular race or time. It means, particularly, sympathy and the innumerable sentiments into which sympathy enters, such as love, resentment, ambition, vanity, hero-worship, and the feeling of social right and wrong.

Human nature in this sense is justly regarded as a comparatively permanent element in society. Always and everywhere men seek honor and dread ridicule, defer to public opinion, cherish their goods and their children, and admire courage, generosity, and success. It is always safe to assume that people are and have been human.⁷

With certain reservations, such as the cautions of anthropologists concerning cultural variations in such standards as "courage, generosity, and success" and perhaps also the cautions of philosophers that human nature refers to what man *is* rather than to the attributes which he *has*, we can appreciate Cooley's insights into the group aspect of the individual, the social nature of his attitudes, and consequently, the importance of studying small groups to extend our understanding of the interacting individual.

Relying upon an artificial distinction which we shall later discard, small-group analysis has made contributions both to "pure" and "applied" social science. We have, elsewhere, discussed the methods of small-group research and study where such "science for science's sake" problems as communication theory and mathematical problems of

⁷ Cooley, *op. cit.*

performance prediction have been studied. On the "practical" side, studies of the *morale* of squads of soldiers and of bomber crews which have thrown light on military practices have proved extremely valuable, while not yet providing us with a scientific theory of morale. Studies of small groups under the rubric of *human relations in industry* have almost revolutionized the concept of management and worker relations, although larger social forces than research teams of social psychologists must, of course, be given credit for the change in attitude toward the human side of industry. *Group therapy* involves the application of knowledge of primary-group processes to the emotional problems of individuals. The approach to such problems as alcoholism, mental disorder, criminal attitudes, and the like, by forming groups of individuals suffering from these problems so that they may help each other, shows great promise. *Group dynamics* is the term most commonly applied to practical attempts to reduce intragroup and intergroup tensions. *Family counseling* as opposed to individual counseling is directed to the problem of improving interpersonal competence of each individual family member by working out problems of the family situation as a whole. Both "pure" and "applied" social psychology have benefited remarkably by following the lead of Cooley and others into the possibilities of the small group approach to the understanding of interactional behavior.

Yet the "pure vs. applied" distinction has little meaning for such areas as the following aspects of small group study: learning and problem solving as a group, establishment of group norms, cohesiveness, social control, conformity and deviation, leadership, sociometrics, and small groups as social systems.

These intensively active areas of small-group research already supply and will continue to supply important new theoretical insights as well as practical applications to problem areas. General psychology advances its theory of the human organism in environment by understanding the situational factors which influence perception and value orientation. General sociology benefits theoretically by the view of the small group as a microcosm of the larger social order. From small-group organization sociologists draw inferences which have validity for the towering organization of modern social structure. As one worker has put it, small groups have the advantage that you can "get all the way around them," meaning that the interrelationship of parts in small groups can be studied intensively because all the elements of organization are present

and available for study. All too often the key to understanding some aspect of the larger social structure "gets away" in the complexity of the elements at work. Finally, as we shall see in this chapter, small groups are *interesting* and as Homans has said, "There is only one paramount reason for studying anything but the multiplication table." That reason is, of course, interest. While the notion is a bit difficult to grasp in the beginning, the conception of the small group as a social system is basic to small-group analysis. Involving as it does an entirely new conception of small aggregates (to most students, at least) its interest, even fascination, lies in the fact that all that will be described has been "happening under the nose" of most of us without our having been more than dimly aware that the common features of the most common groupings can be so revealing when analyzed in this way.

SMALL GROUPS AS SOCIAL SYSTEMS

The first step in analyzing a small group is to mark it off from its surrounding *social environment*—to give it "boundaries" so that it can be recognized as a self-contained entity. Just where to establish these boundaries is a problem because such groups typically blend in with broader social systems without any sharply demarcated lines on which social relations can be divided into those belonging to this group and those belonging to another group. Homans in his *The Human Group*, an analysis of small groups as social systems based on a series of case studies of such groups, approaches the problem from the functionalistic point of view. By viewing the small group as partaking somewhat of the nature of an organism (an organism facing the problem of survival in the environment), the social structure (environment) presenting the problem can be contrasted from the indigenous aspects of the group, as a group. These can be conveniently described as the group's *sentiments, activities, and interactions* which spring up as the solution to survival in the environment. Those sentiments, activities, and interactions which are most closely related to the group "solution" to survival in the environment Homans calls the *external system*. Those elaborations of sentiment, activity, and interaction which are over and beyond the "solution" are the most purely indigenous, give the group its particular flavor, and profoundly influence the external system. These Homans calls the *internal system*. The small group as a social system, then, is both systems. However, the small group is not merely an internal system *plus*

an external system, but rather a circular process is at work which creates a dynamic interrelationship between the two systems (Figure 15).




FIG. 15. The dynamics of a small group following Homans's analysis.

While this may seem complicated, as indeed a full analysis of a small group must necessarily be, we can illustrate these broad conceptions quite clearly through Homans's own analysis of the Bank Wiring Observation Room,⁸ a situation where the environment was the Western Electric Company, which imposed upon the men of the Wiring Room the problem of turning out daily a satisfactory number of wired, soldered, and inspected banks (a kind of panel) of terminals for telephone company use.

The Bank Wiring Room

The men of the Bank Wiring Room responded by work activity sentiments such as "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay" and by entering into the necessary interactions among themselves, that is, of wiremen to solderers and inspectors, solderers to inspectors and wiremen, and inspectors to solderers and wiremen as prescribed by the nature of the task undertaken. These activities, sentiments, and interactions as a whole were the *external system* of the Bank Wiring Room group. The sentiments which they developed toward one another in the course of their interactions and activities were another matter. The formation of cliques, friendships, hostilities, and other manifestations of personal like and dislike led to social ranking, to *group norms* initiated and sustained by the members and the leadership which emerged within the group (as opposed to the institutional leadership imposed by the

⁸ Homans's analysis was based on data appearing in Fritz Jules Roethlisberger and William John Dickson, *Management and the Worker*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1939.

environment). All of this elaboration from within the group was its *internal system*. How did this internal system feed back and affect the external system as we indicated in the diagram above? Let us examine one example of this intermeshing and reciprocal influencing between the two systems. The Western Electric Company employed an "incentive plan" by which the worker received piece wages according to the amount of work he completed. It might be thought that fatigue would set the limit upon the amount of work each employee would complete in one day. But norms developed in the internal system:⁹

1. You should not turn out too much work. If you do you are a "rate-buster."
2. You should not turn out too little work. If you do you are a "chiseler."
3. You should not tell a supervisor anything that will react to the detriment of an associate. If you do, you are a "squealer."
4. You should not attempt to maintain social distance or act officious. . . .

It can be seen quite clearly from these norms that the factor regulating output is not fatigue but group regulations upon worker production. The company was satisfied with the output but its assumptions regarding incentive were not well founded. Fast workers helped the slower ones (in their own cliques, of course) so that a more or less uniform output could be maintained. One worker was an isolate because he persisted in exceeding what the group defined as a "good day's work." Thus, the environment of Western Electric's Hawthorne plant imposed upon the Bank Wiring Room group the problem of supplying it with a satisfactory output of banks. The group responded by elaborating a social system far more complex than was required. The complexities of this internal system "fed back" and affected profoundly the performance of the group. Thus is illustrated some of the broader features of Homans's system. The Bank Wiring Room group serves especially admirably to introduce the notion of internal system as elaboration from and feed-back to the external system. Once these notions have been grasped, however, by far the most significant of Homans's cases for our purposes here—that of gaining some insight into the group as a social system and as an organization of parts each performing a vital function for the whole—is the *Norton Street Gang*.

⁹ George C. Homans, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

The Norton Street Gang

From William Foote Whyte's¹⁰ comprehensive study of a neighborhood gang, Homans further illustrates the concept of the small group as a social system highlighting even further in this case the social, organizational, and leadership aspects of the small group. The Norton Street Gang was so named because its thirteen members hung out together on a Norton Street corner in "Eastern City." In the depression year of 1937, thirteen young men—Doc, Mike, Danny, Long John, Nutsy, Frank, Joe, Alec, Angelo, Fred, Lou, Carl, and Tommy—formed the group. Their acquaintance went back to their childhood in the same neighborhood and school. Gang membership meant a great deal to these young men in their twenties; only two of them had steady jobs. They were rarely at home and normally could be found on the corner much more often than at home. The leader of the gang was Doc. Like most of the gang, Doc was of Italian ethnic origin and had lived in this slum district from birth. After a series of efforts to develop his talent for painting, which failed due to the deepening depression, Doc, like so many of the others in the Norton Street and other gangs in the area, returned to corner life and the Norton Street Gang grew up around him.

The Norton Street Gang, like the other gangs of Cornerville, had a strict social regime. It had its own street corner, its own tables in cafes or taverns, which were recognized and normally respected by other gangs. Each gang had its favorite amusement, which, for the Norton Street Gang, was bowling, often several nights a week. As with the Bank Wiring Room group, the Nortons valued highly certain types of behavior. Athletic ability ranked high on its list of values as did toughness, being able to "take it or dish it out." Yet the gang was not criminal and grosser criminal acts were beneath them. Whyte diagramed their organization as shown in Figure 16.

Two organizational aspects of the group are charted in Figure 16—lines of "influence" and the social ranks of the members. For example, in terms of influence,¹¹

. . . if Doc felt the group ought to take a particular line of action, he was apt to talk the matter over first with Mike and Danny and perhaps Long John. If the decision reached Long John it went no further: he in-

¹⁰ William Foote Whyte, *Street Corner Society*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1943.

¹¹ Homans, *op. cit.*, pp. 160–161.

fluenced no one. But if it reached Mike, he was apt to pass it on to Nutsy, and through Nutsy it reached Frank, Joe, Alec, Carl, and Tommy. Or Doc could influence Nutsy directly. As for influence in the opposite direction, if Tommy, for instance, had an idea that the gang ought to take a certain step, the idea was apt to get to Doc through Carl and Nutsy. The diagram sums up hundreds of instances in which communication between the men in the group took place in these channels.

The boxes linked by the lines of influence also represent an important organizational aspect of the group, that of social rank. Thus, Doc had the




FIG. 16. Lines of influence and social rank system of the Norton Street Gang. Reproduced with permission from William Foote Whyte, *Street Corner Society*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1943.

highest status, Mike and Danny, Doc's "lieutenants," were just below him and so on down to Tommy and Alec at the bottom of the status hierarchy. The Nortons used bowling, heckling, and other devices for maintaining the standings of subordinate and superordinate individuals and subcliques. The leadership of the group proved to be, however, the single most important cohesive factor of the Nortons. When Doc was not around the gang tended to break down into subcliques (see Nutsy's and Angelo's in Whyte's diagram, above). When Doc appeared the smaller units were united into one common group, he became the center of communication. This was not so because of Doc's outstanding and individual characteristics as a "natural-born" leader or "great man," but

rather because *he most embodied the norms of the group*. Those who deviated from the norms of the group, who married, for example, were “suckers” (as were those who lost money in crap games), and if they maintained their statuses in the group it was despite this deviation, never because of it. Poor bowlers “kept” their place, with little chance of leadership. The paradox of leadership in such small groups is, therefore, that the leader does not “stand out” but rather he is the “most normal” of the members, judging, of course, from the norms of that group. Thus, in terms of communication channels, Doc was the central figure because he was trusted and relied upon to transmit and relay messages in the code of the Nortons.¹²

Thus communication flows toward the leader. It flows toward him in general conversations; it also flows toward him in private ones. The followers come to him with their problems and confidences. Thus, he is better informed than anyone else about what is going on in the gang. When a quarrel arises among the boys, he knows what its sources are and is in a better position to settle it than any other man. Since his opinion is the most important single factor in determining a man's standing in the group, each party to a quarrel comes to him with its version of the story, and may appeal to him to act as judge and compose the differences. Here again, he must live up to the standards of the group or risk his position. He must be scrupulously fair, even when his closest friends are concerned—and not all men in the group are equally close to him.

If communication flows toward the leader it also flows away from him. He is the man who makes the decisions, who starts action going, and he is expected to do so. Other men may offer suggestions, but these must reach him and receive his approval before the gang will take them up and do something about them. Moreover, his decisions will pass through definite channels: the leader secures group action by dealing first with his lieutenants. . . .

Finally, the leader's position depends on his being “right,” being right simply meaning that his decisions have usually turned out to be acceptable to the group. . . . Ability to carry the followers with him is the source of any leader's authority.

Since, in this section of the present chapter, our interest is in acquiring some understandings about the small group as a social system we can raise questions about the Bank Wiring Room group and the Norton Street Gang which will help us arrive at a few such understandings. We

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 170–171.

find that the individual, as always in his interactional aspect in our focus ($A \rightleftharpoons B$), enters into social situations to satisfy some need or needs and finds that these situations either do or do not actually or potentially meet his needs. If they are rewarding in some way or other he tends to remain in them. Gradually he becomes aware of the fact that such situations are more than mere aggregates of individuals. As the interaction proceeds he perceives both that there is *differentiation* in the group in terms of there being a *system of rankings and positions* in which he, himself, is expected to take a place, and also there are expected of him, as of all the individuals in the group, certain *similarities* of viewpoint on the sentiments, norms, values, in a word, *the culture* of the group. This is not to say that the group absorbs the individual, but rather it absorbs a segment of him. He has his statuses and roles in other groups and has a life separate from the group. In the case of the Nortons the "separate life" is less meaningful than for those of the Bank Wiring Room. The Nortons were to be found on the corner more often than at home. The home life and recreational groupings of the Bank Wiring Room men were probably, on the other hand, more meaningful to these men. However, in both instances, we find men living in and "acting out" those small-group social systems which form their interpersonal environment within the broader structure of American society.

A question only partially developed in the analysis of small groups as social systems relates to the means by which these microsocieties develop, both in terms of their differentiation into status and role systems and the development of an indigenous group culture. For insight into this question we turn to *processes* within small groups—to the developmental dynamics of the step-by-step building of these little social systems.


THE PROCESSES OF SMALL GROUPS

Communication is the basic social process whether in small groups or large. Hence, research which has shed light on the process of communication in small groups is especially relevant and basic to the understanding of small-group processes. The research which has been completed indicates that *size* of the group and its *organization* impose conditions on communication patterns within the group, and that these, in turn, impose restrictions upon the emergence of leadership and indigenous group

norms. The factor of size is easy to understand. It is one thing for an aggregate of several thousand individuals to communicate with one another and another thing for a small group of thirteen members, like the Nortons, for instance, to maintain an interchange of information. It can also be seen that the leadership must be different for the two types of organization. A national fraternity, for example, must elect its leaders, who, in turn, will communicate with the membership primarily through formalized channels. This type of "institutional" leadership differs radically from that of the small group, where the leadership "emerges" informally as a *central communicating figure* arises in the group. It will be recalled that Doc was the leader of the Nortons because he best incorporated in his behavior the norms and sentiments of the group. Consequently, "jam ups" in communication, such as arguments among the members, could be referred to Doc, and his decisions would open the flow of communication again.

Intragroup Processes


The way in which the members of a small group are ordered to one another in their social organization inevitably indicates that the leader is the central figure in the lines of influence and communication. The concept of *centrality* has been tested in several small-group experiments. The best known of these studies compared four different types of communication networks for the purpose of establishing generalizations about the interaction of the individuals involved in the various networks.¹³ The four networks were (1) the *circle*, in which five individuals could




pass notes in either direction and could thus communicate with one another in the solving of a group problem; (2) the *chain*, the identical situation with the circle, except for one closed slot between *A* and *E*,

¹³ H. J. Leavitt, "Some Effects of Certain Communication Patterns on Group Performance," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1951, 46, pp. 38-50.

so that communication could not occur directly between them; (3) the *Y*, in which four individuals composed a chain and the fifth was only able to communicate with one of them; and (4) the *X*, which placed




one individual at the center of an axis in such a way as to preclude the others from communicating with one another excepting through him.



The conclusions of these experiments support the concept that *centrality*, i.e., being central to networks of communication is conducive to the assumption of leadership. Among other indications the most basic support for this contention arises from the fact that the *X* group developed the most effective social organization and leadership (*C*), as expected, was promptly forthcoming.

In an interesting variation on this pattern another experiment employed networks as follows:¹⁴




The communication nets were set up as follows. Three *S*'s were located in three adjoining rooms. Each *S* had a microphone, amplifier, and ear-phones. Listening was binaural except when a listener was connected to two talkers; then the listener heard one talker in one earphone and one

¹⁴ George A. Heise and George A. Miller, "Problem Solving by Small Groups Using Various Communication Nets," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1951, 46, pp. 327-336. Reprinted in A. Paul Hare, Edgar F. Borgatta, and Robert F. Bales, *Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955.

in the other. The direction of the arrows indicates the channel from talker to listener. A two-headed arrow signifies two-way communication. The nets will be referred to by number, 1 to 5. The subjects will be referred to by letter, *A*, *B*, or *C*. . . .

The problem of the experiment was to observe the effect upon group performance of group organization, intelligibility of the message, and type of problem. The ordering of the subjects, *A*, *B*, and *C* in the five networks, of course, enabled the experimenters to compare group performance in terms of group organization. To get at the effects of intelligibility of the message a distracting noise was used which blended with the speakers' voices and could be lowered and raised. The types of problems to be compared were three: "a comparatively stereotyped and unimaginative exchange of isolated words," "initiative in the construction of sentences," and more complicated anagram problems. The conclusions definitely supported the hypothesis that "the performance of a small group depends upon the channels of communication open to its members, the task the group must handle, and the stress under which they work." Finally, it must be noted that the directions which Cooley and Mead gave to the study of small groups have, as the experiments above amply testify, been borne out in these rigid studies of the importance of the process of communication in group organization and performance. The importance of the face-to-face element of the small group situation emphasized so strongly by Cooley and Mead has also been verified under rigid experimental conditions.¹⁵

The relationship found in this study is explained as being due to the greater physical and expressive stimulus value a member of a group has for others the more nearly opposite he sits from one in a circle. These



results conform to the belief that individuals partaking in a discussion respond to other factors in an individual than the mere content of his remarks.

¹⁵ Bernard Steinzor, "The Spatial Factor in Face to Face Discussion Groups," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1950, 45, pp. 552-555. Reprinted in Hare, Borgatta, and Bales, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

Thus, in summary, later research developments have verified the earlier speculation that the intimate nature of communication in face-to-face groupings is the reason for the impact of these groupings upon the individual and their grip upon him. Further, the communication pattern of the small group tends to produce understanding and agreement among its members with respect to standards, norms, and beliefs, so that a *culture* will result from their interaction, as will a group structure which will be both a consequence of and a factor limiting the communication pattern. An especial consequence of the communication pattern will be the elevation to leadership of the person most embodying the norms of the group and hence in the best position to serve as the central person in the communication net of the group. The leader is also best able to clear the network of "jam ups" due to conflicts of beliefs between members since he is best able to resolve matters according to the norms of the group and to secure the approval of the members for the form which his solution will take.

Thus far we have been interested in the processes of communication and interaction as these function to organize and weld together the small group. We have been concerning ourselves with *intragroup* processes. These do not become different processes when conflict between groups occurs. Rather it is that these intragroup processes become intensified when the group is threatened by some other group or groups. Consequently, small-group researchers have learned much about the processes of intragroup solidarity from studying them in the context of intergroup rivalry and hostility.

Intergroup Relations

By concentrating upon the internal workings of small groups we saw that (1) they develop a hierarchal system of statuses and roles, and (2) they develop a culture. The most striking feature we might note in the processes of intergroup relations is the tendency for this culture to contain stereotypes and other attitudes hostile to other groups as friction and tension develop between them. One of the most important fruits that might be expected of the research labors in the small-group area is the understanding of the processes that produce friction between groups and from these understandings to develop formulas for bettering intergroup relations. Toward this end, the Sherifs have contributed one of the more capably planned and executed studies of small groups, designed to induce tensions artificially between two groups and then to

observe the course of relations between them.¹⁶ Their study gives us the opportunity to present the basic features of intergroup processes in a true-life context.

The Bulldogs and the Red Devils

This experiment in producing friction and negative stereotypes, in artificially inducing reciprocal "in-group" and "out-group" attitudes within and between groups, was conducted in a summer camp in Connecticut in 1949. The chief investigator, M. Sherif, assumed the identity of a maintenance man in order to be able to make observations from a neutral position, and also, in his role of caretaker he could come and go freely in both factions being studied. The subjects for the experiment were told that they were to attend a summer camp under the sponsorship of the Yale Psychology Department. They had no further knowledge about being subjects of an experiment. They were twenty-four in number and were carefully chosen so as to be homogeneous in background. They were lower middle class, white, Protestant, of average mental ability (average IQ of 104.8), and normal in every respect. There were no behavior-problem children nor extreme individual deviation of any kind that the investigators could notice.

The site for the study was an isolated (eight miles to the nearest town) spot in Connecticut near the Massachusetts state line. There were no visitors to the camp during the eighteen days of the experiment and the activities and interests of the subjects were therefore confined to the 125 acres of hills and timber which made up the camp site. There was a stream for swimming and fishing. The conveniences of civilization were few in number; there were two bunkhouses (the importance of this fact will become more obvious as our description of the study unfolds), a few tents and buildings for mess and equipment needs, and an administration building, none of which had electric lights. There were broad, level areas which were used for playing fields.

Sherif set up the plan of the experiment in three stages or periods:¹⁷

Stage I was planned as the period of informal groupings on the basis of personal inclinations and interests. All activities were camp-wide, offering maximum freedom for choice and "mixing up" of boys in

¹⁶ Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, *Groups in Harmony and Tension: An Integration of Studies on Intergroup Relations*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 239–240.

various games and camp duties. Thus it became possible to single out budding friendship groups and, more or less, to equate the weights of such personal factors in the two experimental groups of Stage II.

Stage II was planned as the stage of formation of in-groups as similar as possible in number and composition of members. Each experimental group would participate separately in activities involving all the members of the group. Activities were chosen on the basis of their appeal value to the boys and their involvement of the whole group. Different activities afforded varied situations in which all members of a group could find opportunity to participate and "shine." All rewards given in this period were made on a group-unit basis, not to particular individuals.

Stage III was planned to study *intergroup relations* between the two experimental in-groups thus produced when these groups were brought into contact (1) in a series of competitive activities and situations and (2) in mildly frustrating situations so arranged that the activities of one group were frustrating to the other. In line with the findings of frustration studies . . . special frustrations of *individuals* were not experimentally introduced; rather, on the whole all individual members of a group saw the frustrations as their own precisely because they interfered with *their group*. Great care was taken that these frustrating situations not be blamed on the adults in the situation, but on the other group of boys. This effort was successful to a major degree.

The observations of the groups were made chiefly by two graduate students who, as senior counselors to the boys, were in a position to observe the processes of in-group cohesion and out-group hostility as these developed. They were led, of course, by the chief investigator, Sherif, in his role of "Mr. Musee," the caretaker. Note taking was surreptitious and strong measures were taken to mask the role of these individuals as scientific investigators.

Stage I. The first three days of camp were devoted to allowing spontaneous formations of grouping to arise solely on the basis of attractions and dislikes of the individual boys. They lived in one bunkhouse and freely selected their companions for play activities, eating, and the like. All activities were camp-wide. Emerging friendship clusters and leadership were noted. Interestingly, leaders in this phase of the study were not necessarily leaders in the succeeding stages. The leadership at this spontaneous stage arose out of proficiency in the activities undertaken, as for example, softball (where incidentally the unquestioned leader in this stage was in the lower status level of his group in the later stages). Friendship clusters such as the "three musketeers" arose. One of them

told "Mr. Musee," "When one of us does not do something, then none of us do it." The popularity ratings (sociograms) which were constructed showed that the boys were beginning to form "natural" clusters of two, three, and four friendship groupings. These natural clusterings were crucial to the experiment. It was imperative that they be deliberately split up. A boy was assigned to his group for Stage II on the basis of the *fewest* of his friendship choices represented in that group. The purpose of this, of course, was to create a situation where the group processes of Stage II were at work in such a way as not to be clouded or confused by the presence of "natural" individual preferences. At the end of Stage I the total friendship choices of the boys, soon to be divided into "Red Devils" and "Bulldogs," were as illustrated in this diagram of Sherif's:

Table 12. Total Choices of Friends, End of Stage I

<i>Choices made by</i>	<i>Choices received by</i>	
	<i>Eventual Red Devils</i>	<i>Eventual Bulldogs</i>
Eventual Red Devils	35.1%	64.9%
Eventual Bulldogs	65.0%	35.0%

In the two experimental groups that were set up in the next stage, therefore, there were contained in each the majority of friendship choices made by the other.

Stage II. The second five days of camp were devoted to the setting up of in-group processes. The boys were divided up into the red group and the blue group, and after voting, one chose to stay in the original bunkhouse while the other group chose to move to the other bunkhouse which the camp provided. The reason given to the boys for the split-up was administrative convenience in handling the camp group. There were some emotional disturbances about parting from their newly made friends of Stage I, and the investigators tried to smooth over this transition with exciting activities, hikes, and cook-outs with steak and other special foods broiled over open fires.

After the sharp break, the process of building them into separate groups began. They engaged in all of their activities separately. They neither ate, nor played, nor camped with the other group and they lived in separate bunkhouses as we have said. All of the activities of Stage II required that the member cooperate with his group in collectively

reaching group ends, yet the activities were also carefully selected to allow ample opportunity for each boy to demonstrate his worth in some way.

These participations resulted in both groups in the familiar status hierarchy which previous studies indicated would be the result (see, for example, the Nortons and the Bank Wiring Room group). The sociograms which follow show the relative prestige positions of the boys, much as do the box rankings of the Nortons; but unlike Whyte's diagram of the lines connecting the Nortons (lines of "influence"), Sherif noted several disparities between popularity and power which




FIG. 17. End of Stage II, in-group formation. Reproduced with permission from Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, *Groups in Harmony and Tension: An Integration of Studies on Intergroup Relations*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953, p. 251.




FIG. 18. End of Stage II, in-group formation. Reproduced with permission from Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, *Groups in Harmony and Tension: An Integration of Studies on Intergroup Relations*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953, p. 252.

would indicate the need for further research in this area. Also, by turning to the sociograms, it can be seen that the "gap" between the leaders and the majority of group members in the Red Devil group is much greater than in the Bulldog group. This differential pattern of cohesiveness points to another area which needs exploring further. But these questions are peripheral to our main consideration here. The fact is that in each of the two groups a social system *did* develop and Sherif was able to derive many important conclusions from this fact.¹⁸

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

As the groups formed, the members of each achieved positive in-group identifications along with the acquisition of certain statuses and roles. This identification resulted in shifts or reversals in friendship preferences of in-group members *away* from previously budding relationships of Stage I with individuals who became out-group members *toward* friendship preferences within the in-group. In short, the developing in-groups became the *reference* groups of the individual members. In the process of in-group formation, by-products of group interaction were standardized as *social norms*. Among these by-products were those relating to loyalty in the in-group, nicknames for various members, catchwords, preferred songs, ways of going about group activities, and sanctions for behavior deviant to group norms or contrary to the direction of group activity.

The reversals of friendship preferences at the end of Stage I are graphic evidence of this developmental in-group process. Reversals in friendship choice for former friends not in the out-group and the tendency to identify with those in the in-group were apparent. The friendship choices at the end of Stage II, Sherif illustrates as follows:

Table 13. Total Choices of Friends, End of Stage II

Choices made by	Choices received by	
	Red Devils, per cent	Bulldogs, per cent
Red Devils	95.0	5.0
Bulldogs	12.3	87.7

Comparing these choices with those made at the end of Stage I (Table 12) there is a switch from eventual Red Devils' preferences for individuals who would eventually be Bulldogs from 64.9 per cent down to 5 per cent and eventual Bulldogs' choices for eventual Red Devils from 65 per cent down to 12.3 per cent. The existence of in-group sentiments and attachments is clearly indicated.

Stage III. Stage III, the stage of intergroup relations, lasted about five days during which the two groups were brought into functional relationship *with each other* (as opposed, it will be recalled, to Stage I, the pregroup formation stage, and Stage II, where the two groups were deliberately kept separate from each other and during which intragroup sentiments and structure were developed). Now the groups were brought into relationships with one another. A series of competitive games were

introduced by the counselors as if in concession to the demands of the two groups. Points were granted to either group for winning games and contests, for the neatest bunkhouse, and for other bases which could be judged. The cumulative advantage of points of the Bulldogs over the Red Devils is extremely significant to note.

Table 14. Cumulative Points

Day	Bulldogs	Red Devils
1	26	16
2	46.5	41.5
3	89.5	49.5

At first, there was "good sportsmanship," for example, a cheer after each game. As time wore on, the cheering became less good-natured. It started out as "2-4-6-8, who do we appreciate," followed by the name of the other team. It changed to "2-4-6-8, who do we appreciate." As the pattern of rivalry increased in intensity several important socio-psychological phenomena were observed. There were *perceptual* distortions by individuals in seeing through the eyes of the group. The Red Devils agreed that "the ground was against them" after a loss at tug-of-war. On another occasion all agreed that the Bulldogs "must have done something to the rope." Group efforts and goals became *personal* ones and intensively so for some individuals. Under the frustration of losing to the Bulldogs the Red Devils showed signs of *disintegration*. There were loose accusations of blame which tended to undermine the structure of the group. There was *group shame*. "Gee, we better win that treasure hunt or we won't even be able to call ourselves Red Devils any more."

In addition to the conflict engendered by the contests the investigators contrived some frustration situations, such as making it appear that one group had picked over and rejected the refreshments left to the other group. The derogatory remarks mounted in intensity, acts of overt hostility increased, and the danger of actual violence grew. The conflict situation was terminated and the camp was ostensibly reduced to the one group level of Stage I. All activities were restored to the original camp-wide dimension so that all evidence of the Red Devils and Bulldogs would be removed. The evidence, however, was written in the memories of the boys themselves, and they still tended to maintain

their group prejudices. The "three musketeers" of Stage I, having been split up 2-1 due to the nature of Stage II, were now thoroughly divided and their earlier sentiments of liking had turned to hostility.

Clearly, membership in groups affects the individual's perception, his judgment, and his goals. Returning to the concepts of Cooley we are interested to see that his conception of social participation and "human nature" as being inextricably interwoven is more than borne out by the research on small groups as social systems. For the remainder of the present chapter we shall spell out this relationship of the small group and the individual, although our presentation will necessarily have to be something of a summary since almost all that we wish to examine has been discussed in this present chapter or elsewhere in this textbook.

THE SMALL GROUP AND THE INDIVIDUAL

As a matter of convenience we can divide the influences of the small group upon the individual into two broad categories, although the dividing line between them is somewhat vague in places. We can say that the small group has influenced the individual in his *socialization*, the development of his personality through group participation, and in *social control* of his actions and behavior here and now. Turning first to the socialization of the individual, we have noted elsewhere the primary importance of the family in forming the personality of the young. Indeed, this *first* of the individual's life groupings was called "primary" for this very reason and others are called "primary" because they share some of the capacity of family grouping for holding a grip upon the individual. We have summarized elsewhere in this book the significance of family life for the socialization of the individual. "The family affects the individual first; family experiences are repetitive; the family is the major agent for transmitting culture; family conditioning has a special emotional quality; and the family is a status giver and as such fosters interdependence." We noted also the importance of sibling and peer play groups upon the individual and especially his norms of morality and justice. Throughout the lifetime of the individual his *reference* groups will be the source of most of his religious, political, economic, and other attitudes. Even in old age his socialization will continue as he adjusts and adapts to the peer groups of elders—to the statuses and roles which

these provide him and to the cultural beliefs, attitudes, and sentiments which develop as cultures within them.

Without the human group the isolate human individual does not develop his human nature. Every man born of woman is, of course, intrinsically a human being. Participation in small groups is a necessary condition for his human nature to develop and flourish. *Feral* children, i.e., human beings who become isolated from human participation and are reared by animals, exhibit animalistic behavior more suitable to the infrahuman than to the human species.¹⁹ Isolates who have not had the company of normal persons and the participation in the communication systems of small groups are similarly handicapped. In several instances, upon being exposed to the communication systems of small groups, those earlier viewed as uneducable, now are known to be able to "catch up" with normal children if the situation is corrected in time.²⁰ In the discussion of psychosis and neurosis, we saw that the individual must actively participate in small, intimate, human groupings in order to maintain his "mental health." One meaning of the concept of "anomie" refers to those whose groups have been shattered around them and for whom there are no new groups to which they can relate.

Yet, the socialization of the individual is only one side of the coin. Small groups are the basic social unit of which the most basic is the family. The social control over the individual which is achieved in these groups, the habits which they embed in him make of them the "enormous flywheel of society," as Dewey once described the habit process itself. Society itself never deals with the individual directly but rather indirectly through the face-to-face relations of the small group in which each to each is a looking glass, and the standards of society as seen by the "significant other" are the mirror for the right conduct of the individual. A grave concern is often expressed concerning the failure of small groups to control the individual in modern society.²¹

The customs, traditions, and other expectations have been those of the small group, and these standards have been the basic determinant of social existence. In contemporary life, the small group has lost many of

¹⁹ J. A. L. Singh and Robert M. Zingg, *Wolf Children and Feral Men*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1939.

²⁰ Kingley Davis, "Final Note on a Case of Extreme Isolation," *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1947, 52, pp. 432-437.

²¹ Francis E. Merrill and H. Wentworth Eldredge, *Society and Culture: An Introduction to Sociology*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957.

its important functions. The society may be correspondingly weakened in the face of the declining importance of small group interaction. Continued failure to maintain the small group as a central unit may threaten the existence of society.

To a certain extent it is doubtless true that the decline in small groups is resulting in a high incidence of breakdowns in social control and consequently in an increasing amount of "collective behavior," behavior away from and opposed to the existing social structure. We shall explore this subject further in the next chapter. In the final chapter of the text, however, we shall return to the subject of modern man and his social environment, including, of course, his small groups. At that point we shall see that the loss in small groups is a quantitative rather than a qualitative one. In other words, the small groups that are left may perform more essential functions than ever before. Lest, however, we should tend to overlook the breakdowns in social control which have occurred in modern society, and the decline of small groups is related to this breakdown in social control, let us turn to the subject of "collective behavior," behavior which is a barometer of the cohesiveness of any social structure.

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Chapter 15

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

One of the most curious of social psychology's concepts is the reference to certain types of behavior as "collective." Actually, any interactional behavior occurring in a social situation is "collective" as the term is ordinarily used. We have here one of those instances where some understanding of the historical currents in a field is necessary to the understanding of its current theory. Hence, as a preliminary to the present chapter, let us briefly review the development of the notion of "collective behavior." R. E. Park, one of the "Chicago School" which influenced modern American social psychology so greatly, described collective behavior as follows:¹

Whenever individuals come together even in the most informal way, no matter how strange they may be to one another, nor how great the social distances that separate them, the mere fact that they are aware of one another's presence immediately sets up a lively exchange of influences, the first effect of which is to produce a mood, a *Stimmung*, under the influence of which the individual's behavior—his thoughts and sentiments if not his actions—are controlled and directed.

Thus, in early social psychology, there were two main divisions of inquiry, first, inquiry into *personality* (which we have discussed at length in preceding chapters), and second, inquiry into *collective behavior* (which is our concern in the present chapter). This same general classification still applies, but it is preferable to think of this latter area, as we have suggested many times, as the *social situation*, which we can

¹ R. E. Park, "Collective Behavior," *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, 3, pp. 631-633.

then break down into the finer distinctions which are made in contemporary social psychology. The first book to be titled *Collective Behavior*² treated of four general categories according to the types of social situation encountered in each.

A. Cultural

1. Institutional
2. Conventional
3. Regimental
4. Formal

B. Recreational

1. Congenial
2. Audience
3. Public

C. Control

1. Exchange
2. Politic
3. Nomothetic

D. Escape

1. Panic
2. Revelous
3. Fanatical
4. Rebellious

Since the time when collective behavior was so conceived, theoretical developments in sociology have brought about certain changes in the ways in which social psychologists conceive of the area.

Culture and *society* (or social system) have come to be distinguished from each other and yet are acknowledged to be so interdependent that they are often loosely referred to jointly as "social structure." In a given society there are status and role systems which order the relations of individuals one to another (social systems), and there are ways of thinking and acting that constitute their "way" of life which is handed down from generation to generation (culture). These two together are called the "social structure." The important point for us to note here is that *behavior which contributes to, supports, upholds, and perpetuates existing social structure is no longer considered collective behavior*. Hence, *small-group analysis*, concerned as it is with the *social organization* (recall the status rankings of the Nortons, page 336, and, indeed, of all

² Richard T. LaPiere, *Collective Behavior*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1938.

the groups studied) and *culture* of small groups (the norms and sentiments which developed in the Bank Wiring Room group, the Nortons, the Bulldogs and the Red Devils) is a specialty which, in "coming into its own," has appropriated an area once considered as an aspect of collective behavior.

Turning from the small group ("microsociety") to the broad social structure of modern society ("macrosociety") we can see that the same reasoning applies. There is a *social organization*, vastly more complex, of course, than that of a small group but different only in degree and not in kind from the status systems of small groups. There are, also, attitudes, beliefs, values, and other shared sentiments and norms which comprise the *culture* of our society. We shall discuss these at greater length in the next and concluding chapter of this book. At this point we wish to point out that the social psychology of participation in normal social structure might well be called the *psychology of social structure*, but, for the same reasoning which we applied to small-group analysis, *it is no longer considered collective behavior*.

One final word on the subject may clear up any lingering confusion. In addition to the areas of collective behavior which have been appropriated by small-group analysts and students of social organizations, collective behavior has reduced its own scope by its continued preoccupation with only a certain *kind* of interactional situation. This continued interest in the *strange*, the *dramatic*, the *bizarre*, even the *morbid* types of collectivities have given collective behavior a character somewhat like that of abnormal psychology within general psychology. It is concerned with the types of interaction which make for the destruction of existing society, its structure, and its norms. It becomes a science of collective pathology (within social psychology, of course), so that we must think of collective behavior in a much narrower sense than the framework in which it was originally conceived. To illustrate this point we reproduce LaPiere's early typology diagrammatically, to show what is and what is not considered collective behavior in modern theory. Note that "Recreational" behavior partakes of the flavor of each.

The implications of this emphasis in modern collective behavior are clear, even if, initially, the situation seems confused. Collective behavior has mapped out for itself the following area:




Table 15. The Changing Conceptions of Collective Behavior

<i>Social organizational behavior</i> (not collective behavior)		<i>Disruptive behavior</i> (hence, collective behavior)	
A. Cultural			
1. Institutional			
2. Conventional			
3. Regimental			
4. Formal			
		B. Recreational	
		1. Congenial	
		2. Audience	
		3. Public	
C. Control			
1. Exchange			
2. Politic			
3. Nomothetic			
		D. Escape	
		1. Panic	
		2. Revelous	
		3. Fanatical	
		4. Rebellious	


This behavior can range from a brief and transitory gathering of people to watch a crane operator perform (some contractors have even installed a "Sidewalk Superintendent" platform to accommodate such gatherings) to a full-blown social movement in which, for example, thousands of people migrate to a new home where they can be free to practice their own religious rites without interference. Needless to say the sidewalk audience will soon disappear and its social significance will be small. On the other hand, the social movement, though many die aborning, may survive and accomplish its purpose of establishing a new social order, although the more usual result, even where the movement is successful, is to strike some balance or compromise with the existing social order. Thus, we have a continuum along which we can order collectivities which fall within the purview of collective behavior. Within this scope of inquiry there are distinguished three kinds of collectivities which have received intensive study, *crowds*, *diffuse collectivities*, and *social movements*.³ Our presentation in this chapter will therefore center around these three types of collectivities.

³ Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, *Collective Behavior*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957.

THE CROWD

Crowds are collectivities that are *congregate*, *polarized* (temporarily), that involve only temporary *identification*, and are of a sufficiently large *size* that the processes of organization characteristic of small groups are not at work.⁴ They will be coacting, therefore, rather than interacting; they will tend to be anonymous, casual, temporary, and unorganized. This provides a basis for contrasting crowds with other types of collectivities, in terms of the conceptual tools with which collective-behavior analysts study the crowd. The crowd is *congregate* in that the individuals in it are shoulder-to-shoulder, unlike, on the one hand, the small group where the interaction is face-to-face and more intimate, and unlike, on the other hand, the public, which is too large to congregate and whose members therefore never come together. The crowd is *polarized* in that, temporarily at least, the individuals are paying simultaneous attention to an event or person; there will be little or no division of labor, little specialization of function, since all are doing the same thing. There is little *identification* of self with a crowd, although, as we shall see, there

Table 16. The Varieties of Crowds*



* Reproduced with permission from Roger W. Brown, "Mass Phenomena," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1954.

is a peculiar involvement of the "generalized other" and certain types of crowds where the "illusion of universality" leads the person to do things in such crowds that he would never do in isolation or in small groups of his intimates.

⁴ Roger W. Brown, "Mass Phenomena," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1954, pp. 833-873.

Crowds can be conveniently classified as *passive* or *active*. A crowd that is *doing* something is a *mob*, while a crowd that is passive, is having something done to it, is an *audience*. This major distinction is made because the processes of crowd formation and reaction differ importantly for the two types of crowds. There are classifications within these two categories that are also significant because of their significance for such processes. Mobs, for example, have characteristically been classified as *aggressive*, *escape*, *acquisitive*, and *expressive*, while audiences are often classified as *casual* or *intentional* (see Table 16). In our discussion of crowds in this section of the chapter we shall make use of these classifications. We turn first to the properties of mobs.

The Characteristics and Processes of Mobs

Brown⁵ notes congruences in collective-behavior analyses which enable us to focus upon three properties of mobs and the mechanisms which explain these properties. They are (1) *mental homogeneity*, (2) *emotionality*, and (3) *irrationality*. There is no such thing as a "crowd mind" excepting as a poetic description of the mental homogeneity which the mob seems to impose on its members. Everyone in a mob does seem to think and act alike. *Suggestion*, *imitation*, and *contagion* are descriptive terms which serve well to indicate the kind of hysterical tendency there is in a mob to do what others are doing. This hysterical interstimulation has been described as "social facilitation" and its contagion throughout a mob, the "fever pitch" which the mob achieves through "interactional amplification." These terms do little more than describe the phenomena, however, and much more research on collective-behavior phenomena is needed for clarification of the precise reason why *emotionality* and *irrationality* rather than more rational factors spread through the mob. Rationality is never completely absent from a mob because its members, of course, never lose their human, i.e., rational, nature. Nevertheless, this rationality is distorted in mob action, and the kinds of acts performed by individuals in mobs show a sharp discontinuity with the behavior of these individuals when in isolation or in small groups.

[Probably the *frustration-aggression* concept of the neo-Freudians is the nearest to the mark of the theoretical devices which set out to explain the emotional and irrational actions of individuals in mobs. They contend that tensions accumulate in individuals when social conditions

⁵ *Ibid.*

exert frustrations upon them. When a mob forms, therefore, individuals are able to release these tensions in ways which "everyday" morality would not permit, but the "illusion of universality" (a concept contributed by the psychologist Allport), the notion that a thing must be right because "everyone is doing it," makes the deed subjectively acceptable. This concept has much to support it. Mobs typically occur in areas of social tension. The tensions which are released do seem to be *present already in individuals* and the mob merely triggers them. Then, too, there are *thresholds* of involvement in mob activity. More disturbed individuals in the community seem to be involved first, to be most attracted to the mob, with mob contagion spreading to more "stable" members of the community. Nevertheless, no one set of principles has been developed which explains thus neatly all mob violence. Each of the following types of mobs seems to have special processes of its own within, of course, the same overall context of the mob, its mental homogeneity, its emotionality, and its irrationality.

The aggressive mob has as its object the injury of some person or group. It lynches, riots, or terrorizes. Examples of such mobs are numerous. They inevitably make the headlines as the violence into which human nature can erupt is nowhere more graphic and dramatic than in race, prison, or terrorizing mobs. We must assume, as we remarked above, that the tensions which are relieved in such mobs have accumulated prior to the appearance of the mob and that the mob is the occasion for release of the tensions. Almost anything can come to be a symbol upon which the mob vents its hostilities. The black skin of the Negro, the yellow badge which the Jew was forced to wear in Hitler's period of conquest, the uniform of the prison guard. The "Zoot suit" was one such symbol and illustrates the role of such a symbol in intergroup hostility.⁶

The "Zoot-Suit Riots." Beginning on June 3, 1943, Los Angeles, California, was the scene of sporadic acts of violence involving principally United States Naval personnel with the support of a sympathetic Anglo community and members of the Mexican community. This period of crowd violence has come to be known as the "zoot-suit riots." The designation "zooter" referred mainly to two characteristics. First, the zoot suit was a style of clothing featuring long suit-coats and trousers

⁶ Ralph H. Turner and Samuel J. Surace, "Zootsuits and Mexicans: Symbols in Crowd Behavior," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1956, 62, pp. 14-20. Reprinted in part in Turner and Killian, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

which were extremely pegged at the cuff, draping fully around the knees and terminating in deep pleats at the waist. Second, the zooters wore their hair long, full, and well greased.

We shall not describe the action in detail. It is sufficient to state that many attacks and injuries were sustained by both sides. Groups of sailors were frequently reported to be assisted or accompanied by civilian mobs who "egged" them on as they roamed through downtown streets in search of victims. "Zooters" discovered on city streets were assaulted and forced to disrobe amidst the jibes and molestations of the crowd. Street-cars and buses were stopped and searched. "Zooters" found therein were carried off into the streets and subjected to beatings. Cavalcades of hired taxicabs filled with sailors ranged the east-side districts of Los Angeles seeking, finding and attacking "zooters." Civilian gangs of east-side adolescents organized similar attacks against unwary naval personnel, inflicting injury and swelling the cries of "outrage."

Starting with the social unrest of wartime and the tensions which individuals store up during such a time, a "natural" condition exists for intergroup conflict and race rioting. Such was the case in Los Angeles in 1943. However, the conception of the Mexican in terms of the historical heritage of Old California, his dashing romantic temperament, his devout religiosity, made it impossible for Angelenos to accept him as a scapegoat. Actual rioting against Negroes and Mexicans was taking place "but all the great sanctioning majority" ever heard was that the attacks were upon Zootsuiters. This illustrates the role of the symbol in the activities of mobs. Reducing members of a minority group to a *stereotyped* caricature seems necessary to make the acts of violence acceptable to an acquiescing majority.

The *escape mob* unlike other types of mobs is not polarized upon an object, as for example, is the aggressive mob (described above) polarized on the "Zooter." On the contrary, the panic of such a mob is centrifugal, the *individual* aim is escape or avoidance but the *collective* interactional processes which develop defeat this purpose. Escape is essentially emotional and irrational (i.e., it is rational to want to escape from a fire or a sinking ship, but the means taken are usually not effective in the light of this goal). This is illustrated in the following account of the Iroquois Theater fire:⁷

The theater itself never burned—they could have given performances in it a couple of days afterward. But it didn't have to burn to kill its hundreds.

⁷ W. A. Brady, *Showman*, New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1937, p. 254.

The people from the balcony were piled in the narrow arch at the head of the big gilt stairway—and already many of them must have been crushed to death. Many of those in the orchestra had mobbed the side doors, which had never been inspected to see if they would open at all. And there was another fearful jam at the main orchestra entrance.

The jam at the balcony door was the worst. The victims had climbed over one another until, after it was over, they were found jamming the doorway from top to bottom.

A similar behavior pattern was observed at the time of the sinking of the *Lusitania*:⁸

On the *Lusitania*, torpedoed in British waters on May 7, 1915, collective, rather than individual, suicide appears to have been the predominant panic pattern. Early in the course of the disaster, a number of overfilled and badly launched lifeboats sank. This fact, combined with the fact that the ship leaned so much that the remaining lifeboats had to be launched either down the sloping side or out over the water, seems to have been responsible for the establishment of a refuse-to-leave-the-ship pattern. People huddled hopelessly along the rails until the ship sank. Of the 1,954 passengers, 1,189 drowned. The hero of the occasion was an eighteen-year-old boy, under whose leadership a few boats were successfully filled and launched.

The course of such collective folly is described by LaPiere in terms of three central concepts. First, an ordinary situation is interrupted by a sudden external stimulus which produces *shock* in the individuals involved. There is a sense of *panic*, autonomic nervous-system reactions predominate, and following the sense of shock, in a numbed state, every individual is fumbling for some mode of adjustment to the danger. It is only necessary for some person who is behaving rationally or irrationally to capture the attention of the individuals to induce *mimicry*. Hence, the crucial question revolves around the type of leadership which presents itself at this point in the sequence of events. The folklore of the theater includes many tales of the heroism of such vaudeville stars as Eddie Foy, Sr., and others who “headed off” panic in their audiences by singing songs and telling jokes while the audience filed out of the theater in an orderly manner. Shipboard drills are a nuisance to ocean travelers, but when a time of panic occurs the previous drill provides a series of “built-in” responses which can be reverted back

⁸ Richard T. LaPiere, *op. cit.*, p. 459.

to when the aimless milling of the escape mob threatens to degenerate even further into destructive chaos.

[The *acquisitive mob*, unlike the escape mob, is polarized and centripetal in that there is a convergence upon some object which is highly desired. The essential characteristics of the mob are present, however, as the acquisitive mob defeats itself through its own emotionality and irrationality. This is the type of mob that descends upon banks and ensures, through a "bank-run," that if the banks were not in trouble before they soon will be. These are the mobs of the gold rush, the land boom, and the sure thing.⁹

Although it started as a realty promotion, even the great Florida land boom of 1926 was not induced by deliberate leadership. G. E. Merrick, who originally owned the land in Miami, center of the boom, was a victim, rather than a cause, of that boom. His Coral Gables development, first of the boom-time subdivisions, was intended as a colony for retired ministers, who, he thought, would appreciate the pleasant climate and the low cost of living in Florida. The son of a minister, Merrick undertook the enterprise in the spirit of humanitarianism. Construction started in 1922. It was not until the boom was well underway that Merrick caught the fever and permitted his associates to advertise and otherwise exploit Coral Gables.

During 1925 and 1926 the Florida land boom reached unprecedented intensity. Lots which had brought \$1,500 or less in 1915 sold at the peak of the boom for upwards of \$2,000,000. Jazz bands enticed buyers into the Everglades where people bought sections of swamps at fabulous prices. Late in the spring of 1926 construction began to slow down; a hurricane in September washed out the last of the hopeful; and the boom was over.

The infectious nature of the boom provided the stimulus of a mass movement to mob after mob of fortune seekers engaging in the emotional and irrational behavior characteristic of the mob. Here, the accumulated tensions which are released in the acquisitive mob are, of course, those of an acquisitive society where the individual's desire for status and prestige is wrapped in his ability to make money.

The *expressive mob*, the behavior of which LaPiere calls "revelous," includes orgiastic dances, the Mardi Gras, and revival meetings and refers to any collective behavior which provides a release from the hum-

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 513.

drum of everyday living. There is, of course, in the expressive mob an indication of maladjustment of individuals to their social roles, since such tensions have accumulated within them that great emotional catharsis is required for release. Liston Pope's description of a revival meeting at a "Holiness" storefront church illustrates the emotional climate of such a meeting (see page 131). Blumer¹⁰ stresses two important factors in such behavior, catharsis and what corresponds to the concept of the "illusion of universality" as Allport has used the term.

The individual in the expressive crowd. The stimulation that the individual receives from those with whom he is in rapport lessens his ordinary self-control and evokes and incites impulsive feelings which take possession of him. He feels carried away by a spirit whose source is unknown, but whose effect is acutely appreciated. There are two conditions which are likely to make this experience one of ecstasy and exaltation, and to seal it with a sacred or divine stamp. The first is that the experience is cathartic in nature. The individual who has been in a state of tension, discomfort, and perhaps anxiety suddenly gains full release and experiences the joy and fullness that come with such relief. This organic satisfaction unquestionably yields a pleasure and exhilaration that makes the experience momentous. The fact that this mood has such complete and unobstructed control over the individual easily leads him to feel that he is possessed or pervaded by a kind of transcendental spirit. The other condition which gives the experience a religious character is the approval and sanction implied in the support coming from those with whom he is in rapport. The fact that others are sharing the same experience rids it of suspicion and enables its unqualified acceptance. When an experience gives complete and full satisfaction, when it is socially stimulated, approved, and sustained, and when it comes in the form of a mysterious possession from the outside, it easily acquires a religious character.

Expressive mobs are often built-in features of the social calendar both in primitive tribes and modern societies. Benedict's "Dionysian" primitive participates in revelous behavior at intervals throughout the year. "Stag parties," American Legion conventions, and festivals of various sorts are examples of outlets for accumulated tension in modern society. As such they are social "safety valves." A moderate number of such activities either openly or surreptitiously conducted do not seem a serious threat to society. Of course, when a populace is as

¹⁰ Herbert Blumer, "Elementary Collective Groupings," in Alfred Mc. Lee (ed.), *Principles of Sociology*, New York, Barnes and Noble, Inc., The College Outline Series, 1955, pp. 183-184.

chronically restive as that of Rome during the days of her decline, the chronic need for emotional catharsis is indicative of grave social disorganization.

The *audience* is a polarized crowd that congregates, not for the purpose of acting (although shoulder-to-shoulder aggregates are always potentially kinetic) but rather for a more passive role of being affected by the object of their polarization. Audiences are most often categorized in terms of the degree of formality which attends them. Thus, they can be organized along a continuum ranging from “purely casual” at one end to “completely formal” at the other:

<i>Casual audience</i>	<i>Formal audience</i>
Completely spontaneous	Scheduled, regulated time and place
Psychologically potent	Limited psychologically
No organization	Institutionalized
Polarization accidental	Polarization intentional

We could very likely assemble a casual audience by the simple expedient of walking, say to a college quadrangle, and by looking up into the air for a few minutes soon gather our assemblage of the curious. The spontaneity of the gathering makes it not less but more psychologically potent. If, for example, we could initiate an impromptu basketball “rally” among those who had gathered as a result of our prank, such a rally would *quite likely be more expressive* than those which are formally designated in terms of time and meeting place. Yet such informal and impromptu gatherings are, of course, of less and less significance in modern society, where the necessity of planning formal gatherings is a result of large size and of increasing specialization of function.

Formal audiences can be manipulated once the processes involved are understood. The polarization of attention of the individuals is influenced by seating arrangement. Hence, when it is desired that the audience polarize on a performer, the seats would be arranged in one way, and when crowd processes are desired, the seats would be arranged in another, more intimate way. Other relationships between the setting and the reactions of audiences have been noted. Young notes:¹¹

Common sense observation and experience indicate that the reactions of the audience are influenced by the size of the hall, the number who

¹¹ Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1956, p. 303.

attend, and many other conditions. For instance, if one were to plan a protest meeting—a type of conversional gathering—it would be well to secure a hall which would by ordinary standards be too small for the expected number. That is, it would be more effective to crowd 200 persons into a room which normally seats only 150, than to scatter 200 persons in a hall that would easily accommodate 1,000. Moreover, temperature, humidity, ventilation, lighting, kinds of seats, and wall decorations all play a part as a background to audience behavior.

The audience is conceptualized as a passive crowd but this is not to say that it *cannot* act, especially if the speaker or performer is skilled at arousing its action potential, or as a rare exception, when the speaker or performer is so unskilled that he permits the audience to “get away” from him. The speaker is influenced by the members of the audience in two ways. They are his “hypothetical listeners” as he prepares his material and rehearses its presentation. During the actual delivery of his material the audience is a “significant other” to him and their facial expressions and other gestures tend to produce a modification in the content and form of his presentation. Hence, there is decidedly an interaction between the speaker or performer and his audience.

Young offers five stages in the psychological interplay of the speaker or performer and his audience: (1) preliminary tuning; (2) establishing the initial relationships; (3) securing and maintaining rapport; (4) the play of persuasion and suggestion; and possibly (5) the incitement to action.¹² Expectations and anticipatory responses in the audience, either existing prior to their arrival or “worked up” prior to the performance, have a major role in the success or failure of the performance. Radio and television comedians make a practice of “warming up” the studio audience prior to the time of broadcast, to ensure that the audience will have the expectation of having a good time. Since the expectation usually leads to its own fulfillment this is a wise precaution. It is necessary also to establish the all-to-one polarization which is the essential feature of the relationship between the members of the audience and the speaker or performer. Any one-to-one polarization in the audience is a threat to his command of the situation. The all-to-one polarization is achieved in various ways, by dimming the house lights, by striking a knife against a water glass at a banquet, or by some such sensory cue.

The establishing of rapport goes far beyond the mere establishment

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 304.

of the all-to-one polarization. Identification with and emotional investment in the situation is highly desirable when conversion to some point of view is being attempted. Quite often professional converters will "spot" the audience with hired members who are to stimulate such identification by appropriate actions such as shouting approval or clapping when indicated. These serve to stimulate interactional amplification among the members and help create the "illusion of universality." Suggestion and persuasion are most effective when they are geared to the lowest common denominator of the audience. And, as Young says, "The masses have more in common at an emotional and primary-drive level than they do at an intellectual level."¹³ Hence, "logic," when employed in audience persuasion, tends to be an emotional rather than an intellectual appeal. Logical fallacies tend to go unnoticed in such circumstances. The same holds true when the situation is purely an entertaining and not a converting one—the catharsis of tension that is being sought by members of the audience is best produced by rousing the emotions. Techniques for rousing the audience to a complete conversion from a passive to an active crowd, i.e., a mob, are therefore employed by the unscrupulous who are aware of these principles of audience membership. The technique of arousing hostility toward an out-group (such as the Zooters, page 360) by the use of symbols, favorable ones for the in-group and unfavorable stereotypes toward the out-group, has, on occasion, been all too effective in arousing to lawless action an otherwise lawful and passive crowd.

THE DIFFUSE COLLECTIVITY

In the concept of the crowd, of course, there is the notion of coming together, of aggregates of a given size congregating in a spatial area of given size, such as a small enclosure, a meeting hall, or an athletic arena. We may conveniently employ the idea of size to indicate that the diffuse collectivity *is of a size too large to congregate*. Therefore many features of the crowd will be absent in such collectivities; in the main, of course, the differences will spring from the fact that the shoulder-to-shoulder intimacy of the crowd is not present. Yet, as we shall see, the possibilities for interstimulation of the members of diffuse collectivities are still great. Brown gives as examples of collectivities too large to congregate, classes, castes, publics, electorates, and nation-

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 307.

alities. He describes the three kinds of mass phenomena (i.e., which occur in aggregates too large to congregate) which have been studied intensively by social psychologists as mass contagion, mass polarization, and mass movement. In the remainder of this chapter we shall consider each of these kinds of phenomena which are found in the diffuse collectivity. We shall consider *mass contagion* of "collective folly" in fads and crazes, the spread of an irrational practice to large numbers of people who are not congregating but are nevertheless affecting one another—slightly in the case of the fad and more significantly in the case of the craze. *Mass polarization* is made possible by the techniques of modern communication, such as TV and radio. People can attend the same stimulus without being in shoulder-to-shoulder relations with one another. Hence, their collective folly is that they can panic (and social psychology has been most interested in this), yet their panic will differ from that of a crowd. Finally, *mass movement*, the activity of a diffuse collectivity toward changing the social order or establishing a new one, is of such a complex nature as to warrant a section of the chapter to itself. It is not collective folly that best describes the social movement—its implications are too serious for it to be described in those terms. The ripple of the fad and the wave of a craze will be felt as minor disturbances of the social order. A social movement strikes at its very roots.

Mass Contagion

Fads, as we have suggested, do not have a deep and lasting motivational aspect, but rather, are fleeting, superficial, and more related to vanity than to intensive emotion. Sometimes distinctions are made between various types of fads, such as "the cultist" and the spasmodic types.¹⁴ The distinction centers around the presence or absence of an ideology concerning the alleged benefits of dietary practices, such as eating wheat germ, or nudism (although nudism may also be considered more of a social movement than a mere fad), or similar cultistic practices. Social psychologists have traditionally been interested in the more spasmodic fad, i.e., the "here today-gone tomorrow" type of practice, such as "hula-hoops," miniature golf, swallowing goldfish, and "panty raids." Fads in clothing, of course, are the "latest fashion."

¹⁴S. Stansfeld Sargent and Robert C. Williamson, *Social Psychology: An Introduction to the Study of Human Relations*, New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1958, p. 471.

If properly utilized, the fad can result in large profits over a short period of time

When a fad runs its course, it usually disappears from the social scene. However, zippers managed to stay, as did cigarette lighters. These survivals, of course, are the exception to the rule. The following hypotheses represent the current status of thinking among social psychologists with respect to the fad:¹⁵

IN order to insure mass contagion

1. To be successful, a fad must seem novel and new. Though variants of old fads do recur, they tend to be from a period before the memory of the participants—though often not of their parents.

2. Fads must be broadly consistent with the times. Jigsaw puzzles and miniature golf would hardly spread during wartime; on the other hand, adolescents' wearing of identification bracelets and service insignia, or putting pin-up girls on their walls, are consistent with wartime themes. The rise of miniature golf in the early thirties was consistent with the growth of automobiling, with people's wish for mild exercise, and the depression needs for reasonably priced recreation.

3. Fads must, of course, be harmonious with widespread interest and motive patterns, such as playing games, gambling, gaining attention, and the like. Pea-shooters, bubble-gum, cap-guns, water-pistols, and trading cards have tremendous appeal for preadolescents in our culture. A supply of these items in a store may start a local fad which runs a brief course. The Davy Crockett fad presumably derived from children's tendency to identify with national heroes. With adolescents the fad usually lasts longer—possibly a year or more. Apparently the strongest motive pattern here is a combination of attention-getting, asserting independence from adults, and conformity to the adolescent groups. . . .

4. Despite the transience and unpredictability of fads, publicity and advertising may play a part in their dissemination. Pictures of clothing fads, like fashions, sometimes carry the fad from one community to another. . . . In 1956 and 1957, for example, teen-age magazines carried ads for "butch wax" hair control for "burrs, butches, and ducktails" (all faddist types of haircuts), for "Ivy League" clothes and for "sweetheart picture pumps"—girls' casual shoes with a toe slot for the boy friend's picture.

*play
this
up*

5. Our rapidly changing American culture pattern seems congenial to fads, as it is to fashions, crazes, social movements, and other mass phenomena. Whether this is a function of boredom and low morale, of prosperity, of "flaming youth," or of a pioneer spirit and freedom from regimentation, it is hard to say. In any event, fads seem indigenous to American culture, particularly in urban areas, and will probably continue to flourish intermittently. By the same token most fads do not

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 475.

last long; in a few months, in a season, they are forgotten, sometimes to be followed very soon by the next fad.

As "collective behavior," fads are "time-off" from the activities which are part of the *status quo*. In this light, despite the fact that sufficient research to warrant any strong certitude in the matter is lacking, it seems consistent with existing theory, at least, to think of them as instances of failures in the status and role systems of society. Emotional satisfactions must be insufficient in normal "everyday" roles if recourse to fads provides substitute satisfactions. The most obvious examples in this connection would be, of course, the attachment of little boys to such figures as "Hopalong Cassidy" and "Davy Crockett." Under different circumstances the fathers of these boys would tend to be their models. Yet, on the one hand, the fathers are seldom at home, and on the other hand, their fathers are unromantic figures at best. Little girls, it is hypothesized, do not take on such identifications, or at least not so continually as little boys, because they have the mother as a model and have continuous access to her. Too, the susceptibility of adolescents in our society to fads is undoubtedly related to their ambiguous statuses and roles.

[*The craze*, unlike the fad, is a symptom of more serious social unrest with personal and social implications that fads do not have.] The tulip mania of 1634 in Holland illustrates the way in which such a craze may lead to the neglect of ordinary industry and threaten the economy of an entire nation. Unbelievably, the price of tulip bulbs was driven up to hundreds of dollars per pound when the people of Holland discovered the profits the tulip-bulb growers were making. It was believed that there was no limit to the amount of money at which the world market would support the marketing of tulip bulbs. The bubble burst in 1637.¹⁶ The Florida land boom described on page 363 was on an over-all basis, a craze, and as such it provided the climate within which mob after acquisitive mob descended on the area for the "killing." Such a collective folly indicates, of course, a disparity between the goals of a society and the means available within that society for achieving its goals. Not every one in an acquisitive society can be rich, but the craze illustrates the emotional and irrational premise that "every one can try."

All crazes are not economic. The dancing mania of the Middle Ages and, much more recently, the "phantom anesthetist" of Mattoon, Illi-

¹⁶ Richard T. LaPiere, *op. cit.*, p. 512.

nois, illustrate the fact that the hysteria involved in a craze may take other forms. The psychologist who investigated the "phantom anesthetist"¹⁷ was able to conclude that the newspapers were the only agencies whose contribution to the scare seemed to be economic, i.e., the expanding of their circulations seemed to be their essential motive. Since the "anesthetist" was never located—if, indeed, he ever existed—the stories, first of a lady who reported that a man had raised her window and sprayed her with a sickly sweet gas which partially paralyzed her and the later stories about mysterious prowlers, indicate that personality problems and suggestibility are the main contributors to such crazes.

Some time ago, E. A. Ross formulated certain "laws"¹⁸ of crazes which, either from the dearth of research in the field or because of their explanatory worth, or both, have survived in the theory of collective behavior. The first of these is that the more extensive the ravages of a craze the stronger the intellect it may affect. For example, one who originally dismissed the idea that Florida real estate is a "sure way" to get rich may feel his conviction weakening as the price continues to rise. Finally, this "proof" that the value of Florida real estate has no ceiling may even lead him to invest in it. The second of Ross's laws is that the greater the height of the craze the more absurd the propositions that will be believed or the things that people caught up in the craze will do. This and the following law seem to be compatible with comparative studies of crazes. This law refers to the fact that dynamic societies are more craze-ridden than are those living in the "ruts of custom." A final law, which seems logical enough but which needs research to verify it, is that crazes tend to sweep the same stratum of society or the same ethnic division and that such caste or class lines tend to break the sweep of the craze. Further factors involved in the decline of the craze are (1) the higher the craze the sharper the reaction of recovery from it (the empty "ghost" town can be testimony to this) and (2) one craze tends to be succeeded by another which carries with it the same exciting emotions but of a different variety.

Finally rumor is closely related to fads and crazes in several respects. Rumor is contagious, in much the same way as fads and crazes; the thing *told* must arouse emotional interest in both speaker and

¹⁷ D. M. Johnson, "The Phantom Anesthetist of Mattoon," *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1945, 40, pp. 175-186.

¹⁸ Quoted in R. W. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 869.

listener and the *truth* of the matter must be shrouded in *ambiguity* (which holds true at least for crazes). Then, too, as presently conceived at least, rumors serve to relieve tension. Their sharp increase during wartime can be accounted for in two mutually related explanations; during wartime the normal channels of communication are cut off and people are more dependent upon word of mouth for vital information, and during wartime, of course, there are accumulated tensions which would not be present during "normal" times. Those who have developed frustrations about their part in the war effort, for example, may come to feel a sense of importance from "knowing the latest" about the progress of the war, and while consciously these individuals would perhaps be repelled by the thought of lying, the degree to which a story can be magnified and "dressed up," as it were, after having been passed around by several such individuals is such that one of the originators of the rumor might have difficulty recognizing it.

Mass Polarization

It seems almost a contradiction in terms to speak of a diffuse collectivity as being "polarized" until we reflect on the fact that this is made possible by the mass media "enjoyed" by most people in America today. Radio and television make it possible for literally millions of people to be focused upon, say, one program and, as we shall see, for some of these to enter into a collective folly as a result. It is collective behavior which, it will be recalled, is activity *away from* the existing social structure, and mass polarization which qualifies as collective behavior has this dubious quality. Needless to say, mass polarization upon a presidential address does not so qualify nor would the fact that millions may watch the program of a popular TV comedian as part of the routine of daily living. It is such abnormalities as "The Invasion from Mars" which was set off by a radio broadcast of Orson Welles in 1938 in which the realistic treatment of the invader-from-outer-space theme gave rise to widespread hysteria and panic among the listeners and those stimulated by the listeners. A team of social psychologists studied the "invasion" and concluded that there was a differential susceptibility to such folly. In the "attitude" frame of reference that we have used throughout this present textbook, there were those individuals whose intellectual attitudes predominated over their emotional attitudes and who (1) analyzed the internal evidence of the broadcasts and knew it could not be true, and (2) those who checked up, perhaps

by phoning a radio station, and found it was a play. Those who engaged in irrational activity and usually drew others into the collective folly also divided into two groups, those who attempted first to apply intellectual attitudes but failed (as, for example, those who phoned the radio station but were unable to reach the radio station operator because of the jammed switchboard) and then acted upon emotional attitudes, and finally there were those who acted upon emotional attitudes from the outset. A team of social psychologists who investigated the hysterical behavior of these latter individuals summarized the situation as follows:¹⁹

An individual not only lacks an adequate frame of reference or standard of judgment by means of which he may orient himself but he also lacks even the awareness that he needs and is seeking a new frame of reference. In such instances it never occurs to the individual to evaluate the alternative solutions offered, to question the notion that a proposed explanation or a course of action might not be the only one possible. Whatever solution is proposed, whatever interpretation first "occurs" to the individual, will be unhesitatingly accepted and acted upon. In this extreme condition, created by the lack of any internal structuration, the law of primacy may be considered operative; the interpretation accepted is the interpretation the individual is first aware of. The interpretation may not be held for any great length of time but it at least furnishes a temporary orientation.

The most susceptible to the suggestion of "invasion," by reason of their being more emotionally aroused than others, hence forming a hasty "solution" to the problem (for example, running off in the night to avoid contact with the "monsters" from Mars), were the insecure, the worriers, and the anxious. These seem most susceptible to the more bizarre types of collective behavior.

Thus far we have been considering what we might call the *unintentional* effects of the mass polarization of millions of persons upon radio and TV programs. Because of the increase in population and the spread of densely populated cities, this kind of polarization is becoming increasingly more common; at the expense of the face-to-face type of interaction between one man and another we have an increasing, necessary dependence upon many-to-one communications where information is passed on through the mass media. These media, the newspaper, the

¹⁹ Hadley Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1941, p. 69.

radio, television, magazines, even billboards and signs, attempt to inform us, to entertain us, but above all these exist to *manipulate* us. Hence, the studies by social psychologists of attempts to manipulate diffuse collectivities are worthy of our attention. Often the influence of mass media upon our attitudes and beliefs is minimized and the "explanation" for this minimizing of the importance of mass media is that they "only give us what we want." This is, of course, true only to a certain extent. Programs, for example, are devised to attract a listening or viewing audience, and the best way to accomplish this is, rightly enough, to provide what the public wants. What the public wants, however, is secondary to the commercial interest involved, and once a mass of people has been polarized on the basis of what it wants the prime purpose of the medium is to convert, manipulate, and coerce the listener or viewer. The growth of television in America and the widespread penetration of television into American homes, all, it should be remembered, on the commercial premise that viewers would be influenced to buy sponsors' products, indicates on the one hand that sponsors must feel that they *are* manipulating masses of individuals and on the other hand television penetration indicates that the public either doesn't object to being manipulated or has no acceptable alternative. Table 17 shows the extent of penetration of television in the United States in June, 1955.

Efforts to coerce the masses to buy products, *advertising*, is but one kind of approach to manipulating the diffuse collectivity and is only

Table 17. Penetration of Television, June, 1955 *

<i>By urban and rural location</i>	<i>Per cent of households owning TV</i>
Total urban	74
Inside urbanized areas of:	
3,000,000 inhabitants or more	81
1,000,000 to 3,000,000 inhabitants	82
250,000 to 1,000,000 inhabitants	79
50,000 to 250,000 inhabitants	74
Outside urbanized areas,	
in urban places of:	
10,000 inhabitants or more	62
2,500 to 250,000 inhabitants	52
Rural nonfarm, total	61
Rural farm, total	42

* Leo Bogart, *The Age of Television*, 2d ed., New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1958, p. 17.

collective behavior in the sense that a large number of separate individuals react similarly to having been polarized and buy the same product thereafter. Efforts to sway *public opinion*, to build (or undermine) *morale*, or to *subvert* the existing social order are, in varying degrees of intensity, *propaganda* activities. As such they have received a great deal of attention from social psychologists. Certain necessary conditions have been found to regulate the effectiveness of attempts to manipulate the masses:²⁰

1. All effective influence obviously depends first of all on gaining *access* to the group being influenced. Many of the problems in this connection are entirely technical matters, having to do with the coverage of any particular medium of mass communication. Recurrent questions deal with the relative merits of a few major appeals as contrasted to a large number of brief appeals. Will the political candidate, for example, gain a better hearing by having one or two spectacular television rallies or by a large number of brief "spot" announcements? The problem of reaching specialized audiences and the merits of mass appeal as opposed to selective appeal confront the advertiser or propagandist. In promoting a school bond election, for example, in which only a minority can be expected to take the trouble to vote, the problem of access is not the number of persons reached but rather the number of parents—the persons who are directly affected—who can be reached. Or in promoting a measure to benefit the underprivileged, the key problem may be how to get to those who neither read a newspaper nor listen to political discussions on the radio, but who constitute the potentially strongest body of supporters. The problem of access also includes the question of whether to make a mass appeal or to reach key persons who can then be expected to influence others. In advertising it may sometimes be more important to sell to a recognized fashion leader than to try to sell directly to the masses.

2. The second condition determining the effectiveness of manipulative efforts is the *receptiveness* of the mass toward the proposed course of action or thought. In the mass, the receptiveness is that of the individuals, since individuals must decide and act. While the statement sometimes made that "a propagandist can convince people only of what they already believe" is too extreme, manipulatory activities must take advantage of at least partial readiness to act in the indicated direction.

Receptiveness is compounded of *interest*, *motivation*, and *understanding*. Without interest there is no attention to the communications. Without motivation, verbal assent will not be followed by action. . . . Receptiveness toward any proposed course of action or thought also includes the

²⁰ Turner and Killian, *op. cit.*, pp. 277–278.

ability to "get the point" of the communication, to see the implications of the facts or arguments presented.

The techniques of propagandizing, being susceptible to analysis, are therefore of interest not only to social psychologists but also, of course, to those interested in applying the techniques to their own ends. Adolph Hitler believed so strongly in the effectiveness of the techniques of propaganda that he felt it would ultimately take the place of artillery in softening up an enemy in preparation for invasion. An excellent study of Hitler's own propaganda techniques revealed that nine significant dimensions of propaganda are available for the propaganda analyst.²¹ The *dissolvent-unifying* dimension refers to the fact that effective propaganda is capable potentially of dissolving solidarity or creating cohesion. Hitler's infamous strategy took the form of (1) breaking faith in the customary sources of information, as for instance, in constant attacks upon "the Jews," "Wall Street," and their alleged influence upon the American press; (2) creating factional hatreds, the "divide and conquer" tactic, where the chief wedge Hitler used, of course, was an appeal to an already existing antisemitism in America; (3) setting people against their leaders ("the politician vs. the people" was a common theme); (4) exaggerating crises, effective in the light of the fact that crisis wears down the emotions of a people (the British "war-monger" was periodically alleged to be pushing America into the war); (5) stimulating guilt feelings by such charges as anti-German persecution in America; (6) aggravating fears by such tactics as counter-charges of fifth column tactics of the British and French; and by (7) stimulating fatalism in emphasizing the total futility of resistance to invasion; (8) thus employing the "strategy of terror" by contrasting the "happy and peaceful condition of Axis affiliates" with the utter desolation that would result from resistance.

Other significant dimensions were found by Bruner to be the *negative-positive*, which indicates the fact that propaganda may defend or attack (negative images of Britain and favorable images of Germany); the *temporal dimension*, referring to the fact that propaganda is part of a campaign which can be broken down into periods, each period of which

²¹ Jerome S. Bruner, "The Dimensions of Propaganda: German Short Wave Broadcasts to America," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1941, 36, no. 3, pp. 311-337. Reprinted in Daniel Katz, Dorwin Cartwright, Samuel Eldersveld, and Alfred Mc. Lee, *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, New York, The Dryden Press, Inc., 1954.

must be understood in its own right, paced to the policy of the moment; the *personal-impersonal* dimension, referring to the attempts to penetrate the emotional skin of the individual by first-person references ("you-me"); the *stratified-homogeneous* dimension, referring to the fact that the reference groups of modern man are extremely diverse and specialized appeals to various economic, cultural, racial, and occupational groups must be made; the *authoritative-casual* dimension refers to the prime significance of prestige suggestion in the psychology of propaganda, hence the importance of quoting prestigious figures even if their prestige is due to their activity in a sphere other than the one in which they are speaking; the *dimension of colloquiality*, the use of slang and the daily language of the group toward which the propaganda is being directed; the *immediate-remote* dimension in which the press of contemporary issues takes precedence over more remote issues of the past or future since the progress of today's battles is more readily received by the target individuals in the propaganda process; and finally, the *dimension of repetitiousness* refers to the fact that a thing repeated long enough is liable to be believed. Such principles of propagandizing are a good start in the direction of understanding propaganda in its processes and its content. The status of research in the *extent to which opinions and beliefs are actually changed by propaganda* still leaves a great deal to be desired. However, extensive research has been done by governmental agencies, by commercial agencies, and the research bureaus of large universities.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The mass movement differs from mass contagion and mass polarization, yet it involves a mass too large to congregate as do these other collective phenomena. The difference is that mass movements extend beyond all of the other collective phenomena and frequently contain within them much that is collective behavior in its own right, such as crowds, some of which can also be viewed as manifestations of social movements, and contagion and polarization, which can and often do take place within a social movement. A crowd of pickets in front of a factory may be viewed also as a manifestation of the labor movement (if such it can still be called); a wave of enthusiasm for a pension plan which may contagion through many of the aged in California could be analyzed as a craze but probably is more meaningful when considered

as part of the Townsend Plan movement or the "Ham and Eggs" movement. The polarization of many of the aged of California on certain radio programs which are designed to attract their interest—one such program had for its opening and closing "theme" music a few bars of "Darling I Am Growing Old"—can be analyzed merely as polarization but is much more meaningful when viewed in the broader perspective as a ripe situation for social movements, which, indeed, has proved to be the case.

Social movements, then, are really a different *kind* of collective phenomena. On the one hand, they are not supportive of the existing social structure and on the other hand, they are not, like most other collective behavior, merely activity away from the existing state of things. They are organized collective efforts to achieve social ends. Hence, they partake of some features of social-structural behavior and of some features of collective behavior. Is the Republican party, for example, a social movement? It is at the farthest pole removed since social movements are subversive, rather than supportive of the social order. Hence, the Democratic and Republican parties, the various veterans' organizations, and other collectivities dedicated to the preservation of the American social structure, as they conceive of it, are not social movements. Yet, social movements have some of the organizational features of these more respectable collectivities.

In its early stages it is difficult to discern the organizational aspects of the social movement. At this point, its leadership is liable to be haphazard and extremely radical. Almost completely unorganized, its agitation for a change in the *status quo* is likely to be ignored or scorned by the vast majority until its crude propaganda devices and "gadfly" nuisance demonstrations begin to provoke an annoyed response from the majority. This arousal of public interest results in a clearer definition of opponents and protagonists, and the leadership of the movement begins to take form. Often there is some struggle for dominance among several would-be leaders of the movement, but a leader must emerge, if the movement is to enjoy any success whatsoever; further he must be glamorized and made a glorified symbol of the movement. But he is more than a façade presented to the public. In the organizational phase of the social movement he is usually a dictator of the movement's aims, goals, and means. His appeal brings in new supporters and exacts unquestioned loyalty from his followers. In the final stage of the movement, assuming, of course, that it has survived to complete the cycle, the

opposition is overcome and the program of the movement becomes institutionalized as part of the social structure and receives acceptance from the majority. A social movement is "collective behavior" until this final stage, when it becomes social-organizational behavior. Deviations from the compromise which it has achieved with the majority are then viewed by the leadership of the former movement with the same distaste which the majority displayed toward the movement in its earlier days. The aloof attitude of the Mormon Church during the Short Creek, Arizona polygamy raids²² is an excellent example of this striving to maintain harmonious relations within the existing social order of a former social movement now thoroughly institutionalized and at peace with the world. The Church of the Latter Day Saints was quick to point out that the Short Creek residents were heretical offshoots of, but not "in communion with" (in Roman Catholic Church terms), Salt Lake. In fact, far removed from its swashbuckling period, the Church of the Latter Day Saints now sees itself as an *ecclesia* replacing the "primitive church" of Rome.²³

Liston Pope's scale (see Table 18) indicates the various facets of the transition that takes place when a sect arises and slowly evolves into a church (assuming, of course, that the process is not arrested).

The tendency for cults to develop in an evolutionary process into churches best illustrates the principle we have enunciated above, namely that cults, characterized by Pope's "from" statements, are collective behavior in the truest sense, while churches, characterized by Pope's "to" statements, are not collective behavior but are rather social-organizational. Thus, the rise of religious cults serves well to illustrate the processes of social movements. Yet these latter may be in the political, economical, familial, and other institutional spheres as well as the religious. Rex D. Hopper finds, for example, that the political revolutions of South America follow pretty much the same type of life cycle as the religious social movements we have described. First, there is a period of mass (and individual) excitement and unrest; second, there is what Hopper calls the "popular" stage of crowd (collective) excite-

²² Jack H. Curtis, "Group Marginality and Adherence to Religious Doctrine in an American Community," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University, 1954. See *Newsweek*, 42:26, Aug. 3, 1953; *Time*, 62:16, Aug. 3, 1953; *Life*, 35:35, Sept. 14, 1953.

²³ J. Reuben Clark, Jr., of the First Presidency of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, *On the Way to Immortality and Eternal Life*, Salt Lake City, Utah, Deseret Book Company, 1950.

Table 18. The Transition from Sect to Church *

1. <i>From</i> membership composed chiefly of the propertyless	<i>To</i> membership composed of property owners
2. <i>From</i> economic poverty	<i>To</i> economic wealth, church property, minister's salary
3. <i>From</i> the cultural periphery	<i>Toward</i> the cultural center of the community
4. <i>From</i> renunciation of the prevailing social structure	<i>To</i> affirmation of existing culture and social organization
5. <i>From</i> self-centered (or personal) religion, "experience"	<i>To</i> culture-centered religion, a social institution
6. <i>From</i> noncooperation, or positive ridicule toward established religious institutions	<i>To</i> cooperation with the established churches of the community
7. <i>From</i> suspicion of rival sects	<i>To</i> disdain or pity for all sects
8. <i>From</i> a moral community excluding unworthy members	<i>To</i> a social institution embracing all who are socially compatible within it
9. <i>From</i> an unspecialized, unprofessional part-time ministry	<i>To</i> a specialized, professional, full-time ministry
10. <i>From</i> a psychology of persecution	<i>To</i> a psychology of success and dominance
11. <i>From</i> voluntary, confessional bases of membership	<i>To</i> ritual and social prerequisite only
12. <i>From</i> principal concern with adult worship	<i>To</i> equal concern for children of the members
13. <i>From</i> emphasis on evangelism and conversion	<i>To</i> emphasis on religious education
14. <i>From</i> stress on a future after-life, death	<i>To</i> a primary interest in the future of the institution and its members in this world, successful earthly life
15. <i>From</i> adherence to strict biblical standards such as tithing or non-resistance	<i>To</i> acceptance of general cultural standards as a practical definition of religious obligation
16. <i>From</i> a high degree of congregational participation in the services	<i>To</i> delegation of responsibility to a small minority
17. <i>From</i> fervor in worship services, positive action	<i>To</i> restraint, passive listening
18. <i>From</i> a comparatively large number of special services	<i>To</i> a program of regular services at stated intervals
19. <i>From</i> reliance on spontaneous "leadings of the Spirit" in religious services and administration	<i>To</i> a fixed order of worship and of administrative procedure

- | | |
|---|--|
| 20. <i>From</i> the use of hymns resembling contemporary folk music | <i>To</i> the use of slower, more stately hymns coming out of more remote liturgical tradition |
| 21. <i>From</i> emphasis on religion in the home | <i>To</i> delegation of responsibility for religion to church officials and organizations |

* Adapted with slight alterations from Liston Pope, *Millhands and Preachers*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1942.

ment and unrest; third, there is the "formal" stage with the "formulation of issues and formation of publics"; and finally, there is the institutional stage of "legalization" and societal organization.²⁴ Hence, there is little difference in the life cycle of religious and political social movements and the same general "life cycle" would seem to be a feature of all social movements. Nevertheless, Blumer²⁵ suggests that an important differentiation should be made between three types of social movements in terms of first, the basic difference between the objectives of social movements, and second, the difference in the emotional involvement of its members. The *reform* movement and the *revolutionary* movement are both attempts to "see justice done," yet the reform movement is quite often acceptable to the majority while a revolutionary movement such as American communism is subversive and is viewed with violent distaste. A reform movement thus "woos" public opinion while the revolutionary movement may scorn it, much as does the cult in the early days of religious social movements. The similarity between aggressive communism as a social movement and the fervor which characterizes the rise of religious cults has often been noted. The disillusionment of intellectuals in the communist movement seems to have deactivated this emotional charge which the movement once had. This illustrates the relationship between historical events and the course of social movements as well as the fact that disenchantment of the intellectuals, who create and perpetuate the ideology which binds the members of a movement, is a dangerous practice. Blumer distinguishes a third type of social movement which, unlike the reform movement or the revolutionary movement, is really an end in itself rather than a means to a proposed end. This is the *expressive* movement, such as the religious movement we have already described. Blumer points out quite

²⁴ Rex Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements," *Social Forces*, March, 1950, 28.

²⁵ Herbert Blumer, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

rightly that such movements should be distinguished from reform and revolutionary movements since, despite extravagant claims that might be made, the real functions of such movements are the emotional gratifications which the members derive from participation in them.²⁶

Collective behavior is the child of social psychology, which in turn is a very young parent. While the theoretical formulations of the field are evolving, somewhat more rapidly it is feared than the accumulation of empirically verified findings in the field, nevertheless, the aims of social psychology are gradually being recognized in collective behavior. The scientific methods which social psychology cherishes and the interactional focus which is its proper scope ($A \rightleftharpoons B$) are beginning to make headway against the folk conception of collective behavior as collective misbehavior, and a science of the psychological aspects of mass phenomena is emerging.

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²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

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Chapter 16

MAN IN THE MODERN WORLD

Every society, even the most primitive, must have order in the social relations of its members. Wherever social relations are found, the people involved have necessarily developed a system of mutual expectations of behavior—"rules of the game" which order their relations to each other. *Predictability* of the behavior of its members, especially in areas adjudged critical for the survival of the group or society, is a vital concern of all human groups. Certain behavior is therefore required, some kinds of behavior forbidden, and even the socially undefined acts where the individual may "do as he pleases" are controlled in a more indirect and subtle way by the establishment of tolerance limits—one may do as he pleases, up to a certain point. For the individual this means that his social participation will occur in and through social units which are organized to serve the common interests of individuals, to regulate their actions toward each other, and to coordinate their actions toward goals considered socially desirable. The individual's participation will, therefore, be organized rather than haphazard. His *statuses* (positions in the various groups in which he participates) carry with them expectations of performance. The correlatives of his statuses are his *roles*, which constitute the actions taken, the things done, the *performances* of rights and duties in advancing the function of the group.

Of course, people do not always behave as they are expected to, and a distinction must be made between expected and actual role patterns. Nevertheless, the individual's performances must be at least roughly regularized and integrated with those of the others in the group if the ends of the group are to be advanced and the common interests (in-

cluding, of course, those of the individual himself) are to be pursued. The relationships thus created between individuals as *parts*, or subunits, and the group as a whole, as an entity in its own right, form a *structure* and what is performed or accomplished by the group is its *function*. If the analogy is not carried too far, it is sometimes helpful to think of a group or a society as an organism functioning autonomously by virtue of its total organization or parts rather than by virtue of the activities of any one of its mutually interdependent members. The analogy between the anatomy of a biological organism, such as a dog, a cat, or a human body, is a helpful comparison, but, of course, the individuals who make up a human group are too highly mobile, too complex, and most important, too self-autonomous to be considered the "cells" of a given organism. Still, groups do function *as groups* and not as mere collections of people (the term "social aggregate" has been coined to describe an assemblage or plurality of persons which does not possess to any great degree the *social organization* that we are discussing here). This performance of the group, as a group, is sometimes opposed to and sometimes supportive of the general welfare of the society. But whatever its activity, the part which the group plays toward making the society *what it is* makes it a structural component of that society viewed as a whole. The over-all *social structure* of a society therefore includes all of the different groupings of people within it and the institutions, the systems of role patterns established and controlled to achieve social ends, which are perpetuated by these groupings. Modern man lives in a social structure which because of its sheer mass and its complexity creates problems for him which man in primitive social structure did not have in his smaller and simpler society. This folk-modern difference has been the subject of much speculation. This speculation is not merely "academic" as the term is sometimes applied to knowledge for its own sake, but on the contrary, provides a means for modern man to compare his social structure, his social participation, and his satisfactions in life with those of other men living in societies unlike and conveniently simpler for study than his own. Folk-modern comparisons, in this light, provide what one anthropologist has called a "mirror for man."

THE PRIMITIVE AND MODERN WORLDS

Folk societies are studied, therefore, for the insights which they give us into modern social structure. This is so because certain anthro-

pologists and sociologists have developed constructs which enable us when making statements about one type of society to make the opposite statement about the other. Hence, Robert Redfield's "folk-modern" continuum¹ involved at the "folk" polarity such concepts as the following in the left column which are contrasted with opposite concepts of the "modern" polarity.

Table 19. The Folk-Modern Polarities

<i>Folk</i>	<i>Modern</i>
Small	Large
Isolated	Interdependent subsocieties
Relative homogeneity	Extremely heterogeneous subgroupings
Non-literate	Highly dependent upon written language
Distribution of knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs among all the people	Highly diversified and specialized groupings with special skills, knowledges, attitudes, and beliefs
Individual not a conspicuous unit	Emphasis upon individual accomplishments, conspicuous consumption, status striving
Knowledge not explicitly systematized	Division of knowledge into "fields" explicitly for purposes of specialization
Society based on status	Society based on contract

Tönnies,² Durkheim, and others provided Redfield with the materials from which he formulated the folk-modern polarities. Tönnies, it will be recalled, contrasted the *Gemeinschaft* and the *Gesellschaft*, in which, on the one hand, the smaller *community* (*Gemeinschaft*) has certain attributes, the reverse of which apply to the *society* (*Gesellschaft*). The "folk-modern" continuum also drew from Durkheim's concept of the *mechanical* solidarity of the community where beliefs and conduct are alike, where people are homogeneous mentally and morally, and where conduct is uniform (through the operation of the exterior and

¹ Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1947, 52, pp. 293-308.

² Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Society* (*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*), tr. and ed. by Charles P. Loomis, East Lansing, Mich., Michigan State University Press, 1957.

constraining *conscience collective*), as contrasted with the *organic* solidarity of modern society where society is held together by the interdependence of its parts in the division of labor made necessary by the size of modern societies. The concepts of Durkheim, Tönnies, Redfield, and others overlap a great deal and provide us with something of a composite picture of the differences between primitive and modern social structures.

The small size of the folk society means that its members will know each other well and that there will be intimate communication and "face-to-face" interaction among its members (see Cooley's concept of primary vs. secondary groups, page 329) while the dense masses of population characteristic of modern societies inhibit intimate communication and produce, of necessity, mass, impersonal media of communication, of which the newspaper, radio, and TV are examples. Modern man has access through books to a written chronicle of his historical tradition while primitive man is dependent upon oral tradition where only speech and memory connect him with the past. There is no historical sense for the primitive, his "past" he usually assumes to be a matter of a few generations; he has no formalized theology, no science. The only accumulation of wisdom is that which comes with living the tradition. The aged in the primitive society therefore have prestige while the contrary holds true in modern society as rapid social change tends to devalue the "old" and the "old-fashioned."

The mental homogeneity of the individuals in a folk society is due to their isolation from other societies and from alien ways. Modern men, on the other hand, are subjected constantly to conflicting beliefs, to rapidly changing social power relations among minority groupings and other subgroupings. His "answers" tend to be pragmatic and changing, providing him with little of the psychic security that comes from a more stable *Weltanschauung*. Modern man tends to be more individualistic while primitive man's behavior is highly conventionalized. Modern man is expected to "stand on his own feet," whereas primitive man walked in the shadow of his clan. Primitive society tended to place great emphasis on the holy, the sacred, and the unchanging, whereas modern society tends to be secular and dynamic.

It would be a mistake to draw from folk-modern comparison unwarranted inferences about personality differences and other qualitative differences between primitive and modern man. Let us advance a *caveat* or two in this regard. Folk-modern comparisons have sometimes re-

sembled the *before* and *after* character of many advertisements in today's mass media. Before using the product with the exciting new ingredient the subject was listless and apathetic, and after using the product he became energetic and sparkling. Many writers on "progress" have used this technique in a camouflaged way to illustrate their belief that man *before* civilization was below the mental and emotional par of man *after* civilization. (See page 98 and page 100 for Comte's and Levy-Bruhl's conceptions of primitive man and "progress.") An opposite but equally enthusiastic position advanced by Rousseau and to some extent by Mead paints a depressing picture of modern man in contrast to the noble savage he might have been had he not become involved in social institutions. Both of these extreme positions are fallacious, of course, and the difference between primitive and modern man should be thought of as just that, as *difference*, rather than as "better" or "worse." Our purpose in considering some of the differences between man in the primitive world and man in the modern world has been that of describing something of the characteristics of modern social structure to augment what was presented at the outset of this chapter about social structure in general. Our treatment of the individual in modern social structure should be more meaningful in the light of these introductory conceptions.

MAN IN MODERN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The comparison of a human group with a biological organism may be helpful in showing the part played by individuals in the social structure. As with the members of an organism, individuals do play different, but interactive and highly related, parts toward the whole of group life. All human beings, excluding a relative handful of true isolates, are members of societies which are made up of men and women, young and old, who face the problem of survival in the environment. The most important phase of the problem of survival, from the standpoint of the perpetuation of the society, is the producing of children and the training of these children for social participation. Needless to say, this training, or socialization, must be specialized since the division of labor in society demands different performances by males, females, children, adults, young, old, leaders, and followers. In meeting the problem of survival in the environment, the social life of even the most primitive society is never a simple reaction to its physical environment but is elaborated far above the minimal structure needed for bare survival. This characteristic

complexity of social structure means that no individual participates in all of its subunits. The social divisions of primitive social structures normally include sex, age, residence, and kinship groupings which define statuses and roles for the individual members. In modern societies, the situation for the individual is even more complex. While social ranking systems are almost universal in human societies, the modern urbanized and industrialized society presents the individual with the problem of maintaining his self-esteem in a status and prestige system with very exacting demands. *Social stratification*, the process by which individuals are sorted into strata, or *social classes*, usually on the basis of occupation and wealth, results in a highly complex linkage of statuses in modern society. In addition, institutional participation is vastly more complex in modern society due to institutional segmentation, the "breaking-up" of one institution into several, of which each performs part of the function formerly performed by one institution. Where one would have participated primarily in family life for his major satisfactions in the primitive or the traditional society, he now must participate in educational, recreational, and myriad other groupings for the achievement of the same satisfactions.

A number of concepts have been developed to facilitate the analysis (no easy task) of the functioning of the individual in modern social structure. The concept of the *social person* and *social personality* have been most helpful in this task. These are "constructs," helpful in analysis but not to be confused with the real order of things—they provide tools of logical analysis which are but partial abstractions from the real order. A man, for example, is a rational animal (a "total person") pursuing his ends and exercising his volition, and this volition is, in the last analysis, the basic reason for (or final cause of) social groupings. The concept of *social person* simply refers to those limited aspects of man which are most immediately relevant to his social participation. It refers to his social identity, merely. *Social personality*, consequently, refers to the sum of all of the roles a person plays within the social structure. *Life organization* (more properly perhaps, *social life organization*, although the term is not used) refers to the fact that individuals, in the course of their socialization, do not merely learn roles in a summative way, i.e., role 1 plus role 2 plus role 3 . . . role *n*; roles are rather taken into the personality, internalized as sets of attitudes in a systematic, characteristic way for the individual. He learns a new role in relation to roles already learned. One or two roles (religious, familial, or occupational) are

usually central and other roles, secondary in their significance to the individual, become integrated around the major role or roles.

So, it is a falsely mechanical view, however useful it may be in sociological analysis at times, to conceive of the person in terms merely of his social identity, i.e., in terms of the social roles he enacts. By analogy, the person is an actor playing himself. He enacts the script when he is enacting a role. Like the actor, the individual is more than the roles he is playing. He is *himself* in addition to being his social self.

The Self-system and Social Structure

It follows from the above that similarity in behavior observed at the overt level does not tell the whole story of social participation. The *meaning* of the role will vary from individual to individual for varying reasons. Individuals internalize roles sometimes in a manner which is highly significant for the self-system and conversely, sometimes a role may have little personal significance for the role player. As an example the role of housewife means a great deal to some women, has some meaning for others, and for some it is merely a source of annoyance. It may be the central role in the life organization of a woman, as illustrated in Figure 19, whose socialization included a great deal of preparation




FIG. 19.

for bearing and caring for children (playing with dolls, home economics courses, and religious training), maintaining a clean and tastefully decorated and emotionally "warm" home, and preparing wholesome and well-cooked meals. From her memories of previous family and home life situations she may derive a glow of satisfaction, of achievement, and self-enhancement, through having had parental approval and status among her peers, both siblings and play group associates, and through successful efforts at enacting the feminine role. On the other hand, there are women whose previous preparation and "generalized other" have not prepared them as adequately for the role of housewife. This is quite frequently a problem for women who have found many need gratifications in work roles, as a teacher, social worker, or business-woman, for whom the satisfactions that accrued to the "career" are not present in the role of housewife. The thousands of women who have prepared themselves for careers as nurses, teachers, social workers, and in other professional roles and then have achieved a successful integration of roles as a wife and mother attest to the fact that the transition from career girl to married woman can be successfully accomplished by the woman who does not have an abnormally strong dependence upon a job role for life satisfactions.

We have seen that the relationship between society and the individual is such that the satisfactory functioning of role systems is necessary for the perpetuation of society and the psychological adjustment of the individuals enacting the roles. Ideally speaking, all of the major roles performed by an individual should carry with them the same high degree of emotional satisfaction in their performance. Actually, because each individual's life experience is unique a great deal of variation in role satisfactions occurs. "Love of work" in the job role may, and often does, hamper a person's adjustment to the marital role, as with the individual who is too preoccupied with his business to provide a full measure of attention to his family life. Of course, frustrations accumulated in the family role may be the motivating force behind the "drive" in the job role. On the other hand, many people finding full and satisfying rewards in family life are poorly motivated in business and perhaps become "office hacks" over whose heads are promoted various people whose marital frustrations may be the source of the aggressiveness often valued so highly in modern business.

Finally, we must not view the question of life organization as purely a private and personal one for the individual. His life organization will

definitely reflect the social organization in which his roles are enacted. Since social organization is not a simple unity but rather has suborganizations, themselves divided into groups each with a degree of separation from the total social organization, *the individual's life organization* will tend to be integrated or disintegrated depending upon *social integration* and *disintegration*. Let us illustrate this point. The self derives organization from each of the organized groups that the individual participates in, i.e., it accumulates a role or roles for each group the individual participates in. The result is that modern man is versatile; he has many subelves which are sufficiently distinct from one another to recognize but are not entirely dissociated. If complete dissociation ever has occurred (two selves in one personality) it is so abnormal as to have no practical significance for our purposes here. The subelves of modern man are sufficiently integrated so that one subself plays a part in the others. This is so because of social integration. The much stressed "disorganization" of modern society does make for dissociation between roles and, consequently, between subelves. What should also be stressed is the fact that modern society is far more "organized" (i.e., integrated) than it is "disorganized" (i.e., disintegrated) or life organization for the modern individual would not be possible. Those with similar institutional roles tend to enact them uniformly; roles in one institution tend to carry over and articulate with roles in other institutions. The role of junior executive in the economic institution articulates well, for example, with the role of "bread winner" in the familial institution—so well that many firms review a young man's family situation before recommending him for advancement. But even in more unusual relationships such as a love relationship between a banker and an actress, the same carry-over of role can be observed. The role of lover is flavored by the role of banker and the role of beloved is flavored by the actress role. When he is funny, he is funnier because he is a banker; when she is tender she is more tender because she is an actress.

Hence, we cannot understand the individual and his life organization without some comprehension of the social institutions in which he participates and the institutional roles which he enacts.

Institutions and Personality

As we have indicated throughout this book, both sociology and cultural anthropology have "schools" of social psychologists who are interested in the relationships between culture and social systems and

human personality. In other words, unlike other sociologists and anthropologists who are concerned mainly with broad patterns of society and culture, these social psychologists are concerned with the relationship between social structure and the individual. The work in this area is often called, for obvious reasons, the "psychology" of social structure, wherein are explored on the one hand, the psychological basis of social institutions, and on the other hand, the effects of institutions upon the psychological processes of personality. In a sense, we have already discussed the former aspect of the psychology of social structure, viz., the psychological basis of social institutions, when we discussed the self-system and social structure, for it is in the "looking-glass self" that we find the psychological basis for even the most rudimentary social system. This, together with *anxiety*, the discomfort we feel which disrupts our interpersonal relations, gives us something of an idea of what goes on psychologically which sustains social systems. But what of the effects of social institutions upon these self-same psychological processes? These are often analyzed in terms of (1) the selection processes of institutions and their effects upon personality, and (2) the formative and controlling processes by which institutions function in the socialization of personality and in the controlling of the individual's behavior.³

Selection Processes of Institutions

The distinction between groups and institutions is that groups are *people* in interaction and institutions are their *patterned ways of behaving* in the achievement of societally established goals. It can readily be seen that it is to the advantage of the group to select members for institutional roles who are capable, or with training will be capable, of behaving at the levels expected. In primitive tribes, where tradition is the strongest force acting upon institutional behavior, one's birth into a segment of the kinship structure often predetermines the institutional roles which one must enact throughout life. The distinction between *ascribed* and *achieved* status is that, while all status is a gift from others, ascribed status is given in recognition of one's birth or some other factor outside of one's own control and achieved status is given in recognition of some aspect of one's past or expected social performance.

In primitive and preindustrial "advanced" societies, social organization

³ Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1953.

depends for its strength largely upon the emotional grip of tradition. In modern industrialized and urbanized societies where competition is the major social process, birth may play an important part in later institutional participation in the sense that a person may be born into a family which is socially and economically fitted to confer upon him certain advantages which will enable him to compete more effectively and/or to be more strategically located in the status hierarchy than one not so fortunate. Nevertheless, for those who must achieve status, the minimum standards of competence are constantly rising in modern society and control of entry into institutional roles is a matter of increasing concern to institutional leaders. The control of entry into institutional roles is much more rigid than formerly, and a wide variety of measures are being taken to ensure the adequacy of aspirants to institutional leadership—and even in some cases for mere membership. Tests are taken to enter the armed forces; aptitude tests, recommendations of the pastor, high moral character, seminary preparation, and rigid examinations are required of the prospective minister, rabbi, or priest; in many states there are even restrictions upon assuming a marital role, which often include mental competency, freedom from certain diseases, and other safeguards; job-placement and testing services abound in the personnel offices of industry; and, in general, physical and psychological adequacy, as socially defined, of course, become the criteria for assuming major social roles. Hence, institutions set standards which individuals must meet if they are to gain access to coveted life roles. Subjectively, of course, these standards produce some anxiety in even the best-prepared individuals. And, in the case of “failure,” frustration may lead to aggressive behavior against the “system” or against oneself. However, there is no “failure” in the eyes of the individual unless in his “generalized other” he has come to accept the standards of the institution in question, and in social systems this self-image is never left to chance. Institutions are operative both in the formation of self and in controlling individual behavior.

Formative and Controlling Processes of Institutions

Institutions not only exercise control over the entry of members but they also influence and modify personality in various ways. They enter into and profoundly influence the *socialization* of the individual. In addition to setting up exterior constraints upon behavior through systems of reward and punishment, they *motivate* individuals. In view of the “four wishes,” which include appetites for security and freedom from

anxiety in interpersonal relations, the sensitivity of the self to the "significant other," and the wish to be a recognized human person, institutional participation is the most meaningful of the individual's life experiences.

Since the satisfactory performance of institutional roles, by definition, calls for uniformity and regularity of behavior on the part of institutional participants, erratic performance is quite likely to incur sanction. Hence, the most satisfactory institutional participant, all other things being equal, is the person whose behavior is *consistent*. For the individual this means that *traits* must be developed so that sustained institutional participation of a uniformly acceptable standard can be maintained. Traits involve both attitude and situation. When a person tends to respond uniformly when a certain type of situation occurs he is said to possess a *specific trait*; when he tends to respond uniformly under a wide variety of situational circumstances he possesses a *general trait*. For example, the treasurer of a college may be honest under any and all circumstances where the funds of the college are concerned. He possesses the specific trait of honesty, i.e., specific to any such situations. However, he may slice a few strokes off of his golf score and magnify his exploits in World War II in the locker room "bull session" which follows the game; upon arriving home in the evening, he may misrepresent to his wife where he has spent the afternoon. In short, it becomes problematical whether or not he possesses the *general* trait of honesty. This points up the fact that the situation is as important as attitudes when ascribing traits to individuals. Hence, alterations in social situations make for deviant behavior, and institutional leaders are often reluctant to permit change for the reason that unforeseen individual deviancy may occur. They are well aware of the fact that social roles *structure* the attitudes of individuals and tend to produce traits in the individuals enacting them. Max Weber's conception of *bureaucracy*, i.e., a social structure which provides "offices" for men to fill rather than providing more creative roles, explains the way in which strongly favorable attitudes toward hard work become a trait with Americans, whether Protestant, Catholic, or Jew.⁴

In addition to the socializing effect of institutions upon the individual they exert also a controlling effect upon him. Every society is held together by the integrating force of the common interests of its individual

⁴ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, tr. by Talcott Parsons, London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1930.

members and at the same time riven by the centrifugal force of conflicting interests of individuals and particular groups. Hence, some kind of provision must be made for suppressing these latter when they become a threat to the social order. As we have said, there must be uniformities in conduct in every society in order that the society may survive. But, further, there must be some conformity between the norms of the people and what they actually do. In modern societies there is often a wide gap between these, and the problem of social control is most acute when such a condition of *anomie* exists. Social uniformities differ in importance, hence they also differ in their degree of compulsion. *Undefined acts* are those which allow the most "freedom" although their very lack of importance for the social order is the reason they are undefined socially and likewise the reason why they are not important for our analysis. Which shoe one puts on first in the morning is relatively unimportant. *That one wears shoes* is a custom, or *folkway*, an accustomed way of doing things which may bring amused or even horrified expressions of public opinion on the head of the transgressor, but the society takes no formal action against him. An individual may, after all, walk down a busy city street in his bare feet without penalty excepting for the opinions of onlookers and their personal reactions toward him. To walk down the same street without clothing, however, would constitute a violation of the *mores*, accustomed ways of doing things which are accompanied by positive or negative sanction. Such an action would bring into operation *law*, the crystallization of the mores into legal machinery involving a formal structure of codified regulations upon behavior with a formal staff to capture the errant individual, another formal staff to try him, and another formal staff to keep him in restraint if found guilty. It has often been thought from this that a hedonistic interpretation can be put upon the conformity or deviation of an individual in institutional roles. In other words, these roles are held to be effective only when participation is rewarded and deviation punished. Broadly speaking, there is a grain of truth in this if we do not think of reward merely as sensory pleasure and punishment simply as sensory pain. If we say that conforming participation solves the individual's problems and deviation tends to create problems for him, then we may hold rightly that the most effective social order is that which functions most effectively in meeting the problems of the individuals in it. Freud's conception of society as a repressive barrier prohibiting the individual from achieving satisfactions, therefore, is a very narrow and negative

one. The "good society" is one in which the individual, respectful of both conventions and laws, *fulfills his nature*, quite the contrary from the concept of society as a repressing agent. Yet there are social and personal reasons why this idea falls so short of achievement. Socially, instead of conventions being agreed upon by everyone, there are in modern societies cleavages between convention and law; lack of cooperation, even conflict, exists between the formal legal staff and the public. These disruptions of formative and controlling processes we shall discuss shortly. One personal, psychological reason why the ideal relationship between society and the individual is not achieved is *anxiety* in the individual. Anxiety could be considered under the following section of the chapter on "disruptions of formative and controlling processes" because anxiety that is unmanaged and unharnessed causes many breakdowns in individual performance and hence in social control. Nevertheless, in manageable amounts anxiety functions to maintain social control rather than to undermine it.

The term is taken over from the psychiatric school in social psychology and refers both to fear which is disproportionate to the situation at hand (Freud's definition) and is also distinguished from fear, as Sullivan aptly points out, in terms of its source, i.e., *interpersonal relations* (a man may be *anxious* about his relations with his boss while he may *fear* lightning or burning in a fire). Anxiety is an ever present problem for modern man. Modern psychiatry draws its clientele from the anxious and the fearful and much that masquerades as religion offers the individual "peace of mind" and freedom from fear. Competing in this area also are the drug companies with their various "tranquilizers." The management of anxiety by the individual institutional member takes various forms. Some are drawn to certain roles by the prospect that anxiety will be minimized for them in the performance of these roles. He can "handle" this role, where others may be "too much" for him. One variation of this is taken by the "perfectionist," who only takes roles which will pose no great challenge and in which great attention to detail can forestall threats to personal security. Various attempts have been made to classify role takers in terms of their management of anxiety within the role.

It should not be thought, however, that institutions control exclusively through the motivating force of anxiety. Some institutions even specialize, as it were, in assisting the modern individual to control and channelize his anxieties into personally and socially functional activity. Also, insti-

tutions meet human needs—biological, emotional, and rational. Institutional participation, therefore, is *rationally*, as well as emotionally, entered into. It is a logical and necessary means for the satisfaction of individual needs and wants.

Disruptions of Formative and Controlling Processes

Where institutions possess well-integrated role systems, where traits carry over from role to role, control over institutional members is most effective. Where the roles are disjointed, however, and too highly specific, difficulty in social control is a likely consequence. This integration of the role systems within a social structure is crucial, as we have noted (page 392), for personality integration. The harmonious interrelationship of role systems means that the actor does not have to improvise solutions to conflicting roles or to situations where the culture provides no clear-cut "script" to follow. In the discussion of the differences between the folk society and modern industrial society it was seen that, whatever the problems of man in primitive or small preindustrial communities, adaptation to a bewilderingly complex social structure where "answers" to problems of social participation are confusing and often conflicting is more likely to be the problem of modern man.

In his classic essay entitled "Social Structure and Anomie,"⁵ Robert Merton demonstrates that social control can miss the mark so badly that there is not only role conflict and personal confusion leading to poor institutional performance, but even that "some social structures exert a definite pressure upon certain persons in the society to engage in non-conformist rather than conformist conduct." This condition exists in America as a consequence, he holds, of the disequilibrium between American *goals* and our institutionalized *means* of achieving these goals.

American goals, he goes on to say, are "success" oriented. In the American hierarchy of basic values "getting ahead" is at the top. Monetary success is the American dream.⁶

To say that the goal of monetary success is entrenched in American culture is only to say that Americans are bombarded on every side by precepts which affirm the right or, often the duty of retaining the goal even in the face of repeated frustration. Prestigious representatives of the

⁵ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, rev. and enl. ed., Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1957, pp. 131-160.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

society reinforce the cultural emphasis. The family, the school, and the workplace—the major agencies shaping the personality structure and goal formation of Americans—join to provide the intensive disciplining required if an individual is to retain intact a goal that remains elusively beyond reach. . . .

Of the institutionalized means of achieving these goals, the regulatory norms which prescribe *how* one may go about achieving success, Merton holds that there is not the widespread consensus that obtains for the success goals. This disequilibrium between goals and means is seen as the result of the fact that cultural constraints are efficient just so long as conformity brings about continuing satisfactions to the participating individuals. This relationship between cultural constraint and personality need-gratification applies to both *means* (the quest of “getting ahead in the world”) and *goals* (the end—actually “getting ahead in the world”). Hence, where the institutionalized means are not in at least a rough relation to the cultural ends they tend to become no longer imperative for conduct.⁷

The process whereby exaltation of the end generates a literal *demoralization*, i.e., a de-institutionalization, of the means occurs in many groups where the two components of the social structure are not highly integrated.

There is a great deal of evidence supporting Merton's position that the tension between American goals and the means of attaining these goals creates many of our social problems.

Modern American Institutions

We have stressed earlier that every society has for the very heart of its culture a system of ultimate values which constitute the moral axis around which the life of the society revolves. Benedict demonstrated this truth against the sounding board of three primitive tribes and elaborated upon the unified beliefs, values, and practices of Zuni, Dobu, and Kwakiutl goals and means of striving for their achievement. In our own society⁸

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

⁸ From *Sociological Analysis*, by Logan Wilson and William L. Kolb, copyright, 1949, by Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., New York, and reprinted with their permission.

. . . we have developed such ultimate values as the dignity of the individual, equality of opportunity, "the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and growth of the free personality. Such ultimate values serve as a basis for establishing a hierarchy of intermediate values to which the members of the society can legitimately aspire, such as adequate housing, free public education, the ballot, and a living wage. Further, these ultimate values are expressed in the organization of social norms which define the rights and obligations of the individual in his relations with others. Thus, in our society we have rules defining freedom of speech and worship, selective service laws, traffic regulations, table manners, rules of the job, and so on. It is this total system of ultimate values, hierarchically arranged goals, and normative rules of conduct which create social order and make it possible for the society to function as a unit and the individual to achieve his purposes.

As social psychologists, of course, we are more concerned with the interacting individual than with society as a whole. Yet if we are to understand the individual, we must understand the rules which he has internalized in his socialization which define his social statuses and determine his social roles. These rules are, of course, social institutions. In modern societies which have a myriad number of complex institutions it is possible to single out those institutions which are most basic to human nature and hence most functional for the individual. He must be given birth to and socialized into his life roles; he finds companionship and sexual fulfillment in marriage and the rewards of parenthood are his—all within the institution of the family. He is protected by an authority system which maintains internal order within the society and represents him in relations with other societies—the political institution. He makes a living in and through the economic institution and in an industrial society which stresses individual vocational achievement this same institution confers on him what status and prestige his occupation "deserves" by its standards. The values of the society are reaffirmed by him through his participation in religious activity and in addition the church provides sacred values over and beyond those which are merely supportive of his society and which bind him to his God. Hence, there could be no more important social relationships for him than those involving these institutional roles. By turning our attention to the core institutions of modern social structure, we can conclude our textbook with the assurance that we have touched upon the main social wellsprings of the individual's deepest and most absorbing attitudes.

The Family

Because we have stressed so much throughout this text the formative influence of the family upon the individual no practical purpose would seem to be served by dealing with the subject at any length here. Nevertheless, any discussion of the family as a modern institution which overlooks this major socializing function of the family would be inadequate and a review of pages 270–292 is highly recommended.

In addition to its integral place in the personality makeup of the individual, the family occupies an integral place in American culture. It is regarded so highly that until very recently sociological analysis of the family was considered in poor taste, as a violation of the privacy and sanctity of the home. The present abundance of social-psychological analysis of the family, of family counseling clinics, and other social agencies serving the family attests to the fact that, while increasingly secularized, the family is still valued very highly in America. While on the one hand the divorce rates have climbed since the secularization of marriage in the nineteenth century, they have begun to level off and more marital stability seems to be in the offing. The attitudes of Americans are highly favorable to matrimony. More Americans are married and more marry younger than in other Western countries. Perhaps the absorption with romantic love accounts for this marriage consciousness of Americans.

The love which is idealized is not, however, married love, but rather stresses the physical attraction of the spouses for each other, a fact which means that marital partners mustn't "let themselves go" in terms of physical appearance. The fact that most middle-class couples have children ensures some degree of conjugal love, however, as the shared sacrifices bring a new bond of sympathy to the relationship. This conjugal love supports and even fuses with the romantic love of the couple. No middle-class couple will admit to the absence of romance in their marriage unless, of course, the couple is contemplating divorce, in which case its absence is often viewed as a legitimate reason for dissolving the marriage. Above all, marriage is supposed by Americans to exist for the purpose of providing "happiness" for the individual and the unhappy person, conversely, is thought to have an unhappy marriage.

The nuclear structure of the modern family is essentially the same as the structure of the family throughout the primitive societies of the world, indicating that human nature imposes important boundaries and

restrictions upon family organization. Those pessimists who predict the decline of the family overlook this fact. The essential roles of an adult who provides what in our society is "fathering" and an adult who provides what we know as "mothering" occur in all societies. Hence, the modern, conjugal, "nuclear" type of family is present at the core of the primitive "extended" family, the difference being that a proliferation of relations with in-laws and blood kin complicates the latter. The modern family still performs the *essential* functions of the family of past history, but many of its functions have been allocated or preempted by family-surrogate institutions. This relative isolation and independence of the couple from their parental families results in what sociologists call "discontinuity of generations."⁹

The discontinuity of generations, and therefore the loosening of traditional kinship ties, is evident in the separate households that newly married couples establish. This separation from the parental home, the result of job and territorial mobility and upward social striving, is more than a spatial removal from the old homestead; it is also an aspect of the decline of primary group relationships. The young couple loses the cultural support of the kinship group, has to develop new social relationships that are not kin-based, and must depend more heavily on the husband-wife relationship. They also lose the social benefit of stability that accompanies attachment to a territorial community.

Hence, the modern family is a "stripped down" version of its historical forerunner, the clan, having been stripped of many of its personnel and its functions. As we have stressed, the modern family retains the *essential* functions of procreating and educating children and providing the means of satisfying the sexual and other emotional needs of adults. Other institutions such as the economic have, in antiquity, evolved from the family. The food quest of the primitive family is the crude counterpart of modern industry where, though logically interwoven and inter-related in a myriad number of ways the economic institution is separate from the family. So, in a sense, all institutions are family-surrogate but we have reserved this term for those institutions which assist in the process of socializing the young, extending the socialization process out of the home. The chief educational institution is the family; learning takes place in all of the other institutions, but modern societies have formalized part of socialization and schools are entrusted with many, formerly familial, training functions. These family-surrogate institutions are very

⁹ Joseph H. Fichter, *Sociology*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957.

sensitive to predominant sentiments in the community and are shaped more by public opinion than is often thought. Most school administrators confine their activities to satisfying community sentiment. Community sentiment, however, in a business-oriented society will tend to be materialistic. The buildings and grounds will tend to be evaluated critically as are such factors as the number of students per class and the heating and lighting of the school room. Periodically professional educators have to withstand a storm of criticism about the *quality* of education, but the storms blow over. The day after day emphasis upon the school as a means of advancing the individual socially, i.e., materially, has a much more molding effect upon the school than these periodic storms of public opinion. The climate of opinion which supports this working philosophy of the school is provided by the economic institution, of course, which is the pivotal institution of modern American society.

The Economic Institution

The effect of the economic institution on the family and family-surrogate institutions is considerable, as we have suggested. Without extravagance, however, it may be said that the influence of the economic institution directly and often in subtle and indirect ways dominates the entire American culture. In modern capitalistic societies wealth is accumulated and passed on to heirs. Ownership of stock in corporations no longer is due to the personal qualities of thrift, financial adroitness, and other "virtues" of the holder, although this rationalization is often advanced. The heir's interest is capably handled by a new management class which is motivated by the high salary, the sense of importance, and emotional involvements with the enterprise. Not all stockholders are heirs, of course, and in this age of monopoly capitalism those of the management class will characteristically own stock in the corporation which employs them, but the amount of this stock owned by management is usually negligible. Large corporate absentee-owned enterprises are coming to dominate the American economy.¹⁰

The policies of the leading United States corporations today determine the economic fate of most other economic units in the United States, of many little businesses and family farmers, who are all dependent upon the

¹⁰ From *Character and Social Structure*, p. 220, by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, copyright, 1953, by Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., New York, and reprinted with their permission.

price policies of the corporations that produce oil, farm machinery, electrical current, and artificial fertilizer. The employment opportunities of employees—of wage workers and of the white collar people also—depend upon the strategic decisions of corporate managements. The structure of these corporations is bureaucratic, and the bureaucracy of an oil or steel trust may be more powerful than that of many political states. Their decisions concerning investment and price policies pertain to far-flung production establishments, located in many countries and so having international ramifications.

The influence of business, especially “big business” which we are considering here, has, naïvely, been viewed by some as a plot by the wealthy and the management class against “the rest of us” or against “the little guy.” The fact is that the *basic attitudes* of most Americans support the existing economic structure. Concerning education, parents urge their children to take those courses which will advance them in socioeconomic status, attitudes expressed in family conversations, such as “business is business,” affect the viewpoint of the young, sermons at many churches stress the importance of the economic. Catholic and Jew in America have adopted the Protestant viewpoint on capitalism and economic activity. Dating, romancing, and marriage are commercialized as are athletics. The government of the United States is in business and is influenced by business more than ever in its history. We must not be led to the erroneous conviction, however, that the American individual is “explainable” solely in materialistic terms as so many Europeans are led to think. Although affected by materialism there are still lofty ideals about love and marriage, about religious tradition, and about individual freedom which are apparent in American moral codes and laws. On the one hand, the American government is accused of being the tool of “politicians,” and on the other hand, the highest type of idealism is often expressed when the American political institutions are discussed. This ambivalence of attitudes toward the political institution is a characteristic of Americans.

The State

The “state” differs from “society” in the respect that the former concept is narrower than the latter. We all enact our roles in the political sphere, but we have roles in addition to these which are part of the social structure but are nonpolitical. In modern society where the restraints of the small group are no longer as effective as in former times

it is necessary that a highly formalized structure exists which maintains order among the members. This function and that of maintaining relations between the members as a whole and foreign nations are the functions of the modern state. The state is not clearly distinguishable in primitive societies as in modern societies, but the maintaining of social order is preserved, must be preserved, in all human societies.¹¹

The social order is not an unconscious process; it is an affair of rules, and of keeping or breaking them according to a variety of individual interests, and responding to conscious obligations and training. In each society these rules form a system. In most primitive societies they are not codified—there are no Ten Commandments, or any set of numbered injunctions, nor are they always expressed as abstract principles.

The state, as we know it, with its governmental role system and its codified laws emerged in history as modern civilization evolved. It is a response to the need for order among the many diversified collectivities present in modern society. In our own society one need think only of “capital” and “labor” to illustrate this concept in terms of the economic institution. Religions as diversified as the Roman Catholic Church and the store-front “Holiness” revivals must be treated within the framework of law and tradition which operate within the principle of separation of church and state. The state enters into and regulates many aspects of family life. Family behavior considered deviant on the part of one minority collectivity is regulated by the other collectivities through power mechanisms of government. The state potentially enters into every aspect of American institutional life. Americans divide on the question of how far this government “intervention” should be carried. That it is a problem illustrates our conception of the modern state and its activities as a response to the need for regulating relations between divergent groups in modern society.

The meaning of political participation for the individual American is, as we have said, somewhat ambiguous. He tends to use his vote to advance what he considers to be the best interest of the blocs with which he is identified. It is absolutely imperative to be an Italian-American Democrat to receive certain municipal offices in some cities; Irish Catholic in some, and Anglo-Saxon Protestant in others. This despite the fact that individualism and freedom are highly prized! It is not that

¹¹ Raymond Firth, *Human Types: An Introduction to Social Anthropology*, rev. ed., New York, Thomas Nelson and Sons, and Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1956, p. 131.

such blocs should be eliminated and all Americans reduced to homogeneous "blobs" but rather that:¹²

In the sphere of action, the citizen who values freedom would . . . adopt a flexible policy calculated to support those socio-historical trends which appeared to be conducive to a pluralistic social structure. He would be suspicious of social movements which called for the abolition of traditional freedoms and the establishment of absolute control by some one group or stratum over the community. He would find himself in opposition to those who would maintain at all cost the *status quo* in spite of the changes made necessary by new historical conditions, realizing the dangers inherent in an explosive socio-historical situation. He would give support to those groups which were struggling to achieve a greater equality of status, influence or power, so that the disproportionate power of other groups would be lessened. All of these policies would have as their end the maintenance and extension of freedom through a democratic equilibrium of forces, guaranteed by the mutual accommodation of relatively equal interest groups, maintained by a basic consensus, realistically oriented to historical conditions and trends, and motivated by a liberal-pluralistic ideology of good will, fair play, compromise and progress.

The attitudes appropriate in a modern pluralistic society which places a high value on individual freedom are often difficult to inculcate in the young American because he is able to see the difference between the way things are and the way they "ought to be" as he has been taught formally. The spoils system may be necessary in a democracy, we are not arguing such concepts here, but many children of minority groups in heavily concentrated urban areas have learned about government in action by informal means. Favoritism, under-the-counter payment for illegal services of the police, and politically protected vice in such areas is too well known to warrant any lengthy discussion of them, but it must be understood within the attitudinal frame of reference, that is, in terms of its influence upon the political attitudes of the young in such areas. In higher socioeconomic classes the result is somewhat the same although not as intense or dramatic. A youth learns in dinner table conversation that politics is a "dirty game," that politicians cannot be trusted, and that politics is not an honorable profession. Hence, there is a degree of apathy, especially in some higher socioeconomic circles, with regard to active participation in political activity. There is some

¹² Gerard DeGre, "Freedom and Social Structure," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1946, reprinted in Wilson and Kolb, *op. cit.*, p. 529.

justification for the charge that the politician is insincere since he often holds attitudes which are more realistic but contrary to those which he may have verbalized in his campaign promises. A demagogue may gain prominence through playing upon the fears and anxieties of the people. Those opposed to the demagogue and who, consequently, are constantly under the threat of his spurious attacks, often simply cannot say publicly what they hold to be the truth. But the fault in such cases lies in the emotional attitudes of the public and not in the political machinery, as such. An educated public represents a "silk-stocking" electorate, as politicians call it, and, as politicians acknowledge, there is only one thing that can be "delivered" to such an electorate and that is good government.

The Church

The religious denominations in America have been, and are, profoundly affected by the economic institutions. It is certainly a modern phenomenon where the material aspect of making a living has been exalted in the ideals of a people so that the religious aspect of life becomes an appendage to and a reflection of the economic aspect of life, rather than the reverse. Like primitive man, modern man has the need for affirming the values of his society through religious experience and of acknowledging and attempting to influence the spirit powers which influence human activity. Modern society stands alone in reaffirming its economic values through religious experience and even of casting its God in the role of a business man.¹³

The peculiar American pattern of religious institutions, in which each church has to fend financially for itself, has put a strong emphasis upon economic activities. The pastor who is a good businessman gets contributions, pays the debts, and maintains a large assemblage of buildings is the man who receives wide approval. The United States is probably the only country in which a biography of Christ depicting him as a successful business man could be a best seller. The parable of the talents is often interpreted to mean that a man is morally obligated to use his abilities for economic and material advancement.

Will Herberg in his study of religion in American life¹⁴ holds that modern Americans are in search of a *heritage*, rather than a religion. Deeply religious himself, he holds that being a "Protestant," a "Catholic,"

¹³ Joseph Fichter, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

¹⁴ Will Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic and Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology*, New York, Garden City Books, 1955.

or a "Jew" is, for the typical American, a tag which helps him to find his identity in a mass society. This softens, somewhat, the position that Americans are materialistic on a purely hedonistic basis, at least. The emphasis is upon money and display of wealth because these are the things in modern society which provide one's social identity. Nevertheless, however functional socially, the essential spiritual function of the churches is not being performed satisfactorily under these conditions of American life.

For the American Catholic the problem is twofold; he must retain his identity in the American culture, he must make a living with its occupational structure, participate fully, and assume the responsibilities of citizenship in a democracy, but he should do so within a *minority* frame of reference. America's spiritual values are compatible with Catholic tradition in the sense that the "American Creed" (which on the one hand has roots in Christianity, through Puritanism, and on the other has roots in political liberalism) emphasizes the dignity of man, his equality with other men with respect to his inalienable rights to opportunity, justice, and freedom. Yet, that contradictory element of American culture which goes contrary both to the spiritual character of the American Creed and to Catholicism should constitute the cultural area "outside" of American Catholicism. That American Catholicism has adapted itself to American culture is sociologically understandable but its counterinfluence on American culture has not been proportionate. It has been influenced profoundly while influencing only slightly. The minority status of American Catholics undoubtedly explains this, both in terms of being less powerful than the majority (fortunately Catholics very rarely, excepting when the Church itself is under attack, vote *as* Catholics) and in terms of its individuals succumbing to the American dream of economic prosperity which, while not intrinsically opposed to the spirit of Catholicism, nevertheless in its excessive emphasis upon the material is opposed to the admonition, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God." Catholics concerned with the problem have proposed personal sanctification, holding that social improvement will inevitably follow. Others have emphasized the need for scholarship among Catholics and the need for an intellectual elite. Finally, reform movements and various programs for the vitalizing of the Christian family have sprung into existence.¹⁵

¹⁵ John L. Thomas, S.J., *The American Catholic Family*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956, pp. 433-434.

The American hierarchy have clearly indicated the serious challenge which the Catholic family system faces in contemporary society. It would be illusory to deny that Catholics have been affected by the culture within which they live. Realism prompts the admission that there is evidence of considerable apathy, compromise, and defection. On the other hand, the extensive and enthusiastic response to various forms of family programs and movements manifests an enduring vitality in the Catholic minority which bids fair for the future of its family system. Particularly significant is the participation of the laity in all these activities. If their interest and cooperation continues to grow, the future will reveal not a mere reaction to a threat, but a veritable renaissance of Christian family life.

SUGGESTED READING

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- Faris, R. E.: *Social Psychology*, New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1952. Chaps. 1, 12, and 13 deal with interaction and social roles, variations, inconsistencies, and problems.
- Gerth, Hans, and C. Wright Mills: *Character and Social Structure*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1953. Classic treatment of the subject matter of this chapter.
- Hartly, E. L., and R. E. Hartly: *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1952. See chaps. 16 and 17.
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- Kane, John: *Marriage and the Family: A Catholic Approach*, New York, The Dryden Press, Inc., 1953. Good, scientific, sociological approach within the Catholic framework of values.
- Lerner, Max: *America as a Civilization*, New York, Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1957. The problems of modern Americans and their social structure.
- Merton, Robert K.: *Social Theory and Social Structure*, rev. and enl. ed., Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1957. See "Social Structure and Anomie," p. 131.
- Murphy, Gardner: *Human Potentialities*, New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1958. Psychologist explores the subject of man's future.
- Thomas, John L., S.J.: *The American Catholic Family*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956. Modern Catholic family as social substructure.

TOPICAL OUTLINE

This may be used as a study guide by the student. By transposing these phrases into complete, interrogative sentences, it may also be used by the instructor in composing essay examinations or as a guide for constructing "objective" tests.

Chapter 1 **The Field of Social Psychology**

1. The definition of social psychology.
2. Psychologists' approach to the subject.
3. Sociologists' approach to the subject.
4. Social psychology as a field in its own right. The field in relation to sociology, to psychology, to anthropology, and to psychiatry.
5. The concept of interaction. Interaction vs. reaction. Social and non-social reactions.
6. Society as represented by other individuals.
7. The significance of "the awareness of being perceived."
8. Personal-social and cultural learning.
9. The influence of social psychology upon other fields.
10. How social psychology is "located" within psychology.
11. The difference between social psychology as a general field and as a special field within psychology.
12. The relationship between social psychology and (a) developmental psychology; (b) differential psychology; (c) experimental psychology; (d) comparative psychology; and (e) abnormal psychology.

13. The value of social psychology for general psychology; for applied psychology.
14. How social psychology is "located" within sociology.
15. "Microsociology" and "psychological sociology"; the difference between these and social psychology within psychology; the broader field which subsumes both.
16. The study of social pathology as the study of interacting individuals.
17. Social psychology and demography, urban sociology, ecology, social stratification, and collective behavior.
18. The value of social psychology for general sociology and for applied sociology.
19. Anthropology as a natural science.
20. Anthropology as a social science and its relation to social psychology.
21. Psychiatry as a therapeutic and a social science and its relation to social psychology.
22. Social psychology as the scientific study of the relationship between society and the individual regardless of the academic lines which contain such investigation.
23. Some problems in studying social psychology, such as conflicts with some elements of "common sense" knowledge.
24. As a science, the futility of bringing religious issues into social psychology.
25. The postulate of "man, the social animal."
26. Implicit postulates of many "would-be" social scientists.
27. The reasons for studying social psychology.
28. The three variables in personality development.
29. The scope of the course: Part I, about social psychology; Part II, about the interacting individual *as an individual*; Part III, about the interacting individual *in the group*.

Chapter 2

Theory in Social Psychology

1. The object of study in social psychology and its overlapping of areas in psychology.
2. The concept of $A \rightleftharpoons B$, as interaction, and the part played by society and by culture in the process.
3. $A \rightleftharpoons B$ as a learning situation in which A is an infant or child and B is an adult.

4. "Society" and the "individual" as wedded by interactionism.
5. The approach taken in *The Authoritarian Personality*; in *The American Soldier*; how both approaches are social psychological.
6. Behavior as made up of personality and situation.
7. The two directions that the scientific explanation of a phenomenon may take.
8. The genetic approach to personality in terms of "emergence," biological foundation, social experiences, and culture.
9. Emergent personality as the "outcome" of social relations.
10. The relationship between physical and social needs.
11. The self-adjusting-to-other mechanisms.
12. The looking-glass self; its three principal elements.
13. The interplay between culture and the individual personality.
14. The meaning of the "cognitive" element of $A \rightleftharpoons B$.
15. The ways in which social situations vary in their significance for the individual; priority, intensity, frequency, and duration.
16. The role of social psychology in behavioral sciences other than sociology, psychology, anthropology, and psychiatry.
17. Social psychology in *The Theory of the Leisure Class*; its importance for economics.
18. Social psychology in *The People's Choice*; its importance for political science.
19. Social psychology applied to the problems of industry.
20. Communication as the scientific model within which the physiological, the social, and the cultural approaches to the study of behavior can be integrated.

Chapter 3

The Tools of Social Psychology

1. The scope and method of a science.
2. Social psychology as a science.
3. The primary aim of all science.
4. Considerations dictating the choice of methods in a science.
5. The factorial vs. the processual approach.
6. The essential feature of a sociogram.
7. Strengths and weaknesses of the life-history approach.
8. Criteria for a life history.
9. The structured vs. the "unstructured" interview.
10. The factorial-personality approach.

11. The concepts of universe, population, and sample.
12. The *idios* and social psychology.
13. Attitudes and their measurement.
14. Personality tests.
15. Major factors known to affect attitudes.
16. Kinds of samples.
17. Means of administering schedules, interviews, and mailed questionnaires.
18. Limitations of the questionnaire.
19. Designing a study.
20. Scale, attitude universe, unidimensionality, scalar types, reproducibility.
21. Descriptive vs. inductive statistics.
22. Design of the controlled experiment; its applicability to social psychology.
23. Essentials of the processual-situational approach.
24. Small-group research; the topics studied.
25. Statistical tools; measures of central tendency, dispersion, correlation.
26. Steps in testing hypotheses.

Chapter 4

Philosophical Forerunners

1. Social psychology in folklore.
2. Occidental and Oriental social thought; ancient and modern conceptions.
3. The reasons for "breaking" the history of social psychology at the nineteenth century in Western social thought.
4. The social psychology of the Greeks; the ancients, Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism, and Epicureanism.
5. The "social psychology" of most Greeks who were not philosophers.
6. Reasons why the social philosophy of the Greek philosophers was not a social psychology as we know it.
7. The social psychology of the Romans; reasons for the paucity of such thought.
8. The emphasis of the Early Christian Fathers away from the scope of social psychology as modernly conceived.
9. The social psychology of St. Augustine.
10. The philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas as it bears on modern

social psychology and the reasons why social psychology was not developed further.

11. The rise of science in the Western world.
12. The elements which social-contract theories had in common.
13. The social-contract theory of Hobbes.
14. Modern survivals of Hobbes's conception of man in isolation.
15. The social-contract theory of Locke; his naturalistic humanism.
16. The social-contract theory of Rousseau.
17. Modern survivals of Lockean and Rousseauvian conceptions.
18. The social psychology of Hegel.
19. The ideology of Marxism and fascism as affected by Hegelian thought.
20. The positive value of Hegel's thought for the development of a modern social psychology.
21. The concept of social science as the basis of ethical systems; Spencer as an example.

Chapter 5

The Parent Schools in Sociology and Psychology

1. The concept of "schools" in social psychology.
2. The dual function of each school.
3. Sociology as a parent school; the protest against exaggerated individualism.
4. Comte as the "father" of modern sociology.
5. The social psychology of Comte.
6. The concept of instinct as crucial in Comtean social psychology; elements which foreshadow modern social psychology.
7. French reaction to Comte; Durkheim, "collective representations," Tarde, "imitation," Levy-Bruhl and LeBon as lesser figures.
8. German reaction to Comte; Schaeffle, the "conflict" theorists (Gumpлович and Ratzenhofer), the concept of "interests" (Ratzenhofer and Small), the "social geometry" of Simmel.
9. English social psychology; the general climate of exaggerated individualism; Bagehot.
10. British associationism.
11. Wundt as the "father" of modern psychology.
12. The structuralism of Wundt.
13. The philosophical and physiological conceptions which affected the "new" psychology (as opposed to "rational" philosophy).

14. The "functionalism" of James and Dewey.
15. The Watsonian behaviorists; the concept of "conditioned response."
16. The gestaltists; the work of Kurt Lewin.
17. The aims and directions of modern scientific psychology.
18. Problem areas of social psychology as conceived by psychologists (Klineberg as example).

Chapter 6

The Tributary Schools in Psychiatry and Anthropology

1. Social psychology in relation to psychiatry and anthropology.
2. Psychiatry as involving interpersonal relations.
3. The origins of psychiatry.
4. Pinel, Esquirol, the Bicêtre.
5. Specialization in medicine and the evolving specialty of the neuro-psychiatrist.
6. The influence of Freud.
7. "Id, ego, and superego."
8. "The defense mechanisms" and their significance for interpersonal relations.
9. Meyer and the concept of "functional" disorders.
10. White, Sullivan and "interpersonal psychiatry."
11. Neo-Freudians and their challenges to Freudian orthodoxy; Adler, Horney, Fromm.
12. "Totem and Taboo" and Kroeber's reaction.
13. The "functionalism" of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown.
14. Sapir and his followers, Benedict and Mead.
15. Broader questions in "culture-and-personality" study.
16. Linton, Kardiner, and the "basis personality structure."
17. The approaches of ethnology.
18. Research techniques of ethnologists and their deficiencies.

Chapter 7

Values and Postulates in Social Psychology

1. The ways in which implicit postulates can enter into the theory of a science.
2. Illustrations of projections of sentiments and beliefs into social psychology by sociologists and psychologists.
3. Areas in which social psychologists with conflicting postulates can work together harmoniously.

4. Reasons why a separate social psychology for each conflicting set of postulates is neither desirable nor necessary.
5. The meaning of "value."
6. Ethical, vital, pleasurable, and useful goods and their corresponding values.
7. Science itself as a value.
8. A minimum set of postulates for social psychology.
9. The increasing complexity of postulates as the object of study increases in complexity.
10. The various levels of being.
11. The concept of immanence.
12. Acceptable and unacceptable forms of humanism.
13. The simplistic nature of materialism.
14. The crudity of "parallelism."
15. Empiricism as properly defined and correctly employed.
16. Catholic values in science.
17. The Catholic viewpoint on science and "the social problem" (Fitzpatrick as example).
18. Reasons why there are no "Catholic" values in social psychology apart from values in science generally.
19. The "whole man" and the differential tasks of philosophical and social psychologies.
20. The epistemology of the $A \Leftrightarrow B$ frame of reference.

Chapter 8

The Biological Organism

1. The sense in which human nature is not "fully" present at birth.
2. Man in the animal kingdom.
3. The major characteristics of the primates.
4. The races of man.
5. Heredity vs. social transmission.
6. The futility of a race psychology.
7. "Instinct" vs. "instinctive" as general terms.
8. Lombroso and "positivistic" criminology.
9. Sheldon and "constitutional psychiatry."
10. The bodily systems and their needs.
11. Communicational needs.
12. The intrapersonal network of communication as physiological structure and function.—

13. The nervous systems as communicational channels.
14. The functions of the central nervous system.
15. The functions of the autonomic nervous system.
16. Relation of the nervous systems to the musculature and other bodily systems.
17. The glands of internal secretion and their effects upon emotions.
18. Anxiety.
19. The concept of physiopsychic equilibrium, "well-being," and self-esteem.
20. Frustration.

Chapter 9 **Social Learning and Adjustment**

1. Society's stake in the learning and adjustment of the individual.
2. Instrumental learning vs. learning emotional satisfactions.
3. Learning and teaching as coextensive with social interaction.
4. The scope of the psychology of learning.
5. The heavy reliance upon experimentation in the psychology of learning.
6. Attitudes as unit-processes of personality.
7. The sum total of attitudes not equivalent to "total personality."
8. Direction set vs. actual response.
9. The objects of attitudes; interests and values.
10. Magnitude and stability in attitudes.
11. Idiosyncratic and common attitudes.
12. Pavlov and conditioned response.
13. The law of effect.
14. Animal learning; the experiments of Thorndyke.
15. Exercise vs. effect.
16. Problem solving and rational learning.
17. *S-R* organism in environment.
18. The dual nature of learning; Mowrer.
19. Hullian learning theory; drive, cue, response, reinforcement, and extinction.
20. The intervening-variable theory; Newcomb.
21. Mass, differentiation, and integration as developmental stages in attitude learning.
22. Situational approaches to learning; gestalt field theory.
23. Learning in the social act; identification and introjection.

Chapter 10

The Self and Motivation

1. The way in which attitudes mediate the environment.
2. Overt and covert reactions.
3. Self-attitudes as reflexive attitudes.
4. Definition of the self.
5. "Taking the role of the other."
6. The functions of the self.
7. Motives and the structuring of the self-system.
8. Selective response; selective inattention.
9. The self and social organization.
10. The social person.
11. Self-image, role, and social institutions.
12. The social self and the total self.
13. The "significant other."
14. Reference groups.
15. The "generalized other"; the concept of "character."
16. The self and social control.
17. Social control in folk and modern societies.
18. The "head role" in modern institutions.
19. "Imitation" and "suggestion" as inadequate explanations of conformity.
20. Philosophical conceptions of the self.
21. The difficulty of defining self.
22. The danger of "reifying" the self concept.
23. Self contrasted with "ego."
24. The origin of the self.
25. The self as an antianxiety system.
26. The question, "Can the self change?"
27. Infantile determination vs. functional autonomy.
28. The self and evaluation of others.
29. The self and motivation.
30. Varieties of motivational schemes; "inner," "outer," "inner-outer."
31. The four wishes.

Chapter 11

The Relationship of Culture and Personality

1. The respects in which every man is like all other men, like some other men, and like no other man,

2. The reasons for keeping in mind the broader purposes of ethnology when reading ethnographic data.
3. Misconceptions about the anthropologist's interest in primitive people.
4. "Cultural relativism" as a scientific tool; as an ethical standard.
5. The vast body of descriptive materials on the primitive peoples and the uses of these data.
6. The methods of ethnology.
7. The theoretical framework of *Patterns of Culture*.
8. The way in which the integration of culture comes about.
9. The concept of common goals and means of pursuing these goals.
10. The means and goals of the Zuni, the Dobu, and the Kwakiutl.
11. The difficulty in carrying over Benedict's analytical scheme to more complex societies.
12. The ways in which Opler's "thematic analysis" is a corrective to the Benedict approach.
13. Themes, expressions, and counterthemes.
14. Positive and negative criticism of comparative culture studies.
15. Culture and personality related through childhood experiences.
16. The concept of "basic personality type"; Kardiner and Linton.
17. "Projective systems."
18. The psychoanalytic method in its application to studies of culture and personality; value and shortcomings.
19. The Comanche and Alorese child-training practices and their influences on personality.
20. The attempt to generalize from Plainville to Western man; the extent to which such generalization may have validity; cautions.
21. The concept of "national character."
22. Social class and differential child-rearing patterns.

Chapter 12

Life Experiences in Age Groups

1. The most fixed and "determined" of the three variables influencing personality.
2. Biological life cycle vs. cultural definition of that cycle.
3. The stages of the life cycle in primitive and in modern societies.
4. The "stormy upheaval" of adolescence.
5. Why the biological aspects, the social roles, and the learning and

adjustment involved in each stage of the life cycle must be considered in their interrelationships rather than summatively.

6. The reasons the life cycle might vary for members of different social classes; the reasons why the text deals primarily with modern, middle-class man.
7. The uterine environment; the neonatus; internal and external changes in the infant; and the dramatic growth in infancy.
8. The social "roles" of the middle-class infant; the "mothering" and "fathering" ones.
9. The nature of infantile learning; empathy as presymbolic communication.
10. The physiological growth patterns of childhood compared to those of infancy.
11. The social roles of childhood in the family, in the peer group.
12. Ordinal position in the family; first, last, middle, "only," and its consequences for personality; the question of lifelong significance of ordinal position in the parental family.
13. Extrafamilial vs. familial roles in terms of their influence on personality.
14. Children's societies and the "rules of the game" (example, Piaget's work).
15. Sexual composition and size of the group as influencing personality.
16. The dynamics of a triad and possible effects upon personality.
17. The physical changes of adolescence.
18. The ambiguity of adolescent roles.
19. The criteria of a "good date" vs. the criteria for an ideal mate.
20. Reasons adolescents are strongly attached to their "crowds."
21. The "slowing down" of physical agility in adulthood and the steady decline of the organism.
22. The two main roles of adults in our society.
23. Subordination of the religious role.
24. Role playing and the management of anxiety.
25. The family absorbing the tensions and frustrations of extrafamilial role participation.
26. The competition and success pattern of the American culture.
27. The physiological processes of aging.
28. The roles of the aged in modern vs. primitive societies.
29. Adjustments to the aging role.

Chapter 13

Normalcy and Deviation

1. Normalcy and deviation in each of the three variables influencing personality.
2. The statistical conception of deviancy; the normal curve.
3. Social deviation and social "visibility."
4. Deviant behavior as human behavior; subprocesses and deviancy.
5. Some deviant physical characteristics.
6. Social roles of the handicapped.
7. Adjustment of the handicapped; attitudes of the nondisabled.
8. Handicapped groups as the "significant other" for the handicapped individual.
9. The concept of "sociogenic" deviation.
10. The adjustment of the "eccentric" and his "significant other."
11. Attitudes of the eccentric toward the noneccentric.
12. The case for cultural relativity in defining the "disturbed."
13. Anxiety and individual experiences within social roles.
14. Neurosis, dissociation, and compulsion.
15. The childhood learning and interactional patterns of the neurotic.
16. The functional psychoses, affective, schizophrenic, and paranoiac.
17. Functional psychosis as the outcome of earlier social interaction; defective social learning; defective role adjustments; contrast with organic psychosis.
18. The concentric zone theory of internal urban structure and the statistical incidence of psychosis within the various zones (example, Dunham).
19. The "individual-type" criminal vs. the "career" criminal.
20. Characteristics of the career criminal.
21. Anomie vs. anomia.
22. Psychological backgrounds of noncareer criminality.
23. Social backgrounds of career criminals.
24. Two types of cultural deviation; adherence to minority group norms, *anomie*.
25. Types of minorities and their accommodation to the social order (example, Wirth).
26. Social isolation, marginality, "the marginal man."
27. Ways in which minority group status is attained.
28. Social learning and adjustment in minority groups.

29. Factors conducive to attitudes of prejudice.
30. The ways in which a social structure can impose pressures which dispose individuals toward deviation rather than toward conformity.

Chapter 14

Interaction and Leadership in Small Groups

1. The way in which the situation links the individual and his groups.
2. The group as an entity.
3. The processes of a group.
4. The group as a microcosm of the larger social system.
5. Some of the factors affecting the interaction of a group (Sherif).
6. The unique contribution of the social psychologist to the analysis of group dynamics.
7. The importance of the *size* of a group.
8. The growth of interest in the small group.
9. Cooley on the primary group.
10. "Human nature" and the primary group.
11. "Pure" and "applied" applications of small-group analysis.
12. The concept of "boundaries" of a small group; surrounding social environment.
13. Homans's analysis; sentiments, activities, and interactions; external and internal systems; build up and feedback.
14. The external system, internal system, and group norms of the Bank Wiring Room men.
15. The Norton Street Gang, its organizational aspects and its norms; the embodiment of the group's norms by its leader.
16. The relationship between communication and leadership.
17. The way in which the individual is "recruited" into the group.
18. The concept of "centrality"; experiments testing the concept.
19. The importance of face-to-face relationship in a group.
20. Experiments designed to induce tensions between two groups; the course of relations between them.
21. Background factors of the "Bulldog" and "Red Devil" study; site, subjects.
22. The three stages of the study.
23. The choices of friends in the first, and at the end of the second stages of the study.
24. General findings of the study.
25. The small group and the socialization of the individual.

26. The small group and the social control of the individual.
27. The concept of feral children; isolates.
28. The "failure" of small groups in modern society.
29. Quantity vs. quality; the remaining small groups in our society as still performing essential functions.

Chapter 15 **Collective Behavior**

1. The broad conception of "collective behavior" (Park).
2. Cultural, recreational, control, and escape behaviors as collective behavior (LaPiere).
3. Types of behavior not currently studied as collective behavior; current emphasis upon the strange, the dramatic, the bizarre, and the morbid types of collectivities. Collective behavior as disruptive behavior.
4. The characteristics of crowds; congregate, polarized (temporarily), involving identification, larger size than small groups.
5. The varieties of crowds; kinds of mobs and audiences.
6. The characteristics of mobs; mental homogeneity, emotionality, and irrationality.
7. Suggestion, imitation, and contagion.
8. Frustration and aggression; tensions and their release in mob behavior.
9. Thresholds of involvement in mob activity.
10. The aggressive mob, its symbols and processes (example, Zoot-suit Riots).
11. The escape mob (example, the Iroquois Theater fire).
12. The acquisitive mob (example, the Florida land boom).
13. The expressive mob (example, the Mardi Gras); Blumer on the expressive mob.
14. Expressive mobs and the social structure.
15. The characteristics of audiences; polarization, congregation, passive (but potentially kinetic) nature; casual vs. formal.
16. The manipulation of audiences.
17. The audience as "significant other" for the speaker or performer.
18. The diffuse collectivity as too large to congregate.
19. Mass contagion; fads and their relation to culture; crazes as symptoms of more serious social unrest; Ross's "laws" of crazes; rumor.
20. Mass polarization; the "invader from Mars"; Cantril's study, the

- characteristics of the susceptible; attempts to manipulate the public through mass media; the penetration of TV; receptiveness.
21. The dimensions of propaganda (Bruner's study of Nazi propaganda).
 22. Social movements and their characteristics, predisposing social unrest; stages in the growth of movements, Pope's scale of transition from sect to church.
 23. Collective behavior as a folk conception and as a social psychological science.

Chapter 16

Man in the Modern World

1. The concept of the social order; predictability of members' behavior, statuses, roles, structure and function, groups, social organization.
2. The reasons for studying folk societies.
3. Contrasts between folk and modern social structures; Redfield, Tönnies, and Durkheim.
4. Cautions against some types of folk-urban comparisons, "before and after."
5. Unique features of modern societies; social stratification; social classes.
6. The concept of the social person, life organization.
7. The danger of falsely mechanical views of the person.
8. The self-system and social structure; the meaning of social participation for the individual.
9. Integration of roles.
10. The relationship of social integration and personal integration.
11. Institutions and personality, their interrelationships.
12. The looking-glass self and anxiety as control factors.
13. The selection processes of institutions and their effects upon personality.
14. The formative and controlling processes of institutions in socialization and social control.
15. Traits, general traits, and bureaucracy.
16. The Protestant ethic and Catholics, Jews, and Protestants.
17. Undefined acts, folkways, and mores; formal and informal controls.
18. Disruptions of formative and controlling processes.
19. American goals and institutionalized means of achieving these goals (Merton).

20. The ultimate values of Americans; dignity of the individual, equality, "right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and growth of the free personality.
21. The family in American society.
22. The American economic institution and its interrelations with other institutions.
23. The "state" vs. "society"; individual participation in American government; the maintaining of order through formal means; democratic government and cultural pluralism.
24. The Church in America; influence of the economic institution.
25. The twofold problem of the American Catholic.

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